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Abstract 
 
 
The thesis provides a detailed historical analysis of the British Civil 
Service reforms in the period 1979–2007 using archive, public and legal 
sources. The work focuses on organisational changes and the 
managerialisation process that crossed three different premierships and 
parties in government. All these thirty years of administrative reforms 
involved many common profiles to take into account objectives, 
resources and management information, better policy-making, 
openness to outside thinking and people, role, structure and better 
capacity of the centre of government, size, structures and functions of 
the Civil Service. Continuities with the past and within reforms are not 
neglected considering the relationship between modernisation and 
tradition that included values, principles and embedded practices that 
resisted change and accompanied an incremental process of change. On 
the one hand, the impact of the New Public Management doctrine 
developed by international scholars and policymakers by the eighties is 
taken into account; on the other hand, the ‘constitutional’ characteristics 
of an ancient, professional and centralised bureaucratic model such as 
the Civil Service are not underestimated by this historical work. The 
analysis is historical, considering key events, reforms, personalities and 
debate that involved the civil service during this period, but even 
legally and politically grounded. It considers the historical background 
of the Thatcher era, when the government of the Iron Lady set up a 
new season of reforms for the bureaucracy of the central government 
based on managerial principles, budget disciplines and the need to cut 
waste, spending and manpower. The Thatcher period (1979–1990) was 
characterized by three phases of reform: departmental scrutinies led by 
Derek Rayner and the Efficiency Unit (1979–1983); Lasting Reforms, 
involving the launch of programmes such as MINIS and FMI, which 
aimed to improve information management and offer better value for 
money in government (1982–1987); and the Next Steps Agencies (1987–
1990), which were the most important structural reforms of the last 
three decades. The Civil Service moved from being a unitary 
bureaucracy to being a federalized one in which managerial principles 
and performance measurement could be developed and implemented. 
By 1990, the Major government had focused more on customer service, 
with initiatives such as the Citizen’s Charter (1991) and Competing for 
Quality (1994). Meanwhile, the Next Steps reform was completed and 
contracting-out and competition policy for public services was 
enforced. Traditional values, legal framework and principles continued 
to be reaffirmed by many governmental initiatives and papers. In 1997, 
when New Labour and Tony Blair arrived at Downing Street, the 
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appetite for administrative reforms remained. Continuity with the past 
is highlighted as well as changes at both organisational and policy 
levels. The most important innovations such as Public Service 
Agreements, performance measurement, developing of delivery 
control, capability reviews, the proliferation of units to achieve more 
coordination and tackle social issues, the rise of special advisers and 
transparency in Government are investigated. Moreover, legal updates 
such as Ministerial Code, Civil Service Code and Special Advisers 
regulations are analysed. In the last chapters, crucial issues such as 
constitutional and legal developments, performance measurement, 
special advisers, ministerial responsibility and resilience of tradition are 
assessed. In the conclusion, the new traits of managerial bureaucracy as 
a result of historical facts and reform process are drawn. 
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Introduction: the research, definitions, historical 
background 
 
 
‘The Civil Service has been neglected by historians. We know a lot 
about the machinations of politicians in most twentieth-century 
governments. Yet the role of civil servants, and the Civil Service, is too 
often neglected.’ (Peter Riddell, Director of Institute for Government, 
2011) 
 
 
1. Introduction to the research 
 
In 1969 the historian Henry Parris published his masterpiece 
Constitutional Bureaucracy, where he gave account of the changes in 
British central government from the beginning of the nineteenth 
century to the middle of the twentieth century, identifying the 
transition from a patronage bureaucracy to a constitutional one. Forty 
years later, many other institutional transformations have occurred, 
marking the transition from Parris’s constitutional bureaucracy to a 
new, managerial bureaucracy that originated from the political, 
economic, cultural and social changes that had begun by the end of the 
seventies. This work provides the history of that last transformation, 
which took place between 1979 and 2007, the period of the Thatcher 
and Blair governments, focusing on the Civil Service, the bureaucracy 
of the central government of the United Kingdom. 
The Civil Service is one of the oldest institutions in British government, 
and it represents the bulk of a centralised and unitary State, but in the 
meantime is one of the lesser known and studied institutions in the 
contemporary history of the United Kingdom in terms of political, legal 
and organisational. The period examined is particularly important for 
this institution because it represents nearly thirty years of waves of 
reforms inspired by neoliberalism, monetarism and managerialism 
with the rise of the New Public Management doctrine (Hood, 1991, 
1995; Pollitt, 1990) and by the need to answer the fiscal crisis of the 
State in late seventies and eighties and to manage the pressure on 
government imposed by the expansion of global markets, rise of 
globalisation and 24/7 communication in the nineties and in the new 
century (Raadshelders and Vigoda-Gadot, 2015). These reforms 
informed a cycle that was completed just in the middle of the first 
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decade of the twenty-first century, and this process crossed different 
governments, prime ministers and parties without losing momentum. 
In this work administrative reforms will be analysed from a historical 
perspective considering mainly organisational changes that occurred in 
the period examined without neglecting the political and constitutional 
background that underlay the Civil Service reforms. 
As the administrative historian Joe Raadschelders (2000) argues, 
administrative history is indispensable to administrative science 
research as well as the training of civil servants and politicians. Given 
the contemporary challenges governments face, it is all the more 
important to acquire understanding of how government developed and 
what limits that development places upon reform. Administrative 
history is interesting in itself but it gains meaning when we realise how 
‘path-dependent’ reform proposal can be.  
 
The aim of the research 
 
This research project’s aim is to write the history, focusing particularly 
on the organisational and managerial evolution of the Civil Service in 
the period between 1979 and 2007, considering also the political and 
constitutional background of this institutional development. This was a 
thirty-year period of reforms for the central bureaucracy of the United 
Kingdom that took place through the action of different governments. 
Administrative reforms involved not only organisational overhaul in 
central government but even evolution in public policies and public 
services managed by the Civil Service. In this thesis continuities and 
changes are analysed within this historical period, considering 
traditional values and embedded beliefs and practices of the British 
Civil Service.  
We see administrative traditions as composed of both ideas and 
structures. An administrative tradition is a more or less enduring 
pattern in the style and substance of public administration in a country. 
Traditions ‘live’ both through the thoughts and actions of 
contemporary actors and also through the ‘dead hand’ of inherited 
structures that constrain them in varying degrees (Painter and Peters, 
2010). The administrative traditions approach is important for a study 
in administrative history because it draws attention to the importance 
of time as a variable (Pierson, 2004). The fundamental logic of a 
tradition is that it will resist change and promote continuity, but some 
traditions may be more resistant to change than are others. In the latter, 
paradoxically, there may be a ‘tradition of change’ or, at least, a higher 
level of openness. In our case, the case of the pragmatic and 
managerialist orientation of the British administrative traditions may 
facilitate reforms that appear to work regardless of their source, 
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whereas other more legalistic and formalistic cultures may be more 
resistant.  
This is the background to introduce a research that focuses on 
transformations, continuities and discontinuities with the tradition that 
the process of managerialisation and reform of the Civil Service 
determined through policies, laws, practices, organisations and public 
services during the Thatcher, Major and Blair governments. 
 
 
Why this research: filling a void in the history 
 
The project of writing a thesis on this institution is based on the 
analysis of the literature about the Civil Service. There are some 
political history books that give a general overview of the public sector 
reforms under Conservative and Labour governments and the ideas 
that inspired them, such as The Free Economy and the Strong State: the 
Politics of Thatcherism (Andrew Gamble, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, 1994); The Thatcher Effect: A Decade of Change (edited by 
Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagh, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1989); Thatcher’s Britain (Richard Vinen, Simon & Schuster UK, London, 
2009); John Major: Prime Minister (edited by John Jenkins, Bloomsbury 
Publishing PLC, London, 1990); New Labour in Government (edited by 
Steve Ludlam and Martin J Smith, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 
2000); and Governing as New Labour: Policy and Politics Under Blair 
(edited by Steve Ludlam and Martin J. Smith, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, 2003). Then, there are several political science books about 
the Civil Service reforms that mainly analyse bureaucracy and public 
administration models in the UK or in a comparative perspective. The 
most influential are The Civil Service Today (Gavin Drewry and Tony 
Butcher, Blackwell, Oxford, 1991); Britain’s Modernised Civil Service 
(June Burnham and Robert Pyper, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 
2008); The End of Whitehall (Campbell and Wilson, Blackwell, Oxford, 
1995); The Civil Service under the Conservatives, 1979–1997 (David 
Richards, Sussex University Press, Brighton, 1997); New Labour and the 
Civil Service (David Richards, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008); 
Policy and Management in the British Civil Service (Geoffrey K. Fry, 
Prentice-Hall, Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire, 1995); and The Civil 
Service (Keith Dowding, Routledge, London, 1995). In these works the 
historical approach is functional to design a model of State and 
bureaucracy, to analyse the changes and shifts of the political system, 
and to investigate the politicisation of bureaucracy. In these books 
neither archived sources nor a chronological analysis of facts are used. 
In the most of these works is assessed the impact of some theories that 
inspired reforms and changes such as New Public Management and 
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Public Choice Theory.  
Some general history books tell about the Civil Service’s evolution, 
such as The Civil Service since 1945 (Theakston, Blackwell, Oxford, 1995), 
which outlines the administrative reforms from 1945 to 1995, offering a 
short summary of the changes of this institution, and The Powers Behind 
the Prime Minister: the hidden influence of Number Ten (Anthony Seldon 
and Dennis Kavanagh, HarperCollins, London, 2013), which illustrates 
the relations between ministers and civil servants until the Blair 
government.  
There are some autobiographical books like Ministers and Mandarins 
(William Plowden, Institute for Public Policy Research, London, 1994) 
and Just in Time: Inside the Thatcher Revolution (John Hoskyns, Aurum 
Press, London, 2000) that describe the role of civil servants in the 
reforms and the organisational changes in this institution. Then there 
are prime ministers’ and ministers’ autobiographies that include 
reflections about the Civil Service reforms, such as The Downing Street 
Years (Margaret Thatcher, HarperCollins, London, 1993), The View from 
No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical (Nigel Lawson, Bantam Press, London, 
1992), John Major: the Autobiography (John Major, HarperCollins, 
London, 1999) and A Journey (Tony Blair, Arrow, London, 2011).  
Reforms are analysed by works on public management and public 
administration, such as New Managerialism: Administrative Reform in 
Whitehall and Canberra (Spencer Zifcak, Open University Press, 
Philadelphia, 1994), which considers the administrative reforms of the 
Conservatives in a comparative perspective with Australia and focuses 
on new managerial techniques. Other important works about single 
issue include Special Advisers: Who they are, what they do, why they matter 
(Ben Yong and Robert Hazell, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014), People 
Who Live in the Dark: the History of the Special Adviser in British Politics 
(Andrew Blick, Politico’s Publishing, Cambridge, 2004) and Ministerial 
Responsibility (Geoffrey Marshall, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1989).  
There are a few history books that give an account of the Civil Service’s 
contemporary history such as The Official History of the British Civil 
Service. Volume I: 1966–1981 (Rodney Lowe, Routledge, Oxford, 2011), 
which tells the history of this institution until 1981, and Whitehall (Peter 
Hennessy, Fontana Press, London, 1990), which focuses on the political 
history of the Civil Service until the end of the eighties without using 
archive sources.  
As we can notice, there is not a large number of literature sources on 
the topic, and most of these publications date from before the 2000s. 
There is a lack of historical work on this institution that considers the 
whole period in which ‘managerial-oriented’ reforms were carried out 
by different governments. The research focuses on organisational 
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development of the central government’s bureaucracy and it considers 
constitutional and political issues connected with the rise of managerial 
techniques and practices in government imported from the private 
sector. The aim of this thesis is to explain the dynamic of institutional 
development of the Civil Service from the Thatcher to the Blair 
governments, considering the passage from Conservatives to New 
Labour in office, and to fill the void in the literature, giving an account 
of continuity in traditions and managerial changes of central 
government bureaucracy through the use of legal, public and archive 
sources. This period looks particularly interesting regarding the Civil 
Service; indeed, as the prominent public management scholar 
Christopher Hood (2015) points out, the United Kingdom was by the 
eighties the ‘poster-child nation’ of the world for New Public 
Management’s inspired administrative reforms. During these thirty 
years it developed the passage from ‘constitutional bureaucracy’ to 
‘managerial bureaucracy’ and the divergence between the old ‘Welfare 
State’ and the new ‘Managerial State’, as argued by Clarke and 
Newman (1997). The Civil Service was, in the meantime, the object and 
the actor of administrative reforms. It was an institution protagonist of 
the managerialisation process in the public sector towards different 
political cycles and reforms. Fragmented analysis, based on one 
government or phase, is not sufficient to understand the whole process 
that extended from the ‘end of consensus’ to the period before the 2008 
financial and economic crisis. This is why writing its history between 
1979 and 2007 is interesting for historians and public management and 
public administration scholars alike. 
 
Thesis organisation 
 
The organisation of the thesis is chronological, as outlined in the 
following paragraph, and it is based on three different types of sources. 
 
The thesis consists of an introduction and four chapters. The 
introduction is an overview of the British Civil Service, giving 
definitions and a short history of the institution before Thatcher’s wave 
of reforms. The three central chapters of the thesis reconstruct the 
history of the Civil Service from an organisational perspective, dividing 
it into three periods coincident with the premierships of Thatcher, 
Major and Blair. The last chapter tells about the key findings of the 
research and main issues, summarises institutional changes and draws 
conclusions. 
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Sources 
 
It would be helpful here to make a distinction among different types of 
sources: legal and constitutional sources, archive sources and other 
sources. Legal and constitutional sources are available for the entire 
period considered on the sites of the UK Government 
(www.legislation.gov.uk) and in the Hansard (Parliament) database 
(http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/). 
Archive sources are of different kinds: files in the National Archives of 
Kew Gardens, Thatcher Foundation Archives and Churchill College 
Archives in Cambridge cover the period 1979–1986. Parliamentary 
archives (http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk/marketing/index.jsp), 
which consist of parliamentary debates, white papers, command 
papers, parliamentary committees’ reports and oral evidence, court 
judgements and Civil Service statistics (www.ons.gov.uk), cover the 
entire period considered (1979–2007), and they are the pillars of this 
research. There are other sources no less important, such as civil 
servants’ diaries, prime ministers’ and civil servants’ biographies and 
autobiographies, political books of the period, academic articles, 
journals, speeches, Who’s Who and Who Was Who, Civil Service 
Yearbook, interviews quoted by other authors, Institute for 
Government papers, The Economist Archive, the Independent Archive, 
and the UCL Constitution Unit database. Finally, there are the 
interviews conducted by the author with former civil servants 
including two Cabinet secretaries and Heads of the Civil Service (Lord 
Richard Wilson and Lord Robin Butler) of the period considered. 
 
Key findings 
 
The key findings are the most significant institutional continuities and 
changes underlined by this research. In particular, the thesis finds five 
fundamental elements that describe continuity and change, tradition 
and reform in the Civil Service transformation towards a ‘managerial 
bureaucracy’: the rise of performance management as an effect of the 
managerialisation process, the evolution of the Civil Service legal 
framework as an answer to preserve traditional values in a new public 
management oriented reforms environment, the institutionalisation 
process of the special advisers in government, the evolution of the 
constitutional convention of ministerial responsibility, and the 
‘constitutional conservatism’ of the Civil Service as institution. 
These five elements highlight the changes arising from the 
administrative reform of the government of this historical period and 
the resilience of the Civil Service in changing its original constitutional 
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settings. As a leading constitutional historian, Geoffrey Elton once 
wrote, ‘True administrative revolutions are rare.’ They took place, he 
said, ‘only when the State itself is being refashioned fundamentally’. 
Otherwise, public administration ‘usually develops by slow degrees’ 
(Elton, 1953). As Martin Painter (2010) argues, it seems difficult to deny 
that there is some persistence in administrative systems. Even public 
bureaucracies that have been reformed significantly over the past 
several decades, for example those in New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom, have many of the same features that they had prior to those 
reforms. 
Indeed, analysis of the historical facts shows that many changes 
occurred in the organisation of the Civil Service, the process of 
managerialisation was settled and implemented, organisation and 
structure were reformed, the relationship between ministers and civil 
servants changed progressively, but the traditional principles of the 
Civil Service, such as access by open competition, meritocratic career, 
permanency, neutrality, integrity, impartiality, centralisation and 
institutional self-government, mostly persist. 
 
2. The Civil Service: definition and organisation 
 
The Civil Service: a definition 
 
In order to better understand the subject of the thesis it’s useful to give 
a definition of the British Civil Service. The most widely used definition 
of a civil servant is the one proposed by the Tomlin Commission in 
1931: ‘Servants of the Crown, other than holders of political and judicial 
offices, who are employed in a civil capacity and whose remuneration 
is paid wholly and directly out of moneys voted by Parliament’ (Report 
of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service, Cmnd 3909, 1931). The 
term was first used in the late eighteenth century to distinguish the 
covenanted civilian employees of the East India Company (through 
which India was governed until 1858) from military personnel. This use 
of the adjective ‘civil’ to connote ‘not military’ carried over into the 
context of the early nineteenth-century British civil service, but was 
gradually adopted to convey the crucial distinction between holders of 
permanent posts and those whose jobs changed hands when there was 
a change of government (Parris, 1969).  
However, it was not until well into the nineteenth century that political 
and permanent officials clearly emerged as two separate and distinct 
species of public servant. Departments remained autonomous and 
differentiated in their structures and practices. In such circumstances 
the term ‘civil servant’ and any notion of a coherent entity called a ‘civil 
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service’ had and could have had no useful meaning. Even after the 
major reforms in central administration that took place in the middle of 
the nineteenth century, the expression only gradually became common 
currency. Until 1870, as Chapman and Greenaway point out, ‘statesmen 
and leading administrators were reluctant to talk of the “Civil Service”; 
they used instead such terms as the “public offices” or the “public 
establishments”’ (Chapman and Greenaway, 1980).  
Hence, the terminology is of quite recent origin. And, even in the 
hundred years or so that ‘civil servant’ has been part of the day-to-day 
vocabulary of public affairs, the precise content of the term has never 
been defined. This situation was created too by the fact that the civil 
servant of late Victorian Britain was a very different animal from his 
modern counterpart; he was the product of a very different social and 
political order. The state that employed him has changed greatly in 
size, shape and nature. Similar problems arise when we try to draw 
international comparisons by using the traditional vocabulary of British 
civil servants to refer to the central bureaucracies of France, the United 
States or Germany.  
The neutral ideal type of bureaucracy designed by Weber gives some 
guidelines for undertaking basic comparison across time and space. 
The problem in defining the British Civil Service was that other 
concepts like ‘Crown’ or ‘departments of government’ were themselves 
slippery concepts. This was underlined by Mackenzie and Grove in 
their authoritative account of British central government, which 
pointed out that ‘we are met at the outset by the fact that there are no 
precise criteria, either legal or historical, by which to determine the 
scope of the Civil Service. There is a central core which is unmistakable, 
but at the margin no sharp line divides those public servants who are 
within the Civil Service from those who are not.’ (Mackenzie and 
Grove, 1957). Some twenty years later the Expenditure Committee of 
the House of Commons reached much the same conclusion.  
Defining civil servants became of considerable importance once 
patronage was eliminated in 1870. It is no good preventing politicians 
from nominating their own candidates if they can still insert their 
nominees under a different traditional guise (Sir J. Craig, 1955). This 
problem has re-emerged with the continuing debate about the 
appointment of temporary special advisers in the late twentieth 
century. The absence of firm definition is the expression of the 
reluctance of British administrative reformers to place central 
bureaucracies within a coherent framework of public law. The 
Superannuation Acts, dating from the early nineteenth century, and 
providing a rare symptom of statuary intrusion into the operation of 
the civil service, are often taken as a basis for an official definition of the 
scope of the civil service for statistical and other purposes, though in 
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fact the definition they provide is somewhat tautological.  
Despite these difficulties, the definition from the Tomlin Report is still 
the most useful. In the absence of the sort of neat definition that can be 
found in other countries in a Civil Service Act, the definition stood the 
test of time, until comparatively recently. We have to consider that the 
British Civil Service was a peculiar institution for a number of reasons. 
Officials did not normally have written contracts, presumably because 
they were servants of the Crown, though they had implied contracts. 
Defining the civil service became a useful example of how the British 
unwritten constitution worked in practice. Civil servants were known 
to have modest privileges, or benefits, as a result of being servants of 
the Crown; for example, they had a non-contributory pension scheme 
and they held a job ‘for life’. As the texts on bureaucracy put it, 
following Max Weber’s definition of the ideal type bureaucracy, 
employment in such civil service was ‘based on technical qualification 
and … protected against arbitrary dismissal’ (Blau, 1956:30). The British 
civil service in the early and middle years of the twentieth century built 
upon the advantages that resulted from these characteristics. No one 
contributed more to this process than Sir Warren Fisher, who regarded 
the civil service as a fourth service of the Crown, after the armed 
services. Fisher did much to encourage a sense of belonging to the 
service and emphasised the need to maintain the highest possible 
standards. His approach was continued by Sir Edward Bridges, who, 
when he was the Head of the Home Civil Service, also tried to develop 
a sense of belonging and loyalty to a distinctive service. 
Following the creation of the Civil Service Department in 1968, the 
publication Civil Service Statistics also at first accepted the Tomlin 
definition, though from 1972 the wording was modified. In 1972 it read, 
‘A civil servant is a servant of the Crown (not being the holder of 
political or judicial office) who is paid wholly and directly out of 
money voted by Parliament and who works in a civil capacity in a 
department of government’ (Civil Service Department, 1972:12). This 
was further modified in 1976 by adding the sentence: ‘However, some 
civil servants work for Crown bodies which are not government 
departments, such as the Manpower Services Commission and its two 
agencies or the Health and Safety Executive, and are paid out of grants-
in-aid to these bodies’ (Civil Service Department, 1976:12). By 1994, the 
definition as it appeared in Civil Service Statistics had been changed 
again, this time presumably to adjust to the creation of Next Steps 
agencies, especially those with Trading Fund status. This, the 1994 
definition, omits all reference to what had previously been regarded as 
the key financial clause; there is no longer any reference to pay being 
drawn wholly and directly out of money voted by Parliament. It stated 
that ‘a Civil Servant is a servant of the Crown working in a civil 
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capacity who is not: the holder of a political (or judicial) office; the 
holder of certain other offices in respect of whose tenure of office 
special provision has been made; a servant of the Crown in a personal 
capacity paid from the Civil List.’ (HM Treasury, 1994:18).  
This is, on the face of it, comprehensive, though much less specific than 
earlier definitions. All officials working in the central administration 
come within its sphere, but recent explanations and changes have tried 
to clarify what it means in practice. Since the creation of Next Steps 
agencies, following the publication of the Ibbs Report (Efficiency Unit, 
1988), there has been discussion about whether a civil service as such 
can still be said to exist as a recognisable and discrete service, distinct 
from an aggregation of employees of particular government 
departments and agencies. This process was stimulated by 
characteristics of work in agencies, which operated on business-like 
lines, where staff increasingly began to have contracts with pay and 
conditions of service that vary from agency to agency, and where staff 
were given targets to achieve, with incentives including pay related to 
the achievement of their targets. Sir Robin Butler, Head of the Home 
Civil Service, said he was quite clear that the civil service as a distinct 
entity still existed, though it is a service that was ‘unified but not 
uniform’ (TCSC 1989, Q.320). The 1994 White Paper, The Civil Service: 
Continuity and Change, was also confident on this point. It argued that 
‘the importance of the Civil Service as a coherent entity, rather than 
simply the sum of the staff of individual departments performing 
specific roles, has been recognised for more than 150 years,’ and it goes 
on to quote Butler’s key principles. These are ‘integrity, impartiality, 
objectivity, selection and promotion on merit and accountability 
through ministers to Parliament’ (Cabinet Office, 1994a, para. 2.7).  
Other recent publications have also focused on this issue. Sir Peter 
Kemp, known as ‘the architect of Next Steps’ (Finkelstein, 1993:7), 
wrote about ‘moving away from the model of a single service monolith 
to one where a loose federation of many smaller agencies, units and 
cores predominates’ (Kemp, 1993:8). However, he believed there was 
‘no such thing as a single public service ethos’ (Kemp, 1993:33) and that 
‘there has never been any real unity’ (ibidem:44). Instead, the ‘unity of 
the civil service rests on its being a body of professionals, like doctors 
and lawyers, rather than on any harder commonality’ (ibid.). Similar 
sentiments were expressed in the report by Sylvie Trosa, Next Steps: 
Moving On. Recognising that agencies were semi-autonomous bodies, 
she stated that ‘financial, management and personnel rules will become 
more and more different; the only element of unity which will be left, 
besides ethical standards, will be the uniform tag of being a civil 
servant’ (Trosa, 1994, para. 2.17). One of her conclusions on the 
agencies was that ‘typically, the main protagonists either want to 
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maintain a complete uniformity of rules or alternatively argue that 
unity of the Civil Service is an obsolete preoccupation, contradictory to 
the requirements of good management practice … (however) it seems 
that the solution can neither be uniformity nor complete diversity, but a 
mixture of both’ (para. 4.5.4).  
William Waldegrave, the then minister responsible for the office of 
Public Service and Science, explained how he saw the future of public 
service in the context of reforming Britain’s bureaucracies. He did not 
define the civil service, nor did he discuss the problems associated with 
various definitions, but he explained recent changes as he perceived 
them. Agencification, he said, ‘involves the separation of the Civil 
Service into a number of smaller, increasingly specialised units known 
as Next Steps agencies’ (Waldegrave, 1993:18). This, the result of recent 
reforms, ‘will leave us with a smaller … public service … consist[ing] of 
a comparatively small core, and a series of devolved delivery 
organisations’ (ibidem:23). Furthermore, he saw the new ethos of public 
service as based on the principles to be found in the Citizen’s Charter 
(1991), as being grafted onto ‘unshaken, unchanging, unchallenged 
incorruptibility and political impartiality’. These principles were: 
explicit standards of service that were set, published and prominently 
displayed at the point of delivery; full, accurate and up-to-date 
information about how public services are run, what they cost and how 
well they perform; value for money; regular and systematic 
consultation with service users; accountability; and well-published and 
readily available complaints procedures (Waldegrave, 1993:19–24). 
These principles listed by the Citizen’s Charter were very similar to 
Butler’s list of key principles, except for the reference about 
accountability between Parliament and ministers made by the latter, 
and both hardly differentiated the civil service from good management 
practices. Even on that criterion, however, there must be some doubts if 
we consider the second period of this research (1990–2007), because 
ministers were differentiating between policy, for which they saw 
themselves as responsible, and ‘operational matters’, which were 
apparently the direct responsibility of officials to parliamentary 
committees, the media and the public. 
Therefore, to summarise and to have a clearer perspective about a 
definition for ‘civil servant’, we need to find a way to better define who 
is a civil servant. In the end, the best method is the use of exclusion 
criteria. This means considering the categories of public servants who, 
by general consensus, must not be regarded as civil servants: a) 
ministers and MPs are public servants who receive remuneration from 
public funds, but they are political officers and therefore definitely not 
civil servants; b) members of the armed forces are Crown servants, but 
are not serving in a civil capacity, using that adjective in the original 
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sense (Parris, 1969). However, civilian support to the Army is provided 
by civil servants who work in the numerous divisions of the Ministry of 
Defence, which is by far the largest department in British government; 
c) judges and chairmen of administrative tribunals are public servants 
whose independence from government is safeguarded by special rules 
and conventions. In the case of the higher judiciary, these special rules 
are of great constitutional weight and historical importance. No one in 
this category is a civil servant, even if the courts are administered by 
civil servants; d) employees of Parliament are not servants of the 
Crown. They may belong to civil service unions. The Clerks of the two 
Houses were recruited through the Civil Service Commission until 
1991, when this was abolished, and they enjoy similar conditions in 
terms of contracts to the Civil Service, but they are not civil servants; e) 
local government employees are certainly public servants but they are 
not civil servants. A high proportion of local authority income comes 
from central government transfers approved by Parliament. But local 
authorities are constitutionally autonomous bodies, and those who 
work in them are not servants of the Crown. This approach excludes 
from the civil servant definition many categories such as school 
teachers and policemen, who in other EU countries are considered to be 
civil servants; f) public corporations, the bodies that run what remain of 
the nationalised industries and other services such as broadcasting, 
though subject to ministerial directives and in some contexts supported 
by central government funds, are also constitutionally autonomous; 
those who work in them, or who are appointed to their executive 
boards, are neither Crown servants nor civil servants; g) quangos, 
meaning non-departmental bodies. There are many organisations that 
operate under the central government, performing ancillary 
administrative tasks, sometimes in association with government 
departments, but are staffed for the most part by non-civil servants 
(Drewry and Butcher: 1991).  
Hence, to further narrow the broader definition of ‘civil servant’, the 
best method is first to consider and compare all the definitions 
provided during the history, and second, using the ‘exclusion criteria’, 
eliminate all the roles that cannot be considered roles within the Civil 
Service. 
 
The Higher Civil Service 
 
Most of the issues addressed in this thesis concern the higher (senior) 
civil service, which deserves to be investigated here because it 
represents the core of policymaking in government that shapes reforms 
and organisational changes in the Civil Service itself. The interface 
between politicians and officials, among whom public policy is made, is 
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much more complicated than the one-to-one relationship between a 
minister or secretary of state and the permanent secretary, that is, the 
highest civil servants in every department.  
The minister has his private office, staffed by middle-ranking 
bureaucrats. Some senior civil servants will have frequent access to 
ministers, while others less senior may have intermittent access. Some 
ministers are more anxious than others to talk directly to their 
subordinate officials immediately responsible for particular areas of 
government or possessing a specialisation on a issue. Some permanent 
secretaries are more anxious than others to encourage their ministers to 
talk with senior civil servants. Many civil servants lower down the 
hierarchy will contribute written papers which pass upwards into the 
higher reaches of the policy-making structure. But below the top few 
grades the breadth of the hierarchy spreads exponentially. Thus in 1986 
just 659 senior civil servants occupied the three top grades of the open 
structure; the lower grades were occupied by 77,000 senior executive 
officers, higher executive officers and executive officers; and at the base 
of the non-specialist grades were about 143,000 administrative officers 
and administrative assistants, plus a multitude of telephonists, typists, 
cleaners and messengers (Civil Service Statistics, 1987).  
It is just not possible in the real world to draw hard and fast 
distinctions between the inter-related process of ‘policy-making’ and 
‘administration’. And the success of a policy depends not only on the 
small group of ministers and top civil servants who draw it up and 
translate it into policy instruments such as laws, statutes, and policy 
directives, but also upon the actions and qualities of lower public 
servants who execute those policies and deliver them as service to the 
public. Thinking about the civil service, a full awareness must be 
retained of the massive labour force that constitutes its rank and file. 
Nevertheless, for many purposes we inevitably tend to focus attention 
upon the small élite of civil servants that is closer to political power. 
This happens because the small group of higher civil servants who 
operate in the atmosphere of policy making and ministerial briefings, 
and who also perform the top managerial functions, is vital for the 
effectiveness, the changes and the cohesion of such a vast organisation 
as the civil service.  
However, to have a better definition of the higher civil service, it may 
be helpful to read the concept that was used in a book by H E Dale 
published in 1941 and echoed by others, included the Priestley 
Commission on the Civil Service of 1955 (Dale, 1941. See also Report of 
the Royal Commission on the Civil Service 1953–55, Cmnd 9613, 1955). 
Dale observed that when an official becomes an assistant secretary ‘he 
begins to breathe a rather different air’, and took the view that no one 
of lower rank ‘exercises a real and distinct influence in important 
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matters’. His higher civil service therefore began at the rank of assistant 
secretary (grade 5 of today’s ‘Open Structure’). He added to the list a 
few others in lower grades (6–7 in the Open Structure) and some senior 
specialists, particularly departmental legal advisers who are in a central 
position to know what is happening in their department. On this basis, 
he arrived at a total of about 500–600 top officials out of the entire body 
of civil servants. Dale offers comfort to those who might be alarmed by 
‘the thought that there are as many as five or six hundred matured 
bureaucrats surrounding and advising ministers’ with the observation 
that most of them, at the level of assistant secretary or principal 
assistant secretary, are qualified to offer policy advice only within the 
limited area of their divisions inside the department. The concept of a 
‘higher civil service’ is not very well defined, and this enhances its 
utility, for its starting point is not people but process, namely the 
process of policy making and advice (Drewry and Butcher, 1991).  
The senior civil service represent the first ring of the chain of command 
in the bureaucratic process that conducts policy making and signal the 
cooperation and the administrative limits between ministers who are 
accountable to Parliament and answerable to the public and permanent, 
neutral civil servants. Looking to the arithmetic at the beginning of the 
1990s, there were around 3,000 higher civil servants in a total of nearly 
500,000 non-industrial civil servants. Hence, there is a very small area 
of interface between the political and the official higher echelons. As it 
will be showed, even after the managerial-oriented wave of reform, the 
hierarchical and professional order of the Civil Service persisted. 
 
3. The history of the British Civil Service: from its origins to the 
present day 
 
Origins and development of the Westminster–Whitehall Model 
 
The history that we are approaching is intertwined with the long path 
of British constitutional and institutional development. The continuity 
and change that mark the life of the Civil Service cannot be avoided, 
and, even concentrating on a circumscribed period, the long 
perspective is essential to make a credible historical analysis.  
The Civil Service is both a component and a product of the United 
Kingdom constitutional system. It has evolved as state systems and 
structures have changed and grown over the years. Organic growth 
and gradual change have been the characteristic modes of 
development, rather than sudden, consistent change. In contrast to 
most other nations, there is no founding constitutional statute or basic 
civil service law establishing the purpose, function and responsibility of 
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this vital body of the State. Instead, coherently with the broader 
constitutional trend in the UK which, again, unlike most other nations, 
is an uncodified collection of Acts of Parliament, court decisions, 
conventions, customs and practices deemed to be of constitutional 
significance, the work of the civil service is to be understood with 
reference to a group of statutes, codes, memoranda and time-honoured 
procedures (Burnham and Pyper, 2008). The origins of the British civil 
service lie in the sets of courtiers surrounding the early monarchs of the 
nations of Britain that themselves had yet to crystallise.  
The evolution of the institution was slow and gradual. It took six 
centuries, from the ninth to the fifteenth, to refine the organisation of 
the English Crown’s records and distinguish between the monarch’s 
‘household’ finances and national finances and for staff to be appointed 
by the monarch to administer government affairs. There was no formal 
distinction between officials and ministers or between administrators 
and parliamentarians, as illustrated by the case of Thomas Cromwell, 
various MP, solicitor, Principal Secretary to the King and Lord Privy 
Seal. All were servants of the Crown, all subjected to the spoils system; 
indeed, they remained in post for as long as the monarch decided. Into 
the nineteenth century, ministers had time for administrative issues; 
officials were often their political supporter and would leave with their 
minister when having resigned or having been dismissed. The history 
of the early development of the civil service can be seen in terms of 
financial administration and thus of the supremacy of the Treasury.  
In the nineteenth century too, the Treasury often took the lead in 
improving the administration and building the civil service into a 
unified institution, and its strong role was to persist in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries (Hennessy, 1990: 17–30; Drewry and Butcher, 
1995: 39–41). On the other hand, another and important element to 
control the civil service issues derives from the ‘Privy Council’, 
comprising a monarch’s religious, official, judicial and political 
advisers. In modern times, Privy Counsellors are appointed by the 
Queen, but are chosen by the government from among ministers, 
opposition party leaders, top officials, judges, archbishops and other 
senior figures, simply as an honour or to enable them to be told in 
confidence sensitive intelligence on Privy Council terms. From the 
Privy Council derives a number of constitutional and organisational 
arrangements. First, the inner circle of the Privy Council eventually 
became today’s Cabinet government. By the early eighteenth century it 
had become the Cabinet of government of ministers, whose role was to 
advise the Crown. They found it safer to reach a private consensus 
before giving that advice, thereby alimenting the concept of collective, 
and confidential, Cabinet government. By the end of the eighteenth 
century the Cabinet of ministers, led by the Prime Minister, exercised 
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power, provided it had the support of Parliament, but it acted in the 
name of the Crown.  
There was little administrative help to support Cabinet government 
until the First World War, not even to keep records on what ministers 
had decided when they met in Cabinet. When Lloyd George became 
prime minister in the middle of the war, the Cabinet Secretariat, which 
became the Cabinet Office, was created to support his War Cabinet, 
using the staff and the coordinating techniques of their 
interdepartmental secretariat already serving the Committee of 
Imperial Defence. The continuation of the Cabinet Office after the war 
was opposed by the Treasury and by Conservative politicians, who 
aimed to abolish what they considered to be Lloyd George’s ‘power 
building’. However, the incoming Conservative prime minister (Bonar 
Law) had seen first hand the usefulness of the Cabinet Office, and the 
Cabinet Office and its Secretary stayed (Burnham and Pyper, 2008).  
Traditionally, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury have remained 
opponents to be the centre of government, and to be in control of the 
Civil Service, as was particularly the case in the 1980s. Second, 
decisions by the ‘Monarch in Council’ have remained an appropriate 
method of law making long after Parliament became the main source of 
legislation. The Queen still authorises ‘Orders in Council’ at a meeting 
of four or more ministers who are ‘Privy Counsellors’. Most of the early 
monarchs’ former areas of competence have been transferred to 
Parliament, but those powers that the Crown still retains, called Royal 
Prerogative Powers, such as agreeing international treaties, dissolving 
Parliament before having new elections and being head of the armed 
forces, are exercised in practice by ministers and usually the prime 
minister.  
An Order in Council is one way in which these powers are exercised. 
Many examples in history have showed how this instrument has been 
useful to introduce changes in the civil service without the need to rely 
on a majority in Parliament first. Paradoxically, the short Civil Service 
Management Functions Act of 1992, delegating personnel functions 
from ministers to top officials, created considerable suspicion within 
Parliament, if only for the reason that it was so unusual for MPs to be 
asked to give their consent on civil service functions.  
Third, managing the civil service is a prerogative power of the Crown, 
exercised by the prime minister. The Civil Service Management Code, 
which is the set of regulations that govern the recruitment, promotion, 
conduct, transfer, retirement or dismissal of civil servants, reaffirms the 
historic principle: ‘Civil servants are servants of the Crown and owe a 
duty of loyal service to the Crown as their employer.’ (Cabinet Office, 
2006, par. 4.1.1). This declaration is followed by a statement of the 
contemporary practice: ‘Since constitutionally the Crown acts on the 
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advice of Ministers who are answerable per their departments and 
agencies in Parliament that duty is … owed to the duly constituted 
Government’ (Par. 4.1.1). 
British government has substantial to reorganise the civil service 
because it is still, in principle, the administrative structure of the 
monarchy and the vestigial power of the monarch can be used to 
establish new rules on its reform. Two Orders in Council during the 
Blair government showed the usefulness of this power. In 2007 the 
Civil Service Management Code was ‘issued under the authority of the 
Civil Service Order in Council 1995’. It gives power to the minister for 
the civil service ‘to make regulations and instructions for the 
management of the Home Civil Service, including the power to 
prescribe the condition of the civil service’ (para. 1). In contrast to the 
widening control, an Order in Council of 1997 gave a new power to the 
prime minister for the appointment of three special advisers, which 
means temporary political appointees to advise the prime minister, 
who could give orders to permanent civil servants. For example, Blair’s 
chief of staff and his press secretary were appointed under this 
innovative provision.  
Fourth, government departments such as Trade and Education 
originated as committees of the Privy Council, there is no longer 
important in itself, but it is yet a useful tool for a British government 
trying to reform its civil service. The Board of Trade, which was created 
in a permanent form in 1786, is particularly significant for the history of 
the Civil Service because it was organised on the basis of a clear 
distinction between its government ministers on the one hand and its 
small staff of officials on the other. It introduced a clearer 
differentiation between ministers and civil servants on financial 
grounds (Pyper, 1995:6). These ministers were also starting to act as a 
single government and resign together, so that it became 
administratively the best option if those junior officials who were not 
identified closely with their minister’s politics stayed to serve the 
incoming government. It was the emergence of formal departmental 
frameworks that led to the development of a permanent civil service in 
the United Kingdom (Burnham and Pyper, 2008:12).  
Moreover, the wide collection of departments and boards being set up 
in the early nineteenth century hardly merited the name ‘civil service’, 
although a form of commons pension scheme for officials was 
introduced under pressure from the Treasury in 1810. The term civil 
servant was first used in the eighteenth century by the East India 
Company, which was a crown agency, to categorise those employees 
who were not military personnel. It was not too much used in Britain, 
however, until the late nineteenth century, when it came into use to 
denote permanent officials, that is to say, those who remained when the 
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minister changed. It took the first wave of modernisers to fight against 
nepotism, patronage, inefficiency and corruption by imposing common 
recruitment and promotion systems, working practices and a collective 
ethos on the growing bureaucracy. Some individual reformers, such as 
the early monarchs Alfred the Great and Henry VII, and the Principal 
Secretaries, Thomas Cromwell and Lord Burghley, made significant 
contributions to the initial development of the British central 
government. Cromwell’s employer, Henry VIII, made an unwitting 
contribution to administrative language when he took over the area of 
London between Parliament and what is now Trafalgar Square, and 
turned it into a palace that he called ‘Whitehall’, which is now the site 
of many government buildings. This became the term to indicate 
bureaucracy, just as Parliament and its associated political institutions 
around the Palace of Westminster are collectively called Westminster.  
Although these individuals and many others played a part in 
transforming the civil service into a unified entity, a special part was 
played by two top Treasury officials, Charles Trevelyan in the mid-
nineteenth century and Warren Fisher between the two World Wars.  
The periodical interest of Parliament in cutting back on expenditure 
had provoked a special parliamentary inquiry in 1848. Trevelyan, 
Secretary to the Treasury, advised it that one way to reduce the growth 
of bureaucracy would be to recruit officials on the basis of competence, 
eliminating patronage and clientelism, and to use more productively 
the junior officials with the higher qualifications. Trevelyan already had 
experience of bureaucracy and a great interest in reforming the British 
Civil Service, which was less efficient than the East India Company, for 
which he had previously worked. His project was supported by 
William Gladstone, then Chancellor of Exchequer, who asked 
Trevelyan and Stafford Northcote to produce a report advising on how 
to recruit and then motivate qualified people. The Northcote–Trevelyan 
report of 1854 recommended a division of the civil service into 
superior, ‘intellectual/generalist’ work and lower 
‘mechanical/technical’ tasks; recruitment through an open, competitive 
examination, conducted by an independent Board; promotion on the 
basis of merit and moving staff between departments to make use of 
them where they were most needed and to create a more unified 
service; pensions to be granted only after a report on the work done by 
an official; annual pay increments to maximum in class and further 
increases to depend on promotion (Report on the Organisation of the 
Permanent Civil Service, 1854). The reformers clearly expected resistance 
to their proposals from those who benefited from the old system or 
were aghast at the idea of ‘being displaced by middle-class, 
meritocratic clerks’ (Drewry and Butcher, 1995:44). Gladstone could not 
assist because he wasn’t in office at the time of publication. 
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Furthermore, educational reformers were pressing the premiership 
from outlets for students coming from the public schools and the 
universities of Oxford and Cambridge, which in the same period were 
reformed and opened to the rising bourgeoisie.  
In 1855 the Civil Service Commission was created to examine 
candidates to evaluate career advancement by departments. In 1870, 
with Gladstone now prime minister and with Robert Lowe, a reforming 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, open competition was established as a 
rule, though the Home Office and Foreign Office were still slow to join 
in. Some other elements of the Northcote–Trevelyan recommendations, 
such as the functional separation in two divisions, also took place, but 
other proposed reforms, notably actions to reduce departmental 
fragmentation, were still not in place by the end of the First World War 
despite more reports endorsing them. However, implementation was 
much more difficult than recommendation. It was not until Warren 
Fisher was appointed Permanent Secretary to the Treasury in 1919 that 
a genuine corporate identity developed and the unitary nature of the 
institution became clearly established. Fisher, who wanted the civil 
service to have the same status as the armed services, created the top 
role of ‘Permanent Head of the Civil Service’. On the one hand the 
move could be seen as reinforcing Treasury interests in controlling 
expenditure on personnel: an Establishments Branch was established in 
the Treasury and soon organised common pay scales for all but the top 
tiers of officials. On the other hand, the appointment was thought to be 
a way into bringing about ‘Treasury’ or general classes of civil servants 
at the different hierarchical levels who could be deployed across 
departments, and it gave the holder the authority to issue guidance to 
the permanent secretaries of other departments, thus developing 
common conventions (Lee et al., 1998:141). The Cabinet decided in 1920 
that the prime minister would have the final say in the appointment 
and dismissal of all senior civil servants. Warren Fisher then used his 
position as Head of Civil Service and chief adviser to the prime 
minister in the latter’s guise as First Lord of Treasury to put forward 
names in a way that encouraged officials to seek interdepartmental 
transfers and work in more than one department on their way towards 
the top.  
Fisher implemented the 1854 Report during the inter-war period, but 
the Northcote–Trevelyan prescription for intellectuals to perform the 
superior tasks was interpreted narrowly as a requirement for generalist 
administrators recruited through the generalist examination in which 
Oxford and Cambridge graduates excelled (Burnham and Pyper, 
2008:16). During Fisher’s long period at the head of the civil service, the 
number of senior officials with specialist experience fell dramatically. It 
was the triumph of generalist. His personnel policy was to have 
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important consequences as government intervention in social and 
economic affairs became a characteristic of political life in Britain, and 
the issue of generalist versus specialist expertise was a fundamental 
theme of the next big inquiry into the British civil service by the Fulton 
Committee. To summarise, the full effect of the Northcote–Trevelyan 
Report of 1854 was not felt for some decades after its publication, but it 
was the final step in the building of a modern civil service (Greenwood 
et al., 2002; Hennessy, 1989, ch.1).  
By the early twentieth century, a corporate, unitary civil service could 
be recognised (Drewry and Butcher, 1991; Parris, 1969). It was 
characterised by departmental recruitment to the lower-level posts in 
departmental offices, but also by a standardised system of national 
recruitment of university graduates for top posts. This central control 
over higher-level recruitment coupled with inter-departmental staff 
transfers for officials moving into the senior rank, a centralised pay 
system, and a unified approach to the administrative problems faced by 
all government departments led to the emergence of a harmonic 
organisational entity. The functions of the civil service expanded far 
beyond its nineteenth-century administrative role in central 
government, especially after the Second World War with the building 
of the welfare state, as government became involved in managing 
pensions, national insurance, health and social care systems, 
employment offices, and, in time, industries and transport systems. 
Whitehall’s structures and processes were exposed to fresh ideas and 
new personnel during both the First and the Second World Wars as 
temporary civil servants from a range of business, scientific and 
academic backgrounds took up posts in government. However, even as 
Whitehall reverted to its traditions in the 1950s, concerns were already 
starting to emerge about the civil service’s efficiency for purpose, as the 
UK’s economic performance declined and the central institutions of the 
State became under scrutiny.  
The twentieth-century equivalent of the Northcote–Trevelyan Report 
was the Fulton Report of 1968. While the administrative reformers of 
the mid-nineteenth century had been inspired by elements of Britain’s 
imperial adventure, especially the experience of the Indian 
Administrative Service, by educational elites of the Oxbridge system 
and by the municipal improvers, Fulton and his promoters were 
influenced in large measure by the corporate and strategic management 
changes that derived from the private business world: the major US 
corporations believed they would be more efficient and profitable with 
greater integration of the manufacturing process. ‘The report was based 
on collectivist assumptions about big government, emphasising the 
need for management expertise in an era of rising expenditure, the 
expansion of government activities and large departments’ (Theakston, 
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1995:90). The inquiry also fitted into a wider reform programme of 
Labour government of 1964–1969, with other committees examining the 
case for corporate management in local government, economic 
planning regions and reforms to the National Health Service. The 
recommendations of the Fulton Report have, like those of the 
Northcote–Trevelyan report, continued to be debated, whether 
implemented or not. The recommendations of the Report can be 
summarised as follows: a civil service managed by the Civil Service 
Department under the control of the prime minister and headed by the 
Home of the Civil Service; fusion of generalist and specialist classes 
into a single and unified grading structure, with civil service jobs 
evaluated to determine the grade; recruitment that takes into account 
relevance of university studies for future work; specialist training of 
administrators from the beginning of their careers; establishment of a 
Civil Service College to provide training; more movement in and out 
through late entry, temporary appointments and secondments; 
transferable pensions; managerial responsibility and accountability for 
performance; adaptation of government accounting; hiving off of work 
to non-departmental bodies; introduction of departmental policy 
planning units to ensure that decisions are made in light of possible 
future developments; and governmental review of the progress made 
in implementing changes recommended by the Report (Cmnd 3638, 
1968).  
Successive governments lost interest in the details of the civil service 
reform in the face of serious economic crises, and the top officials 
successively neutralised the measures they saw as most damaging to 
the civil service they knew, even if younger officials, especially those 
with technical qualifications, had rather looked forward to the new 
management opportunities that were proposed. Nevertheless, some 
significant changes were introduced in the early 70s, including a 
rationalisation of the staff grading system to give more opportunities 
for specialist administrators at senior level, the beginnings of 
managerial training for officials, a few experiments with executive 
agencies, and advent of a new accountable management, planning and 
budgeting system. The partial introduction of Fulton’s 
recommendations, which were already rather restricted by the 
Committee’s official terms of reference together with a growing 
concern about the quality and efficiency of the Whitehall machine, left 
the civil service exposed as being ‘underdeveloped’ when the Thatcher 
Government came to power in 1979 armed with a precise conception 
about the role of the ‘mandarins’ as the symbol of a discredited system 
of big government, bureaucratic oppression and state intervention. The 
impact of the subsequent modernisation, which was developed by 
Thatcher’s government and its successors, the governments of John 
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Major and Tony Blair, is the object of our analysis. 
 
 
4. The seeds of the managerialisation process: the Fulton Report 
(1966–1970) 
 
Following definitions and an overview of the institutional development 
of the British government, it’s time to focus on the history of the Civil 
Service before 1979. In the chronological division of history the 
previous block respect to the period analysed by this work is the Fulton 
era, which derived its name from the Fulton Report of 1968. This was 
undoubtedly a major chapter in the historical development of the 
British Civil Service.  
The Fulton Committee was appointed in 1966 and the report was 
produced in 1968. We can consider three reasons that qualify the 
importance of the Fulton Report for the historians. First, it was the first 
major report on the civil service. As a result of the well-known 
Northcote–Trevelyan Report of 1854, there had been major inquiries on 
the service every twenty to thirty years. The most important were the 
Playfair Commission (1875), the Ridley Royal Commission (1887–90), 
the McDonnell Royal Commission (1912–15), the Tomlin Royal 
Commission (1929–31), and the Priestley Royal Commission (1953–55). 
In the decade immediately prior to the Fulton Report the Estimates 
Committee produced the Treasury control of expenditure (1957–8) and 
recruitment (1964–5). The Plowden Committee (1961) had analysed the 
role of public expenditure in the Plowden Report, highlighting much 
about the way Whitehall worked. Fulton continued the periodical line 
of inquiries into the Civil Service. Partly for these reasons, Fulton 
reported little that was truly innovative. This was not a surprise 
because it was the product of a wider contemporary milieu. It 
expressed a very critical position towards the Civil Service because, 
during the relatively long economic decline in Britain, top mandarins 
were very much criticised. They were at the centre of government: it 
was felt that they should accept their part of the blame for the crisis of 
the State. A series of consistently hostile comments highlighted their 
failures (Balogh, 1959; Chapman, 1963; Rees, 1963; Fabian Society, 1964; 
Nicholson, 1967). Considering this climate, it would have been difficult 
for the Fulton Committee to have said much in a reformist way that 
was worth saying and had not already been said. The third reason for 
the importance of this report is more thoroughly discussed. There has 
long been discussion about the influence exerted by the Fulton ideas, 
both in the years immediately after the publication and in the longer 
term (Fry, 1993). Such debate is still going on. Without taking position, 
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it would be wrong to claim that the influence of the Fulton Report 
ended in a few months or, on the other side, argue that everything that 
happened after 1968 had its roots in this report. Its importance, and 
what produced such a debate, lay in the fact that, among all the official 
reports on the civil service, it was the most critical.  
Then, it became particularly influential because it reflected a prevailing 
trend among contemporary reformers towards the civil service. In the 
end, Fulton provided a blueprint for those who sought to challenge the 
bureaucratic status quo. Indeed, it became the point of reference for 
many years to come for both supporters and dissenters. The Fulton 
Report opened with this statement: ‘The Home Civil Service is still 
fundamentally the product of the nineteenth-century philosophy of the 
Northcote–Trevelyan Report. The tasks it faces are those of the second 
half of the twentieth century’ (para.1). The report considered the Civil 
Service ossified in the previous century: the very successful framework 
of the Northcote–Trevelyan continued to resist, and, despite over one 
hundred years of administrative changes, had left the service 
underdeveloped. It issued a list of complaints: specifically, it claimed 
that there was too much of the ‘culture of the generalist’, and specialist 
knowledge was not spread among senior civil servants where it was 
more necessary; the grading system was too rigid and inconvenient to 
exploit skills of civil servants; and these formed a too-elitist institution 
based exclusively on an Oxbridge education.  
Furthermore, there was too much mobility within departments and too 
little career development, and this was partly because the Treasury was 
not able satisfactorily to manage both the economy and the civil service; 
there was a lack of systematic training, a further reflection of the British 
philosophy of administration, and this feature was linked with an 
excessive emphasis upon advising ministers, so that senior officials 
were giving too little attention to the efficient management of their 
departments. Finally, there was a lack of clearly defined responsibility 
and accountability among individual civil servants within the 
hierarchy.  
In order to modernise the Civil Service, Fulton made 158 specific 
recommendations. The bulk of these were focused on overcoming the 
generalist culture, with correspondingly greater emphasis upon the 
role of the specialists; building a classless service; unifying grading; 
giving more equitable opportunities; recruiting graduates from a 
broader range, and having regard for the nature and relevance of 
applicants’ qualifications; curbing excessive mobility between 
departments within Whitehall by employing more coherent career 
planning, with careers resolving around either the economic/finance or 
the social service functions, and transfer between these broad areas 
being allowed only in exceptional circumstances; creating a Civil 
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Service Department, taking away from the Treasury all responsibilities 
for personnel management and staffing and setting up a Civil Service 
College to give a new emphasis to post-entry training at all levels, 
partly to direct greater attention to the management of their 
departments by senior civil servants whose near monopoly on policy 
advice to ministers would be tempered by the enhanced role for 
specialists; creating within each department policy units or think tanks; 
developing ‘accountable management’, with individual civil servants at 
various levels in the hierarchy being given clearly defined 
responsibilities for areas of work for which they would be held 
accountable if not outside Whitehall; and ‘hiving off’ certain functions 
within each ministry to semi-independent bodies or agencies. The aim 
of the Fulton Report was to make the Civil Service more efficient and 
more managerially minded. The Wilson government swiftly endorsed 
the principles embodied in the report. In November 1968 the Civil 
Service Department (CSD) was settled and its Permanent Secretary, Sir 
William Armstrong, was also the Head of the Home Civil Service. The 
CSD was a disempowerment of the Treasury and assumed most of its 
responsibilities for staffing and personnel in the civil service. It was the 
Treasury’s lower moment in the British government. Furthermore, the 
Civil Service College (CSC), established in 1970, was the replacement 
for the Treasury Centre for Administration Studies (CAS). The CAS 
provided training for the new entries in the higher grades of the 
service, insufficient training, according to Fulton. The CSC was 
established to cover a wide range of post-entry training. With this new 
institutional arrangement, the Treasury retired into a corner, weakened 
but not defeated. As we will see, it later returned triumphantly to 
recover failures of the Civil Service Department.  
The implementation continued in the seventies. In 1971 the 
Administrative Class, the bureaucratic elite, was merged with the 
Executive Class and the Clerical Class to form a new Administration 
Group. To provide a more broadly based entry training, the 
Administrative Trainee Scheme was launched. This framework was 
completed by the creation of an ‘Open Structure’ in January 1972. This 
meant that posts at and above under-secretary level were a unified 
category and they would no longer formally belong to any discrete 
administrative group. The last change was in the departments where 
there was a slow introduction of new forms of organisation. Pilot 
schemes created new units of accountable management, but resistance 
to significant changes soon became evident and there was little political 
will or bureaucratic commitment to tackle it. William Armstrong told 
the Expenditure Committee that running a government department 
was not like running a bank (Expenditure Committee, The Civil 
Service, HC 535, q. 1510, 1977). Government was different from 
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business management because of its political dimension. The resistance 
to this change was an example of the ‘mistake-avoiding culture’ 
described by Sir Derek Rayner in the eighties: ‘In business one is 
judged by overall success … the civil servant tends to be judged by 
failure,’ and that influenced officials’ approach to their work and the 
structure’s organisation adopted. The scope for delegation was limited 
by ‘the conventions of public accountability, the highly centralised 
arrangements for the control of the spending by the Treasury and of 
manpower and pay by the Civil Service Department, and the need for 
equity and consistency in the treatment of cases’ (Garrett, 1980:132).  
In most areas of governmental departments it was not possible to 
measure in quantitative or financial terms performance and objectives. 
Without a proper accountable management regime, the information 
and budgeting systems could not operate. Initially, there was some 
progress in the application of the technique called Management by 
Objectives (MBO), which was developed by the private sector in the 
sixties. The CSD had launched 45 projects covering 12,000 managers by 
1974, but the process then was stopped. Fulton had considered MBO as 
a tool for areas of administrative work, but CSD had used it in 
executive operations, quasi-commercial works and support services. As 
Theakston wrote: ‘Some of the schemes had apparently been over-
elaborate and costly to install, but it is also clear that top administrators 
had not been enthusiastic and that the unions were concerned about the 
pressure put on low-ranking officials by target-setting and 
performance-monitoring arrangements.’ (1995:106). A number of 
governmental functions were hived off during the seventies following 
the recommendations of the Fulton Report, but, again, this approach 
was applied only in a few parts of Whitehall. Another prescription was 
to adopt planning units in the departments in order to plan costs and 
activities performed by the department. In 1972 there were ten 
departments of palling unit of one sort or another, but none of them 
was equipped in the sense conceived by the Fulton Report. The 
dominant view in Whitehall was that planning was a political 
responsibility and it should involve only the policy division and not the 
Civil Service as a whole. Dismissive comments by the Permanent 
Secretary to the Department of Education in 1976 about ‘the flabby type 
of futurological day-dreaming’ suggested that there were senior 
officials who did not take planning seriously (Barberis, 1996). 
In the late seventies, accomplice the general economic decline, the 
Fulton Report was considered a failure for the central government. 
Fultonites complained about ‘the lost reforms’. John Garrett’s position 
was that ‘in general the Civil Service of 1980 is not much different from 
the Civil Service of 1968 … The top management of our large and 
technically complex departments of state is still dominated by 
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generalist arts graduates from public schools and Oxbridge.’ Whitehall 
had not been immobile, but ‘there has not been any sense of pushing 
through the great strategy for development that Fulton envisaged. 
After 1969 no politician with sufficient weight cared sufficiently to 
understand the strategy or to see the importance of reform.’ A civil 
servant told Peter Hennessy in 1975 that ‘Fulton was a joke’ because 
‘they accepted everything he said and then did what they wanted to.’ 
Some academic observers argued about the administrative system’s 
‘remarkable capacity to absorb and transform reform proposals, 
adapting them subtly to its perception of what is tolerable’ (Garrett, 
1980:3; Hennessy, 1989:205). The Fulton programme was detuned for 
the whole of the seventies, but a decade later the impact of the report 
was revalued. After 1979 Mrs Thatcher abolished the CSD but provided 
the political commitment necessary to implement the Fulton-shaped 
management reforms (the FMI and the Next Steps) as well as extending 
unified grading.  
However, even if the Thatcher government developed many Fulton 
recommendations, the ideological perspective of the two initiatives was 
very different: Fulton focused on the promotion of more efficiency for a 
big civil service and Thatcher’s reform aim was to roll back the State. 
The Whitehall view in the 1980s and 1990s was that Fulton had been a 
‘milestone’ on the way to the ‘lasting reforms’ of the Thatcher years and 
that it had ‘laid a trail for many of the key changes in the civil service 
over the next two decades’. Also some members of the Fulton 
Committee embraced this view. In broader terms, we can argue an 
indirect influence of Fulton on the Conservative government’s reforms. 
Its proposals were coming from a process of periodical review every 
twenty years seen after the Northcote–Trevelyan Report (Theakston, 
1995:107). The Secretary of the Fulton Committee, Richard Wilding, 
commented on Thatcher’s civil service reforms: ‘Lots of foundations 
were laid by the Fulton Committee … Without accountable 
management it would not be possible to contemplate the Ibbs changes’ 
(Fry, 1985:257–9). Even if, it seems more accurate to argue that the 
Fulton Report planted the seeds for further reforms rather than set 
them up. Thatcher and her successor had their own ideas, views and 
agenda for the civil service. Fulton was not the only source of ideas 
before Thatcher’s era, but it was a very important first step towards the 
administrative reformism of the following years. 
 
5. 1970–1974: Heath’s attempt to modernise the central government 
 
Edward Heath was the Conservative Prime Minister in the period 
1970–4, and he was a former civil servant who was fascinated by 
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reform of the machinery of government. His approach in government 
was managerial, rational and problem solving. Political adversaries 
criticised him as a ‘civil servants’ Prime Minister’ because his key 
advisers were civil servants rather than party or political cronies and 
undoubtedly he had a high regard for his previous institution, and he 
was focused on reform to make government more efficient and to 
achieve better policy-making (Theakston, 1995:111). The plan of the 
Conservatives in 1970 to overhaul the machinery of government was 
wide and, at the same time, very detailed. Heath had a very strong and 
developed vision of the civil service: he ‘hankered after a French-style 
civil service with highly trained officials not afraid to take a strong 
line’. In opposition, Heath had changed the approach of his party to the 
reform-enforcing think-tanks through the creation of a party policy 
group to formulate solutions for a new pattern of department, the 
Public Sector Research Unit, which worked on new analytical, 
budgeting and managerial techniques pioneered in the US government 
and in the private sector, and a team of businessmen to enforce the 
economic tasks. Former senior civil servants advised the Prime Minister 
on the creation of a possible Prime Minister’s Department and a new 
central planning staff (Hennessy, 1989:238). As Kevin Theakston wrote: 
‘The Conservatives’ aim was for “less government, but better 
government” with a more “rational” departmental structure, executive 
functions “hived off”, and clear objectives and systematic control 
supported by new decision-taking methods and by a stronger and more 
strategic central direction’ (1995:108). Whitehall was not opposed to 
these plans, and most senior civil servants had been sharing the same 
general ideas about the central government’s reform. In particular, the 
idea of large and functional departments had wide support at both a 
political and bureaucratic level. The Treasury officials prompted 
practices for evaluating individual spending programmes and their 
results in the annual Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC) 
turn. William Armstrong and Burke Trend were in favour of a new 
‘central capability’ unit which could elaborate a long-term reform plan 
and provide for a strategic vision.  
The government’s plan of reform was set out in October 1970 in the 
White Paper The Reorganisation of Central Government (Cmnd 4506, 
1970). In many ways, in the paper there was a socialist–Fabian 
approach whose aim was to search for a better functioning of 
government and not its reduction. The main reforms were the creation 
of two giant departments, the Department for Trade and Industry and 
the Department of the Environment, the introduction of Programme 
Analysis and Review, the hiving-off of functions and carrying out of 
some activities from departments, and the establishment of the think 
tank, at the service of the Cabinet Office, called Central Policy Review 
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Staff. In broader terms, Heath had built a smaller Cabinet focused on 
established priorities and a system of larger and ‘federal’ departments. 
In the Cabinet there were eighteen people compared to the twenty-one 
of Wilson’s previous government, and the departments were merged, 
passing from nine to four. With this method there was less overlapping 
of functions and, consequently, less duplication and more strategic 
capacity. The unified departments eliminated the interdepartmental 
compromise and divisions in favour of a unified line of management. 
On the other hand, the wideness of departments created some 
problems: the DTI, with 18,000 officials, had a huge heterogeneity and 
an enormous range of very different functions and this framework 
favoured the wide spread of policy responsibility. There was a team of 
nine ministers and four Second Permanent Secretaries. These super-
departments needed a new breed of ministers, effective and 
managerial, but only Peter Walker proved capable of managing the 
new asset, being at DoE (1970–2) and then DTI (1972–4) (Theakston, 
1995). The different ‘sectors’ of the DoE began to drift apart after 1972 
(Radcliffe, 1991). These facts proved that the super-departments were 
too difficult to manage, and, after the energy crisis of 1973, a separate 
Department of Energy was created in January 1974. The successors, 
prime ministers Wilson and Callaghan, completed the dismemberment 
with the division of the DTI into two departments and the setting out of 
the Department of Transport, a function subtracted by the DoE. By the 
mid-1970s, the idea of the giant departments was only a memory. 
The Programme Analysis and Review (PAR), introduced from 1971, 
was established to control and to make a systematic critical analysis of 
objectives, costs, outputs and new options. The aim was to provide 
information to ministers about was going on in their department, in 
order to achieve better policy-making and costs-management. 
However, as a tool for more rational government, PAR was a failure 
because it fell prisoner to political and bureaucratic plays (Gray and 
Jenkins, 1982).  
The idea of basing PAR in the Civil Service Department found 
opposition from the Treasury, which never considered it a priority from 
a financial point of view. To deal with the Treasury, an 
interdepartmental steering committee called PARC was created that 
made more bureaucratic and slow the pace of analysis and programme 
reviews. The Treasury considered PAR as a problem of expenditure-
reduction; it did not take positively the involvement of the CPRS that 
argued for more funds to PAR in order to improve the effectiveness of 
the programme because this meant increasing public expenditure. On 
there side, the largest departments reacted against this spending review 
and tried to protect their plans from cuts and budget reduction. 
Considering these difficulties, PAR did not produce savings on the 
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scale forecasted. Another problem was the diminished political support 
for the initiative because most ministers considered PAR useless or 
irrelevant in influencing their political decisions. Finally, the Heath 
government ‘U-Turn’ at the end of 1972, with its continued expansion 
of public expenditure, completely wasted the PAR system, which 
became pointless without the political support of a government that 
wanted ‘to roll back the State’. It survived, absolutely disempowered, 
after 1974 and it was formally abolished by Mrs Thatcher in November 
1979 (CAB 184/384).  
At the same time, ‘hiving off’ was making very little progress. In 1971 
the Civil Aviation Authority was created, a function hived off from 
Whitehall. In broader terms, the opposition of the Civil Service unions 
to devolution of functions to other bodies was strong. The result was 
that no major public sector areas were privatised in the Heath years. As 
far as civil service manpower was concerned, the outcome of reduction 
was modest: in four years the overall reduction was only 5,000, with the 
number of non-industrial civil servants actually increasing. An 
interesting experiment was the establishment of ‘departmental 
agencies’ that could be considered the ancestors of the Next Steps 
executive agencies, were separate units of accountable management 
operating within a departmental framework. The Defence Procurement 
Executive was created in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in 1971, and 
Derek Rayner, a crucial figure for Thatcher’s civil service reform, was 
its Chief Executive. The Property Services Agency was set up in the 
Department of the Environment (DoE) in 1972, and the Employment 
Services Agency and the Training Services Agency were created in the 
Department of Employment. In January 1974 the Manpower Services 
Agency appeared, a unit contested by officials and established to cut 
civil service staff. Its 18,000 employees were no more considered part of 
the civil service but they regained their civil servant status in 1975 after 
a wave of protest against the government (Theakston, 1995). 
The Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) was, as said, a think tank to 
serve the Cabinet. Probably it was the most visionary and successful 
experiment of this set of reforms for central government promoted by 
Heath’s premiership. It was settled in the early months of 1971, and it 
generated a certain amount of media attention for its autonomy, its 
team of free thinkers at the centre of government and the personality of 
its Chairman, Lord Rothschild, a scientist and former head of research 
at Shell Company. The think-tank was a mix of outsiders and civil 
servants and its staff numbered around 15–20 people. Its aim was to 
clarify and monitor the government’s overall strategy, the selection of 
priorities and the analyses of alternative policy options and long-term 
problems. Its staff defined its role in more subversive terms as thinking 
the unthinkable and the grit in the machine, contesting the over-smooth 
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working of Whitehall (Blackstone and Plowden, 1988).  
As noted, CPRS served the Cabinet as a whole, but the Prime Minister 
was in practice the think tank’s most important interlocutor and it was 
very dependent on prime ministerial support to live and work 
effectively in Whitehall. Rothschild built a very close relationship with 
Heath and became one of the most influential advisers. The Head of 
CPRS and his deputy were protagonist of an exception because they 
were the only civil servants admitted to attend and to speak at Cabinet 
committee meetings. The CPRS had different roles. One was to prepare 
ministers to the Cabinet meeting, briefing them about policies of other 
departments and informing them about proposals of ministers and the 
wider problems of the government.  
The think tank organised and distributed around fifty ‘collective briefs’ 
a year to the whole Cabinet in which short notes or reviewing 
departments’ plans were presented. Departments usually disliked the 
intervention of the CPRS in their domestic policies and ministers 
mostly remained departmentally oriented. However, this was an 
innovation to give a better orientation in the collective ministerial 
decision-making. The group was also committed on more complex and 
longer-term projects, including issues that intersected departmental 
boundaries. For example, it produced reports on energy policy, the 
Concorde aeroplane, the role of the City of London, roads and 
transport and nuclear power, having an indirect influence on Whitehall 
policies on some key problems. The Treasury excluded the CPRS from 
fiscal argumentation and it rejected the idea to open up budget policy-
making. However, the think tank was involved in the annual public 
expenditure round and it became a very important ‘player’ on general 
economic policy issues (Drewry and Butcher, 1991). 
Another function given directly by the Prime Minister to the CPRS was 
to preserve the general strategy of the government. Every six months 
the group organised presentations to the Cabinet, using slides and 
charts, reporting how the government had performed in relation to the 
established objectives and looking at big issues that were rising in the 
public debate. For example, CPRS, in one of these meetings, warned 
about inflation in May 1972, anticipating this happening and 
influencing the Heath government’s development of a statutory 
incomes policy (Fry, 1995).  
After 1974 the CPRS changed its heads in this order: Sir Kenneth Berrill 
(1974–80), Sir Robin Ibbs (1980–2), John Sparrow (1982–3), and it did 
not maintain the same influence and wide-ranging role of the early 
years. The strategy session ended in 1974. The Policy Unit at Number 
Ten gave Wilson, Callaghan and Thatcher more personalised and 
party-oriented advice and at the same time the practice of appointing 
special advisers for Cabinet ministers increased and weakened the role 
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of the think-tank (Theakston, 1995). The CPRS was progressively bound 
into the machinery of government and pushed more into producing 
reports on single issues. As already said, the think-tank depended on 
strong support from the Prime Minister and none of Heath’s successors 
enforced the role of the CPRS: Wilson and Callaghan were not 
interested in developing it, Thatcher considered it useless. The CPRS 
reflected a view of policy-making as a rational, data-analysis and 
technocratic process. In the mid- to late seventies politicians like Wilson 
and Callaghan lost interest in the long-term and overall strategy and 
were forced into crisis. In 1979 the strong leadership of Mrs Thatcher 
came close to abolishing the CPRS, and her style of conviction politics 
and centralised power further compressed its influence and the scope 
of its work for the Cabinet. The think-tank was already badly damaged 
in 1977 for its controversial report on diplomatic service and it was 
further undermined by a leak on health policy in 1982. After the 
election of 1983, Mrs Thatcher abolished it.  
To conclude, Heath’s ‘new style of government’ was not really 
effective. Central government faced the difficulties of giant 
departments’ reform then break-up after 1972. PAR was disempowered 
by the Treasury and the other ministries and it was ineffective in 
reducing public expenditure. Little functions were hived off. The only 
two successes were the administrative unit, but it was too early to 
extend their governance to all the public sector as would happen in the 
late eighties, and the CPRS, but the innovative think-tank worked 
effectively and at its best only during the four years of the Heath 
government. Douglas Hurd, Heath’s number 10 political secretary, 
argued that ‘because of his justified respect for his senior advisers, Mr 
Heath tended to exaggerate what could be achieved by new official 
machinery … a little more scepticism about machinery would have 
been wise.’ John Campbell stated about Heath government ‘an element 
of wishful thinking’ was that ‘institutional tinkering was a solution to 
deep-seated economic problems’ (Douglas Hurd, 1979:92–3; Campbell, 
1993:222). Like Wilson, Heath seemed to have lost interest in reforming 
the central government soon after the oil crisis, and his attention moved 
from reshaping Whitehall to other issues. In some ways, Heath’s 
reformist ideas about the civil service prepared the ground for 
Thatcher’s proposal of change. This was, for example, the introduction 
of businessmen in government, the developing of accountable 
management and the concept of separating policy and management 
through setting-up of administrative units which were the ancestors of 
the executive agencies. These issues came onto the agenda again during 
the Thatcher years and she didn’t lose interest in completing the reform 
of the civil service. As Theakston noted: ‘She took a much more robust 
and confrontational attitude than did Heath to the civil service as an 
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institutional interest and, crucially, maintained tight control over 
budgets to keep up the pressure to find more efficient, streamlined and 
economical methods’ (1995:114). 
 
 
 
6. Malaise and crisis in the public sector: towards Thatcher’s era 
 
The mid-seventies represented the height of the civil service crisis. Its 
size, its veto-power, its inefficiency and inflation-proofed pension were 
perceived as privileges and obstacles to reforming the system. Criticism 
of the civil service from left and right and especially from the public 
was strong. The long and wide economic crisis made by stagflation, the 
1973–4 oil shock and the recourse to the IMF in 1976 meant for the civil 
service, and for the public sector broadly, that reforms were no more 
avoidable. The policies strategy was now focused on economy, cost-
control, cutbacks and the search for greater efficiency. The Treasury’s 
imposition of the cash limits system created a short-term control on 
public expenditure that substituted for economic planning in the long-
term. The CSD planned a cost of central government review and the 
civil service manpower policy was oriented towards cuts: between 1976 
and 1979 there were 15,000 jobs cut (Fry, 1995).  
In the meantime, civil servants felt they were on the cliff of a political 
and organisational change. ‘There had been the disheartening spectacle 
for civil servants of the habitual volte-face by ministers, as much within 
the life-span of a single administration as the product of two-party 
adversary politics. The trauma of frequent policy changes had been 
exacerbated by continuous administrative upheaval.’ The malaise of 
civil servants exploded against Wilson’s break-up of the DTI in 1974, 
because they were ‘tired of being pushed around from pillar to post’. 
The notion of ‘overloaded government’ became common, and this 
feeling was shared by some civil servants, who agreed with the idea 
that central government had too many functions and too many 
administrative and managerial issues to face (Painter, 1975:434). In 
order to face discontent of middle and lower grades of the civil service, 
the CSD created the Wider Issues Review Team in July 1973, which 
produced a report in 1975 called Civil Servants and Change. Contesting 
the stereotype of the mandarin as a middle-aged, London-based, 
Oxbridge-educated man, the report pointed out that a third of staff was 
under 30, two-thirds of the clerical class were women, and less than a 
fifth worked in London. Then the report put forward a programme for 
improving staff relations and conditions. The idea of the Wider Issues 
was to move from the traditional civil-service establishment approach 
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to a modernisation towards a human resources and personnel 
management approach. However, the context in which the report 
appeared was not favourable to reform in that way developing a more 
managerial approach. Indeed, to promote managerial techniques 
against a backdrop of public hostility towards the civil service, public 
expenditure crisis, cash limits, staff cuts and deteriorating industrial 
relations was almost impossible. At the same time, the old model of 
government pivoted on the ‘good employer’ was one of the causes of 
the disease. The Priestley pay system, with its idea of a ‘fair 
comparisons’ principle in calculating civil service pay, came easily 
under attack by the public. To stem this friction, the Conservative and 
Labour governments of the seventies chose to limit, defer or stage civil 
service pay increases.  
The easiest way to control pay for the government in the crisis of the 
late seventies was to make the public sector an example for the other 
workers. Indeed, in 1976 the Labour government suspended pay 
research and the Treasury’s cash limits now established criteria for pay 
bargaining and settlements. This situation transformed the industrial 
relations in the civil service. Until the late sixties, civil service relations 
with trade unions had been relatively calm: consensus and stability in 
staff relations were the result of fifty years of Whitleyism (this was the 
practice established between government and trade unions to agree 
certain benefits for civil servants in return for the surrender of the right 
to strike). But by the end of the seventies, the crisis of Whitleyism had 
started, and civil service industrial relations became very complicated. 
The civil service was intensively unionised. The behaviour of civil 
service unions became very similar to that of the mainstream unions: 
they began pressing their interests with greater insistence and were 
willing to use the strike weapon, which returned in the industrial 
relations of the public sector.  
The first civil service strike occurred in 1973 as a protest against the 
Heath government’s income policy. In 1979 there was a series of 
selective strikes that defeated the Labour government’s attempt to 
reform civil service pay policy. A new adversarial moment was created 
by the unions and this meant that ‘Whitleyism is dead, in spirit if not in 
body’ (Drewry and Butcher, 1995). John Garrett wrote in 1980: ‘This 
harsher climate had taken its toll on the civil service before the 
Conservative Party returned to office,’ and he added ‘the innovative 
and optimistic atmosphere of the late 1960s has given way to a sour 
hostility between the Civil Service unions and the government and 
between politicians and the Service’ (Garrett, 1980:191).  
To conclude, the problems of low morale, discontent with the pay 
system and deteriorated industrial relations were inherited by Mrs 
Thatcher, not created by her. The reforms of the new Conservative 
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government elected in May 1979 would change the structure, the 
functioning and the profession of the civil service; these reforms 
became a ‘critical juncture’ in the administrative history of the United 
Kingdom because the most profound overhaul since Northcote–
Trevelyan was made and the most ambitious attempt to reform the civil 
service of the twentieth century was started. 
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Chapter One. the rise of managerialism in the Civil 
Service. Efficiency, Economy and Effectiveness in the 
Thatcher years 
 
 
1. The political, economic, social and administrative environment in 
the early eighties 
 
The political impact of the New Right on public management  
 
The conservative government came to office in 1979 with a clear 
commitment to reduce the size of the government and eliminate its 
waste and inefficiency. This aim was linked directly with the 
administrative reform and to reassert political control over the civil 
service. The determination of the Prime Minister regarding this 
objective was particularly in evidence. Margaret Thatcher’s attitude 
towards the civil service was described by one of her colleagues as 
‘ferocious’ (Cosgrave, 1985). She considered the public administration 
an obstacle and a hindrance to government action in reforming the 
state. She came to office determined to tackle and overhaul it (Thatcher, 
1993). In developing her vision on the civil service, Mrs Thatcher had 
been strongly influenced by a number of close advisers. In 1978, Leslie 
Chapman, a former official of the Property Services Agency, wrote a 
book entitled Your Disobedient Servant, in which he harshly criticised the 
civil service organisation and management. His arguments were 
considered sympathetically by the Conservative opposition, and he was 
appointed Thatcher’s adviser during the 1979 election campaign.  
Chapman was passed over following the election in favour of Sir Derek 
Rayner. Rayner, who was a member of top management at Marks & 
Spencer, arrived at Downing Street number 10 with the idea of infusing 
managerial behaviours of the private sector into the public one. Less 
severe in his attitude to the civil service than Chapman, he devised, 
with the strong support of Mrs Thatcher, an efficiency strategy which 
used civil servants themselves to identify areas of waste and 
duplication and to make recommendations for change (Metcalfe and 
Richards, 1987). Late in the terms of the first Thatcher government, Sir 
John Hoskyns, the head of the Prime Minister’s policy unit, also 
threaded into the civil service debate. Whitehall, he sustained, lacked 
strategic direction, a deficit which should be considered particularly 
severe in the context of Britain’s economic decline (Hoskyns, 1983). He 
argued that the civil servants had lost their strategy for national revival. 
This problem was exacerbated by their political neutrality, which made 
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it necessary for them to withdraw the ‘last five per cent of commitment’ 
to governmental objectives. He believed that neutrality should be 
abandoned and the Whitehall professional bureaucracy should be 
overcome in favour of a spoils system (Hoskyns, 1983). With the 
introduction of this reform, individuals would be committed to change 
more than professional civil servants. From this debate a number of 
problems linked to the civil service were delivered to the public debate. 
First, the aim of the new Conservative government was to reduce the 
power of civil servants. In pursuit of this objective, the government 
proceeded with a strong commitment to attack the influence of civil 
service unions, to decrease the rights of civil servants to engage in 
politically related activity and to introduce measures designed to 
compress civil servants’ privileges (Pointing, 1986).  
Second, the civil service’s efficiency in implementing the government 
programme had to be increased. The Prime Minister soon made it clear 
that she was willing to ‘skip a civil service generation’ in order to 
promote those whom she believed would pursue government policy 
with vigour and effectiveness (Hennessy, 1990: 631).  
Third, the size of the civil service would be reduced. The cuts were 
considered necessary not only to shape the reduction of public 
spending, but were also politically performance in order to 
demonstrate government’s determination to decrease the weight of the 
state.  
Fourth, private-sector solutions would be adopted to deal with public-
sector inefficiencies. These issues were present in the administrative 
debate by the mid-60s; in fact, the Plowden Report of 1961 argued for a 
‘management trainee’ for the civil servants. Privatisation and 
managerial methods would be pursued with considerable vigour. 
Fifth, non-departmental bodies whose primary rationale was deemed 
to be survival rather than productivity would be shut down (see Cmnd 
7797, 1979). 
On this point, Richard Vinen (2009) writes: ‘Thatcher’s government 
seemed to have acted with a determination and ruthlessness that had 
not been in major Western democracies since 1945.’ 
 
The social context: the distrust of government and bureaucracy 
 
The decline in Britain’s economic fortunes was accompanied by 
increasing criticism in the community regarding the size and the role of 
government. As the recession grew worse and Britain’s economic 
standing deteriorated relative to other major industrialised nations, the 
search for a scapegoat began. Government provided a ready and easily 
identifiable target (Gamble, 1986). When the Keynesianism paradigm, 
the role of government had been considered as a positive force for 
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economic and social development. Fiscal policy provided the essential 
means through which cyclical fluctuations in economic activity could 
be moderated. The higher the level of public expenditure, the greater 
the leverage which fiscal policy could exercise. Keynesians believed it 
proper for the state to intervene in the market to provide public goods 
and to mitigate the effects of free market power on the poor and the 
disadvantaged. Given these beliefs, there had been a consistent 
propensity for state expenditure to grow as a proportion of gross 
economic growth had been strong and standards of living continued to 
rise, the community’s faith in the right and the capacity of government 
to recover economic and social problems had remained unsolved 
(Zifcak, 1994). However, with the changes in economic fortunes, the 
critics of government became more numerous and their influence 
greater than before. In the intellectual arena, the most powerful were F. 
A. Hayek and the American Milton Friedman, both of whom were 
economists, and both of whom had a vision for society. Hayek believed 
that central planning was both politically dangerous and economically 
inefficient. It was politically dangerous because it reduced individual 
liberty in favour of political coercion, increased the power of the State, 
weakened the role of Parliament and undermined the rule of law by 
investing government officials with considerable discretion. Planning 
was economically inefficient because it damaged competition, 
increased the prevalence of monopolies and comprised 
entrepreneurialism (Hayek, 1944; 1960). Friedman too fought against 
effects of big government. He argued that slow growth and declining 
productivity called for a fundamental reassessment of the role of 
government in economic activity.  
Continued governmental intervention at the expense of market 
competition threatened not only to destroy economic prosperity but 
also to reduce human freedom of choice (Friedman, 1962). These ideas 
were embraced enthusiastically by think tanks and politicians alike. 
Through its ‘Hobart series’, the Institute for Economic Affairs 
introduced Hayek’s and Friedman’s ideas to a wider audience. It 
popularised Niskanen’s work on the pathology of bureaucracy and 
held several symposia on the role and size of government (Zifcak, 
1994). The Centre for Policy Studies took a similar path. It had been 
founded by Sir Keith Joseph in 1974. Margaret Thatcher later became its 
president. Both Joseph and Thatcher cited Hayek and Friedman with 
approval and it was Joseph who later assumed primary responsibility 
for carrying the arguments of the New Right from the academic into the 
political arena. The Centre was also the intellectual home of other 
prominent Thatcher advisers, such as Sir Alan Walters and Sir John 
Hoskyns. Politicians, advisers and analysts alike believed that 
responsibility for the decline in British fortunes should be laid at the 
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feet of the government. Only if government strictly limited its 
interventions in the market, economy and society could Britain’s 
economic decline be reversed. Just as the role of government was 
attacked, so also was that of the civil service. From a theoretical 
perspective, public choice theorists such as Tullock and Niskanen 
(1971) argued that bureaucrats should be regarded as rent-seekers, their 
principal objective being to maximise their budgets and increase the 
influence of their bureaus. These theorists proposed that, unlike private 
entrepreneurs who would not supply goods beyond the point at which 
their price equalled their cost, the welfare of bureaucrats rose 
continuously as agency budget increased. Hence, individual 
bureaucrats had little incentive to restrain their output even where the 
marginal value of providing a service exceeded its marginal cost. 
Consequently, bureaucrats themselves were central to explaining why 
government had grown significantly. These anti-bureaucratic views 
found a ready audience in the Conservative political leadership 
(Dunleavy, 1986).  
Public sector management was also subjected to harsh criticism. 
Influential business writers compared management in the public sector 
unfavourably with that in the private sector (Drucker, 1977). They 
believed that the problem with public sector institutions was that they 
were rewarded not for effective performance but for honouring their 
promises. Hence, there was a genetic tendency for expenditure to grow 
and for delivery to take precedence over productivity. In the policy 
sphere, public sector management relied too much on civil servants’ 
special status and too little on science, planning and rational analysis 
(Johnson, 1985). The management theorists argued that governmental 
affairs would be conducted more effectively if the tenets of private 
sector management were adhered to. As this view became more 
popular, techniques developed in the private sector, such as zero-based 
budgeting, programme budgeting and cost–benefit analysis, were tried 
in government but without notable success (Wildavsky, 1979). 
Politicians, too, picked up the thread, berating the civil service for its 
inefficiency and lauding the productivity of private entrepreneurial 
initiative. Both the Heath and the Thatcher governments employed 
private sector managers as consultants on civil service efficiency on the 
premise that their diagnosis would be both sharper and more relevant 
than that developed by the civil service itself. 
 
The economic paradigm: the end of Keynesianism 
  
The economic situation which prevailed in Britain in the 1970s was 
quite unlike that in the previous decade. The 1960s had been 
characterised by a great affluence: gross domestic product increased 
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continuously, public expenditure and public services expanded and 
personal income rose. Inflation was low and under control, there was 
full employment and the economy was growing constantly albeit 
slowly. In the 1970s occurred a reversal of these trends. Inflation 
increased dramatically, unemployment reached levels unseen since the 
Great Depression, the balance worsened and the dollar value of the 
pound declined significantly. The Keynesian paradigm, which had 
prevailed for several decades, was confounded by stagflation, paving 
the way for the ascendancy of the monetarist alternative. This upheaval 
set the scene for a strong attack against the excesses of public 
expenditure. Influenced heavily by monetarist economists at home and 
abroad, the Conservative party concluded the government should no 
longer engage actively in demand management. Rather, the market 
economy was best left to correct itself. The process of market self-
correction could only be obstructed by active governmental 
intervention in the economy, since public sector growth crowded out 
private sector investments, thereby reducing the capacity of the 
economy to re-establish its equilibrium.  
The government’s first expenditure White Paper was a clear 
demonstration of these beliefs. It argued that inflation would be 
attacked by controlling the rate of monetary growth and reducing the 
public sector borrowing requirement. Taxes would be reduced to 
restore individual and corporate incentives for investment. Public 
expenditure would be cut to reduce borrowing and taxation. There 
were no measures proposed to secure full employment, marking the 
decisive departure from the post-war Keynesian consensus (Gamble, 
1994). The government’s economic policy had substantial implications 
for the level and composition of public expenditure. Describing public 
expenditure as being at the core of the country’s economic problems, 
the government announced its intention progressively to reduce public 
spending in volume terms for the following four years. The reduction 
in expenditure was necessary to decrease the rate of growth of money 
supply in the same period.  
The government did not reach its expenditure targets in the first term. 
Nevertheless, its attempts to cut expenditure were serious and they 
included substantial reductions in education, housing, environment 
and social security. These cuts were supplemented by more general 
measures instituted to increase control of the public expenditure. The 
government imposed cash limits, made cuts in civil service personnel 
and launched a concrete attack on levels of public sector pay. It was 
these changes, more than deficit spending reductions, that contributed 
to spread a feeling among civil servants that they were under attack. 
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The administrative context: the seeds of managerialisation 
 
Since the Plowden Report (Cmnd 1432, 1961) and moreover with the 
Fulton Report (Cmnd 3638, 1968), the civil service itself had been faced 
with the problems of managerial modernisation. Lord Fulton, echoing 
criticisms made by Lord Plowden in 1961, argued that in its structures 
and methods of operation the civil service had placed too great an 
emphasis on the provision of public policy advice. As a result, it had 
neglected the task of effectively managing governmental business. This 
was a serious problem given that the administration’s principal activity 
was not in fact policy development but service delivery. To accomplish 
this goal, Fulton made a wide-ranging series of recommendations for 
change. The most relevant of these for present purposes was that 
‘accountable management’ should be introduced throughout the Civil 
Service. Accountable management involved the designation of discrete 
units in governmental departments whose outputs could be measured 
against costs and other criteria and whose performance could 
effectively be controlled (Zifcak, 1994). The Fulton Report argued that 
wherever measures of achievement could be established in quantitative 
or economic terms and where individuals could be held responsible for 
output and cost, accountable units should be established (Cmnd 3638, 
1968). Once established, these units would be connected into 
commands, each of which would be responsible for the achievement of 
specified programme objectives. These programme objectives in turn 
would be related to corporate and governmental objectives through a 
process of strategic planning (Garrett, 1980). In the following years, not 
all went well for the managerialist cause. The new Civil Service 
Department took responsibility for initiating Management by 
Objectives (MBO). It did it by setting a number of experimental projects 
that, however, did not satisfy their reformers’ expectations. This was 
because an information system necessary to support managerial 
decision-making was either absent or inadequate, advice for MBO 
specialists had not always been available and lack of commitment from 
senior staff had sapped morale and enthusiasm among public servants 
(Hancock, 1974; Garrett, 1980). MBO finished its formal development in 
the mid-seventies, but the techniques introduced survived on a random 
basis in different areas of the administration. The next major attempt to 
introduce a ‘managerial reform’ was the Heath government’s 
Programme Analysis and Review (PAR). This was a programme which 
focused on policy evaluation rather than managerial improvement, but 
it shared much in common with accountable management. PAR’s 
authors sought to make policy formulation more rational (Heclo and 
Wildavsky, 1981: 280). Under the supervision of an inter-departmental 
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committee, each year every department would evaluate specific blocks 
of policy. The evaluation of the precedent would establish the basis for 
future policy development. However, PAR too was not really 
successful. Insufficiently appreciating the differences between ‘running 
a company and running the country’, the technique never successfully 
mixed policy review and political decision making (Zifcak, 1994). 
Consequently, it was marginalised as the government became more 
preoccupied in managing economic decline (Pliatzky, 1982). The 
demise of PAR did not stop the attempts to improve civil service 
management. Accountable management, for example, continued to 
emerge in other guises. Pressure was applied by the House of 
Commons Expenditure Committee to improve the reporting of public 
expenditure to Parliament by classifying it in terms of the objectives it 
was to meet and by developing tangible measures of performance. 
These examined the operation of departmental units, subjecting their 
performance to critical scrutiny in the light of their stated managerial 
objectives (Zifcak, 1994). 
Thus, while the programmes and managerial reform failed and died, 
each of them left its mark and slowly the managerial ethos began to 
spread through Whitehall’s passages. While this low-key but steady 
progress received little attention in academic debate and the popular 
media, it was sufficiently significant enough to later form the 
foundation for Whitehall’s response to the Thatcher government’s 
demands for a greater improvement of managerial competences. That 
response was the establishment of the Efficiency Unit in 1979 and the 
development of MINIS and FMI in 1982. 
 
2. The new ‘right’ approach to the Civil Service and administrative 
reform 
 
Thatcher’s Opposition and the Civil Service 
 
The problem-solving approach that characterised Edward Heath’s 
approach to policy making in opposition in the 1970s was not the one 
that Margaret Thatcher adopted after the election as Conservative 
leader in 1975. Mrs Thatcher, Sir Keith Joseph and Angus Maude, who 
was made chairman of the Research Department, had been of the view 
in the years down to 1970 that principles and ideas should be settled in 
advance of details. So, as the historian of the Research Department 
observed, between 1975 and 1979 ‘there was not imposing array of 
policy groups as before the 1970’ and few resulting policy pledges by 
the standards of modern Oppositions, and yet the Conservative Party 
‘succeeded … in building for itself a clear identity’ (Ramsden, 1980: 
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308–309). As the only valuable principles and ideas available were 
those provided by market philosophy, the Conservative leadership’s 
identity at least was bound to be an economic liberal one, and this time, 
in contrast with the 1960s, it was not just within the Party that the 
intellectual tide was running in that direction. Margaret Thatcher ran 
over this vision and she moved radical ideas into the mainstream of the 
Conservative Party. Heath had moved in different directions, for a 
while at the same time, and, not surprisingly, he lost his seat. Such had 
been the humiliating manner in which the Heath government had left 
office that one of the Conservative policy groups subsequently formed 
was concerned with the authority of Government, examining how the 
‘crisis of the authority’ could be fought (Conservative Party Archive: 
PG 40/75/18). That overload at the centre combined with the exercise 
of trade union power had rendered Britain ‘ungovernable’ was a 
fashionable belief in the wake of the events of 1974 (King, 1976), but the 
situation was never beyond remedy by a different form of political 
leadership. The IMF crisis of 1976 and its imposed settlement marked 
the end of the Keynesian era, but well before that economic 
neoliberalism had gained centre stage. Nevertheless, on economic 
policy issues, the writings of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman 
gained increasing attention, and the implications of what became in 
character and Anglo-American debate about the role of government 
were encapsulated in the title of a contemporary book, Democracy in 
Deficit: The political legacy of Lord Keynes (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977). 
Though an organisation like the Institute for Economic Affairs would 
promote the discussion in the form of Bureaucracy: Servant or master? 
(Niskanen et al., 1973), it tended to have little direct interest in the 
machinery of central government as such or in the organisation of the 
Civil Service as had the Bow Group in the past or the Centre for Policy 
Studies from 1975 onwards, and the Adam Smith Institute was formed 
too late to be influential at that time. However, the opposition to 
bureaucratic expansion and self-seeking and budget maximisation was 
as clear as it was in the growing body of public choice literature 
(Buchanan, 1960, 1975; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Tullock, 1965, 1976; 
Niskanen, 1971). Whatever the elaboration of such theorising, its 
impact on reality seems almost certainly to have been summarised by 
Leslie Chapman’s book Your Disobedient Servant, published in 1978, for 
this was an insider account which revealed gross operational 
inefficiency and waste of public money in the Ministry of Public 
Building and Works and its successor, the Property Services Agency, on 
a scale that inspired demands for cuts in the Civil Service numbers and 
activities. ‘The incoming government might well, as immediately as it 
takes office, set up a Committee on Government Expenditure, like the 
Geddes Committee of 1922, to recommend cuts and to report within a 
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matter of months,’ Nigel Lawson wrote to John Nott in November 1975, 
advocating ‘the adoption of some variant of the old “balanced budget” 
doctrine’ involving cash limits and staff controls.  
Lawson added: ‘The Civil Service has become an interest group just like 
any other. It is as keen to reduce the number of civil servants as MPs 
are to reduce the number of Members of Parliament. Yet the number of 
civil servants has got to be reduced. Thus it is necessary to increase the 
power of Ministers vis-a-vis officials. This will not be easy, but may be 
facilitated in two ways: first, by requiring that interdepartmental 
meetings of officials may not take place without the prior agreement of 
ministers involved, who may ask for an account of the meeting 
afterwards; and, second, by having more meetings of Ministers without 
officials present’ (Conservative Party Archive: CRD 4/13/19). As it can 
be noted, the concerns about the ‘conservatism’ of the Civil Service and 
its protection of bureaucrats’ vested interests were strong in the higher 
echelons of the Conservative Party of the time. The two most 
prominent policy documents produced by the Conservative opposition 
under Mrs Thatcher were The Right Approach and The Right Approach to 
the Economy, and the best-known policy document of the Heath years in 
opposition was A New Style of Government. These documents 
encapsulated their differing approaches and priorities. The scale of the 
work done in relation to the machinery of government in the years 
down to 1970 tended anyway, though, to diminish the need for further 
extensive activity, especially as it had been wildly ranging and an 
economic liberal agenda could be selected from its varied proposals. As 
early as 1975, David Howell elaborated an agenda for the party’s Public 
Sector Policy Group. It involved ‘questioning and subjecting to 
systematic analysis the purposes and objectives of a wide range of 
government activities in almost all government departments’ and ‘a 
campaign to replace traditional departmental hierarchies with proper 
management structures in all appropriate areas throughout Whitehall’ 
and ‘hiving off activities’ and ‘creating an overall framework for better 
management control, better information flows, and a more effective 
political input into and control of Whitehall’.  
Thus John Barnes, who was involved in the machinery of government 
preparations in both the 1960s and 1970s, wrote: ‘The Conservative 
Party has noted the ratchet effect of socialism, but their condemnation 
of the politics and policies of consensus as practised since the War has 
to some very considerable extent ignored the mechanisms which gave 
direction to the consensus, the most obvious of which is the part played 
by the Civil Service in policy making.’ In this view, the Civil Service 
was exercising excessive power. It was a ‘closed corporation’ that 
needed to be opened up and brought under closer political control 
(Conservative Party Archive: CRD 3/13/5). The seeds of the Thatcher 
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revolution had been planted in the mid-1960s with the people in the 
Conservative Research Department and the Public Sector Research Unit 
being the original directors of the process of reform settled in the 1980s 
and made possible by the Thatcher factor. 
 
 
 
The Hoskyns versus Wass debate about the Civil Service reform 
 
As it has been written, the first Thatcher government did not choose to 
exempt the Higher Civil Service from its economic neoliberal beliefs. 
Norman Strauss, one of Mrs Thatcher’s political advisers recruited for a 
time from Unilever, detected disdain for Ministers in the Higher Civil 
Service, the culture of which, he believed, was antipathetic to change. 
Strauss and Sir John Hoskyns, the head of the Prime Minister’s Policy 
Unit, had wanted a Prime Minister’s Department established to 
emphasise political control over the civil service (Churchill Archives, 
HOSK 2/3). Mrs Thatcher turned it down because she did make more 
use than her predecessor had done of long-existing prime ministerial 
powers related to senior appointments to try to promote cultural 
change in this way. Once he had left to become the Director General of 
the Institute of Directors, Sir John Hoskyns went on to argue for an 
explicitly politicised Senior Civil Service. Sir Douglas Wass, once he 
had left the Treasury and the Head of Home Civil Service, came to the 
defence of the career Civil Service. There then ensued the first debate 
about this matter for generations, involving, inevitably, considerations 
of existing Minister–civil servant relationships; and, if the controversy 
had never been at the centre of political debate, events like the GCHQ 
affair, the Ponting case, the Westland affair and the Spycatcher case 
soon became facts that shed light on the issue.  
Britain was ‘fighting for its life’, Sir John Hoskyns declared in 1982, and 
yet its government had to rely on a Higher Civil Service which was 
pessimistic about the chances of success in this struggle. Sir John had 
spent twenty years in a computer business before selling it, after which 
he joined the Centre for Policy Studies in 1975, where he wrote policy 
papers for Mrs Thatcher as Leader of the Opposition and for the 
Shadow Cabinet. He served in Downing Street with his own terms of 
reference as the Prime Minister’s Senior Policy Adviser. As his beliefs in 
electoral reform suggested, Sir John was hardly the conventional 
Conservative businessman, admitting to having voted for Labour in 
1970 and for the Liberals in 1974. He then converted to the 
Conservative faith, not so much for the Conservative cause itself, but 
for the confidence inspired by the leadership of Margaret Thatcher. 
‘Radical aims, better organisation, proper methods, new politics and 
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fresh thinking must go together,’ Sir John argued. ‘It’s all or nothing. 
Turning a country around is a big job’ (Hoskyns, 1984:10). He strongly 
believed in the opportunity of a ‘strategic leadership’ (Hoskyns, 
1983:140). The leadership vacuum followed from a structure in which ‘a 
deeply pessimistic Civil Service looks for political leadership … to a 
tiny handful of exhausted Ministers. The same Ministers look in vain to 
their officials to provide policy options which, to be any use, would 
have to be too “politically controversial” for the officials to think of’ 
(ibidem:143). This was why ‘most post-war Governments have, like 
hamsters in a treadmill, gone round and round in a strategic box too 
small to contain any solutions’ (Hoskyns, 1984:8). Sir John did not 
believe that the ‘antique conventions, culture and machinery, which 
failed us between 1950 and 1980, [would] somehow succeed between 
1980 and 2000.’ To overcome the inefficiency of government Sir John 
proposed ‘the Prime Minister should no longer be restricted to the 
small pool of career politicians in Westminster forming a Government.’ 
The workload on Ministers had to be reduced, though Sir John did not 
say in what ways. Whitehall had to be organised ‘for strategy and 
innovation, as well as for day-to-day political survival’. It had to be 
possible ‘to bring adequate numbers of high-quality outsiders into the 
Civil Service’ (ibid.: 14–15).  
Sir John was a strong supporter of the American spoils system model: 
‘We need to replace a large number of senior civil servants with 
politically appointed officials on contracts, at proper market rates, so 
that experienced top-quality people would be available. They might 
number between ten and twenty per department. Some of them would 
fill senior positions in the department. Others might work as policy 
advisers to the Cabinet Minister concerned. There is no reason why, in 
some cases, the Permanent Secretary should not be an outsider, with a 
career official as Second Permanent Secretary responsible for the day-
to-day running of the department.’ The political appointees would 
come from private business, and Sir John wanted taxpayer support for 
political parties to maintain shadow teams of officials in Opposition 
which would then accompany their party into office. In addition to this 
new energy in the departments, Sir John said that there was ‘a need for 
a new small department, responsible for the development and 
overseeing of the Government’s total strategy across all departments, 
integrating policy and politics into a single whole’. He had in mind a 
‘reconstructed Cabinet Office’ which would be ‘headed and partly 
staffed from outside, though it would also include a substantial number 
of high-flying career officials’ (Hoskyns, 1983:146–7). While 
disapproving of the effects of the Official Secrets Act (Hoskyns, 
1984:12), Sir John did not allow his ‘radicalism’ to be deflected by 
suggested reforms, for his ambition was to parallel the changes brought 
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about by the Rayner scrutinies in the area of operations management 
with ‘a management revolution in policy work’, the very area in which 
higher civil servants believed themselves to be ‘already expert’. 
Nothing less would be appropriate for the ‘new politics’ started in 1979 
(ibid.:9).  
Towards the end of his career, when in the position of Permanent 
Secretary of the Treasury and joint Head of the Home Civil Service, and 
then in early retirement when delivering the Reith Lectures for 1983, Sir 
Douglas Wass established himself as the main defender of the career 
Civil Service against contemporary critics such as Sir John Hoskyns. Sir 
Douglas observed: ‘Looking back on nearly forty years’ experience of 
government, I am struck not by its deficiencies … but by its strengths. I 
am struck too by the adaptability it has shown to changing 
circumstances, always preserving what was best, but being ready to 
discard what had become obsolete and irrelevant. This evolutionary 
quality of our system of government reflects our pragmatic and 
cautious approach as a nation to change and reform.’ While he 
instinctively warmed to this approach, Sir Douglas recognised that it 
could breed ‘complacency and suspicion of change’. He saw himself as 
favouring change. The bywords which he adhered to in evaluating the 
need for change were efficiency and responsiveness: ‘Efficiency because 
of the incessant need for any institution to achieve its objectives at 
lowest cost to those who have to bear it, and responsiveness because 
the test of government in any democracy is ultimately its acceptability 
to those it governs’ (Wass, 1984:119). Sir Douglas was certainly not 
lacking in suggestions for institutional change. While he believed the 
Cabinet to be ‘in real terms … the ultimate embodiment of the 
executive government in this country’ (ibid.:10), it was a body that he 
thought needed to strengthen its directing capability. His mechanism 
for achieving this resembled the Central Policy Review Staff abolished 
by the Thatcher government in 1983, though he was critical of the think 
tank’s record (ibid.:36–40).  
A believer at least in a form of ‘open government’ to try to raise the 
level of public debate and the quality of the information to which the 
public has access, Sir Douglas proposed the establishment of ‘a single, 
large, permanent Royal Commission from which panels would be 
drawn to carry out specific studies. It would be the Commission itself, 
not the Government, which decided what issues to investigate, what 
terms of reference to give its panels and who should sit on them’ 
(ibid.:115–6). As far as concerned his view about the relationship 
between politics and administration, Sir Douglas argued ‘in the real 
world, Ministers and civil servants are inextricably mixed up with each 
other. And they can only function on the basis of a close and 
harmonious partnership in which each has the trust of the other.’ Sir 
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Douglas was aware that ‘in recent years this trust has not always been 
taken for granted’ (ibid.:116). He denied that the Civil Service had any 
right to an independent role or that it generally sought one. The 
existing system was responsive to ministerial initiatives, and he saw no 
need to go beyond the recently introduced practice of bringing a small 
number of politically committed special advisers into government 
departments. He considered disadvantageous adopting American-style 
organisation whereby political appointees automatically took over the 
leading administrative posts in departments upon a change in 
government rather than appoint a small number of special advisers to 
support ministers and professional bureaucrats. Sir Douglas added: 
‘Businessmen or academics cannot be expected to know how to run a 
government department any more than a civil servant can be expected 
to manage an industrial concern without a lot of training and 
experience. The mechanics, the procedures and methods of 
government, the constraints of administrative process, all these things 
are new to outsiders; and because they are not familiar with them, they 
make mistakes which experienced hands would not. One of the virtues 
of the British system is that we change Governments smoothly, without 
the violent dislocation which is a feature of the Washington scene.’  
Furthermore, Sir Douglas said, the politicisation of the Senior Civil 
Service would lead to a situation where ‘the time horizon over which 
policy is formulated would become markedly biased towards the short 
term. One of the advantages of a permanent cadre of heads of 
departments is that their very performance inclines them to take the 
long view of the problem they are dealing with.’ If ‘a senior post were 
no longer filled by career officials’, Sir Douglas observed, ‘then 
Ministers would lose much of the benefit of a department’s collective 
and historical knowledge’, and he added, ‘from the point of view of the 
Service as a career, young men and women of ability would not be 
attracted if they knew that the most senior posts were likely to be 
denied to them. There would be a major problem too of ethics over 
business appointments when political advisers and managers left the 
Service on a change of Administration.’ Sir Douglas believed that a 
professional civil servant was an official who had ‘a skill of professional 
calibre’ which required a ‘mastery of the arts of politics as well as a 
command of intellectual analysis and of management’ and that the 
senior official could aspire to ‘an objectivity that sometimes escapes the 
political enthusiast’ (Wass, 1984:43–59). When Sir Douglas Wass, 
defending the Civil Service, criticised the former Central Policy Review 
Staff for being too small to really question areas of departmental 
expertise and initiatives (Wass, 1984:37–8), he proved to be a 
comfortable target for the scorn of Lord Rothschild, the former Director 
of the CPRS, who talked of Wass’s ‘departmental dream world’ 
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(Hennessy et al., 1985, p.107). The Prime Minister’s Policy Unit, mainly 
composed of Conservatives, was better suited to the task of attempting 
to fill ‘the hole at the centre’ of the system. If the Thatcher government 
wanted centrist advice, this was always unlikely to be in short supply 
from the Higher Civil Service. Yet the Thatcher government showed no 
sign of wishing to emulate the Reagan administration in the United 
States, which to a limited extent had a similar political vision, and 
which made a determined effort to impose its will on permanent 
bureaucracy through the vigorous use of provision for political 
appointments (Saltman and Lund, 1981:337–413). The executive did not 
embrace the Re-skilling Government proposal for experiments in French-
style ministerial cabinets which Sir John Hoskyns with others carefully 
constructed and costed and then published in 1986 after wide-ranging 
consultations (Hoskyns et al., 1986; Institute of Directors, 1986a; 1986b). 
The Thatcher government preferred to skip it and to work with the 
Senior Civil Service, managing a relationship that was particularly 
difficult in the first term and that represented the constitutional 
dialectic between the elected government and the career Service. 
 
 
The 1979 Conservative Manifesto 
 
In the Conservative Manifesto of 1979, the programme of the first 
Thatcher government, there was not a direct reference to the reform of 
the Civil Service. However, in different parts of the text could be found 
indirect clues of the reform that the Conservative government was 
preparing for the bureaucratic machine of the United Kingdom. In the 
second chapter, entitled ‘Restoring the Balance’, the Manifesto 
announced: ‘Any future government which sets out honestly to reduce 
inflation and taxation will have to make substantial economies, and 
there should be no doubt about our intention to do so. We do not 
pretend that every saving can be made without change or complaint; 
but if the Government does not economise, the sacrifices required of 
ordinary people will be all the greater.’ In another passage the 
programme of the Conservative party maintained that ‘the reduction of 
waste, bureaucracy and over-government will also yield a substantial 
savings’ (Conservative Manifesto, 1979). And again in the paragraph 
dedicated to trade union reform: ‘In bringing about economic recovery, 
we should all be on the same side. Government and public, 
management and unions, employers and employees, all have a 
common interest in raising productivity and profits, thus increasing 
investment and employment, and improving real living standards for 
everyone in a high-productivity, high-wage, low-tax economy’ 
(Conservative Manifesto, 1979). The manifesto was expressed in broad 
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political terms. It underlined the principles of the Conservative political 
offer, concentrating on different issues expect to the reform of the Civil 
Service: the labour market, trade unions, stopping inflation, tax 
reductions, schools, immigration, privatisation, international relations. 
Anyway, these measures imposed implicitly a change for central 
government administration. The need for this reform would be 
expressed immediately in the first weeks after the establishment of 
Margaret Thatcher at Number 10 Downing Street. 
 
The 1979 reform of the Select Committees 
 
1979 could be considered a crucial year in the history of the Civil 
Service, not only for the arrival of the Conservative government headed 
by Margaret Thatcher, but even for the parliamentary reform of the 
Select Committees.  
A system for scrutinising the executive through a series of 
departmental select committees was established in June 1979. The 
incoming Conservative government implemented proposals from the 
1976–1978 Procedure Committee for a permanent system of committees 
to ‘examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the principal 
government departments’ in the words of Standing Order No 152. The 
departmental committees are designed to mirror each government 
department and are re-organised following machinery of government 
changes. Other Select Committees deal with Internal House matters, or 
regional areas, or cover cross-cutting issues, such as environmental 
audits.  
The establishment of a system of departmental select committees in 
1979 followed the recommendation of a special Procedure Select 
Committee, first established in 1976, which reported in 1978. The 
proposal was agreed to by the House in June 1979, following the 
support of the new leader of the Commons, Norman St John-Stevas. 
Implementation of the report had become a manifesto commitment in 
an atmosphere of political demand for a more assertive Commons. 
However, there had been a debate since at least the time of Richard 
Crossman as Leader of the House 1966–1968 as to the desirability of 
establishing a system of departmental committees. In the nineteenth 
century, select committees had been an influential part of 
parliamentary work, often leading to significant legislation.  
However, the growing use of independent inquiries and royal 
commissions in the early twentieth century reduced the scope of select 
committees (Parris, 1969). There were committees such as those for 
Nationalised Industries and Estimates that had been eliminated with 
economic changes. Under Crossman, six subject committees were 
established, followed in the 1970s by sub committees under a new 
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Expenditure Committee. Dissatisfaction with the unplanned nature of 
that system, combined with concern that the balance between the 
Executive and Parliament was weighted too heavily towards the 
former, was an impetus to reform. The incoming Conservative 
Government had given its support for a departmental select committee 
system in their election manifesto. The proposals were implemented on 
25 June 1979.  
The new committees were established by the Committee of Selection on 
26 November 1979, but none began work until early 1980. The 
Procedure Select Committee argued for a departmental, rather than 
subject-based committee system, in order to focus on individual 
ministerial responsibilities. It was an accepted principle that the 
departmental committees should replicate the machinery of 
Government, so that when departments were formed or merged, the 
select committee system could be modified. The Procedure Committee 
reported positively in 1990 on the operation of the departmental select 
committee system, with some recommendations for incremental 
reform.  
The committees provided a near legislative symmetry to the Whitehall 
departmental landscape. From their advent the departmental select 
committees were seen as one of the main arenas for the scrutiny and 
influence of executive actions, which would go some way to redressing 
the power imbalance between executive and legislative functions. In 
fact, civil servants soon lost their anonymity: over eighteen months 
after the introduction of the reform in 1979, 652 officials gave evidence 
to the Committee (Drewry and Butcher, 1991). The work of Committees 
has become increasingly important in orientating departmental 
activities, and bringing officials as individuals onto the stage of public 
accountability, even if, officially, they answer on behalf of their 
minister, who is able to determine the scope of questioning. 
 
The higher Civil Service and the Thatcher factor: an outlook on the 
appointments 
 
‘The Conservative victory in May 1979 was more than just another 
change of Government; in terms of political and economic philosophy, 
it was a revolution,’ according to Sir Leo Pliatzky, a former Permanent 
Secretary (Pliatzky, 1982:176).  
By 1979, to the extent that ideas determine the party political contest, 
the restoration of ‘neo-classical’ vision, in its modern guise of 
monetarism, to the position of economic orthodoxy enabled the 
Thatcher government to lead the domestic policy debate against their 
adversaries, who possessed only tried and failed political solutions 
with which to reply. Whether this Conservative ascendancy would 
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remain reflected in terms of political predominance necessarily 
depended on what voters defined as results, and positive results at 
least required the emergence of an entrepreneurial class in Britain 
capable of more than holding its own in international competition (Fry, 
1995). The free-marketers in and connected with the new Government 
saw themselves as contending with what Mrs Thatcher herself called 
the ‘Welfare State mentality’ embedded in the Keynesian ideas, 
represented in Britain by what she termed ‘special interest groups’ that 
made the country into ‘an entitlement society’ (The Spectator, 2 March 
1985:10).  
Indeed, so formidable were the opposing interests that what Sir Leo 
Pliatzky called a ‘Monetarist half revolution’ all that was possible in the 
short run. As G. K. Fry wrote, ‘Such neo-liberal remedies as were 
deemed politically feasible were applied to the economy; the Thatcher 
government, as part of its ambition to put private enterprise back on 
the throne, treated the public sector as usurper’ (Fry, 1995:37). Of the 
various ‘special interest groups’ to be overcome and contested, the 
career Civil Service was one of the priorities to reform because it was 
heavily unionised from top to bottom and it was seen as a group of 
privileged bureaucrats by the Conservatives’ propaganda. ‘The sheer 
professionalism of the British Civil Service, which allows governments 
to come and go with a minimum of dislocation and a maximum of 
efficiency, is something other countries with different systems have 
every cause to envy,’ Margaret Thatcher wrote in her memoirs 
(Thatcher, 1993:18). Similar sentiments had been expressed by Lord 
Hewart many years before, when, before accusing civil servants of 
wishing to impose through ‘bureaucratic encroachments’ what he 
called ‘the new despotism’ (Hewart, 1929: 21), he had written of Britain 
having the ‘best Civil Service in the world’ (ibid.:13).  
Although Mrs Thatcher recognised the qualities of the Civil Service, 
and especially of those members who worked closely with her in 
Downing Street, her administration did not temper their feelings of 
distrust and dislike until the late eighties. At times, Mrs Thatcher 
seemed to be ‘almost Maoist in her suspicion of established institutions’ 
(Anderson, 1986:6). To judge from her own account of the Civil Service, 
Mrs Thatcher closely associated the ‘gentlemen in Whitehall’ with the 
‘prolonged experiment’ in ‘democratic socialism’ conducted in the UK 
between 1945 and 1979, which had been a ‘miserable failure in every 
respect’, because ‘far from reversing the slow relative decline of Britain 
vis-a-vis its main industrial competitors, it accelerated it’ (Thatcher, 
1993:6–7). The Thatcher government’s approach to the Civil Service’s 
work was in such open contrast with the attitudes of extreme 
dependence that characterised the governments of the Wilson–Heath–
Callaghan era that the radical nature of its attitude was in danger of 
	   52	  
being exaggerated (Fry, 1995). This did not mean that the status of the 
Civil Service was unaffected by the Thatcher government. That 
government declined to treat the Service as an interest in its own right. 
The politically aggressive Civil Service unions were defeated in the 
Civil Service strike of 1981, when the Conservative government 
unilaterally broke the Priestley pay system. The Thatcher government 
struck at the hierarchy of the career Civil Service in other ways too, 
initiating a programme of cuts in numbers which amounted to 15% 
overall between 1979 and 1984, and 16.2% at Senior Open Structure 
levels near the top of the Service over the same period (Civil Service 
Statistics, 1984:5).  
The Wardale inquiry formulated recommendations about whether or 
not the Under Secretary grade should be abolished. Though the grade 
was to survive, one effect of such inquiries, and of the various 
confrontations and ‘de-privileging activity’, was to push the Civil 
Service on the defensive. Not satisfied with that, the Rayner efficiency 
studies and the introduction of MINIS and then of the Financial 
Management Initiative of 1982 were aimed at changing the Civil 
Service’s culture, and this was enforced too by a more direct 
intervention of the Prime Minister in high-level appointments and 
promotions (Richards, 1997). ‘I took a close interest in senior 
appointments in the Civil Service from the first, because they could 
affect the morale and efficiency of whole departments,’ Mrs Thatcher 
was later to confess (Thatcher, 1993:46). There were those who felt that 
the scale of the then Prime Minister’s involvement in such 
appointments was politically unfair in two ways. One was that she was 
instrumental in promoting personal favourites and in blocking the 
advancement of others who had crossed her. The other objection was 
that she used to give preference to the officials who shared her political 
outlook. What was being engaged in, Clive Ponting, was not alone in 
believing that there was a ‘politicisation of the Civil Service in the back 
door’ (Ponting, 1986: 7–8; for a divergent opinion, see Richards, 1997). 
Early on in her premiership, Mrs Thatcher actually took to visiting 
government departments by the front door. These tours were later seen 
as an unhealthy practice because they led to assessments of senior civil 
servants being made on the basis of face-to-face impressions. 
Furthermore, some higher civil servants’ careers may well have 
benefited from working in proximity to Mrs Thatcher, constituting 
what one observer called ‘the Cabinet Office effect’ (Richards, 1993:24–
5). Mrs Thatcher wrote: ‘I was enormously impressed by the ability and 
energy of the members of my Private Office at No. 10. I usually held 
personal interviews with the candidates for Private Secretary for my 
own office. Those who came were some of the very brightest men and 
women in the Civil Service, ambitious and excited to be at the heart of 
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decision making in government. I wanted to see people of the same 
calibre, with lively minds and commitment to good administration, 
promoted to hold the senior posts in the departments. Indeed, during 
my time in government, many of my former Private Secretaries went 
on to head departments. In all these decisions, however, ability, drive 
and enthusiasm were what mattered; political allegiance was not 
something I took into account’ (Thatcher, 1993:46).  
Of course, the Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister’s Office were not 
the same thing, and concerning one of the controversial appointments 
made, the translation of Sir Clive Whitmore, the Prime Minister’s 
Principal Private Secretary, to become the Permanent Secretary to the 
Ministry of Defence in 1982, it could be observed that Whitmore had 
spent almost the whole of his career in that Ministry (RIPA Working 
Group, 1987:44).  
As for the promotion of Sir Peter Middleton from Deputy Secretary to 
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury in 1983, made openly against 
official recommendations favouring Sir Anthony Rawlinson, some 
thought that Middleton’s preference for monetarism explained his early 
advancement. Clive Ponting and the other civil servants accused Mrs 
Thatcher’s critical use of appointments within the exercise of Prime 
Ministerial powers as a back-door politicisation never demonstrate that 
the promotions made were illegitimate because civil servants appointed 
were unqualified for the posts concerned and that they were promoted 
above their level of skills.  
Competence may well have been given preference over shared political 
outlooks with the Prime Minister. After all, at a lower level Ponting 
himself, who seems to have made no secret of his social democratic 
beliefs, initially gained career terms from the Prime Minister’s 
recognition of his energetic part in the Rayner project (Ponting, 
1986:11). The First Division Association, representing higher civil 
servants, observed about senior Civil Service appointments in the 
Thatcher era: ‘Anecdotal evidence suggests it is style rather than belief 
which tends to be considered important. The style which appears to 
appeal to the Prime Minister is the “Can Do” approach, best 
characterised by decisiveness and an ability to get things done, rather 
than the more traditional approach which lays greater emphasis on 
analysis of options with recommendations for action based on that 
analysis.’ The RIPA Working Group (1987: 43–4), which was informed 
of this, concluded that there was no evidence of politicisation, and this 
was also the assessment made in another scholarly study (Richards, 
1993:23).  
 
 
 
	   54	  
3. Efficiency and managerial culture: Rayner’s public management 
reforms  
 
 
1979–1983: The Rayner project for public management 
 
When the Thatcher government took office in 1979, there were three 
objectives for the management of the Civil Service: the rationalisation of 
quangos, emergency reduction of manpower, a project for monitoring 
the public expenditure and reduction of waste conducted by Derek 
Rayner, known as scrutinies. These actions were coordinated with 
monetary policy, indeed as Richard Vinen (2009) pointed out: ‘Ever 
since the 1960s, government departments had calculated their future 
spending in terms of “volume” or “funny money”, as it came to be 
known. […] Automatic adjustment to inflation meant that civil servants 
and contractors had little incentive to cut costs. The government now 
began to move towards the calculation of future spending.’  
The latter objective was the most complex, with greater impact on the 
civil service and many political implications. Derek Rayner was a 
manager of the leading retail company Marks & Spencer, and he was 
appointed five days after the election victory of Margaret Thatcher. 
Immediately afterwards the Efficiency Unit was created, composed of 
just Rayner, Priestley and Allen (Lowe, 2011).  
The presentation of the Rayner project was attacked by Leslie 
Chapman, the previous adviser of Margaret Thatcher on the Civil 
Service reform, who criticised the excessive moderation of the reformist 
ideas exposed by Rayner, in particular as concerned the rejection of the 
introduction of external auditing for monitoring Civil Service 
expenditure and performance (PREM 19/60). On 31 May 1979 the 
programme proposed by the Efficiency Unit was agreed by the Prime 
Minister. Rayner’s basic idea was to start a process of spending 
monitoring through the ‘scrutinies’ in ministries in order to eliminate 
waste, to save public money and to reduce public expenditure. On 6 
July the members of the Efficiency Unit and the Prime Minister 
established an initial plan of three months (30 August–30 November 
1979) for scrutinising the ministries and finding savings. Another 
campaign agreed by the Cabinet and Rayner’s Unit was to analyse the 
main efficiency problems of the British public administration in six 
months. The first report produced by the Efficiency Unit identified £80 
million worth of savings, with a one-off of £32 million. There was, 
however, a delay in implementing the scrutinies. The programme 
established that they should be finished for the end of November, but 
in April 1980 they were still not finished. This was because of the 
resistance of some ministers, which compelled Rayner to request access 
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to check the spending of ministries. The possibility of big savings was 
inextricably linked to political strategy. Meanwhile, Rayner also 
focused on the mechanisms of the administration through the 
introduction of new technologies such as computer and monitoring of 
business (PREM 19/243).  
However, the start-up plan by Rayner was to establish a long-term 
management culture in the Civil Service, considering that the impact of 
the policies that he and his team suggested depended to a large extent 
on politics and balances in the Cabinet. He considered his mission 
linked more to the development of managerial culture because this was 
more easily accomplished and had greater impact in the long run than 
the cost savings that were tied to the political opportunities (Lowe, 
2011). Thirty-nine scrutinies were commissioned by the Efficiency Unit 
in 1980 and forty in 1981, with two multi-department scrutinies. Rayner 
knew that the success or failure of his strategy was based on the 
commitment of Cabinet ministers, so he established three objectives in 
order to achieve the result: to find and to eliminate waste and 
inefficiency, bypassing senior officials and supervisor committees that 
were considered to be an obstacle in the reduction of the expenditure, 
working directly with ministers to give them a managerial attitude 
(CAB 128/76).  
In parallel with these measures, the Efficiency Unit concentrated on the 
simplification and elimination of forms and activities, a process that 
would be concluded in 1982 (PREM 19/62), and it produced savings of 
£5 million per year. The ministers decided the subjects for scrutinies, 
which means the area where they believed there was waste and 
inefficiency, they appointed the scrutinisers and they decided the 
actions that had to be taken in order to accomplish the Efficiency Unit 
objectives. They could also choose external agents, such as consultants, 
to achieve the results. This led, however, to unsatisfactory outcomes: 
only 12,000 posts were cut by December 1982, of the 21,000 that had 
originally been selected for culling, and just £180 million had been 
effectively saved of the £400 million targeted (PREM 19/244). In 1980 
there were three significant events that influenced the outcome of the 
scrutinies: the merger of the offices provided by the Efficiency Unit for 
the DHSS was blocked by the conflicting interests of the senior 
executives of the Public Ministry; the statistical services of the Ministry 
of Industry instead accepted 90 percent of the recommendations of the 
scrutinisers and reduced staff by 20 percent; while the pilot scrutiny 
given to the CSD led to a cost increase of 25 percent. Once again, 
Rayner obtained mixed results. On the one hand, he realised the 
managerial objectives but he failed to achieve broader political results.  
In 1981 it was necessary to establish cash limits for general budget 
needs and to introduce best practices in order to save money and 
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improve efficiency.  
For the year 1981, the scrutiny formula was improved: all ministries 
were required to have an interview with the Prime Minister to identify 
the cuts in each ministry; full publication of all returns was required for 
use by departmental committees; ministers were allowed to use 
management consultants to achieve better performance and bigger 
savings; and MINIS (Management Information Systems), developed by 
Michael Heseltine in the Department of Environment, were 
implemented in other ministries (TNA,CAB 128/66). These measures 
brought to light the resistance to the process of spending review 
encountered by the Efficiency Unit owing mainly to the reluctance of 
some ministers and ineptitude towards the management of many 
Senior Officials.  
The second stage of the reform was presented on 31 March 1980, and it 
was based on a draft proposed by Clive Priestley. The draft was 
approved by the Cabinet on 1 May. At the time Margaret Thatcher was 
expressing impatience with the Civil Service for the difficulties she was 
finding in reducing the number of public employees and fighting 
against waste and inefficiency. She blamed this situation on lack of 
commitment by senior civil servants owing to their desire to defend 
their privileges (Lowe, 2011). The aim of the second Efficiency Unit 
programme was, at first, to implement managerial training for the 
permanent secretaries in order to enable them to extend managerial 
practices to the rest of the Civil Service top grades. Four steps were 
established (TNA, PREM 19/242): reduction of waste and public 
expenditure; management of resources collectively and within 
departments; cultural change in civil servants’ approach.  
These measures were well known to the members of the Efficiency 
Unit, as they resembled those set out in a 1970 paper produced by the 
Heath government and entitled The Reorganisation of the Central 
Government. In April 1981 the Wardale Report was published, 
suggesting management of the grades of the open structure to obtain 
savings in civil service pay, merging the different grades in which the 
civil servants’ pay was constituted.  
The Rayner project, to reduce salary expenditure, planned to abolish 
three administrative grades and reduce the Open Structure to its size in 
1965 (equivalent to a 35-percent cut), but the head of the Efficiency Unit 
considered the Civil Service Department incapable of meeting this 
target. The Efficiency Unit plan was also challenged, on a political level, 
by Soames and other senior ministers, such as Whitelaw and Hailsham, 
who regarded a 35-percent cut arbitrary and exaggerated (Lowe, 2011). 
Anyway, in November 1981, when the ‘stringent reviews’ was 
launched by Rayner and his team, the 35-percent cut was downgraded 
to a mere aspiration by Thatcher herself (TNA, PREM 19/62).  
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The second aim of the lasting reform programme, the strengthening of 
the collective management of resources at both a political and 
administrative level, was the most sensitive and so was responsible for 
the majority of the amendments between its first and final draft. The 
aims were the more efficient calculation and overall allocation of public 
expenditure, a better balance between central and spending 
departments in relation to the monitoring of performance and the 
existence in each department of an effective management system 
(Lowe, 2011). To achieve the aim of better management, Rayner 
suggested merging the Civil Service Department and the Treasury and 
establishing an inspector general in the Civil Service.  
The function of the inspector was to monitor the application of the best 
practices and refer to the Prime Minister about the implementation of 
them. This proposal by Rayner was not accepted by the Cabinet, which 
would have preferred to directly abolish the Civil Service Department 
led by Sir Ian Bancroft. The problem the Ministers had with the 
institution of inspector general was the excess of centralisation in the 
management and control of the Civil Service. In order to improve 
control over public expenditure and the accountability to Parliament of 
the Civil Service, the Conservative backbenchers proposed putting into 
place comptrollers and auditor general departments (TNA, PREM 
19/Government Machinery). The answer of Margaret Thatcher to this 
request was to move accountancy, finance and the audit division from 
the CSD to the Treasury. The second initiative was prompted by a 
Treasury scrutiny of its supply divisions and ultimately resulted in the 
Financial Management Initiative of May 1982. On 2 June 1981 the 
control of expenditure paper was drafted: departmental responsibilities 
despite the title, its essential objective was to reinforce Treasury control 
(TNA, PREM 19/Civil Service long-term manpower policy). As initially 
planned in 1920, PFOs and PEOs were accordingly to act as Treasury 
agents within departments, assuring compliance with directives and 
preventing any untoward developments. Despite the Permanent 
Secretaries criticising the lack of skills and training on the part of the 
central officials, the initiative continued, although the CSD had been 
further disparage.  
The issue of the third objective of the lasting reforms programme was 
the enforcement of the management resources within departments, and 
it clearly depended on the success of the central initiatives. Here 
remained the problem of how to make the management systems work 
once they had been started. Technically, Rayner had sought since his 
appointment to encourage greater cost-consciousness through direct 
departmental payments for common services. This meant that payment 
would strengthen the consumer–supplier relationship and thereby 
ensure a more responsive and flexible service (TNA, PREM 19/62). As 
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an outcome of these policies, HMSO and the Central Office of 
Information had placed their services on a full repayment basis by 1981. 
Departments, working within stricter cash limits, weighted their 
budget not only for transaction costs but also for the principle of paying 
for the training of officials from which other departments might 
ultimately benefit. A compromise was finally reached whereby they 
were required to pay for job-specific training whilst the CSD paid for 
the rest. It thus became another point with which to beat the CSD. This 
was another step to get a clear definition of the managerial authority of 
Ministers, the role of Permanent Secretaries as departmental accounting 
officers, and the ‘authority, responsibility and requisite qualifications’ 
of PEOs and PFOs. The requirement that all PFOs should be 
professionally qualified was also ignored, an example of the 
programme’s short-termism. PFOs, it was argued, required vision and 
political sensibility as much as formal accountancy training.  
By November 1981 the Civil Service College was primed to offer new 
courses in financial management for existing officials, although Rayner 
was still demanding a more rigorous programme and the appointment 
of outside experts. The fourth and final objective of the lasting reforms 
programme was the transformation of the generalist Whitehall culture 
in order to ‘drive home the fact that managing activities efficiently is of 
equal merit to thinking through policies and analysing issues’ (TNA, 
PREM 19/147). Rayner was determined to transform ministerial culture 
but, given forecasted Cabinet resistances, specific recommendations 
were excised from the draft initially submitted to the Prime Minister. 
The focus was, once again, on civil servants. Rayner had two 
interrelated targets: the promotion to senior positions of officials with 
proven managerial skills and the improvements of these skills through 
the Service.  
The first issue was addressed by the introduction in February 1982 of a 
formal succession policy. Each department was required to indicate 
annually who would succeed to senior positions in the ‘normal course 
of the event’, who could succeed if the positions ‘were unexpectedly 
vacated’ and who should be ‘in the field for the next but one 
succession’ (TNA, PREM 19/Civil Service long-term manpower policy). 
All potential candidates had to be evaluated on the basis of training 
and experience. The empowerment of managerial skills was created 
with the removal of disincentives and the provision of rewards. These 
disincentives had included a too-rigid hierarchy and the 
disproportionate promotion of generalists to senior posts at the cost of 
democracy, individual responsibility and development of managerial 
(rather than political) skills; Parliament had tended to justify faults and 
inefficiency as the inescapable cost of democracy rather than valourise 
the success of skilled civil servants (Lowe, 2011).  
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The Wardale inquiry and succession policy aimed to increase 
individual accountability and encourage managerial skills. There was 
also an attempt to limit the supply of information to Parliament: CSD 
officials were worried about the transmission of information to 
Westminster because answering MPs’ enquiries fully was ‘a 
fundamental piece of our constitution and ought not to be considered 
in the same light as’ other lasting reforms. Nevertheless, Rayner, 
supported by successive Cabinet Secretaries, continued to argue for 
‘less perfectionism’ and succeeded in persuading Cabinet in May 1980 
to begin an inquiry (TNA, PREM 19/60 and TNA, PREM 19/48). The 
provisions of rewards included honours and pay. Honours involved 
Prime Ministerial prerogative and so their reform was never referred to 
Cabinet (TNA, PREM 19/147).  
However, a proposal for performance-related pay was advanced. 
Arguing that this was a common practice in the private sector and 
would improve morale of the officials, Soames sought to introduce it 
successively for Under Secretaries in 1981 and Assistant Secretaries in 
1982. Officials were divided as witnessed by a minute of the Cabinet 
Secretary Robert Armstrong (TNA, PREM 19/152, Armstrong to 
Whitmore, 3 November 1980). Ministers against these measures led by 
Whitelaw and Hailsham rejected them on the grounds that it could 
politicise the Service and undermine the natural collegiality of public 
service. Many practical objections were also advanced, such as the 
additional bureaucracy required to monitor and determine payments. 
On 15 January 1981 Cabinet replaced this proposal with a compromise 
that established a programme of accelerated promotion and early 
retirement, but not performance evaluation.  
In the end, scrutiny produced mixed results, depending on ministers’ 
commitment in each department. However, the policy was universally 
recognised as more successful than many others developed during this 
period, if not in numbers in its pedagogic aim to introduce a better cost-
consciousness in the Civil Service (Lowe, 2011; Theakston, 1995; Fry, 
1995; Metcalfe and Richards, 1993). Up until 1982, 155 scrutinies were 
made with £300 million saved. The scrutinies continued until the 1990 
carried on by the Efficiency Unit and Rayner’s successors, Sir Robin 
Ibbs (1983–1988) and Sir Angus Fraser (1988–1990). When Margaret 
Thatcher left government, 300 scrutinies had been completed with a 
final saving of £1.3 billion from 1979. In 1993, £1.5 billion had been 
saved with the institutionalisation of scrutinies (Theakston, 1995; Fry, 
1995). 
After the commencement of the scrutiny process, the lasting reforms 
were for Rayner his core contribution to administrative reform. 
However, they were neither as well organised nor as well received as 
his scrutiny programme.  
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On the one hand, the programme of reforms was far more complex and 
reformist because, focusing exclusively on management issues, Rayner 
ignored both political balances within the Cabinet and the Civil Service 
and constitutional realities. On the other hand, Ministers were hostile to 
its proposals for the fear of further centralisation, and at the same time 
they had been in relation to the CSD’s manpower policy. It also gained 
latent support within Whitehall. Rayner, after all, was considered to be 
broadly sympathetic and most of his proposed reforms had been 
adopted by the CSD, if not in their details, surely in their aims (TNA, 
PREM 19/148). The CSD was also weakened by the lack of strong 
Prime Ministerial commitment. In fact, it’s true that the Civil Service 
Department remained too anchored to the generalist culture, but 
Margaret Thatcher, who never showed interest in its organisation, 
never showed the desire to manage her own department. By November 
1981 the programme had enjoyed some important successes. It had 
prevented a ‘u-turn’ on administrative reform by the Cabinet in 1980 
and it had infused into officials a greater attention for management 
(Theakston, 1995).  
To conclude, although it actually opposed the most radical reforms, 
such as privatisation and hiving off, and kick others with which it had 
initially flirted, such as open government, it also set the stage for a wide 
range of administrative initiatives that have been realised from the CSD 
abolition in November 1981 and the big strike started in March 1981. 
 
 
 
The reduction of Quangos: a spending review attempt 
 
The review of Quangos (quasi-non-governmental body) was another 
key policy for public administration reform in order to reduce the 
public expenditure and to achieve the cash balance. It was self-
contained but nevertheless epitomised the nature of administrative 
reform before 1982. For this job, it was not a Minister appointed or a 
member of the CSD, but a valued individual. In fact, the individual 
responsible for this procedure was Sir Leo Pliatzky, a senior civil 
servant of the Treasury, who, in a final Paper (Cmnd 7797), had forecast 
the opportunity to abolish 247 quangos of the existing 2,115, to produce 
a £11.6 million in savings. However, instead of making a major 
contribution, as trailed, to a £200 million reduction in public 
expenditure, the Report merely recommended the abolition of a large 
number of Quangos with limitative cutting of waste. The Report also 
made some detailed procedural notes for the introduction of a code of 
best practices whose circulation was typically delayed so that it might 
be made more robust by the Efficiency Unit.  
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The review of Quangos was also damaged by a fundamental confusion 
of purpose. Before 1979, the attack on NDPBs (non-departmental public 
bodies) had had three objectives: to reduce public expenditure, to 
restrict patronage and to reverse the expansion of government (Lowe, 
2011:239). It was argued that public expenditure was increasing not just 
by the bodies’ own cost but also by the spending programmes they 
managed and the subsequent cost of departmental monitoring. 
Patronage was similarly protected as a source of backdoor entrance, 
especially for trade unionists. Finally, Mrs Thatcher sought to reduce 
NDPBs, and particularly new high-spending bodies such as the 
Manpower Services Commission, in order to reverse the corporatism of 
the Heath government. On 7 December 1979 (TNA, PREM 19/245), the 
Cabinet established an inquiry for different department bodies, but it 
was not settled for Quangos; in fact, NDPBs were excluded by the 
inquiry for the spending review. One could find friction between the 
Conservative electoral manifesto and this policy on Quangos. Before 
the hold of Downing Street the purpose was to reduce public 
expenditure, to restrict patronage, and to reverse expenditure of 
government, but in 1979 it became just a ‘body count’. On 28 August, to 
manage the situation, Pliatzky met the Prime Minister (TNA, PREM 
19/245), and some criteria were established in order to evaluate the 
opportunity to close a non-departmental bodies. The criteria were 
judged by permanent secretaries who were given ‘death–life’ power 
over Quangos even if the final decision was always ratified by 
Ministers. Pliatzky was allowed to interview permanent secretaries on 
Quangos, and they had to answer on the alleged waste of non-
departmental bodies (Report on NDPB, par.47). This inquiry discovered 
that twenty bodies were responsible for 87 percent of the total public 
expenditure of Quangos (TNA, PREM 19/Government Machinery, 
22/04/1981, The future of Quangos). Anyway, until 1982 there was just 
a monitoring of the Quangos’ spending without any concrete action to 
reduce these institutions.  
Pliatzky’s action was a failure in reducing public expenditure and 
patronage for several reasons. First, the Conservative Party was now 
making the appointments and the issue of patronage became less 
important. Rather, the Report paid tribute to the many ‘worthy people 
who gave their service for free’ and who had been humiliated by the 
polemical attack on Quangos. Second, a new approach towards 
government intervention was required, not least because, in response to 
demands for manpower cuts, Ministers were surreptitiously 
transferring departmental responsibilities. That situation made 
impossible completion of the ‘hiving off’ of functions from the public to 
the private sector (Lowe, 2011:240).  
Furthermore, the Report’s inability to identify any major candidate for 
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abolition was significant, especially among the twenty bodies that were 
responsible for the most of the expenditure. As far as concerned the 
guidelines on NDPBs, the Report established that: new bodies should 
be established only as a last resort and, whenever possible, with a finite 
remit; the value of existing ones should be kept constantly under 
review; and to maximise Parliamentary and public scrutiny, all 
financial records should be accessible to the Comptroller and Auditor 
General and a detailed annual report published. Moreover, the review 
demonstrated the real impossibility of a radical reform for the influence 
of Party and public rhetoric. The number of NDPBs may have halved 
by December 1981, but this was largely the result of expedients and so 
illusory. And new initiatives were launched in 1983, 1984 and 1985. By 
then the critique was more soundly based and the objectives more 
ambitious. Indeed, in the further years until 1990, 872 non-
departmental bodies were suppressed, even if 372 were created. Part of 
the NDPBs were privatised, but Thatcher’s governments never showed 
the willingness to abolish the Quangos as governance bodies. For 
obvious political reasons, particularly at local government level, she 
preferred to appoint people who were politically close to her rather 
than leave the Quangos field to neutral and professional civil servants. 
 
 
 
A priority for the Prime Minister: reducing departmental manpower 
 
The third expedient of the first Thatcher government was the 
emergency reduction of manpower in the Civil Service. The first 
Cabinet commanded the CSD to freeze recruitment in order to reduce 
immediate manpower costs by three per cent. On 31 May 1979 the CSD 
promoted an option exercise to cut the Service by up to 20 per cent 
(TNA, PREM 19/5). In June 1979 the Efficiency Unit established a series 
of departmental projects to identify specific areas of waste. At the same 
time, the Treasury exercised pressure and then, in February 1980, more 
firmly imposed a cash limit on manpower costs.  
However, it was not clear what the strategy was and if the prime aim 
was to reduce numbers or public expenditure. The two options were 
not synonymous because, for example, a reduction of tax collectors 
could respectively increase expenditure or decrease revenue. And it 
was not declared if the objective was to cut waste or reduce the role of 
government. However, it seemed that the objective could simply be the 
pure meeting of monetarist target. Indeed, the Conservatives, as was 
widely acknowledged, had received a ‘dreadful inheritance’, with 
Labour having unrealistically budgeted for a mere two per cent 
increase in public expenditure (TNA, PREM 19/5).  
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Consequently, without major manpower cuts, the Government could 
not achieve one of its fundamental political aims: a reduction in the 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement. Like with the NDPB review, 
however, Ministers collectively were either unwilling or unable to 
resolve such a problem. Furthermore, the tension originated by these 
difficulties in managing public sector reform exposed the friction 
between the CSD and the Treasury, with their respective 
responsibilities for manpower control and public expenditure, as well 
as condemning the CSD in Mrs Thatcher’s mind. The initial freeze on 
recruitment, which lasted from 9 May to 27 July 1979, foreshadowed 
many of the later political tensions (Lowe, 2011:241). In order to 
manage the issue and to oblige both Ministers and civil servants to 
confront stark choices, Mrs Thatcher imposed a radical policy: six 
months of recruitment freeze and a manpower cut of five per cent. This 
provoked a Cabinet revolt as early as 17 May 1979 on the grounds that 
such an indiscriminate freeze could be counterproductive. It could, 
some ministers argued, reduce the efficiency of the operations held in 
regions and in specialist areas where turnover was high.  
Above all, the Cabinet rejected the premise that no policy changes were 
needed because waste was so excessive (TNA,CAB 128/66). The Prime 
Minister was defeated by the Cabinet on this field. As desired by the 
CSD, the target for reduced manpower costs remained three per cent 
instead of five per cent, and the freeze was to be quitted after only three 
months. The exercise with which the CSD sought to replace the ban for 
recruitment was the options programme, which required each 
department to specify how it would reduce manpower by 10, 15, 20 per 
cent. This policy was a failure. Three progress reports were considered 
in Cabinet (September–November), but when the programme’s final 
results were announced in Parliament on 6 December savings of only 
five per cent had been found. It consisted of a reduction of 39,000 posts, 
of which 11,000 were the result of contracting out, rather than real cuts. 
In this case, one obstacle was the strong opposition of departments. The 
three largest departments, which employed 64 per cent of officials (the 
Ministry of Defence, the Treasury and the DHSS), justified proposal for 
respective cuts of only 3, 4.2 and 1.8 per cent (TNA, PREM 19/6).  
However, there were other reasons for failure related to administrative 
organisation. As Francis Pym, the secretary of State for Defence, 
argued, a better strategy for him was to ‘build upwards from the facts 
rather than downwards from arbitrary targets’ (TNA, PREM 19/6). 
Before proceeding to any cuts, he aimed to complete the internal policy 
of investigation he had already ordered. Indeed, many planned cuts 
were dependent on controversial, and so more difficult to achieve, 
policy changes such as pay system, for which Parliamentary approval 
was required. Moreover, the objective of a 20 per cent manpower cut 
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alarmed the unions and it provoked a flood of unofficial strikes, such 
that an emergency Cabinet subcommittee had to be formed to draft 
contingency plans (Lowe, 2011:242). Finally, the principal problem was 
the conflict was caused by the reduction of numbers through the 
contracting out of services to the private sector.  
This policy was particularly supported by Mrs Thatcher and Mr 
Heseltine, Minister of the Department of Environment, even if it 
increased public expenditure in the short term. By Cabinet on 1 
November Mrs Thatcher was clearly upset by the CSD’s unreliability, 
and she decided to bet on the Rayner projects which had recently been 
completed and the MINIS programme settled by Heseltine, 
demonstrating that manpower could be cut without any policy changes 
(CAB 128/66). Consequently, Mrs Thatcher abandoned the options 
initiative and thereby the CSD. Finally a cut in manpower costs of 2.5 
per cent was finally agreed, which led to a further saving of 15,000 
posts (TNA, PREM 19/6). Derek Rayner was involved to settle the 
agreement on manpower cuts but simultaneously expressed criticism 
that, rather than a coherent manpower policy, there were only 
‘sporadic squeezes when other factors required them’. This dismay was 
directed as much at the Prime Minister as the CSD, as was later 
demonstrated by Rayner’s explicit refusal of her preferred policy of ‘nil 
recruitment, nil redundancy’ (TNA, PREM 19/6). However, he 
managed to preserve her confidence in order to realise his programme 
of lasting reforms. Furthermore, Rayner maintained a profitable 
cooperation with Channon, chief official of the CSD, in order to manage 
a longer-term manpower policy and to achieve the target of reduction 
to 630,000 civil servants. 
 
The abolition of the Civil Service Department 
 
The abolition of the Civil Service Department was a critical moment in 
the contemporary history of the civil service because it signalled a 
transition from an old concerted method with unions and civil servants 
to a new style imposed by Thatcherism to achieve the targets of 
reforms.  
There were several factors that determined the abolition of the Civil 
Service Department: the lack of agreement on civil service reform 
between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Civil Service 
Christopher Soames; the idea of Mrs Thatcher and Sir Rayner that the 
department was an obstacle to the achievement of the economic target 
established by the Cabinet for the Civil Service; the necessity to 
centralise the control on pay of the public bodies; and the pressure 
created by the twenty-one-week civil service strike in 1981. 
Indeed, shortly after the end of the strike on 7 September 1981, the 
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Prime Minister announced her decision to abolish the CSD in a meeting 
with Rayner and the Head of Civil Service, Robert Armstrong. Then 
Soames’ dismissal followed on 14 September and there was, by mutual 
agreement, an audience with Bancroft on 24 September before the 
reorganisation was announced to Parliament on 12 November and 
became operational and fully legal on 7 December (Lowe, 2011:269). 
The Civil Service Department’s abolition was a mixture of institutional 
contradictions. The role of the Department was widely discussed by the 
middle of 1970s, but it was included as core in the ‘lasting reform’ of 
Rayner’s project. Despite this involvement in such an important project 
of reform, both the Prime Minister and the Efficiency Unit had 
criticised it relentlessly. Definitely the idea of abolishing the CSD was 
effective since the summer of 1980 and Mrs Thatcher was waiting for 
the best political occasion to declare it. The problems with the CSD 
were related to the slowness in implementing government policies or 
planning them effectively to achieve the objectives established by the 
Cabinet. Bancroft, the Permanent Secretary of the CSD, and Soames 
justified their resistance with the low morale of the Service owing to the 
reduction in numbers and economic resources.  
The CSD echelon accused the government of being ‘hostile to its own 
employees’ and treating it like a veto player. The Prime Minister denied 
this statement, replying that ‘Ministers were not hostile to the Civil 
Service, though she did feel disgust at the resistance which she had 
encountered to her efforts to bring about greater efficiency. This she did 
regard as disloyalty’ (quoted in Lowe, 2011:270). However, abolition 
was justified on both institutional and personal grounds. 
Institutionally, the English Committee had concluded that, with the 
effective abandonment of Fulton Report style, it had lost its reason for 
existence. Rayner was equally in favour of discussion, albeit on the very 
different grounds that the separation of the CSD from the Treasury was 
‘neither justified in principle or by experience’. Using a managerial 
approach he argued that the optimal use of money and manpower 
efficiency required united control over both (TNA, PREM 19/147). 
Furthermore, experience had shown that a divided centre was a weaker 
one. The experience of spending departments had showed how the lack 
of coordination among them in the management of public expenditure 
was inefficient (HC 54, 1980–1).  
Personally, Rayner expressed his doubts about CSD personnel. He 
considered that civil servants of the CSD were not interventionist 
enough in the reform processes. Consequently, they were signally 
ineffective in prescribing and monitoring reform. In part, this was a 
result of their jealousy of the constitutional independence of other 
departments but, in the main, it was because senior staff were 
insufficiently ‘seized by the importance of management’ and lacked the 
	   66	  
skills of ‘background and success in management’. In this regard, they 
were ‘cautious, introspective and self-conscious’ and ‘ladylike’. Some 
CSD officials were considered very good, but it was made clear in the 
summer of 1980 that there wasn’t any senior figure judged to be 
capable enough to be appointed ‘Inspector General’, as projected by 
Rayner’s team in the lasting reforms programme (TNA, PREM 19/250).  
These perceived weaknesses could have been resolved in one of four 
ways, each of which was summarised by Robert Armstrong in his 
evidence to the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee when it 
proposed in 1980 a formal Parliamentary inquiry into the future of the 
CSD. It was for such complexity that the Prime Minister succeeded in 
the abolition of the CSD only at the third attempt. The first opportunity, 
selected by Armstrong, was the renovation of the CSD. This was the 
solution eventually to be recommended by the Select Committee and 
temporarily adopted by the Prime Minister in January 1981 (TNA, 
PREM 19/Government Machinery). The second possibility, Rayner’s 
preferred solution for his managerial approach, was a total merger of 
the CSD with the Treasury. This was immediately rejected by everyone 
else on the grounds that it would overload the functions of the 
Treasury, resulting in decreasing attention towards the management of 
the Civil Service. The third solution was the creation of an independent 
Office of Management and Budget. One of its attractions had been the 
consequent opening up for Cabinet discussion of economic issues 
traditionally internalised within the Treasury. However, in the cultural 
realm of monetarism, this was not an option favoured by Mrs Thatcher, 
especially as it was the one supported by the unions. The fourth and 
finally chosen solution in 1981 was the transfer to the Treasury of 
responsibility for management, manpower and pay, and the remaining 
CSD divisions, principally those dealing with human resources such as 
appointments and training, formed a separate personnel office.  
In 1980, however, this option was rejected because of the fear of 
dividing the management of the Service and the argument that the CSD 
would be too small to justify a separate Minister or a Permanent 
Secretary. The two key facts that led to the decision for the abolition 
were the inability of the CSD to undertake monitoring and to lead the 
scrutiny programme in other departments and the combined attack by 
Rayner, unsatisfied with the contribution of the CSD on the 
implementation of the lasting reform programme, and the Treasury 
and Civil Service Committee, in response to parliamentary criticism of 
the CSD. After these two episodes, the Prime Minister decided to 
abolish the CSD. Like the Select Committee, she convinced herself 
when she received the first draft of the white paper responding to the 
Committee’s report. She immediately minuted Rayner: ‘We have come 
to the heart of the matter. In spite of all our efforts and admonitions, 
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CSD is not doing the job it was set up to do … and intends to carry on 
as now’ (TNA, PREM 19/Government Machinery). The Civil Service 
Department was condemned. There was a connection between the 
weaknesses of the CSD and the actions taken after the end of the strike 
on the grounds of internal auditing, the Wardale report on the pay 
system and departmental running costs, which confirmed her 
conviction that it was ‘never going to be the Mckinsey of the Civil 
Service’ (TNA, PREM 19/Government Machinery).  
The plan of reform was established in May 1981 by the tandem Rayner–
Armstrong, and they reported three options to choose from: an 
independent Office of Management and Budget within the Treasury; 
the transfer to the Treasury of the CSD’s core responsibilities except for 
the promotion of the efficiency (to be embedded in the Cabinet Office); 
and the rejuvenation of the CSD under a dynamic and younger 
manager (TNA, PREM 19/Government Machinery). Mrs Thatcher 
chose the second option, deciding on the abolition of the Civil Service 
Department. This decision was criticised for several reasons. It 
continued the division of responsibility for managing the Service; gave 
the Treasury the responsibility of managing a difficult issue like pay 
negotiations; was potentially a first step towards a Prime Minister’s 
Department, which Mrs Thatcher favoured but which both Armstrong 
and Rayner strongly opposed (Churchill Archives, THCR 1/15/10); 
and, technically, through the transfer to it of executive powers opened 
up all Cabinet Office business to scrutiny by the Public Accounts 
Committee and the Ombudsman (TNA, PREM 19/Government 
Machinery).  
The technical difficulty was soon resolved by establishing the functions 
of the CSD, the new Management and Personnel Office as an 
independent unit, related to the Cabinet Office just by its common 
Permanent Secretary (the Cabinet Secretary, Robert Armstrong, who 
became Head of the Home Civil Service jointly with the Treasury’s 
Permanent Secretary, Sir Douglas Wass). The MPO thus became an 
independent enclave in the Cabinet Office. The more fundamental 
objections were also resolved, at least in Robert Armstrong’s outlook, 
by an examination of similar arrangements in Canada (ibid.). 
With the MPO, the management of manpower and pay ‘would be 
brigaded with the management of resources’ in the Treasury, whilst the 
management of people and organisation would be brigaded with the 
‘management of policy-making in the Cabinet Office’. In January 1982 
the MPO was presented as having a ‘clear, coherent and vitally 
important responsibility’ in the promotion of efficiency through the 
consideration of human factors and not just cost cutting (CAB 
164/1587). To conclude, after two years of opposition against the CSD, 
the first Thatcher government achieved the goal of the abolition. 
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However, the ultimate choice of the Treasury to drive through lasting 
reforms was taken, therefore, not on administrative grounds but on the 
political grounds that the Chancellor, together with the Prime Minister, 
was the guardian of government strategy. The reason for the Treasury’s 
prominent role derived from the aim to eliminate opposition to 
vigorous manpower cuts and to achieve monetarist goals that meant 
intensifying the process of managerialisation within departments, 
avoiding any veto by the Civil Service Department. 
 
4. 1983–1987: the rise of managerialism and central government 
reform. MINIS and FMI, Lasting reforms and the Open Structure 
restructuring 
 
The embryo of public management reforms: 1982–1984 
 
This three-year period was very intensive for the reform of the British 
public administration, as the results of archive research suggest. In 1982 
there was the launch of the Financial Management Initiative, which was 
fundamental to securing a better spending review and developing 
managerial skills among civil servants. 1982 was also the year of the 
pension scheme reform after the publication of the Megaw Report. As 
far as concerned the administrative organisation, there was the 
abolishing of the Central Policy Review Staff and the merging of the 
ministries of Commerce and Industry in a single department. In 1983 
there was the appointment of eight new Permanent Secretaries and the 
appointment of Sir Robert Armstrong as the Head of the Home Civil 
Service. At the head of the Efficiency Unit, Sir Robin Ibbs substituted 
Sir Derek Rayner, who retired from public life. In 1984 there was a 
restructuring of the Open Structure and it established the basis for the 
introduction of performance evaluation for civil servants. In broader 
terms, this was a transition period in which were created the embryo 
for the further general reform of the British Civil Service such as Next 
Steps Agencies and the completion of the managerialisation of civil 
servants’ practices.  
 
Lasting Reforms in broader terms 
 
Despite their ‘quick and dirty’ image (Metcalfe, 1993), scrutinies 
prepared the ground for the next phase of reform. The revelations of 
specific instances of governmental waste and inefficiency confirmed 
popular prejudices and gave the political oxygen to the reform process 
as well as strength to reduce sources of internal opposition. Scrutinies 
made it possible to build a more general case for public management 
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modernisation. The number and variety of actual cases of waste and 
inefficiency showed that bad management was prevalent and action 
could be taken to deal with it.  
It was a short step from this to the proposition that a general process of 
management modernisation should be instituted. This second phase of 
change, Lasting Reforms, was a broadly based effort to improve general 
management in departments. Lasting Reforms was a theme formulated 
in parallel with scrutinies, but not developed in practice until after the 
scrutiny programme had been in place for two years. Rayner invented 
the formula to summarise the main elements of a general management 
reform strategy for government departments (CAB 164/1588). The 
objective, to shift from procedures-based administration to results-
based management with an orientation towards year-on-year 
improvement in performance, required a knowledge of results and 
costs along with better methods of using human and financial resources 
(ibid.). Lasting Reforms relied on the concept of management by 
objectives, a philosophy strongly coloured by private sector experience. 
They assumed that a common stock of management principles could be 
applied throughout government (Allen, 1981). The initiatives of Lasting 
Reforms showed marked differences from Scrutinies and can be 
summarised as parallel reforms of management in all departments, 
strengthening accountable line management, longer-term reform 
programme for developing new systems and structures, prioritised to 
decentralised budget and cost control.  
Whereas scrutinies focused on individual instances of bad or 
inadequate management and proposed specific case-by-case 
improvements, Lasting Reforms, as the term suggests, were intended to 
establish the foundations for better management in the future, to be 
permanent. The main vehicle for doing so was the FMI, the Financial 
Management Initiative. The FMI was a major attempt to reform the 
whole process of financial management in government with the aim of 
establishing better control of public expenditure. Reducing government 
spending was central to Mrs Thatcher’s political mission. Early 
attempts to get this reform process under way were frustrated, not least 
by the Treasury, which feared that decentralised budgets would 
weaken central control. Equally important, the FMI represented a 
challenge to the established practices of management in departments. It 
entailed changes in the whole methods and culture of public 
management. Because financial management reform had more far-
reaching implications than scrutinies, the dynamic conservatism of the 
system had to be overcome by a more determined approach than the 
one that had established the scrutiny programme (Metcalfe, 1993). 
The FMI was launched in March 1982 after an extended period of 
bureaucratic fighting, described by one of its advocates as ‘the wasted 
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year of the FMI’. The subsequent White Paper (Cmnd 8616) of 
September 1982 specified three basic principles, to promote in each 
department an organisation and a system in which managers at all 
levels have: ‘(a) a clear view of their objectives and means to assess and, 
whenever possible, measure outputs or performance in relation to those 
objectives; (b) well-defined responsibility for making the best use of 
their resources, including a critical scrutiny of output and value for 
money; and (c) the information (particularly about costs), the training 
and the access to expert advice that they need to exercise their 
responsibility effectively’. The launch of the FMI was used as an 
occasion to emphasise that government was subject to permanent 
budgetary constraints. Departmental management structures and 
systems had to be redesigned to ensure tight control of resources and 
achieve better value for money. Great importance was attached to 
bringing together the previously dispersed functional responsibilities 
for policy, implementation, personnel and finance, so that a clear line of 
accountable management was established within departments. As with 
the scrutiny programme, some mechanisms were needed to drive the 
FMI forward. One was simply establishing a deadline of the end of 
January 1983 for all departments to assess existing arrangements and 
decide how to bring them into line with the FMI principles. The 
personal back office of the prime minister ensured that the deadline 
was taken seriously. The second mechanism was the creation of a 
central unit similar to the Efficiency Unit to oversee the development of 
the FMI across departments. The Financial Management Unit was set 
up as a joint venture between the Treasury and the Management and 
Personnel Office to advise and assist departments in elaborating their 
plans and implementing them. It was a means of setting a common 
management agenda (Metcalfe, 1993).  
The Unit focused its attention in three key areas: (1) the creation of 
MNIS-type top management information systems; (2) procedures and 
practices for delegated budgeting within departments; (3) clarification 
of arrangements for managing programme expenditure, including the 
inter-organisational dimension of linkages between departments and 
non-departmental bodies through which public services are delivered. 
The pressures towards delegated budgeting and the redefinition of the 
financial relationships between departments and non-departmental 
bodies anticipated a move towards divisionalisation within 
departments which was to underlie the fourth, ‘Next Steps,’ phase of 
reform.  
Lasting Reforms sought to be broader than just financial management 
reform. Concern with improving information about results originated 
the environment to create performance indicators. It also addressed the 
implications of new management practices for personnel policy, but 
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there was little doubt that the FMI was the spearhead to start up a 
longer phase of administrative reform. They even included the review 
of the administrative forms, in order to simplify regulation and enable 
a better framework between individual and the Civil Service, that took 
place between 1981 and 1982 and led to the abolition of 26193 forms 
and the reshaping of other 41000 (TNA,CAB 164/1628). The review of 
administrative forms cost £250,000, and it produced savings of more 
than £5 million (TNA,CAB 164/1629). 
Subsequent developments of the Lasting Reforms can be seen as both 
an outgrowth of what it achieved and a response to its failure to bring 
public spending under control. The economic and political factors 
affecting the growth of public spending and public borrowing proved 
that the FMI was not sufficient. To overcome the status quo of the 
system new initiatives were required, which, again, strengthened Mrs 
Thatcher’s strategy that macro problems could be solved by breaking 
them down into micro components as suggested by the strategic 
Stepping Stones document drafted by John Hoskyns and his team in 
November 1977 when Thatcher was the leader of the opposition (THCR 
2/6/1/248). 
 
MINIS and the Financial Management Initiative  
 
The FMI was born officially on 8 March 1982 when the Treasury and 
Civil Service Committee published its report on efficiency and 
effectiveness in the civil service (HC 236, 1981/1982). It made a number 
of significant recommendations. In the committee’s view, it was 
important that ministers should assume greater responsibility for the 
management of their departments. The effective management of 
departmental programmes, it believed, was at least as crucial to the 
country as the performance of ministers on the floor of the House.  
To assist ministers in the performance of their new managerial role, the 
committee recommended that top management information systems 
known as MINIS, a system invented by Derek Rayner in 1980 and 
developed by the Secretary of Environment Michael Heseltine in 1981–
82 to improve circulation of information at departmental level, should 
be introduced in all departments (TNA, PREM 19/680). In the world of 
Heseltine, MINIS provided ‘who did what, why and at what cost’ 
(1987:16–20). MINIS was strengthened in 1983 with the Joubert 
programme, an organisational structure that fragmented the 
Department of Environment into 120 ‘cost centres’, each with an annual 
budget to cover running and staff costs. The two initiatives compared 
actual expenditure with planned expenditure, enabling the minister to 
conduct systematic budget review. Heseltine considered MINIS as a 
driver to improve efficiency and effectiveness and he exported it to the 
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Ministry of Defence when he moved there as a minister. The initiative 
was exported to other departments during the 80s, but as Heseltine 
testified: ‘On one memorable occasion, I was asked by the Prime 
Minister to give my colleagues an account of how MINIS was helping 
the DoE to put its house in order. My fellow Cabinet Ministers sat in 
rows while I explained my brainchild, each with his sceptical 
Permanent Secretary behind him muttering objections, or so I 
suspected. […] When I had done, there were few takers and absolutely 
no enthusiasts’ (Heseltine, 1987:16–20).  
MINIS was designed to provide ministers and senior officials with 
systematically presented information which would enable them to 
review priorities, set objectives and allocate resources (Likierman 
1982:30). Each year, departmental activities, performance and future 
plans would be assessed in particular to determine whether value for 
money was being achieved, and specific areas of work would be 
selected for detailed scrutiny in order to select new departmental 
priorities and resources allocation (FMU, 1984:ch.5). In Whitehall, the 
advent of MINIS was not welcomed with universal support. Senior 
officials giving evidence before the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee (see, for example, HC 236-II, 1981–2) argued that they were 
already doing much the same thing, that the system was not exportable 
to other departments and that its applicability was heavily dependent 
on the personality of its sponsoring minister (Likierman, 1982:130). 
Others contested whether the return from introducing comprehensive 
reporting in some areas would justify its expense. In their view, 
principles of financial management should be applied only in areas of 
expenditure where they were directly relevant, such as in operational 
areas (Minutes, Meeting of Permanent Secretaries, 7 April 1982). 
However, Mrs Thatcher strongly supported it (‘Shades of a Home 
Counties Boudicca’, The Times, 17 May 1983:5), and the Prime Minister’s 
endorsement ensured that other members of the Cabinet applied it. 
Next, the Treasury and Civil Service Committee argued that line 
managers in the civil service should have more freedom in managing 
their resources. Therefore, it recommended that managerial authority 
should, as far as possible, be delegated from the centre of departments 
to operational managers. Then it focused on policy and programme 
expenditure. In this field, it recommended that there should be an 
annual cycle of departmental programme reviews. The performance of 
each programme should regularly be evaluated and the results of the 
evaluations should be reported to the Management and Personnel 
Office and Parliament. The committee argued that all these operations 
should be harmonised through changes to personnel policy designed to 
encourage the promotion of better managers and the enhancement of 
their managerial skills. The Financial Management Initiative was the 
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Thatcher government’s answer to these recommendations that were 
received in September 1982 with the Command Paper 8616. The aim of 
the initiative was to ‘promote in each Department an organisation and 
system in which managers at all levels have: a) a clear view of their 
objectives, and assess and wherever possible measure outputs or 
performance in relation to those objectives; b) well-defined 
responsibility for making the best use of their resources, including a 
critical scrutiny of output and value for money; and c) the information 
(including particularly about costs), training and access to expert 
advice which they need to exercise their responsibilities effectively’ 
(Cmnd 8616). The approach embedded in the principles of the reform 
differed markedly from the traditional pattern of management in the 
civil service. This had been forged by methods of organisation in which 
managers were motivated to concentrate exclusively on the quality of 
service they were providing; to be relatively indifferent to the costs of 
the service; and to spend little time confronting costs and results 
(Wilding, 1983). In summary the FMI prescribed a system of 
management in which: a) objectives are set and ranked at the apex of a 
department and framed in terms sufficiently specific to provide 
concrete guidance for action; b) the department is divided into coherent 
managerial blocks or business, each of which is responsible for the 
achievement of specific objectives; c) each manager’s objectives are 
settled as are the expense and borders of his or her responsibilities; d) a 
chain of accountability is defined in which each manager is made 
responsible to the one person for his or her use of resources and 
programmatic performances; e) the manager’s authority to take 
decisions is related to her or his responsibility for action; f) information 
systems are established to allow ministers, senior and junior managers 
alike to monitor their performance against targets and adjust their 
activities and resources accordingly; and g) const and programme 
information is brought together at the top of the department to enable 
consistent decision-making about future priorities and resource 
allocation (Hunt, 1986). The new system could not be introduced 
entirely, but an incremental approach was necessary. Therefore, the 
Financial Management Unit (FMU), which had been created as a 
guidance for the initiative and was composed of a dozen civil servants 
by the Treasury and the MPO, concentrated its attention on three 
specific areas of development (Cmnd 9058, 1983). First, following the 
government’s acceptance of the committee’s recommendation with 
respect to MINIS, the unit began work to introduce a top management 
system in each Whitehall department (Cmnd 8616, 1982, Cmnd 9058, 
1983).  
Then, the FMU focused on the delegation of managerial responsibility. 
In cooperation with departments, it established a number of 
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experimental projects in delegated budgetary control and worked 
intensively on the design for a decentralised management accounting 
system (Chipperfield, 1983, pp.26–9). Then, the evaluation of 
programmes occurred. The government had not accepted the Treasury 
and Civil Service Committee’s recommendation for a structured cycle 
of review. Instead, the FMU was charged with responsibility for 
introducing effective methods to assess whether programmes were 
meeting targets and providing value for money. Early governmental 
reports were clear about the political, institutional and methodological 
obstacles which stood in the path of managerial change. The 
communication process to the citizens was exceeded in the 
government’s later paper that were most concentrated on public 
relations and political communication. The early reports drew attention 
to a host of difficulties which management reformers would have to 
face. In summary, these were as follows: a) the Conservative 
government had imposed tight controls on numbers of civil service 
personnel, yet these controls went against the grain of, according to 
departmental managers, the flexibility to vary the mix of resources at 
their disposal (Cmnd 9058, 1983); b) a balance needed to be struck 
between flexibility within budgets, which increased the responsibility 
of each manager for the use of resources, and flexibility between 
budgets, preserving for senior management the ability to adjust the 
allocation of resources during the budget year (Cmnd 9058, 1983). 
Similarly, a balance needed to be struck between departmental 
flexibility and the Treasury’s desire to exercise strict control of the 
expenditure; c) if delegation were to be successful, the performance of 
the programme needed to be tested accurately. Developing adequate 
measures of performance, particularly the ones based on quantitative 
methods, posed formidable methodological problems (Financial 
Management Unit, 1983:10); d) one important although long-term 
objective of the reforms was to combine management and budgetary 
planning. To do this, the timetables for the two needed to be combined, 
but this posed considerable logistical difficulties (Financial 
Management Unit, 1983:37); e) ultimately, the success of the reforms 
would depend upon the ability of the reformers to change behaviours 
and practices embedded in the British Civil Service. Whether the 
changes proposed would, of themselves, be sufficient to shift these 
attitudes was an issue at the forefront of the FMU’s thinking as it 
embarked on what everyone recognized would be a thoroughly 
daunting task (Financial Management Unit, 1983:43). 
In 1982 the process to introduce managerial practices in central 
government was definitely marching forward. 
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The FMI further development (1982–1987) 
 
Between 1982 and 1987, there was published a series of reports which 
summarised, implemented and assessed the FMI’s progress from the 
government’s perspective. One of the first assessments to appear was 
the FMI’s report on the development and operation of top management 
systems (Financial Management Unit, 1984a). The unit reported that 
most departments had established systems which covered both 
administrative and programme expenditure and which collected 
information covering both past performance and plans for the future. 
However, further development was required to draw clear 
intradepartmental objectives and to test the assignment of managerial 
responsibility for programmes as well as administration. Considerable 
work also needed to be done to create effective linkages between the 
top management system, PESC and Estimates. The 1984 White Paper 
(Cmnd 9297, July 1984) revealed that effective progress had been 
achieved with MINIS. Each department, it argued, had to introduce a 
top management system. The system had established a useful 
framework within which ministers and senior civil servants could take 
decisions on the basis of resource allocation and they could manage 
appropriate changes in departmental organisation, setting up a vast 
amount of information. During 1984, the FMU provided a detailed 
survey of top management systems in five departments. It argued that 
the systems were generally well established (Financial Management 
Unit, 1985a). This method needed to be implemented to allow top 
management to set plans for improved performance and value for 
money, to allocate personnel and other resources and to review 
consequent progress as suggested by the officials of the Cabinet Office 
and the Efficiency Unit (TNA, PREM 19/1175). By the time of the 
National Audit Office report on the FMI (HC 588, 1986/87), the Joint 
Management Unit, the successor of the FMU, was doing not so much 
work in connection with the top management systems. The NAO report 
showed the considerable level of progress which had been made by 
departments in adopting and operating systems which had already 
proven to be of benefit for both ministers and senior civil servants (HC 
588, 1986–7). 
In Budgetary Control Systems (Financial Management Unit, 1984b), the 
FMU produced guidelines to instruct departments on how they should 
proceed with the delegation of financial responsibility. The Unit 
proposed that departments develop a strategy, compatible with the 
framework set by the top management systems, for decentralising 
budgetary responsibilities from the centre to senior line management 
and their subsequent delegation even further down the line. It was 
another step towards the separation between policy-making and policy 
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implementation. Only when such a strategy was agreed could the 
function of cost centres and the assignment of managerial responsibility 
be implemented effectively (Zifcak, 1994:31).  
In 1985, the FMU examined the issue of delegation from a different 
perspective, that of the Principal Financial Officer (PFO). In the report 
Resource Allocation in Departments: the Role of the Principal Financial 
Officer (Financial Management Unit, 1985b), the unit, considering the 
experience of a number of departments, drafted a plan for the role that 
the PFO should play in an environment of delegated managerial 
control. It suggested that PFOs should relinquish their detailed controls 
in favour of playing an active role in establishing and monitoring the 
achievement of value for money targets for programme and 
administrative expenditure. The recommendation for the general 
framework was that the Treasury set a similar approach in relation to 
departments. The Treasury, it said, should exercise aggregate control 
through cash limits and personnel numbers. Beyond this, the 
departments should be given a block budget for administrative 
expenditure, leaving them maximum scope for the internal allocation of 
their running costs (Financial Management Unit, 1983: 37). 
In Policy Work and the FMI, the FMU identified a number of problems 
which arose when programmes had not been systematically evaluated 
(Financial Management Unit, 1985c). Programmes had been 
misconducted or out-dated, insufficient information had been 
produced to assess their value and, without appropriate information, 
officials had not been able completely to advise the minister about 
criticisms of existing policy. Moreover, it recommended that new policy 
initiatives brought before Cabinet should specify their aims in terms of 
‘what will be achieved, by when and at what cost’. Subsequently, each 
initiative should be evaluated in the terms proposed (HC 588, 1986, 87: 
19). 
The early white papers and official reports presented a picture of 
steady and real progress. Even where difficulties occurred they were 
minor and would be overcome in the future, the publications insisted. 
These conclusions could hardly be different, considering that the 
reports were written by the reformers themselves.  
However in 1986 the initiative was evaluated from a more independent 
perspective. The evaluation demonstrated that the results were more 
mixed, asymmetrical and less successful compared with the early 
reports. The government accountant, Anthony Wilson, was the first to 
report (HM Treasury, 1986a). He led a team which examined the 
operation of a delegated budgetary control system in six central 
departments. He concluded that there were encouraging signs of 
progress in the delegation of running cost controls, operational 
managers had become more cost-conscious, savings had been made 
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and budgetary discipline had stimulated local managers to reorganise 
their work and implement the services. Nevertheless, progress between 
departments had been asymmetric and the ‘laggards do much to 
accelerate their progress by using the developmental work and 
experience already gained elsewhere’ (HM Treasury, 1986a:2).  
The report concluded that to be effective, budgeting must secure the 
firm commitment and better involvement of senior management, 
strong relations must be built between budgets, outputs and results, 
and the environment created by central agencies must be continuously 
supportive (Zifcak, 1994:32). However, despite these recommendations, 
the report illustrated a fundamental criticism of the FMI’s progress. 
Wilson found that top officials had not been sufficiently involved in the 
budgetary reforms: they hadn’t shown enthusiasm for becoming 
managers (Richards, 1987:34). They had not exercised budgetary 
responsibilities themselves and they had not used top management 
systems to set objectives, match resources and allocate responsibilities. 
Finally, they had not been involved properly in the evaluation of 
budgetary performance. Although expressed in technical language, 
these criticisms were consistent. Wilson argued that greater emphasis 
should be placed upon the development of output and performance 
measures as the New Public Management doctrine recommended. He 
recognised that these presented a methodological problem when they 
were applied to policy implementation and he argued that these 
problems were matters of organisation and willingness rather than 
principles. The final part of the report considered the difficulties at the 
budgetary level. It declared that the manpower limits and centrally 
imposed pay levels had ‘represented the most serious detraction from 
credibility and realism of the whole budgetary process’ (HM Treasury, 
1986a:17). As departmental planning systems became more 
complicated, Wilson proposed that the government agencies should be 
considerably more committed than they had been to devolved control. 
The Wilson Report was attacked by strong criticism in Whitehall. The 
Treasury didn’t appreciate its conclusions, not least because the report 
suggested that central control must be relaxed (Richards, 1987:35).  
The report by the NAO found greater favour in government because it 
was more positive. The NAO’s paper was based on the evaluation of 
the FMI’s progress in twelve government departments. The report 
concluded that substantial progresses had been made in the 
development of the management systems and no serious problems had 
emerged in the departments examined. The NAO found that all 
departments had developed top management systems which supported 
the setting of objectives, decisions on priorities, the allocation of 
resources and the review of the activities. Nevertheless, departments’ 
targets should be formulated more clearly; objectives needed 
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harmonisation at further departmental levels and in many departments 
integration had not yet been achieved between top management and 
the budgetary system. The NAO found that all departments had 
introduced budgetary control systems for their administration costs, 
but the range of costs covered by budgetary systems varied 
considerably within and between the departments analysed. 
Considering the remarks of the Wilson Report, the NAO also 
recommended that considerably greater emphasis be placed on the 
development of effective indicators of performance and it argued to 
methodological difficulties inherent in the evaluation of programmes. It 
concluded that programmes should be reviewed periodically and 
review should concentrate on programmes whose objectives could 
clearly be defined and which offered good solutions to improve value 
for money.  
These two reports seemed very different to each other. In part, the 
difference can be explained by the fact that, in its reports, the NAO was 
unable to contest the pillars of existing Treasury policy. It could just 
analyse whether or not a policy was operating effectively. Since the 
Treasury had already accepted departmental plans of work, the NAO 
was hardly likely to contest them (Flynn et al. 1988:184). The moderate 
tone of the NAO’s report may also have been related to the close 
relationship that existed between the Comptroller and Auditor General, 
Gordon Downey, and the Head of the Efficiency Unit, Sir Robin Ibbs, 
for whom he had worked (Hennessy, 1990:614). Departmental officials 
are traditionally defensive in the face of the inquiry from the Auditor. 
Defences may have been down when the Wilson team proposed its less 
informal inquiries. The NAO, too, must related carefully with 
departmental officials fearing that, if criticism were highlighted too 
harshly, departmental cooperation might in future be less fluid.  
On the contrary, the Wilson team were insiders examining what was 
happening inside. The NAO’s officers were outsiders relying heavily 
on second-hand information. The two reports were, in effect, refereed 
by the Committee of Public Accounts (HC 61, 1986/7). It conducted its 
own examination of the FMI based on the NAO’s findings. It was less 
cautious than the NAO had been in underlining dysfunction. The 
committee observed that departments had been developing their new 
management systems for nearly five years but not all had progressed as 
quickly as they should have. For many departments, full 
implementation was still many years away. Similarly, it concluded that 
delegated budgetary control systems had taken so long to develop that 
support for delegation in departments had been significantly delayed. 
Then, the committee turned its attention to policy evaluation and 
programme expenditure. It supported strongly the government’s 
requirement that for new policy initiatives and reviews of existing 
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policy, targets should be set in terms of what would be achieved, by 
when and at what costs. The committee concluded by expressing its 
view that the FMI should be concerned as much with obtaining 
improved value for money by providing better-quality services as with 
the achievement of savings through greater efficiency. The FMI which 
emerged from these external reports respect to the designers of the 
reform underlined how this was far less radical than it seemed at first 
sight and that it was weakened by the departmental implementation 
(Zifcak, 1994:32). Obviously some progress had been made, but it 
wasn’t enough to achieve a substantial change. Indeed, many 
fundamental problems remained unresolved even five years after the 
initiative had been announced. 
 
The Cassels Report: improving career management and training for a 
‘new breed’ of skilled public managers 
 
These macro reforms, new management information centres, a 
decentralised style of budgetary and increased accountability were all 
targets of the FMI. However, the FMI alone was not sufficient ‘without 
a new breed of skilled manager.’ Consequently, the FMI was being 
complemented by a set of improvements in financial management, like 
the ones suggested by the Cassels Report of 1983, including improved 
career management and training for those with potential to rise to 
senior positions. Taking advantage of the experiences of both the 
Fulton Report and Rayner Scrutinies, Mrs Thatcher promoted a review 
to improve managerial training and techniques for the civil service 
personnel. Alongside the introduction of the FMI, a review by the 
Management and Personnel Office was established in order to examine 
personnel work within the Civil Service.  
The review was coordinated by John Cassels, the department’s Second 
Permanent Secretary, and the report he published was regarded as a 
blueprint for the future conduct of personnel management in Whitehall 
(Richards, 1997:33). The review’s brief was to examine all areas of 
personnel work, ranging from recruitment, redundancy, staff 
movements and career management, in order to identify new methods 
with which to improve individual performance targets.  
The Report was built analysing nine departments and its conclusions 
were radical: staff to be appointed to jobs and not grades; increased job 
transfers with industrial and commercial managers; merit pay awards 
to reward individual effort and initiative; line managers to be allocated 
more responsibility and authority over personnel matters; and 
inefficient staff to be dealt with more swiftly (Cassels, 1983). There were 
some criticisms. Civil Service unions argued that this represented a 
further shift towards the widespread privatisation of duties in 
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Whitehall. The Levene appointment in 1984, soon after the report was 
published, certainly inflamed the situation: Michal Heseltine appointed 
Peter Levene, the Chairman of United Scientific Holdings, as a 
Chairman of Defence Procurement in the MoD. Paper wrote that ‘this 
was the most significant and controversial of growing numbers of 
secondments to the top levels of the Civil Service, which challenged the 
traditional appointment procedures overseen by the Civil Service 
Commission … Levene had been appointed with a salary of £95,000, 
twice the normal rate for this post, without reference to the 
Commission’ (Pyper, 1991:115). Although individuals were 
occasionally seconded to Whitehall from outside, a number of the 
appointments made following the Report prompted some interested 
parties to suggest that a form of ‘surreptitial politicisation’ was 
occurring (Richards, 1997).  
However, these appointments, supervised by Senior Appointments 
Selection Committee, were supported by the House of Commons Select 
Committee on the Treasury and Civil Service and the Royal Institute of 
Public Administration (1987:61). They did not find irregularity in the 
functioning of the appointment procedure: ‘Only about 2 percent of the 
members of the Senior Open Structure are “outsiders” temporarily 
brought in to fill particular vacancies. Whitehall is too cautious in this 
respect. More could be done centrally to liaise with business, 
universities, and the rest of the public sector to seek out talent. More 
Civil Service posts should be publicly advertised, and applications for 
them encouraged from the existing civil service and from outside 
Whitehall.’ Interviewed by David Richards (1997:34) in December 1994, 
Cassels argued that his paper was written ‘to produce a more 
professional Civil Service’. He maintained that for a long time Civil 
Service had been too professional in the handling of parliamentary 
affairs, which had enforced the effectiveness of ministers. However, as 
Richards (1997:35) writes, ‘Cassels felt where the Civil Service had been 
less effective waist being professional about the subject it dealt with.’ In 
the same interview Cassels expressed his position about the Civil 
Service in the early 80s: ‘I am one of those who feel the Civil Service 
wasn’t as good as it thought it was. It was really alarming how poor 
they were and quite a lot of things they should have been better at. 
Above all, they were professional at the politics of it but unprofessional 
at the realities of it and especially uninterested at implementation. The 
Civil Service is bad at implementation and always has been, because 
clever chaps can think up policies all the time, but find it dreary to 
apply them. We have never been good at doing that. We are always 
making mistakes.’  
Cassels then went on to argue that the Civil Service was top heavy with 
policy makers and lacked at implementation ground. He also pointed 
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out that there had been an earlier, failed, attempt at reform that had 
occurred under the control of the Civil Service Department. He argued 
that ‘setting up the Civil Service Department had been a formalised 
attempt at that, but it turned out to be a complete fiasco. Rather 
surprisingly as well. […] the CSD had come to look as though it were a 
vested interest, looking after the material welfare and privileges of civil 
servants and not being about an efficient, well-trained, professional 
Civil Service. That is how it seemed and that is how I guess it looked to 
Mrs Thatcher’ (Richards, 1997:35).  
The Cassels report was responsible for legitimising a new era in Civil 
Service appointments through the introduction of a new breed of 
official; it insinuated that the traditional path of promotions in a civil 
service career was not necessary any longer the ground norm. Indeed, a 
serving official in the Senior Civil Service group observed that: ‘In the 
1980s, the Civil Service placed much more emphasis on personnel 
development, actively seeking individuals with the ability to manage 
change. There had been a shift away from what in the early 1960s 
would have been termed policy-makers, high intellectual types, to 
those with good interpersonal skills, competent runners of 
organisations, able to manage staff. People still needed high intellectual 
qualities but they do also need managerial and interpersonal skills. 
Therefore, the individual sought after is one capable of managing 
change and running a staff’ (Richards, 1997:36, interview). A first step, 
which would be completed in 1987–88 with the Mueller Report and the 
Next Steps, to study a private-sector-style career organisation and 
flexibility had been made. 
 
The Central Policy and Review Staff abolition: the end of the 
government’s think tank 
 
One significant decision made by Mrs Thatcher was her announcement, 
on 16 June 1983, that the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) was to be 
abolished (CAB 128/76). The origins of this unit, created to improve 
government strategy and coordination among departments, can be 
found in Mr Heath’s 1970 White Paper. Having considered the 
importance of inter-departmental committees, the White Paper 
admitted that there was need to enforce them ‘by a clear and 
comprehensive definition of government strategy which can be 
systematically developed to take account of changing circumstances 
and can provide a framework within which the government’s policies 
as a whole may be more effectively formulated’ (para.45). In February 
1971 it announced the creation of ‘a small multidisciplinary central 
policy and review staff in the Cabinet Office’ which will ‘form an 
integral element of the Cabinet Office and, like the Secretariat and other 
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staffs in the Cabinet Office, will be at the disposal of the Government as 
a whole. Under the supervision of the Prime Minister, it will work for 
ministers collectively; and its task will be to enable them to take policy 
decisions by assisting them to work out the implications of their basic 
strategy in terms of policies in specific areas, to establish the relative 
priorities to be given to the different sectors of their programme as a 
whole, to identify those areas of policy in which new choices can be 
exercised and to ensure that the underlying implications of alternative 
courses of action are fully analysed and considered’ (ibid. para.47) As 
the first director of the CPRS said, its first aim was ‘sabotaging the 
over-smooth functioning of the machine of government’ or, as he 
argued another time, ‘thinking the unthinkable’ (Lord Rothschild, 
1977). The CPRS was an experiment for the importation of ‘outside’ 
ideas into a traditionally closed system of government: half its 
membership, which fluctuated around 18, consisted of bright young 
civil servants from different departments, and the other half was made 
up of outsiders from university, industry and commerce who became 
temporary civil servants. The studies of the CPRS produced the 
Programme of Analysis and Review (PAR), which was, in turn, 
intended to reinforce the inter-departmental expenditure planning 
reforms (PESC) developed in the 1970s: PAR required departments to 
justify and defend their various policy programmes in 
interdepartmental discussion, albeit on a highly selective basis. Both 
CPRS and PAR were deliberate attempts to break down the isolation of 
departments by strengthening the collective basis of Cabinet decision-
making (Fry, 1995).  
The government’s overall strategy was to enforce the centre to prevail 
over vested interests of single departments. These experiments were 
too weak to break a very strong tradition of departmentalism and 
became difficult to implement after Mr Heath left his office. The PAR 
was abolished soon after Mrs Thatcher became Prime Minister and 
substituted with the small Efficiency Unit led by Derek Rayner and 
settled under the Prime Minster’s office in order to achieve better 
results with administrative reforms. The CPRS lasted longer, and 
focused on principal Conservative policy issues such as privatisation 
and the curbing of trade union influence. Some political problems 
emerged a few weeks before the 1983 election from the leaking of a 
CPRS report that advocated a sharp reduction of the role of the welfare 
state. It was, in the end, too small and too alien to survive without 
active prime ministerial support. It was abolished mainly because it 
served the Cabinet, and Mrs Thatcher preferred a direct and 
personalised advisory service to the Prime Minister than a broader one 
to all Ministers. Mrs Thatcher’s strong leadership, her preference for 
like-minded ministers and personal advisers and for ‘can-doer’ civil 
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servants in order to reduce the size of the public sector and improve its 
efficiency was a powerful element in reducing the resistance of 
departments in policy implementation.  
As Drewry and Butcher wrote, ‘The gravitational force of a dominant 
Prime Minister reinforces the constitutional convention of collective 
responsibility, and Mrs Thatcher clearly believes that she can establish 
and enforce a collective strategy without artificial aids such as CPRS’ 
(Drewry and Butcher, 1991:89). Mr Heath had attempted to work out 
coherent principles to reform the machinery of government in the 
context of what was then a new spirit of strategic planning of policies. 
Mrs Thatcher was more pragmatic, and as one Whitehall journalist 
argued, ‘She is impatient with Whitehall’s cumbersome Cabinet 
committee structure, preferring, instead, to set up ad hoc committees 
on a particular issue, preferably with herself in the chair. In short, she is 
not greatly interested – to great disappointment of academics looking 
for tidy solutions– in the machinery of government and constitutional 
theory’ (R. Norton-Taylor, the Guardian, 27 September 1983). In this 
scenario, the survival of the CPRS was difficult and the collective think 
tank less useful, even if her Cabinet Secretary Robert Armstrong did 
not agree with the idea of suppressing it, as he wrote: ‘I conclude from 
this analysis that: 
(1) You may well want some reinforcement of your advisory staff, 
particularly on economic and matters. 
(2) Even if you do, we should retain a CPRS. 
(3) The balance in the CPRS’s work should shift away from specific 
studies and more towards collective briefing on policy analysis and 
advice.  
(4) The CPRS should not be debarred from undertaking in-depth 
studies at your request or that of a departmental Minister (with your 
agreement). But we should not try to think up a programme of studies 
for the CPRS to do. 
(5) The CPRS in its new role should continue to be part of the Cabinet 
Office, though it would need to work closely with the advisers in your 
office. 
If this prescription is followed, there may be scope for some reduction 
in the size of the CPRS, but I think not much, if it is to be equipped with 
a reasonable range of talents and skills. Some of those now in the CPRS 
might be worth considering as candidates for advisory positions in 
your office’ (Churchill Archives, THCR 1/11/15).  
Indeed, she decided to cut it off, as she argued on 16 June 1983: ‘The 
Prime Minister said that an announcement would be made that 
afternoon that the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) would 
be disbanded at the end of July. The CPRS had been a valuable 
organisation in the early years after the 1979 General Election, but 
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studies of the kind the CPRS had recently undertaken needed firm 
political direction and would be better carried out in the planning units 
which had now been set up in a number of Departments. The Chief 
Scientist, CPRS, would remain as Chief Scientific Adviser, Cabinet 
Office, and some of the CPRS staff who had come from outside the 
Civil Service might be taken on by other Departments’ (CAB 128/76). 
The CPRS’s abolition was a pragmatic case that showed how the role of 
external think tanks and advisors was increasing in the UK system of 
government and that this ‘contracting-out’ of policy-advisory was 
becoming one of the characteristics of this change at the heart of the 
executive. 
 
 
 
From FMI to the Next Steps Executive Agencies 
 
The FMI was a watershed for the reform of the British Civil Service in 
the early 80s. After the spending review led by Derek Rayner and the 
manpower reduction, the Financial Management Initiative was a 
breakthrough in the reform and for the process of managerialisation in 
the public sector. The Comptroller and Auditor General wrote that 
‘departments consider that the visible benefits of their FMI systems 
have included greater cost consciousness at all levels of management 
and the MDR of budgeting cites many examples of administrative cost 
savings arising from management action inspired by the improved 
information and the constraint on resources imposed by a tightly 
drawn budget’ (HC 588, 1986). Outside commentators also praised the 
FMI and the earlier scrutinies as a success, as underlined by Hennessy: 
‘The first eight years of Raynerism represented … a formidable 
achievement in absolute terms as well as in comparison to anything 
that had gone before’ (Hennessy, 1989:619). Permanent Secretaries 
showed enthusiasm for this reform. Hennessy (1989:619) reported the 
opinion of one of the most influential mandarins of the era: ‘I never 
realised what an effort it would be turning this tanker around. But over 
the past year it has become clear that it (the FMI) will endure. If there 
was a change of government, we would still want to do it for our own 
purpose.’  
Despite this, not all the opinions expressed satisfaction with the FMI. 
Metcalfe and Richards (1987:131), who studied this period of reform, 
argued the long-term, effective management reform was not just a 
matter of introducing new operational techniques and systems. Reform 
of Whitehall also had to consider the embedded culture of the 
administration, ‘the, often unspoken, set of assumptions about their 
role within which senior civil servants think and act. [A culture] … 
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where writing a well-constructed ministerial brief on a topical subject 
or steering a bill through Parliament has a higher value … than 
implementing a new policy or improving the administration of an 
existing policy.’ The Civil Service unions argued it was contradictory to 
ask managers to be fully accountable for their spending, whilst 
allowing them little or no control over determining what the size of the 
budgets should be. They argued that the FMI’s downfall, in relation to 
the demands of government, was ‘the allocation of real money to 
managers … but giving them real money would, of course, mean 
giving them a real power down the line, the last thing that the central 
departments, or, for that matter, department-level managements, 
would contemplate. So we are left with the usual half-backed Civil 
Service compromise. Civil Service managers have all the rigours and 
disadvantages of “developed power, without being allowed to exercise 
the power”’ (Bulletin, 1985:17).  
Whether or not it can be argued that the FMI stood on its own as a step 
forward in Civil Service reform, it certainly created a new ground. It 
encouraged a greater cost consciousness by individual departments 
and, with it, the greater economies and value for money that the 
government sought. It also provided officials with a clearer view of 
policy objectives. The Cassels Report attempted to create a path 
towards the personnel changes in relation to these reforms. The FMI 
constituted the first moves towards a programme of decentralisation 
for Whitehall, which were later better defined by the Next Steps 
Agencies reforms. As Barney Hayhoe, the then Minister for the Civil 
Service, concluded, the FMI meant ‘a push to a greater decentralisation 
and delegation down the line … will represent a highly significant 
change in the culture of Civil Service … Recruitment, training, 
promotion, prospects and practice will be affected’ (HC 38, 1982a). The 
efficiency scrutinies, MINIS, Joubert and the FMI can be regarded as the 
legacy and evolution of the Fulton Report, based on the principle of the 
economy and efficiency. The FMI was not a period of revolution for 
Whitehall, but of continuous change. A step forward from the previous 
emphasis on effectiveness. The culmination of these changes provided 
the foundations for the Government’s largest scheme of reform: the 
Next Steps. 
 
5. The last effort to reform: Unionism transformation in the public 
sector, Civil Service regulation, pay and performances, recruitment 
and training  
  
 
Transformation of Unionism in the public sector: The Government 
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Communication Headquarter case (1984) 
 
The constitutional relationship between ministers and civil servants has 
altered in many important respects, and the changing character of trade 
unionism in the civil service is in parallel the cause and the 
consequence of the constitutional change that has occurred. The extent 
of that shift is well illustrated by the GCHQ case, which exploded in 
1984. The Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) is an 
important part of the United Kingdom security system, whose main 
function is to provide information for government’s intelligence. From 
its inception in 1947, the civil servants who staffed it had been allowed 
to join national civil service unions, and there were long-established 
practices of consultation between management and staff. However, 
between 1979 and 1981 there were seven instances of industrial action 
at GCHQ; most of these were minor incidents, but during the major 
dispute of 1981 the civil service unions decided to hurt the Thatcher 
government by directing action at security and defence installations, 
and GCHQ was closed down for a short period (Drewry and 
Butcher:1995).  
The Government was angry and embarrassed by what it saw as an 
irresponsible menace to national security and took steps to negotiate an 
agreement that would prevent any recurrence. However, in December 
1983, with meetings between unions and management imminent, Mrs 
Thatcher privately issued an oral instruction in her capacity as Minister 
for the Civil Service, banning trade union membership among GCHQ 
staff. The ban, together with a decision to deprive GCHQ staff of the 
statutory right of recourse to industrial tribunals, was announced to the 
House of Commons a month later. It was announced that staff would 
be offered £1,000 taxable compensation for the loss of their statuary 
rights (Drewry and Butcher: 1995).  
There was a storm of protest from many quarters, and the unions tried 
to persuade the government to accept a draft agreement to limit, but 
not ban, future industrial action at GCHQ. These representations didn’t 
produce a compromise, and the CCSU decided to seek a legal remedy 
against the government in the courts. In July 1984, Mr Justice Glidewell 
gave a judgement which, although it rejected several of the points 
advanced on behalf of the unions, ruled that the staff at GCHQ had a 
‘legitimate expectation’ that they or their unions would be consulted 
before withdrawal of their rights and that the applicants were entitled 
to a legal declaration that the Prime Minister’s instruction was invalid. 
The unions’ enthusiasm was short lived. Three weeks later, the Court of 
Appeal upheld the government’s appeal, accepting its contention that 
the decision to ban the unions, and the procedures by which this had 
been achieved, were governed by overriding consideration of national 
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security, which the courts were not competent to question.  
In November, this ruling was finally upheld in the House of Lords, 
though there were crumbs of comfort for the unions, particularly in so 
far as the law lords repudiated the government’s contention that action 
taken under the royal prerogative cannot in principle be reviewed by 
the courts. The door was opened to litigation by civil servants and their 
unions to resolve many kinds of disputes about matters to do with 
employment and terms of service, so long as ‘national security’ was not 
invoked by ministers to prevent judicial intervention. The government 
got its way, but at considerable cost. Whether right or wrong in 
principle, it was widely regarded as having handled the matter with 
harshness and inflexibility. Industrial relations in the civil service, 
already in a fragile state, were further damaged, and perhaps changed 
permanently (Fry: 1995).  
The case served to unite unions whose interests, in other contexts, were 
often divided. The issue has been kept alive by some of the staff at 
GCHQ, who have continued to fight against the ban on union 
membership. In seeking to defend national security, the government 
gave enormous publicity to the hitherto low-profile activities of GCHQ. 
The case went to the European Commission of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg early in 1987, and the unions failed to win a hearing before 
the Court. Despite this outcome, and whatever the legal implications of 
the GCHQ case, the crucial point is that the affair occurred, changing 
the balances between the civil service as institution and the unions. 
When unions representing civil servants feel obliged to take the 
government to court, but this happening changed the relationship 
between politics, civil servants and unions, making it more unstable 
and weaker.  
 
 
The Armstrong Memorandum and the renewed constitutional debate 
on the civil service 
 
One of the most debated issues in the constitutional debates of the 
Conservative era involved the position of the civil servants and the 
relationships among them and ministries, narrowly focused on 
ministerial responsibility. The rise of managerial issues in the public 
sector, the agencification process at the end of the 80s and some 
episodes related to ministerial responsibility opened the discussion on 
the position of civil servants and the responsibility of ministries. The 
constitutional lawyer Geoffrey Marshall observed that ‘a clear and 
succinct account of the principle or convention of ministerial 
responsibility is not easy to give. One reason might be that the 
convention is, like most British conventions, somewhat vague and 
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slippery – resembling the procreation of eels.’ Nevertheless, Marshall 
added, politicians carry on as if the convention does exist (Marshall, 
1984:84–5).  
The problem was that with the growth of government, which was 
affecting the span of control, and the consequences of the Crichel Down 
case and the appointment of the Ombudsman as regards the perception 
of the constitutional position, Ministers still remained responsible in the 
sense that they were in charge to report upon the activities of the 
government department of which they were political head to the 
Crown, to the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and to Parliament. Civil 
servants remained non-political in the sense that they did not generally 
receive their appointments independently of Ministers, that they were 
not allowed to built political partnerships and that they were not 
required to perform politically on the floor of either House of 
Parliament. Civil servants were required to appear before 
Parliamentary Committees, but they were publicly responsible neither 
for the advice that they had given to Ministers, nor for the efficiency 
with which they carried out their work. Allegations such as the ones 
pointed out by Clive Ponting that the Thatcher Government was 
‘politicising’ the Civil Service in one sense ignored the reality that 
politics has never been absent from the career Civil Service, which 
operates in the midst of it. As Sir Gwilym Gibbon once observed, 
nobody ever said that the higher civil servant should be a ‘political 
eunuch’. What the career civil servant must abstain from being, he said, 
is a ‘political gospeller’ (Gibbon, 1943:86).  
By the time that the Thatcher Government had reached office, the Civil 
Service unions had made themselves much more consciously part of 
the wider trade union movement, and thus much more politically 
prominent, than, generally, the old staff association had tended to do; 
and especially once they had established the centralised council of Civil 
Service Unions, these bodies represented a challenge to elected 
government of a kind that the Thatcher Government was disinclined to 
sidestep. The Civil Service strike of 1981 could hardly be said to have 
been without political intent, because a defeat for Government would 
have menaced its economic plans and its political survival. As it was, 
the Government won, and in 1984 one of the ways it followed up its 
victory was, as we have seen, to ban union membership for civil 
servants working at the Government Communications Headquarters 
and its outstations. The excitement which this action provoked tended 
to distract from the wider question. Whether a career Civil Service 
could be heavily unionised when it was supposed to be a politically 
neutral body was a question that was easier to pose than to answer in a 
way compatible with an open society (Fry, 1985:122–45).  
The disharmony that characterised relations between the Thatcher 
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Government and the career Civil Service was that given departmental 
policy positions, in practice this was scarcely an arrangement that was 
politically neutral, but it was one conducive to a form of loyalty. When 
the Thatcher Government engaged in ‘deprivileging’ the Civil Service, 
in some cases disloyalty resulted. Of the ‘leakers’ of the confidential 
information in the Civil Service who were uncovered, Clive Ponting 
expressed disgruntlement at the Thatcher Government’s behaviour 
towards the Service material interests (Ponting, 1986:7), and related 
resentment was expressed by Sarah Tisdall and Ian Willmore (Pyper, 
1985:72–81). Clive Ponting’s behaviour in leaking material about the 
Belgrano incident merited the observation sometimes ascribed to 
Talleyrand: ‘C’est pire qu’un crime, c’est une faute.’ Ponting’s ‘mistake’, 
natural enough in the confusion invited by the behaviour of so many of 
the recent Governments, was to act as a ‘political gospeller’ and, thus, 
to fail to appreciate the essentially subordinate position of the official.  
In February 1985, during the facts of the Ponting Case, Sir Robert 
Armstrong, as Head of the Home Civil Service, in consultation with 
other Permanent Secretaries, thought it appropriate to issue a note of 
guidance on the duties and responsibilities of civil servants in relation 
to Ministers. The principal part of the note was: ‘Civil Servants are 
servants of the Crown. For all practical purposes the Crown in this 
context means and is represented by the Government of the day. There 
are special cases in which certain functions are conferred by law upon 
particular members or groups of members of the public services, but in 
general the executive powers of the Crown are exercised by and on the 
advice of Her Majesty’s Ministers, who are in turn answerable to 
Parliament. The Civil Service as such has no constitutional personality 
or responsibility separate from the duly elected government of the day. 
It is there to provide the Government of the day with advice on the 
formulation of the policies of the Government, to assist in carrying out 
the decisions of the Government, and to manage and deliver the 
services for which the Government is responsible. Some civil servants 
are also involved, as a proper part of their duties, in the processes of 
presentation of Government policies and decisions’ (Armstrong 
Memorandum, 1985). 
Sir Robert Armstrong emphasised that the ‘British Civil Service is a 
non-political and disciplined career Civil Service, and those civil 
servants who could not accept the consequences of these arrangements 
should resign, while continuing to respect the confidences obtained 
during their work in the Civil Service’ (HC, 92-II, 1985-6:7-9). The 
Armstrong Memorandum was unique. Never before had the head of 
civil servants publicly written and diffused in such detail what he 
believed to be the constitutional position regarding the relationship 
between Ministers and civil servants. That the Head of the Home Civil 
	   90	  
Service felt the need to issue a document of this kind was evidence of 
the controversy which had come to surround the subject. And to 
confirm this, the Memorandum was given a generally unfavourable 
reception not only by outside commentators, who as a breed seem 
afflicted by compulsive reformism, but also by the First Division 
Association (FDA), representing many leading officials in the Service.  
The embarrassment which the FDA had felt about the implications of 
the Ponting case for the relationship between Ministers and officials 
had led it earlier to promote the idea of a code of ethics for civil 
servants. The first general statement of principle in the FDA’s draft 
code stated that: ‘Civil Servants in the United Kingdom are servants of 
the Queen in Parliament. Executive government as a function of the 
Crown is carried out by Ministers who are accountable to Parliament. 
Civil Servants therefore owe to Ministers the duty to serve them loyally 
and to the best of their ability’ (FDA news, December 1984:3). This 
seemed to be much the same position as that taken in the Armstrong 
Memorandum’s second paragraph, where it said that ‘civil servants are 
servants of the Crown’ and that ‘for all practical purposes the Crown in 
this contest means and is represented by the Government of the day.’ 
According to the textbook on constitutional law published by E. C. S. 
Wade and Godfrey Phillips, ‘it is usual to refer to … “the Crown” as the 
collective entity which in law may stand for central government’ (Wade 
and Phillips, 1977:216). In the opinion of Wade and Phillips ‘the 
responsibility of Ministers to Parliament consists of a duty to account to 
Parliament for what they and their departments are doing,’ which 
means that a Minister ‘must answer before parliament for anything that 
his officials have done under his authority’ (ibid.:108–109).  
It was, though, the independent status of the career Civil Service which 
was at the heart of the debate about the Armstrong Memorandum. Like 
the position of Wade and Phillips, that Memorandum was organised 
around the constitutional convention of ministerial responsibility, and, 
hence, effectively denied that the Service could or should have an 
independent status in relation to the activity of governing. Those 
observers who considered the doctrine of ministerial responsibility to 
be a myth were naturally unfavourable towards the Memorandum, 
tending to prefer arrangements to be established which reflected what 
they saw as the reality of extensive Civil Service influence over 
Ministers, even control of them.  
The FDA also wanted these arrangements to be compatible with open 
government, and for civil servants to serve Ministers subject to the 
explicit conditions, and informed the House of Commons Treasury and 
Civil Service Committee of this (HC 92-II, 1985-6:59-67). That 
Committee’s Report on Civil Servants and Ministers: Duties and 
Responsibilities, published in May 1986, failed to address fully the core 
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issues it was charged with reviewing, preferring to adhere uncritically 
to the reforming agenda of the time. At one point, the Committee 
declared that ‘the evidence that we have received does not suggest that 
the Government has made a convincing case against some form of 
Freedom of Information Act’ (HC, 92-I, 1958-6, para. 6.5).  
These considerations stimulated the Thatcher Government to manage 
the issues proposed by the Committee’s Report (Cmnd 9841, 1986). The 
Westland affair ‘dramatically exposed the difficult nature of the 
relationship between Ministers, civil servants and Parliament’, the 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee believed (HC 92-I, 1985-6, p.vii), 
though the affair primarily involved personal rivalry between two 
members of the Thatcher Government, namely Michael Heseltine, the 
Secretary of State for Defence, and Leon Brittan, the Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry. These two Cabinet Ministers differed over what 
would be the best arrangements for safeguarding the future of the 
Westland helicopter company, which was in financial difficulties; 
Heseltine wanted Westland to be taken over by a European consortium 
and Brittan favoured the company being taken over by American-
controlled interests. The matter came to be discussed in early January 
1986, when Brittan authorised the disclosure of confidential material 
from the Solicitor General, which cast doubt upon the accuracy of a 
statement made by the Secretary of State for Defence. Heseltine 
resigned from Government because his preferred solution to 
Westland’s difficulties was ignored. Brittan was then forced to resign 
shortly afterwards, having seemed to mislead the House of Commons 
about events relating to the publication of the Solicitor General’s letter. 
Whether or not the Prime Minister knew of and, hence, condoned the 
leaking of the letter became the centre of the dispute. That six civil 
servants were involved became another controversy. The six civil 
servants were Bernard Ingham, the Prime Minister’s Chief Press 
Secretary, Charles Powell, Private Secretary in the Prime Minister’s 
Office, Collette Bowe, Head of Information, John Mogg, the Private 
Secretary to the Secretary of State, and John Michell, Under Secretary in 
charge of Air Division, all of the Department for Trade and Industry, 
and the familiar figure of Sir Robert Armstrong, Cabinet Secretary and 
Head of the Home Civil Service. The Defence Committee of the House 
of Commons investigated the Westland affair, and in July 1986 it 
produced two Reports on the subject, together with a substantial 
volume of evidence. That Report, called Westland plc: The 
government’s decision making (1986), examined the affair in detail, and 
it discovered nothing that was either novel or exciting. The Defence 
Committee sought to explain the uninteresting nature of its Report by 
pointing to the fact that, while it was able to summon Sir Robert 
Armstrong and another Permanent Secretary, Sir Brian Hayes of the 
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Department for Trade and Industry, to appear before it, the Committee 
had been denied the opportunity to cross-examine Mrs Ingram, Powell, 
Mogg, Michell and Miss Bowe. The Committee recommended that the 
situation in which such exclusions were possible should be changed 
(HC 519, 1985-6, pp. lxv-lxviii).  
The Government’s initial response to this proposal was one of reception 
(Cmnd 9916, 1986, para. 44), and its attitude came under attack from 
some of its own supporters when the relevant Reports were debated in 
the House of Commons in October 1986. Two months later, the House 
of Commons Liaison Committee reinforced the calls for a relaxation of 
restrictions (HC 100, 1987-7, para. 19) and the Government had earlier 
hinted at concessions. It was difficult to see what form such concession 
could take which would not be undermining of the type of career 
Higher Civil Service that was essential to running of British Central 
Government as currently organised. The most that the Conservative 
Government was likely to do was to make minor modifications to the 
Osmotherly Rules of 1980, the guidelines which state that civil servants 
who appeared before or who submitted papers to Parliamentary 
committees did so ‘on behalf of the Minister’ (Civil Service Department, 
Gen. 80/38, 1980, para. 7), and a White Paper, published in February 
1987, did no more than that (Cm. 78, 1987, p.4).  
Considering the political delicacy of these episodes and their 
consequences, the Armstrong Memorandum was dismissed as a ‘Yes 
Minister Code’ by the ‘liberal’ opinion makers (the Guardian, ‘Yes 
Minister Code’, 27 February 1985), but thus invited the question of 
what else it could be. For it to be believed that, in principle, the career 
Service could say ‘No, Minister’ would be to accord that Service a 
constitutional veto of the kind once enjoyed, for example, by the House 
of Lords in relation to the Liberal Governments of Campbell-
Bannerman and Asquith, which had the effect of negating the electoral 
verdict of 1906, and which was removed in 1911. Sir Douglas argued: 
‘the Civil Service cannot be thought of as an in-built safeguard against 
what some people might call the excesses of a radical or reforming 
Government. The only effective safeguards … have to be found in the 
political and judicial processes, or in the force of circumstances 
themselves’ (Wass, 1984:53).  
In constitutional terms, agents of Ministers more accurately summed 
up the role of the civil servants than notions that officials should fight 
either for the policies that they believed in, or against those which they 
opposed, or that they should act like watchdogs armed with the 
machinery other than that which existed through which to alert the 
public about ministerial policies or behaviour they deemed 
undesirable. If the Armstrong Memorandum raised major 
constitutional questions, the answers were determined by structure. 
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Civil servants were responsible to Ministers. Their relationship with the 
Crown was an indirect one, unlike that of the armed forces, which were 
organisations of a different kind, not least in disciplinary arrangements 
and ordinary roles. More generally, civil servants did not seem to have 
a direct responsibility as servants of the Crown in addition to their role 
as servants of the Government of the day (Woodhouse:1994).  
As the Memorandum highlighted, higher civil servants could not aspire 
to act as guardians of the Constitution in the same manner as some saw 
the Crown as doing in a political crisis or national emergency. They did 
not have any comparable responsibility for the continuity of the state 
and, besides the massive gulf in status, the Civil Service never enjoyed 
anything remotely like the popular authority of Monarchy. Civil 
servants did not have a prior responsibility to Parliament. Except in the 
case of Accounting Officers, they had no direct relationship with 
Parliament at all. Thus, there was no useful purpose served by 
suggestions that civil servants appearing before Parliamentary Select 
Committees should have more freedom to answer questions on policy 
matters.  
To conclude, the Armstrong Memorandum only stated the traditional 
constitutional interpretation, given the structure of British central 
government at the time. A structure that was having a greater 
resemblance and the Next Steps Programme of the Thatcher 
Government was moving in that direction.  
 
The changing structure of the Civil Service: pay and promotion 
system 
 
As in all developed bureaucratic structures, the pay and promotion 
system represents one of the pillars on which the administrative 
hierarchy is built and careers are organised. As one experienced official 
stated in the 50s: ‘The hope, and indeed expectation, of promotion is … 
something the civil servant, more than most men, lives with throughout 
his working life. The Service is so graded and its salary scales so 
adjusted that failure to cross a particular promotion bridge at more or 
less the expected time may well represent a serious setback, not only 
financially, but socially and personally’ (Dunnill, 1956:61). Apart from 
restructuring exercises and the necessarily occasional adjustment of 
‘back pay’ from a salary settlement, normally it was only through 
promotion that the civil servant could obtain sustained advances in his 
or her standard of living and work satisfaction. The prestige that might 
accompany high status in the Civil Service, at least within the 
machinery of central government, was not available to the most of civil 
servants, who could not be protected by popular protest in the harsher 
moments of history, and it was a natural reaction to seek material 
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compensation. The cultivation of public ethos among civil servants may 
always have been less strong than was once believed. H. E. Dale 
(1941:77) wrote of the inter-war Higher Civil Service that ‘a few enter 
the Service from idealistic motives: most have no particular desire to be 
government officials, apart from the material inducements, but for 
various reasons they have a negative feeling towards the other possible 
callings.’ Dale was clear that few of his contemporaries would have 
entered the Home Civil Service if they had had the possibility to do 
something better paid. Forty years on, Lord Rayner found the Civil 
Service that he dealt with to be ‘a mixture of superb talent and 
commitment to the public good on the one hand, and an able coterie of 
cynics on the other’ (Rayner, 1984:16). The ‘ministerial inducements’ 
that Dale talked about seem to have been quite modest in the inter-war 
period, when, of course, economic liberalism ruled, and they remained 
so until the ‘Priestley formula’ for Civil Service pay, a creature of 
Keynesianism’s influence, promised civil servants relatively high 
rewards. The promise of Priestley was often denied by income policies, 
but the main practical objection to the implementation of the fair 
competition principle, and the ‘relativities’ that went with it, was the 
substantial overall cost of the resulting salary settlements (Fry, 1995:72). 
In much of the same spirit as it attempted to reform the career 
hierarchy, and it attempted to remove the index-linking provisions to 
the Civil Service pensions, the Thatcher Government tried to cut the 
knot of Civil Service pay in 1980.  
The Government explicitly declined to implement the latest finding of 
the Civil Service Pay Research Unit as regards the broad mass of civil 
servants, and then abolished the machinery concerned. The Megaw 
Committee of 1981–2 was appointed to review Civil Service pay, with 
the implication that it ought to try to turn the clock back to before 
Priestley (Fry, 1985:96–121). The expectations and the claims that the 
Priestley era had fostered were not easy to manage. The Thatcher 
Government did not help its own cause when it missed the abolition of 
the Review Body on Top Salaries (CAB 164/1587). Established in 1971 
by the Heath Government, then supposed to be in economic free-
marketer mode, the Review Body had since then periodically made 
recommendations about the salary levels of the highest grades of the 
Civil Service and those of other public sector groups, based on outside 
comparisons with the private sector.  
There was strong evidence that ‘grade drift upwards’ had taken place 
in the Civil Service in the 1970s, as Sir Frank Cooper, the then 
Permanent Under Secretary of the Minister of Defence, had observed 
(Cooper, 1981:13), a natural trend to the setting of targets for reduction 
in numbers was for the Thatcher Government to review the structure of 
the Civil Service. This activity was concentrated at first at or near the 
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top of the Service.  
The formal objective of the team led by Sir Geoffrey Warble, appointed 
in January 1981, was ‘to examine the contribution of different 
management levels to work involving staff of the Open Structure 
(excluding those in purely specialist hierarchies); to consider in the 
light of that examination the case for shortening the chain of command 
both by abolishing grades and by restricting the number of 
management levels in particular areas of work; and to make 
recommendations’ (Wardale Report, 1981, para.1.1). The Economist (17 
May 1980) thought that it had ‘first put forward’ the idea ‘since 
adopted by Sir Derek Rayner’ that ‘the entire Under Secretary grade 
should be abolished as an aid to speed and efficiency’. In actual fact, Sir 
Alexander Johnston, the then Chairman of the Board of Inland 
Revenue, had suggested to the Fulton Committee in his oral evidence 
in 1966 that the Under Secretary grade was ‘superfluous’ and retained 
for career purposes (Fry, 1993:175). The Under Secretary grade became 
a permanent feature of the then Administrative Class immediately after 
the Second World War and it was developed largely in place of the 
previous Principal Assistant Secretary grade on the grounds of the 
increased mass and complexity of the bureaucratic work (Cmnd 9613, 
1955, para. 48).  
In 1981 the Under Secretary grade accounted for 591 of the 784 posts in 
the post-Fulton Open Structure (Wardale Report, 1981, para. 21), and 
with this number its survival was possible. The Wardale inquiry 
concluded that ‘there are … a number of Open Structure posts [that] 
can be removed and should be’ (ibid., para. 6.2) but that ‘there are 
chains of command in which all existing levels, using all available Open 
Structure grades, are needed, and where there would be a risk of 
serious damage if a level was removed. Therefore, no Open Structure 
grade should be abolished’ (ibid., para. 6.1). The extensions of unified 
grading, in the form of expanding the Open Structure, would take place 
under the Thatcher Government. The most prominent of 
recommendations of the Fulton Committee that had not been 
implemented had been its proposal that unified grading should be 
introduced from the top of the bottom of the Home Civil Service. As 
Fry (1995:74) pointed out, ‘obstruction on the part of then Head of the 
Service, Sir William Armstrong, was blamed by some, and there was 
certainly opposition from the representative of the former Executive 
Class whose members’ prospects would be disproportionately and 
adversely affected by a change to unified grading, which would 
primarily benefit members of specialist groups’.  
When the Open Structure was established in 1972, unified grading was 
only extended to Under Secretary level. Sir Robert Armstrong later 
observed that the further extension of unified grading had not been 
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managed by his predecessor. It was an objective to be achieved by 
stages, and plans had been made to take such grading down to 
principal level (Fry, 1993:272–5). The reform of the Open Structure was 
discussed in the Cabinet by 1981 (TNA, PREM 19/679), when a 
preliminary draft was written in November 1981 soon after the 
abolition of the CSD. A first step was made in early 1982 when the 
Cabinet agreed in reducing the ‘administrative size’ of the Open 
Structure, and in the review was included a new path for recruiting by 
1983 passing from the Civil Service Commission to the Management 
and Personnel Office with the amendment of the 1978 Order in Council 
(PREM 19/680).  
The extension of the Open Structure down to Senior Principal and 
equivalent grades in 1984 encompassed some of the 5,600 staff 
previously organised into approximately 100 grades (Civil Service 
Statistics, 1984, p.6), and its further extension to Principal and 
equivalent levels in 1986 involved 5,500 staff previously organised in 
approximately 60 grades (Civil Service Statistics, 1986, p.6). Numbered 
grades having been introduced at the top of the Service in 1984, the 
Open Structure from 1 January 1986 onwards had the following 
arrangement: Grade 1 Permanent Secretary, Grade 1A Second 
Permanent Secretary, Grade 2 Deputy Secretary, Grade 3 Under 
Secretary, Grade 4 Executive Directing Bands and corresponding 
Professional and Scientific grades, Grade 5 Assistant Secretary and 
corresponding Professional and Scientific grades, Grade 6 Senior 
Principal and corresponding Professional and Scientific grades, Grade 7 
Principal and corresponding Professional and Scientific grades. The 
rationalisation of salary scales seemed to be more in the spirit of the 
Fulton Committee than that of FMI, although a more radical approach 
was indicated, as will be seen, by experiments with performance-
related pay, which the Prime Minister made clear in April 1987 were 
being made permanent (114 HC Deb. 6s. Written Answers, c.656) after 
they had been discussed in the Cabinet by 1983 (TNA, CAB 164/1709; 
TNA, CAB 164/1740).  
There was little sign of reformism even in the restructuring of the lower 
grades of the Administration Group. This followed from the 
Government’s plan to introduce new technology into departments and 
its recognition of the need for the cooperation of the staff concerned, 
who in some instances would need to be redeployed. The main 
elements of the deal were as follows. The Clerical Assistant and the 
Clerical Officer incremental pay scales were shortened with effect from 
1 January 1986. The staff in Clerical Assistant and related Data 
Processing grade were absorbed into a new grade of Administrative 
Assistant with effect from 1 January 1987. With effect from the same 
date the existing grades of Clerical Officer and Senior Data Processor 
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were combined to form the new grade of Administrative Officer, 
involving a general additional increase in the salary minimum six 
months later. Data Processing Staff retained their existing allowance. 
While the Local Officer II Grade in the Department of Health and Social 
Security remained a separate departmental grade, it members also 
received the same pay increases as the New Administrative Officer 
grade, with the result that its relative position was enhanced (Red Tape, 
April 1986:1–2).  
Grade remaining, especially when it attached the famed Civil Service 
designation ‘Administrative’ to routine clerical work, raised suspicion 
that a classic ‘maquillage’ in restructuring exercise had been engaged 
in, raising costs and rewards all round (Fry, 1995:75). Less 
contentiously, the most important point about the deal, and while it 
was worth exploring in detail, was that it was very much across-the-
board settlement of the traditional kind. As a similar sort of settlement 
was obtained for what could still be described as the Executive part of 
the Administration Group (Opinion, March 1987: 1–4), little seemed to 
have changed, but, also in the first part of 1987, a deal was concluded 
between the Institution of Professional Civil Servants and the Treasury 
which that department considered the first serious effort in its bid to 
establish a ‘new pay regime in the Civil Service’ (Treasury, 1987a:1). 
‘The difficulties of introducing pay rates’ in the Civil Service ‘related to 
merit proved immense’ Margaret Thatcher was later to write, recalling 
that ‘we made progress, but it took several years and a lot of pushing 
and shoving’ (Thatcher, 1993:46). The appointments of the Megaw 
Committee in June 1981 had been almost predictable. There was a 
‘dreadful symmetry’ about the setting-up of outside bodies to review 
Civil Service pay arrangements at roughly twenty-five year intervals, 
Peter Jones of the Council of Civil Service Unions was to observe. Jones 
wrote at the Megaw Committee: ‘There is the fourth major inquiry into 
the Civil Service union’s pay this century, and its arrival was bang on 
time, with its predecessor being launched in 1912, 1929 and 1953. Each 
previous inquiry plumped for a system based on comparability with 
outside rates of remuneration, but with a successive degree of 
sophistication which found its apogee in the pay research method 
advocated by the last, the Priestley Royal Commission. Cynics may say 
that the Megaw Inquiry will follow the established pattern of “re-invent 
the wheel”’ (CCSU Bulletin, November 1981:137).  
When the Megaw Report on Civil Service pay was published in July 
1982, The Economist detected ‘signs of relief’ on the part of the Prime 
Minister, observing: ‘The last time Mrs Thatcher commissioned an 
inquiry intended to chip away at Whitehall privilege, Sir Bernard 
Scott’s findings on inflation-proofed pensions recommended the 
extension of index linking, not its abolition. Sir John Megaw, former 
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Lord Justice of Appeal, did not so signally fail her this time. On only 
one point – regional variations in pay, which he found against – did he 
waver from what Mrs Thatcher thinks in her line … Mrs Thatcher 
hoped that he would inject a strong market element into pay 
determination while building in incentives for high performance and 
productivity.’ The Economist argued, as it had done for several decades, 
that ‘the only sensible guiding principle of any wage system is to pay 
enough to recruit when you want, judged day to day’ (The Economist, 10 
July 1982:20–1). So while the sole trade unionist on the Committee, John 
Chalmers, issued a Minority Report (Cmnd 8590, 1982:102–15) which 
kept the Priestley system, the recommendations in the Megaw 
Committee’s Majority Report represented a compromise with the 
market (Fry 1983: 90–6, 1985:115–19). The Majority Report argued that: 
‘The governing principle for the Civil Service pay system in the future 
should be to ensure that the Government as an employer pays civil 
servants enough, taking one year with another, to recruit, retain and 
motivate them to perform efficiently the duties required of them at an 
appropriate level of competence’ (Cmnd 8590, 1982, para.91). The 
Majority Report used the argument of the comparability principle: 
‘Civil Service pay increases and level of remuneration, including fringe 
benefits, should in the longer term broadly match those available in the 
private sector for staff undertaking jobs with comparable job weight … 
the main comparisons used in the system would be of the trends of 
percentage increases in comparator pay rates in the current pay round. 
This information would be supplemented as soon as possible, and 
thereafter every fourth year, as a check, by information on levels of 
local remunerations … The data collection analysis would be carried 
out under the supervision of an independent Board’ (ibid., para. 101). 
The Civil Service Pay Information Board (ibid., para 125) consisted of 
five ‘independent-minded persons’ appointed by the Prime Minister 
(ibid., para.128) and ‘to maintain demonstrable independence from the 
Civil Service management and unions, surveys, data collection and 
analyses should be undertaken by management consultants on behalf 
of the Board’ (ibid., para. 129). What was named ‘informed collective 
bargaining’ (ibid., para. 9) was to be involved when the Board 
presented the negotiating parties with its findings. The limits within 
which a pay settlement could be researched would be ‘the inter-quartile 
range’, meaning the middle ranges of outside pay. Though the parties 
‘would need to give weight to management needs’ (ibid., para. 102), the 
majority of the Megaw Committee believed that ‘the Government 
should regularly make it clear, as it has done to us, that the cash limit 
system does not necessarily imply a completely rigid control of pay 
increases on the basis of the initial assumptions’ (ibid., para. 219). The 
majority of the Megaw Committee recommended too that more 
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emphasis needed to be placed on internal relativities, which had been 
the case under the Priestley system (ibid., para.195), involving 
discussions of them between management and unions against the 
background, where appropriate, of job evaluation information (ibid., 
para. 103).  
It was these observations that aroused the interest of the Institution of 
Professional Civil Servants, representing specialist groups, which, 
differently from the other unions, pointed out ‘the Megaw Report as 
the foundation on which a new pay system can be built’, not least 
because of the prospect it offered of ‘resolving long-standing 
international anomalies’ (IPCS Bulletin, 10/82, October 1982:1), 
meaning, of course, those which disadvantaged specialists. Another 
recommendation was that the Civil Service Arbitration Agreement 
should be revised to put the Government and the unions on a more 
equal footing (Cmnd 8590, 1982, para. 269–70). The Megaw Majority 
Report favoured too ‘arrangements to encourage more active 
departmental and line management involvement in relating pay to 
management needs and efficiency, and measures to relate performance 
directly to pay’ (ibid., para. 104). Incremental scales were only to be 
retained for grades below Principal and its equivalent (ibid., para. 335), 
and even then related to performance as measured in annual reports 
(ibid., para. 339). For grades from Principal to below Under Secretary, 
incremental pay should be replaced by merit rangers, again on the basis 
of annual report (ibid., para. 344). The salaries of civil servants at Under 
Secretary level and above should continue to be settled without 
negotiation, after the receipt of the report of the Review Body on Top 
Salaries (ibid., para. 355). As for index-linked pensions, the Megaw 
majority did not need to replicate the work of the Scott Committee, and 
restricted itself to recommending that civil servants’ pension 
contributions should be made more explicit (ibid., para. 163–4). Both 
the Majority and the Minority Reports of the Megaw Committee were 
essentially conservative in that they acted as if centralised pay 
determination and grading for the Civil Service as a whole would 
continue in broadly the same form, whereas decentralised 
arrangements of the type encouraged by ‘business methods’ that were 
already introduced with FMI.  
The Megaw Majority Report did seem to make a concession to business 
philosophy in embracing merit pay, and The Economist (10 July 1982:21) 
attributed this idea to Sir Derek Rayner. There were, in fact, few new 
ideas in the world of Civil Service. Though it came to be largely 
forgotten later, the Fulton Committee, for instance, had recommended 
the introduction of performance pay, while at the same time endorsing 
the Priestley System (Cmnd 3638, 1968, paras. 226–9). The intellectual 
coherence of the Priestley Report was attributed to Barbara Wootton, 
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who had a clear, socialist position she believed to be rational (Wootton, 
1955). She was alarmed at the variations in public sector pay, and the 
expression of the need ‘to bring order out of the present chaos’ (Kahn, 
1962:10) was a catch-phrase to condemn pay based on ‘business 
methods’ lines. Despite these criticisms, what the Thatcher Government 
wanted was to draw a line under the Priestley Era and its ‘rationality’. 
Obviously, there was not to be a clear resolution. That the Review Body 
on Top Salaries survived the Megaw Majority Report underlines the 
Report’s conservatism. However, The Economist (10 July 1982:21) 
welcomed what it described as the privatisation of pay research while 
setting doubts upon the professional integrity of management 
consultants to be employed in much the same manner as that of the 
Civil Service Pay Research Unit. That comparability was to be resorted 
to at all rather than sole reliance on a simple market rule was because a 
career Civil Service did not exist on a day-to-day basis, and, while one 
response would be to break up that Service, in the meantime, the 
centralised form of pay determination persisted (Fry, 1995:76). The 
Civil Service’s pay arrangements had been developed with an intricate 
evolution during the 1980s, but the Council of Civil Service Unions at 
least found the way for a new interpretation, as it made clear in a paper 
submitted to the TUC Public Services Committee in 1989: ‘Since the 
Government unilaterally abandoned pay research in 1981, the 
Treasury’s pay strategy has been to continue to screw down Civil 
Service pay in the interest of containing public expenditure. In effect, 
annual pay reviews since 1981 had been cash limit driven at the 
expense of meaningful negotiation. As chronic problems of recruitment 
and retention and low morale emerged, the Treasury resorted to the 
pursuit of the flexibility, through ad hoc arrangements such as Special 
Pay Addition and Local Pay Additions, and ill-fated performance 
bonus schemes, generally with little or no consultation. These ad hoc 
pay arrangements failed to solve the problems and the Treasury was 
forced to discuss implementing long-term pay determination. The 
Treasury’s general approach to the non-industrial Civil Service’s 
emerging pay system is to promote a more selective approach, whereby 
pay is targeted at groups and areas where it considers there are 
problems, that is grades where there are recruitment and retention 
difficulties, or skill shortages.’ As the aim of the Civil Service unions 
was to ensure a ‘settled, orderly and fair national pay system for all 
non-industrial civil servants’, the conclusion of long-term pay 
agreements was preferable to ‘the haphazard and disjointed 
arrangements’ that had proceeded them, especially as the agreements 
involved union participation. All the agreements reached included a 
spinal pay structure, performance pay, and a system for pay 
determination in the long period based on annual pay movements 
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surveys conducted at least every four years of the levels of pay and 
benefits of jobs outside the Civil Service. All the arrangements also 
contained provisions for extra pay to be agreed for posts where there 
were recruitment and retention difficulties (CCSU Bulletin, May 
1989:69). It was in the autumn of 1985 that the Treasury proposed 
outline ideas for a long-term Civil Service pay agreement, nearly three 
years after the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Geoffrey Howe, 
had announced both the Government’s acceptance of the Megaw 
Report and the intention to seek an agreement (34 HC Deb. 6s Written 
Answer c.12). The delay to the Council of Civil Service Unions was 
difficult to explain because all the proposals seemed to amount to was 
‘a watered-down version of the Megaw Committee’s majority 
recommendations’. What the Treasury proposed was that the pay 
increases should be negotiated between itself and the CCSU so as to 
lead to overall percentage increases for the non-industrial Civil Service 
as a whole lying between the upper and lower quartiles of pay 
settlements in the private sector. So long as this overall framework was 
respected, different groups could receive different increases above or 
below the negotiating range. For 1986, as had been the case in 1984, the 
negotiating range was to be established by the Officer of Manpower 
Economics. For 1987 and later the method of establishing the 
negotiating range would be agreed between the two sides (Fry, 
1995:79). Either side could introduce into the bargaining process such 
factors as they wished, including recruitment, retention and 
motivation. The Treasury’s aim was for the Civil Service pay system to 
develop flexibility on the basis of joint consultation. In the case of a 
dispute, and if both sides agreed, the matter could be put before the 
Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal for resolution. The Tribunal’s 
decision would be binding, though it could not lead to a settlement 
outside the negotiating range and it would also be subject to public 
expenditure limits. The agreement was intended to be a lasting one, 
subject to both sides accepting it, and, as the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer had stated in December 1982, the Government reserved the 
right to suspend the operation of the agreement to safeguard the public 
policy. The CCSU, while envisaging further discussions, dismissed the 
Treasury’s proposal as ‘seriously flawed’ (CCSU Bulletin, November 
1985:149–50).  
In the short period after its defeat in the Civil Service strike of 1981, the 
Service’s union movement had held together remarkably well, but after 
four years of joint action ‘the difficulties of formulating a common 
claim covering grades from cleaner to Assistant Secretary’ proved to be 
too many. The unions were displeased by the outcome, as their leaders 
made clear. According to Alistair Graham of the Civil and Public 
Service Association, the Treasury’s pay offer for 1985 was ‘low and 
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vindictive’ (Red Tape, April 1985:2). Graham believed the offer to be ‘a 
monstrous insult to workhorses of the Civil Service at the sharp end of 
Thatcher’s Britain’ (CCSU Bulletin, April 1985:49). The General 
Secretary of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants, William 
McCall, considered the offer that the union received to be ‘completely 
unacceptable’, adding that ‘the Government’s claim that the 3 per cent 
cash limit is not an overriding factor is once again exposed for the sham 
that it is’ (IPCS Bulletin, 4/85:1). This situation of discontent led to a 
series of joint pamphlets by the unions published in 1986 and titled 
Performance Pay: The first year of failure and Performance Pay: A 
misconceived experiment. None of this protest produced any effects. The 
Government had a different agenda from that of the unions and it 
continued towards a new Civil Service pay settlement.  
Specialists, commonly members of the IPCS (Institute of Professional 
Civil Servants), had been prospectively the main beneficiaries of the 
extension of unified grading down to Principal level completed in 1986, 
as we have noted, and this had obvious implications for pay. Breaking 
ranks with the Council of Civil Service Unions had also led the IPCS to 
obtain a pay settlement in 1986 which was ‘nearer the going rate than 
any settlement since 1980’ (IPCS Bulletin, 6/86:1). The IPCS had not 
been as dismissive of the Treasury’s one-term pay agreement proposals 
as the other unions had been. Thus the union and the Treasury, on 
behalf of the Official Side of the National Whitley Council and the 
departments generally, eventually signed the Agreement on the Pay, 
Pay System, Organisations and Personnel Management Arrangements 
for Grades and Groups Represented by the Institution of Professional 
Civil Servants dated 7 May 1987. The new system was designed to link 
pay and personnel management arrangements; to provide incentives 
for improving and maintaining efficiency; to reward sustained high 
performance; to provide greater flexibility in the management of the 
staff concerned and better opportunities for career development; to 
maintain the openness of all the rules and provisions of the pay, 
promotion and career management arrangements; to provide for equity 
of treatment while also providing for flexibility to deal with particular 
pay problems; to secure the confidence of the public in the system for 
determining the pay of the staff in the non-industrial Civil Service 
covered by the Agreement, providing that their pay shall be enough, 
taking one year with another; to recruit, retain and motivate the civil 
servants concerned to perform efficiently the duties required of them; 
to secure the confidence of these civil servants that their pay will be 
determinately fairly; and to enable the Government to reconcile its 
responsibilities for the control of the public expenditure with its 
responsibilities as an employer.  
The new system involved the introduction of the pay spine and of pay 
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spans. The pay spine was a sequence of pay points, arranged to provide 
suitable incremental progression, on which all staff covered by the 
Agreement were to be paid with effect from 1 September 1987.  
A pay span consisted of a number of consecutive pay points on the pay 
spine which were available for paying staff occupying posts within that 
span. Posts were to be allocated to spans according to their job weight 
and there was to be one span for each grading level thus determined. 
Categories, classes and grades as such were to be abolished and 
occupational groups were to be redesigned. Pay spans would be 
divided into scales and ranges. A pay scale or scales would form the 
lower part of a pay span, and, provided that they were efficient, staff 
would normally progress in annual steps up the spine to the maximum 
of their scale. Staff who received a ‘Box 1 – outstanding’ rating for 
overall performance in their annual report and who were below the 
maximum of the scale were eligible to receive an immediate extra 
increment. They would then receive their normal increment on their 
incremental date. The provision was to apply within the limits of the 
maximum of the scale. Increments could also be withheld or 
withdrawn in accordance with the agreements set out in paragraphs 
1247 and 1248 of the Civil Service Code.  
The pay range was to consist of at least three points on the spine. 
Progression up the range was to be discretionary in the sense that it 
would not be automatic, but it would be in accordance with strictly 
defined rules and criteria. Increments in the pay ranges would depend 
on performances as assessed in the annual reports over a period of 
time. Staff would be eligible for consideration for an increment in the 
range in accordance with the following criteria: receipt of at least one 
Box 1 (outstanding) marking after reaching the maximum of the scale; 
receipt of at least three consecutive Box 2 (performance significantly 
above requirements) markings after reaching the maximum of the scale; 
receipt of at least five consecutive markings of Box 3 (performance fully 
meets normal requirements) or above after reaching the maximum of 
the scale and if in the view of management they merit such an award 
for consistently producing valuable and effective work. Further 
increments could be awarded after the elapse of further similar periods.  
It was expected that if reporting and marking criteria were properly 
observed the staff who received range points would constitute no more 
than 25 per cent of the staff at each grading level in each department. 
Range points could be withdrawn on a mark time basis where 
performance was deemed to have fallen off over a prolonged period. 
Additionally, range and scale points could also be used for other 
purposes: where, for example, particular and special difficulties of 
recruitment and/or retention would arise, they could dealt with by 
identifying the group of posts concerned on the basis of function 
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and/or discipline and/or location, and advancing pay for the staff 
occupying these posts up the span. Their pay scales would be adjusted 
accordingly. Other arrangements could be made to deal with particular 
problems when the other provisions of this Agreement were unsuitable 
or inappropriate. There was to be an appeals procedure in accordance 
with paragraph 9973 of the Civil Service Code. The remainder of the 
Agreement was concerned with matters such as fluid grading and the 
future of occupational groups in relation to career management, and 
details of the implementation of the new pay arrangements, with the 
Office of Manpower Economics being assigned the fact-finding role 
(Treasury, 1987b).  
In November 1987 the unions signed a detailed negotiation titled 
Provisional Agreement between HM Treasury and the Board of Inland 
Revenue Staff Federation. This was modelled on the IPCS Agreement, 
having similar opening paragraphs and the same number of objectives, 
though differently ordered and, in some cases, worded. A double pay 
spine was established which had thirty-three pay points, with spine A 
covering the main IRSF grades and spine B the remainder. 
Advancement up the scale was by annual increments up to the 
maximum, after which there were three range points attainable on the 
basis of performance. There were also arrangements for accelerated 
incremental progression for individuals below the maximum who 
obtained the best performance ratings. The spine also included pay 
spans, with posts allocated within them according to grading levels and 
job weight (Treasury, 1987c). Then in July 1988 came New Pay 
Agreements for Grades 5, 6 and 7, comparable to the positions of 
former Assistant Secretary, Senior Principal and principal grades and 
their equivalents. These arrangements resulted from an agreement 
between the Treasury and the FDA, the IPCS and the National Union of 
Civil and Public Servants. This pay spine was a single one with twenty-
two points involving annual increments, together with the now-
familiar pay span and accelerated increments arrangements and four 
range points above the scale maximum (Treasury, 1988). Then in April 
1989 came the New Pay Agreement for Executive, Office Support and 
Related Grades established between the Treasury and the NUCPS 
(Treasury, 1989a) and the New Pay Arrangements for Clerical and 
Secretarial Grades agreed between the Treasury and the Civil and 
Public Services Association (Treasury, 1989b). Each agreement included 
a pay spine that was a sequence of full and half pay points. In the case 
of the agreement with the NUCPS, this took the spine to point 29, and 
in that with the CPSA to point 22.5, and both had the now common 
provisions for range points and accelerated increments and so forth. By 
the end of the 1980s, at first sight and in some contrast with the 
intervening years, the Civil Service seemed to have developed a 
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coherent pay system to substitute the outmoded Priestley Pay system. 
The Review Body on Top Salaries, a link with earlier arrangements, had 
been one advocate of the introduction of performance pay in the 
Higher Civil Service (Cmnd 9525-I, 1985, pp.48–50). The long-term pay 
agreement that the Treasury had secured for grades 5, 6 and 7 had 
involved over 20,000 staff. The agreement made with the IPCS had 
covered 60,000 civil servants as had that with the IRSF, while the 
agreements with the NUCPS has embraced 100,000 civil servants and 
that with the CPSA approximately twice as many.  
The Council of Civil Service Unions observed: ‘All five agreements 
make provision for performance pay. In all five cases, however, the 
agreements have preserved existing pay scales and normal incremental 
progression. Performance criteria have been introduced only in respect 
to additional payments above the old scale maximum, and any pay 
achieved by performance is extra money on top of existing scales. The 
agreements have also been successful in eliminating many 
unacceptable features of the Government’s earlier experiments in 
performance pay in the Civil Service. In particular in place of a wholly 
discretionary system – with the dangers of favouritism and abuse – the 
agreements tie the performance pay to annual markings under the 
established Civil Service staff reporting system. The agreements also 
provide for an appeals system and for joint monitoring and review.’ 
The award of performance pay was introduced in order to limit the 
overall cost. The Council stated that: ‘Regional pay variation is not a 
feature of any of the agreements. Indeed, for the unions concerned, the 
agreements provide a framework for a measure of control over the 
Treasury’s recent propensity to impose a non-negotiable flexibility, for 
example, Local Pay Additions’ (CCSU Bulletin, May 1989:69–70).  
The extension of departmental discretion in determining pay and the 
resulting variation in the pay of officials of the same grade in differing 
towns and sometimes in the same one had alarmed the Council of Civil 
Service Unions, which described the outcome of this ‘saga’ as a ‘dog’s 
breakfast’ (CCSU Bulletin, July 1988:97). More dispassionately, the 
National Audit Office later concluded that ‘on the available evidence 
from the Treasury and the Department for Trade and Industry, Local 
Pay Additions are an effective, cheap and flexible response to staff 
recruitment problems’ but that ‘this is not so strongly the case for 
retention’ (HC 259, 1991-2:3). ‘The future long-term pay of non-
industrial civil servants will be determined by a system of informed 
collective bargaining,’ the Council argued to the TUC Public Services 
Committee in May 1989, believing that ‘provisions on pay flexibility do 
not run counter to agreements providing for a national framework for 
bargaining and the preservation of national pay rates’ (CCSU Bulletin, 
May 1989:70). Regional pay was not the only attack to the tradition of 
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the Civil Service pay system.  
From that perspective, performance pay had gained the unions’ early 
opposition and, with provisions for its award reaching all the way up 
the service to Grade 2 and Grade 3 levels, its further application was 
easier to accept even for unions because it seemed to guarantee a 
greater uniformity in rewards. And for these reasons the reform of Civil 
Service pay and structure became irreversible and permanent in the 
coming decades. 
 
 
Changes in the Civil Service’s recruitment and training 
  
One of the most important innovations in terms of recruiting 
introduced by the Fulton Report was to made the Civil Service 
Commission, part of the Civil Service Department. This was an 
important change in status, although it did not affect the 
Commissioner’s independence in selection. In 1969, the traditional 
administrative class examination, which had long been called Method I, 
was abolished. The Fulton Committee had been divided on the matter 
and it was the Civil Service Commissioners themselves who had 
pressed for the abolition (Fry, 1993:221–225).  
The Fulton Committee had been less than admiring of what had been 
called Method II, invented by K. A. G. Murray, the Chairman of the 
Civil Service Selection Board at the time, who believed, ‘two or three 
like-minded members’ of the committee had this outlook. He blamed 
them for the Fulton Report promoting ‘disgracefully ill-informed 
comments on selection’ which were little more than ‘generalised 
criticism unsupported by evidence’. Murray observed that ‘as CSSB 
professionals … it was difficult not to resent the amateurish Fulton 
views.’ Help was at hand in the form of the Davis Committee, which 
conducted ‘a full-scale external review of CSSB procedures’, the results 
of which were comforting (Murray, 1990:22–3).  
The Committee found ‘no evidence of bias in Method II itself either in 
the procedures or on the part of the assessors’. The Committee 
described Method II as ‘a selection system to which the Public Service 
can point with pride’. This did not stop the Committee from producing 
twenty-three recommendations for changes, which were implemented 
in whole or in part. However, these proposals were framed on the 
assumption of Method II continuing to be used for selecting ‘graduates 
with qualities of Assistant Principals’. The Committee recognised that 
‘if and when the wider graduate entry discussed in the Fulton Report is 
introduced or other changes occur, consequential change in the 
selection system may well needed’ (Cmnd 4156, 1969, pp. 82–6). 
However, the real changes in the mission of the Civil Service 
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Commission began in the 1980s when this had translated itself into a 
highly professional central recruitment agency. The 10 per cent of 
recruitment that was carried out directly by the Commission was to the 
grade of Executive Officer and above to the equivalent grades in other 
administrative groups and classes. Writing in 1981, the then First Civil 
Service Commissioner stressed that departmental recruitment was 
subject to at least formal Civil Service Commission supervision (Allen, 
1981:22–3). Following the amendment of the Civil Service Order in 
Council of 1978, this was no longer the case by 1982 (TNA,CAB 
164/1587).  
In 1985 and 1986, experiments were made in the local recruitment of 
Executive Officers by the Board of Inland Revenue and the Department 
of Health and Social Security (Civil Service Commission, 119th Report, 
1987, p.17). Departmental recruitment would seem to promote greater 
flexibility, and, in the economic climate of that time, it could be 
expected that national pay scales would enable government 
departments with offices in the relatively depressed parts of Britain to 
locally recruit potentially very able people, even of university entrance 
standard as defined and sometimes with the fundamental skills already 
developed, for even basic clerical work. In the more prosperous 
regions, the Civil Service was less well placed.  
There was a high wastage rate in the clerical grades in such areas, and 
the reason for the local recruitment experiments mentioned earlier for 
the Executive Office Grade was that ‘the biggest problem in filling 
vacancies remains in London and the South East where unemployment 
is relatively low; the cost of living, particularly housing, relatively high; 
and competition from employers at its fiercest’ (Civil Service 
Commission, 120th Report, 1987:14). Few observers seemed interested 
in the career Civil Service below its higher grades, despite the need to 
achieve efficiency also in the lower grades, and despite the fact that in 
modern times the Civil Service has always placed great emphasis on 
promotion from below.  
In 1985, the Management and Personnel Office conducted a review for 
identifying and developing internal talent in the Civil Service (Eland 
Report, 1985). The Civil Service Commission highlighted two years 
later that ‘we remain anxious to develop in-Service talent to the full; the 
aim is for the 50 per cent of the fast stream to come from internal 
sources’ (120th Report, 1987:16). This was at the same time that the 
Commission was turning down literally thousands of outside 
applicants for the fast stream. The scholars naturally tends to drawn the 
direct-entry recruitment, but the Executive Officer grade, for instance, 
while attractive to some graduates by the 1980s and traditionally the 
entry point for those with at least basic university entrance 
qualifications, was mainly composed of former members of what used 
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to be called the Clerical Office grade, which over the years had 
struggled to attract recruits, and continued to do so outside the less 
favoured regions. The abandoning of the wider graduate entry also 
determined that ‘for the first time Oxbridge candidates made up a 
minority of those appointed’ to the fast stream when the results were 
declared in 1986 (120th Report, 1987:14–16), but this need not 
necessarily became a welcome development. It might well have been a 
worrying sign that in the competition for the best graduate, the severity 
of which showed no signs of abating, as the Atkinson inquiry testified 
(Atkinson Report, 1983:6), the Career Civil Service was losing out.  
No recruitment system can be better than the men and women 
presenting themselves for appointment, but it was evident that 
‘research in 1970s established that the CSSB method had effectively 
predicted long-term potential for senior posts in the Civil Service’, and 
a further statistical study of candidates selected between 1972 and 1981 
and recorded as ‘fast streamers’ and still in post at the beginning of 
1992 came to the same conclusion (Clements-Bedford Report, 1992, 
pp.2–4). 
Another innovation established by the Fulton Report of 1968 was the 
Civil Service College. After a decade of debate among civil servants and 
academics, the idea was to create a sort of ENA (École Nationale 
d’Administration) patterned on the French model to produce the new 
higher civil servants. However, this project never achieved this aim for 
several reasons. A Civil Service Department review team identified one 
reason in 1974: ‘The College, unlike the justly esteemed École Nationale 
d’Administration, is not an elitist institution. If it had been, it might 
have found it easier both to establish its repute with some of its more 
demanding critics and to fulfil the research and promotional roles 
proposed for it. On the contrary, it was proposed by the Fulton 
Committee and accepted by two successive Governments that it should 
be a large-scale and broad-based institution. As such, it has been 
expected to provide a very widely assorted range of courses, more 
varied, probably, than those of any comparable institution in this 
country and of such divergent nature as to generate not a little 
ambiguity, and even some inner contradictions in its role. All this for a 
very large and constantly changing body of trainees of very widely 
varying abilities, experience and degrees of commitment and 
enthusiasm’ (Heaton–Williams Report, 1974:14).  
Hence, the Civil Service College was supposed to cater for everybody, 
and in its early years at least it ended up pleasing very few people, 
including its first Principal, who was drawn from academic life and 
who wanted an elitist institution rather like the London School of 
Economics of Laski’s time, to which the Civil Service unions were 
opposed. As performance at the College was not important for their 
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careers, the training provision for the Administration Trainees attracted 
criticism (Fry, 1993:267–72). The post of Principal went to senior civil 
servants from 1976 onwards, and the Civil Service College gradually 
established a role for itself as an efficient provider of Civil Service 
training. In terms of overall provisions, it was a minor role as, for 
instance, the College’s Report for 1982–3 made clear: ‘Departments 
rightly continue to provide the great bulk of Civil Service training from 
their own internal resources. Most have their own training centres and 
they were responsible … for 75 per cent of the total training (measured 
in trainee days). A further 20 per cent was provided by external 
institutes – local authority night schools, further education institutes, 
polytechnics and universities, and business schools. The remaining 5 
per cent was the College’s share’ (TNA, JY/13, Civil Service College 
Annual Report and Accounts, 13th Report, 1982–3, p.3).  
From September 1981, a modular system was introduced to meet 
formal training needs of the different phases of the early career of those 
in Administration Trainee and Higher Executive Officer grades. The 
induction courses were concerned with Communication Skills, with 
Parliament, Government and the Civil Service, and with Finance and 
Control of Public Expenditure. There were six modules available at the 
next level, including Essential Quantitative Skills and also Economics, 
Government and the Administration; later still, further modules were 
presented, notably Staff Management (Thompson, 1984:48–54). The 
continued prominence of economics and its related subjects reflected 
the subject matter of most administrators’ work, and the supposed 
flexibility of modularisation did not disguise the lesser commitment of 
resources (Fry, 1995:95). Training in the non-industrial Civil Service in 
the late 1980s was reviewed by the National Audit Office (NAO), which 
observed that: ‘This compares favourably with the volume of training 
per person in the private sector. But a review of good practice in the 
private sector, carried out by the NAO in parallel with the Civil Service 
study, showed that in a sample of leading firms the training is 
differently distributed, with senior staff and high fliers receiving most 
training. In the Civil Service, junior and middle managers receive the 
most’ (National Audit Office, 1990:1). This was despite the Coster 
Report of 1984, and the following Development Programme for staff 
between Principal (Grade 7) and Assistant Secretary (Grade 5) was 
started in September 1985 because ‘formal training had been neglected’ 
and intended to be on a scale ‘well above the average for British 
managers’ (Coster Report, 1984; Coster, 1987:293).  
Earlier in 1985, a six-week Top Management Programme for newly 
appointed Under Secretaries had been established (TNA, Civil Service 
College, Fifteenth Report, 1984–5:5). The Senior Professional 
Administrative Training Course, designed for specialists transferring to 
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administrative work, dated from as early as 1972 (Fry, 1985, pp.49–50, 
67–8). Sixteen weeks of early career formal training for administrators, 
though, was never going to impress those who were aware of the ENA 
arrangements and that institution’s type of direct entry.  
The Fultonite vision, at least presented by John Garrett twenty-five 
years on, was that the Civil Service College had become ‘gentrified’ in 
‘the way that educational institutions in Britain always go in that they 
always begin as technical colleges for ordinary people and end up as 
universities’ (HC 390-II, 1992–3, q. 647). Garrett described the Civil 
Service College has having facilities that were ‘gold plated’ (ibid., q. 
648) and as being like ‘Oxbridge with rhododendrons’, enforcing ‘the 
mandarin image’ (ibid., q. 666). While the ENA might well aspire to a 
social status comparable with that of Christ Church or All Souls, 
Oxford College, the Civil Service College has never been in this league, 
and, though definitions of what constitutes a university keep changing, 
for most of its existence the College has had more in common with a 
technical college. The Fulton Committee neither sought such status for 
the Civil Service College nor did it do much to prevent it. Some of the 
Committee’s members were interested in the ENA, presumably with 
the idea to import it, but this advocacy process failed, even because the 
Fulton Report itself was dependent on the Treasury’s Osmond Report 
for the main body of such ideas as it had on post-entry training (Fry, 
1993:207–14, 221–5). Far from having a mandarin image then or later, 
the Civil Service College always seemed abandoned in its early years, 
before designing for itself a role more coherent with the new Civil 
Service, to which was added the managerial approach that the Thatcher 
Government required even in the College’s dealings with the Service. 
The Fulton Committee certainly wanted the career Civil Service to 
persist, but it also believed that it needed to be opened up to more later 
recruitment than had been common, which has occurred, and also to 
secondments, which occurred following the Fulton Report in 1968. The 
next step was in 1977, when the then Government decided to seek a 
‘sharp and significant increase’ in the number of civil servants 
seconded to business organisations. In March 1989, Lord Young and 
Richard Luce, as members of the Thatcher Government, initiated the 
Bridge Programme ‘to build more bridges between government and 
industry’, the aim of which was to further encourage secondments and 
job exchanges between civil servants and business people, the scheme 
being run by individual departments. Prior to this programme, targets 
were set for the Civil Service as a whole (250 outwards and 200 
inwards). Under the Bridge Programme, an overall doubling of 
secondments took place (Gosing and Nutley, 1990:3).  
A follow-up study found that civil servant secondees were regarded by 
private sector organisations as being ‘excellent ambassadors for their 
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departments’, and that, while the Bridge Programme might well lead to 
the formalisation of procedures, previously these had been haphazard 
(ibid.:92). As far as civil servants’ careers were concerned, the study 
concluded: ‘There was evidence from line managers and other 
departmental representatives that the idea of a lifetime career was 
changing. The “velvet drainpipe” was leaking at all levels, through 
secondment, and through early leaving (sometimes as a result of 
secondment). This was not regarded as a particular problem, as a well-
trained and informed civil servant would benefit the private sector. 
However, three large companies were very concerned lest the civil 
servants might be “testing the water” before taking the plunge into the 
private sector. They saw their role as training bureaucrats for the 
Government’ (ibid.:91). Greater movement in and out of the Civil 
Service had long since become a familiar part of the reformer’s agenda. 
Yet when Peter Levene was appointed to the Ministry of Defence from 
private industry in 1985 at a salary twice that of his Civil Service 
counterparts (FDA News, April 1985:1–2), there was unease, which 
caused the Civil Service Commission to express the need to get the 
procedures right (119th Report, 1986, pp.7–9), a vision also present in 
several critical House of Commons reports about the dangers of higher 
civil servants taking up outside appointments (HC 216, 1980-1; HC 302, 
1983-4; Cmnd 9465, 1985; Cmnd 585, 1989). However, the trend for 
external appointments would increase inexorably in the following years 
because of the Next Steps effect and because of the rise of special 
advisers’ power in central government. 
 
 
6. Completing the puzzle: towards Next Steps reform. Working 
Patterns and administrative agencies 
 
The new Civil Service Working Patterns: the Mueller Report 
 
‘Examination of working patterns outside the Civil Service shows that 
many people do not work from 9am to 5pm, 5 days a week with the 
prospect of a lifetime’s employment and career advancement. Non-
standard and alternative working patterns are increasing and becoming 
more widespread. The most significant trends are the wider and more 
imaginative use of part-time work, varieties of temporary work, shift-
working and sub-contracting, and the reduction of systematised 
overtime. The primary reason for this development is the economic 
pressure to reduce running costs by matching staff costs with work as 
closely as possible. The secondary reason is the availability of labour 
prepared, and sometimes demanding, to work non-standard patterns. 
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Managers at local level have generally had the freedom and the 
incentive to respond by developing individual schemes which, taken 
cumulatively, amount to a significant change in employment practices.’ 
This was the theory, in a report called Working Patterns, explained by a 
study team led by Anne Mueller of the former Management and 
Personnel Office, that summarised some recent developments in the 
private sector (Mueller Report, 1987, paras. 2.1–2.2), set out in a 
document dated September 1987 and circulated by the Treasury within 
the Civil Service and its unions two months later.  
The Mueller team’s examination of ‘alternative patterns of work being 
evolved by business and industry’ was accompanied by a consideration 
of ‘what benefits these might have for the Civil Service and for the 
customers of the various services which are provided’ (ibid., para. 1.2). 
What was imagined in Working Patterns was what in effect would be a 
two-sided Civil Service, with a core Civil Service that would enjoy job 
security and career prospects, and a peripheral Civil Service that would 
be employed on a wide range of conditions of employment. These 
contracts would permit the introduction on a large scale of recurring 
temporary contracts; nil-hours contracts, which mean people being 
available for work but with no guarantee of it; annual-hours contracts, 
which state the agreed number of guaranteed hours an employee is 
contracted to work through a twelve-month period; widespread part-
time employment; part-time work for individual senior staff; fixed-term 
contracts; and provision for home working (ibid., para.7.1).  
The benefits that followed from new working patterns of this kind were 
said to be the opportunities given for the better use of new technology 
(ibid. para 3.14), the greater ability to respond to fluctuations in 
workload and enhanced capacity to adapt to new demands in the 
labour market (ibid., para 2.4), notably by recruiting staff with low 
skills (ibid., para. 3.21). The study team recognised that ‘some outside 
employment conditions and practices that are favourable to alternative 
working patterns are at odds with those that are generally regarded as 
essential elements of the Civil Service employment/career package or a 
distinctive characteristic of a “good employer”’ (para 6.9). In the Civil 
Service as currently organised, the study team said ‘some regulations, 
such as those covering shift disturbance allowance, travel and 
subsistence, superannuation and maternity leave, can constrain the 
efficient management of working time’, adding that ‘the rules of annual 
leave, overtime and substitution may not always operate to make sure 
that the needs of the work take precedence’ (ibid., para. 4.9). 
Substantially, what the study team which produced Working Patterns 
was pointing out was that the career Civil Service with its characteristic 
bureaucratic professionalism tends to make for staff costs to be 
effectively treated as if they were fixed costs, while the philosophy of 
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the FMI was to treat them as running costs.  
Hence, given the Conservative Government’s will to persist with the 
FMI, the scale of the career Civil Service had to be considerably 
reduced, eventually down to a core. The study team argued against 
using the terms ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ on the grounds that ‘in general 
successful outside firms do not have one set of terms and conditions 
from which all alternative working patterns are seen as derogation’ 
(ibid. para. 7.8). The career Civil Service possibly had as much 
standardisation as its necessarily complex structure could sustain, and 
the Mueller team recognised that maintaining the core of the career 
Civil Service and eventually developing alternative working patterns 
elsewhere risked ‘creating two classes of employee – the “haves” and 
the “have nots”’. In Civil Service terms any such move would be 
redolent of the worst features of established and unestablished service 
before the 1971–2 pension reforms and would rightly be resisted (ibid., 
para. 7.7).  
The establishment issue was to do with security of tenure and 
associated rights and the Working Patterns reforms were directed 
towards restricting tenure and rights. If the norm was substantially 
changed, then appeals against aberrations lost their force. ‘Working 
Patterns is a programme for revolutionary changes in Civil Service 
conditions of employment,’ declared the IPCS, accompanying its 
analysis with a picture of ‘the original nil-hours contract – dockyard 
labourers waiting to be offered work “on the stones” in London Docks 
in 1931’. The IPCS observed: ‘The Working Patterns programme of 
“reforms” would sound the death knell for the role of government as a 
“good” employer. In pay terms that has already been the case since 
1980. The Cabinet Office report would now kill off any remaining 
pretension that the Government’s own employment policies should set 
an acceptable standard for the rest of the community.’ While the 
‘overriding concern’ behind the Mueller Report was ‘to cut costs’, the 
IPCS argued that ‘a vast new workload’ would be occurred on 
‘departments and line managers with scant prospect of cash savings at 
the end of the day’ (IPCS Bulletin, 2/88:8–9). The unwillingness to 
consult the unions before the circulation of the Mueller Report seemed 
to offend the FDA as much as that document’s ‘emphasis on cost 
cutting’. The FDA could not see how adopting alternative working 
patterns that had the effect of diminishing job security would attract 
people to the Civil Service, but it gave a positive evaluation of some of 
the Mueller proposals because ‘we have a long-standing commitment 
to the extension of part-time work, which can play an important part in 
helping a civil servant to combine a career with domestic 
responsibilities; and we favour flexible working hours.’ The FDA then 
prepared a set of guidelines for negotiators which seemed designed to 
	   114	  
negate the exercise (FDA news, March 1988:7).  
The NUCPS and the CPSA issued a pamphlet that described the 
Mueller Report as ‘a major threat to the career Civil Service, to our jobs 
and conditions of service, and to our rights as workers and trade 
unionists’. The strategy behind Working Patterns was the cutting of 
costs and the numbers of permanent civil servants, and the creation of 
‘a large tier of second-class civil servants with few rights, poor pay, and 
no career opportunities’ (CPSA/NUCPS, 1988). The Council of Civil 
Service Unions, in its response to the Mueller Report, sent to the 
Treasury in March 1988 research findings to challenge the evidence of 
changing working patterns outside the Service on which the Mueller 
proposals were based, before going on to give details of a ‘real 
alternative’, meaning the further improvement of conditions of service 
(CCSU Bulletin, July 1988, pp.101–11). In the meantime, however, the 
main attention had turned to the Next Steps Report, in which proposals 
formulated in the Mueller Report found a definitive implementation. 
 
The birth of the Next Steps report  
 
‘It was only towards the end of my time in government that we 
embarked upon radical reforms of the Civil Service which were 
contained in the Next Steps programme. Under this programme much 
of the administrative – as opposed to policy-making – work of 
government departments is being transferred to agencies, staffed by 
civil servants and headed by chief executives appointed by open 
competition. The agencies operate within frameworks set by the 
departments, but are free of detailed departmental control. The quality 
of management within the Public Service promises to be significantly 
improved,’ Margaret Thatcher wrote in her memoirs (Thatcher, 
1993:49). The official history recorded that when, in the autumn of 1986, 
her Adviser on Efficiency, Sir Robin Ibbs, presented a critical review of 
progress in Civil Service reform since 1979, ‘the Prime Minister … was 
disappointed to discover that, after seven years of effort to improve 
management in the Civil Service, so much still needed to be done. She 
commissioned Sir Robin to find out why, and to suggest how to move 
matters on.’ So ‘at the beginning of November 1986, Sir Robin Ibbs and 
the Efficiency Unit – a small team of civil servants and people from 
industry – began an intensive fact-finding exercise’ (Goldsworthy, 
1991:3–4).  
The scrutiny project was led by Kate Jenkins, a member of the 
Efficiency Unit and later its chief of staff. That team was given 90 days 
to complete the scrutiny. This involved conducting more than 150 
interviews, including 21 ministers, 26 permanent secretaries, 26 grade 
2/deputy permanent secretaries, a number of personnel and financial 
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directors, nationalised industry chairmen and staff in local and regional 
office (Panchamia and Thomas, 2014). The team collected opinions on 
how effective previous initiatives had been in improving managerial 
tasks, what measures had helped the most, what obstacles remained 
and what future improvements were needed (Haddon, 2014:17). 
Following the scrutiny process, the team led a collaborative process 
with civil servants. A group of six most senior permanent secretaries, 
led by Sir Robert Armstrong, then Head of the Civil Service, was 
entrusted with testing and developing the new administrative 
structure. It included Sir Kenneth Stowe (DHSS to 1987, then Cabinet 
Office), Sir Brian Cubbon (Home Office) and Sir Clive Whitmore 
(Ministry of Defence). At this point, many senior officials didn’t seem to 
understand the full implications of the process and where it was going. 
The Next Steps report seemed a standard research and it was not 
threatening in its methods, and for this reason they allowed the team 
access to information they might not otherwise have disclosed (Jenkins 
et al., 2007:110). The Efficiency Unit presented its report Improving 
Management in Government: the Next Steps to the Prime Minister in 
March 1987. The report argued early for a better organisation that 
resulted from the breaking up of the Civil Service unity: ‘The Civil 
Service is too big and too diverse to manage in a single entity. With 
600,000 employees it is an enormous organisation compared with any 
private-sector company and most public-sector organisations. A single 
organisation of this size which attempts to provide a detailed structure 
within which to carry out functions as diverse as driving licensing, 
fisheries protection, the catching of drug smugglers and the processing 
of Parliamentary Questions is bound to develop in a way which fits no 
single operation effectively’ (Para.10). So, in explicit contrast with the 
Fulton Committee, which recognised that the work of government 
departments might be better organised if each department employed its 
own staff independently, and built its own grading system, but then 
went on to endorse a unified Civil Service (Fulton Report, 1968, 
para.196), the Efficiency Unit was prepared to urge the breaking-up of 
the career Civil Service into many administrative agencies. ‘At present 
the freedom of an individual manager to manage effectively and 
responsibly in the Civil Service is severely circumscribed,’ the Ibbs 
Report observed. ‘There are controls not only on resources and 
objectives, as there should be in any effective system, but also in the 
way in which resources can be managed. Recruitment, dismissal, choice 
of staff, promotion, pay, hours of work, accommodation, grading, 
organisation of work, the use of IT equipment are all outside the control 
of most Civil Service managers at any level. The main decisions on 
rules and regulations are taken by the centre of the Civil Service. This 
tends to mean that they are structured to fit everything in general and 
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nothing in particular. The rules are therefore seen primarily as a 
constraint rather than as a support, and in no sense as a pressure on 
managers to manage effectively. Moreover, the task of changing the 
rules is often seen as too great for one unit or one manager or indeed 
one department and is therefore assumed to be impossible’ (Para. 11). 
Then, as in the report of 1987 by the National Audit Office and the 
Public Accounts Committee before it, the Efficiency Unit underlined 
the ineffectiveness of the FMI in the long term and that much more 
could be done. The price to achieve more efficiency and effectiveness 
would have been the changes to the Civil Service framework and 
organisation.  
The Efficiency Unit reported that ‘it was clear the advantages which a 
unified Civil Service are intended to bring are seen as outweighed by 
the practical disadvantages, particularly beyond Whitehall itself. We 
are told that the advantages of an all-embracing pay structure are 
breaking down, that the uniformity of grading frequently inhibits 
effective management, and that the concept of a career in a unified Civil 
Service has little relevance for most civil servants, whose horizons are 
bounded by their local office, or, at most, by their department’ (ibid., 
para.12).  
The report outlined three types of activity: the ‘need to focus on the job 
to be done’, staff should have relevant experience and skills, 
maintaining constant pressure for improvement. The implications of 
the report were long-term and permanent. First, it recommended 
hiving off the delivery of functions of Whitehall into autonomous 
arm’s-length agencies, which would involve transferring around 75–95 
per cent of the existing civil service out. Second, it recommended 
changing the skills and management of what remained of the 
machinery of government. Third, it recommended retaining a unit in 
the centre of government to maintain an institutional pressure for 
reform (Panchamia and Thomas, 2014, CSR Interview 22).  
Together, these solutions implied fundamentally changing the ‘genetic 
structure’ of Whitehall and transforming the way officials conceived of 
their core functions and responsibilities. While progress was made on 
all three recommendations (e.g. the Top Management Programme was 
established to train Whitehall officials in management), only the first 
point, agencification, was pursued with success. The agencification 
process dealt with the concerns of middle managers and articulated 
their frustration with constraining central rules, but generated 
ambiguity, resistance and even opposition by other civil servants. The 
environment of Whitehall was cautious around the reform, primarily 
because of the enormity of the proposed change and the prospect of 
Treasury hostility (Panchamia and Thomas, CSR Interview 23, 2014).  
Margaret Thatcher supported the project in its aims. In the end, prime 
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ministerial approval meant that Ibbs and Jenkins had significant 
influence to drive through the conclusions of the scrutiny process 
(Kandiah and Lowe, 2007:121). The Treasury was highly resistant, 
fearing a loss of control over public finances and upward pressure on 
agency expenditure. The first protest came during the phase of writing 
of the draft in February 1987, and the issue became discussed seriously 
in the summer of 1987 when the Treasury suspended co-operation with 
process, causing something of a break. Nigel Lawson, the Chancellor, 
and Sir Peter Middleton, the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, 
campaigned hard to block the publication (Kandiah and Lowe, 
2007:126). Opposition was not limited to the Treasury, but came from 
different parts: the No. 10 Policy Unit, Thatcher’s principal private 
secretary and press secretary, some ministers, unions and permanent 
secretaries. While some senior officials welcomed the opportunity to 
free themselves from management and delivery concerns, others feared 
the consequences of losing control over whole sections of their 
department. Unions were similarly divided: some concerns were that it 
was another step towards extensive privatisation, while others saw it 
was a chance to renegotiate management on staff and pay conditions, 
as the Treasury feared (Panchamia and Thomas, CSR Interview 23, 
2014).  
Treasury support was fundamental to carry the reform on. However, 
Thatcher, under the advice of Ibbs and Armstrong, refused advice from 
the Head of the No. 10 Policy Unit, her chief of staff and her principal 
private secretary to make any significant step forward that would 
change the bulk of the report. This resulted in a long battle with the 
Treasury, which delayed the publication of the report by nearly one 
year. Lawson was eventually won round when he began to be 
convinced that Next Steps fitted with political commitment of using 
market models for public services delivery and it was a first step 
towards an extensive privatisation. Middleton remained sceptical for a 
long time and had to be ‘talked and drafted around’ (Kandiah and 
Lowe, 2007:112). Finally, only minor wording and emphasis changes 
were made to the final report. This expressed clearer lines of 
accountability and slowed down the pace of reform by committing to it 
only a pilot basis (ibid.:119).  
The unions were ‘far easier to deal with than the Treasury’ and were 
generally persuaded after long and formal consultation (Panchamia 
and Thomas, Interview 20, 2014). At the ministerial meeting in July 
1987, Thatcher asked all ministers to put forward candidates for the 
pilot stage. Although this stage was voluntary, departments were 
expected to produce at least two candidates, which ‘gave scope to 
enthusiasts and embarrassed others … into action’ (Jenkins, 2010:118). 
Departments then analysed their functions and identified areas where 
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agencies could be set up. Initially, departments put forward fairly 
modest candidates who already had a degree of autonomy. There was a 
conclusive effort to create an agency in more autonomous areas first 
and leave the more politically sensitive ones for later, when experience 
had been reinforced (Panchamia and Thomas, CSR Interview 23, 2014). 
During this time, wider developments could have distracted attention 
and stalled progress, including a general election in 1987 and a change 
in the leadership of the Civil Service that passed from Armstrong to Sir 
Robin Butler in 1988. This period has been considered a crucial time 
that, if not handled well, could easily have led to a disempowered 
agenda. However, the Efficiency Unit made a significant effort to 
communicate the importance of Next Steps to the Labour opposition to 
prevent it being abandoned if Labour came to power (Haddon, 
2014:20). Important efforts were also carried on by the Treasury and 
Civil Service Committee (TCSC), which published its first, very 
supportive report in July 1988 where the Next Steps reform was 
considered as permanent (HC 494, 1988).  
Considering the main managerial features introduced by the Next Steps 
report, it can be pointed out that the Efficiency Unit found that the 
pressures on departments were mainly on expenditure and activities, 
and that there was too little attention to results and value for money 
(para.8). The management and staff concerned with the delivery of 
government services, which involved some 95 per cent of the Civil 
Service, were generally convinced that the developments towards more 
clearly defined and budgeted management had been both positive and 
constructive (para.3). At the higher levels of the Civil Service, though, 
the Efficiency Unit argued ‘senior civil servants inevitably and rightly 
respond to the priorities set by their Ministers which tend to be 
dominated by the demands of Parliament and communicating 
government policies’ (para. 6).  
Ministers, feeling themselves overloaded, complained with the Unit 
that, provided no major political risk was involved, they would be 
enthusiastic to improve managerial tasks. The Efficiency Unit stated 
‘better management and the achievement of improved performance is 
something that the Civil Service has to work out largely for itself’ 
(para.7), but it would be ‘unrealistic to expect Ministers to do more than 
give a broad lead’ (para.7). The Unit knew the limits of the higher civil 
service and it noticed that ‘senior management is dominated by people 
whose skills are policy formulation and who have relatively little 
experience of managing or working where services are actually 
delivered.’ One Grade 2 official told the Unit ‘the golden route to the 
top is though policy not through management’, and this was reflected 
by the early experience with the agencies system and the need for 
training for officials. The Unit argued ‘this kind of signal affects the 
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unwritten priorities of a whole organisation, whatever the formal 
policy may be’ (para.4), and it added that ‘managing large 
organisations involves skills which depend a great deal on experience; 
without experience, senior managers lack confidence in their own 
ability to manage. Although, at the most senior levels, civil servants are 
responsible for both policy and service delivery, they give a greater 
priority to policy, not only because it demands immediate attention but 
because that is the area in which they are on familiar ground and where 
their skills lie, and where ministerial attention is focused. A proper 
balance between policy and delivery is hard to achieve within the 
present framework’ (para. 5).  
The Efficiency Unit concluded that the structure needed to be revisited: 
‘The aim should be to establish a quite different way of conducting the 
business of government. The central Civil Service should consist of a 
relatively small core engaged in the function of serving Ministers and 
managing departments, who will be the sponsors of particular 
government policies and services. Responding to these departments 
will be a range of agencies employing their own staff, who may or may 
not have the status of Crown servants, and concentrating on the 
delivery of their particular service, with clearly defined responsibilities 
between the Secretary of State and the Permanent Secretary on the one 
hand, and the Chairmen or Chief Executives of the agencies on the 
other. Both departments and their agencies should have a more open 
and simplified structure’ (para. 44). An interesting perspective about 
the Next Steps report was highlighted by The Economist (20 February 
1988:20): ‘Another Cabinet Office report prepared by Sir Kenneth Stowe 
recommends a more radical approach, freeing up whole departments 
for Treasury control and giving them supervisory boards. Sadly, that 
report languishes, unpublished, in a Whitehall pigeonhole. Mr Peter 
Kemp, who is moving from the Treasury control to oversee 
implementation of the Ibbs Report, should dust it down. He should 
also consider an even bolder approach, hinted at but not developed in 
Mrs Thatcher’s statement on the Ibbs report: competitive tendering. 
Many government bodies charged primarily with executive functions 
could easily be made to tender regularly for their business. Imagine 
what that might do for the efficiency of the Inland Revenue or Customs 
and Excise.’  
The Economist was not impressed by the reform even if Mrs Thatcher’s 
statement indicated that the Government had ‘not excluded the 
possibility’ of locating agencies in the private sector (127 HC Deb.6s. 
c.1155), she herself believing that ‘it would be best to deal in that way 
with (agencies) that are essentially commercial services’, and 
specifically mentioning the Property Services Agency and that there 
was ‘a review of that agency and how best to reform its activities’ (ibid., 
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c.1156). As far as concerned the unions, The Economist (20 February 
1988) wrote, ‘The Civil Service Unions are predictably (and 
unthinkingly) hostile to the plan,’ but the reaction of the unions was not 
uniform. The Prime Minister was informed that ‘the Civil Service 
unions will be consulted about the setting up of particular agencies,’ 
and that ‘they will also be consulted if any change in terms and 
conditions of civil servants is contemplated’ (127 HC Deb. 6s c.1149).  
The Council of Civil Service Unions was cautious but not hostile and 
the idea of joint consultation with Peter Kemp was considered a good 
signal. They welcomed the apparent diminution of the Treasury’s role 
in managing pay and resources, believing that ‘any real devolution of 
managerial responsibility (as opposed to the “Monopoly-money” 
approach of the FMI) is bound to loosen this control’ (CCSU Bulletin, 
April 1988:49). The FDA stated that ‘the changes proposed by Ibbs are 
potentially far reaching’, in particular because they tried to ‘break up 
traditional arrangements on pay and personnel’, adding: ‘Nevertheless, 
leaving aside the buzzwords used in the report like “chief executive” 
and “project manager”, the immediate changes stemming from the 
report are less dramatic than many expected from the early Press 
speculation … This is probably because the Government has failed to 
resolve the inherent tensions between its wish to give Civil Service 
managers more “personal responsibility” and its desire to retain central 
control over expenditure’ (FDA News, March 1988:7). The Vice 
Chairman of the IPCS, John Gibson, in his speech to the annual 
conference of 1988, stated that the Ibbs report should be regarded with 
‘considerable unease’ because under them ‘the Civil Service would 
ultimately become a cadre of policy makers and everything else would 
be done outside the Civil Service proper. This is certainly radical, it is 
certainly dramatic, but is it sensible? Is it even realistic?’ (IPCS Bulletin, 
7/88, p.6). A different opinion was expressed by John Ellis, the General 
Secretary of the CPSA: ‘What we face with the Ibbs Report is an 
alternative to privatisation. The fact that it was given so much credit by 
the Prime Minister was the reason for my and others’ relief when the 
announcement was made on February 18. If Ibbs had been rejected, the 
alternative with this government was not inaction, it was privatisation. 
It’s absolutely vital, therefore, that the Civil Service trade unions do all 
they can to make the agency concept a success because, if it fails, 
privatisation will be the next step for large parts of the Civil Service’ 
(Red Tape, June 1988:6).  
On the contrary, Leslie Christie, General Secretary of the NUCPS 
considered ‘the Ibbs plan’ as ‘a first step towards privatisation’, and he 
argued: ‘Our first priority will be to defend the terms and conditions of 
civil servants and at the same time win the public debate about the 
future of the Civil Service. The Government’s hidden agenda poses the 
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most serious threat to civil servants’ terms and conditions yet faced. 
National rates of pay, job security, career opportunities, even the Civil 
Service pension scheme – all these things are on the line. Government 
assurances that all staff in departmental agencies will remain civil 
servants mean nothing when fragmented pay and pension 
arrangements, wide regional variations in pay, and new powers to 
“hire and fire” replace established Civil Service conditions’ (NUCPS 
Journal, March 1988:5).  
By the spring of 1988 the Ibbs Report implementation was added to the 
Mueller Report on working patterns, starting a process of changes in 
the Civil Service conditions, structure and organisation that will last for 
the next decades. 
 
Implementing the report and building the agencification (1988–1990) 
 
The phase of implementation was embedded in the Next Steps Report 
to the Prime Minister: ‘The aim should be within five years to establish 
a quite different way of conducting the business of government. The 
central Civil Service should consist of a relatively small core of about 
20,000 people engaged in the functions of servicing ministers and 
managing departments who will be the “sponsors” of particular 
government policies and services. Responding to these departments 
will be a range of agencies employing their own staff who may or may 
not have the status of crown servants’ (1988). On the day of 
presentation, Margaret Thatcher spoke in the House of Commons 
supporting the report’s recommendations and suggesting that the 
agencies should be created ‘to the greater extent’, a statement that did 
not establish any limits for the agencification process (Drewry, 1994: 
583–95). Between 75 per cent and 95 per cent of civil servants would be 
hived off to executive and autonomous agencies focusing on service 
delivery. Central government would lose some of the detailed controls 
it held so that senior officials would have more time to concentrate on 
policy, while agencies would have more freedom to adopt business-like 
management practices. It was hoped that this would lead to more 
accountable management with specific targets, customer-focused 
services and better value from public expenditure. The underlying 
intention was to separate delivery from policy in order to realise better 
linkages between them (Kandiah and Lowe, 2007:108). 
By 1988, even the Treasury was committed to realising this project. 
More generally, the aims corresponded with the traditional attitude 
that saw civil servants as highly effective as policy analysts, but as 
needing ‘to be preserved from doing what they were very, very bad at, 
such as the delivery of services’ (Kandiah and Lowe, 2007:117). The 
entire environment was more supportive than it had been, but not 
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completely aligned with what was to come. Having considered the 
challenging objectives of the reform, Thatcher appreciated that it was 
vital to have it project-managed by a permanent secretary, directly 
answerable to her. Peter Kemp, a Treasury senior official, was 
appointed the project as project manager and became a permanent 
secretary in the Cabinet Office. He was identified for the role because of 
his accountancy background and his hard-working mentality (Jenkins, 
2010).  
While Kemp’s role, experience and style gave him some strengths, 
some senior officials were essential. In this sense, Robin Butler was 
hugely important in managing internal civil service tensions and 
gaining access to the Prime Minister when needed. Thatcher didn’t 
offer high-profile support or a significant amount of her time, but made 
it clear that she supported the agenda and she would not tolerate 
continued opposition (Kandiah and Lowe, 2007:128). The combination 
of support gave Kemp the authority to complete the changes and that 
meant that no other departments, especially the Treasury, could stop 
him. The operating model was shaped by an analysis of previous 
reforms. The scrutiny process had revealed that an ‘initial flurry of 
ministerial activity was likely to fade, and implementation unlikely to 
be carried through, without a dedicated central unit’ (ibid.:128). 
Accordingly, a Next Steps Unit (NSU) was created, which led the 
reform strategy and had access to the Prime Minister and her staff, 
when needed. The Unit was composed of ten motivated and skilled 
people, including a Grade 3 director, a Grade 5 day-to-day manager 
and junior account managers. This model was inspired by the 
Efficiency Unit created in 1979 by Derek Rayner, which demonstrated 
that a small, focused organisation would create value and results, while 
a large one would only ‘add bureaucracy’. The NSU was seen as a small 
team comprising ‘misfits’, ‘significantly awkward people’ and, 
unusually, a few outsiders, many of whom had a strong understanding 
of service delivery. (Pachamia and Thomas, CSR Interview 23, 2014). 
Following the leadership of Kemp, they were seen as ‘disruptive 
mavericks armed with an unwavering commitment to change things’ 
(ibid.). The team worked towards a numerical target of 75 per cent of 
civil servants into agencies and developed a clear set of processes 
around which a new agency would be established and what it would 
look like, later developed into a thirteen-point checklist of essential 
characteristics to create an agency. This involved conducting a review 
of pre-agency functions to control what was supposed to be delivered, 
what management techniques would make it work better, and how 
performance would be improved if the function was privatised, 
abolished or established as an agency (Panchamia and Thomas, 2014).  
Then, considering this review, the team would shape the relationship 
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between the parent department and the agency in a carefully crafted, 
custom-made framework agreement, which set out the objectives, 
performance targets and resources assigned to each agency. This was 
drafted in consultation with the Treasury, and single negotiations 
would take place on any proposed changes to staff pay and conditions 
(NAO, 1989:3).  
Finally, each agency was formally launched with a public statement 
from the relevant minister. A few years into the reform, the Treasury 
devolved more financial flexibility to agencies and an important 
element of this was the trading fund model. This gave agencies greater 
control over how they spent the money that they received from 
customers. The expectation was that profits would be reinvested into 
service improvements that customers would recognise, thereby 
improving how agencies related to customers (Panchamia and Thomas, 
CSR Interview 23, 2014).  
Responsibility for the day-to-day operations of each agency was 
delegated to a chief executive. For these ideas, Kemp was particularly 
focused on recruiting outsiders such as accountants with experience in 
financial management. They would be held accountable for 
performance by a minister, who in turn would be held to account by 
Parliament for the agency’s performance (NAO, 1989:12–13). During 
this development phase, the team invested an immense amount of time 
in briefing all those who were involved, coordinating networks, 
creating champions for reform and devising a communications 
programme, including booklets, public reports and a video which 
communicated that the reform was succeeding. Kemp ran regular 
meetings with agency chief executives to discuss common challenges 
and provided updates to permanent secretaries at the weekly 
Wednesday morning meeting, and he always had clear support from 
Butler, which ensured that the initiative wasn’t seen as a revolution 
against the civil service but as a normal process of modernisation to 
cooperate with (Panchamia and Thomas, CSR Interview 20, 2014). The 
Unit’s primary measure of success was progress against coverage 
targets, which was published in an annual report.  
External accountability for progress was largely provided by the 
Treasury Commons Select Committee (TCSC), which published annual 
reports in the first few years of reform. The TCSC could easily have 
sabotaged the programme, but Kemp, and later project managers, 
understood the need to keep it on side (ibid.). A significant amount of 
time was spent discussing recommendations openly and honestly, such 
as the need to strengthen accountability to Parliament, soon fulfilled 
though the creation of agency accounting officers. The TCSC became an 
important ‘reforming partner’, playing a key role in publishing the 
changes more widely. Given that very few ministers were interested, 
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and the Opposition didn’t really express a view, the only parliamentary 
voice was ‘intelligent and supportive’(Kandiah and Lowe, 2007:122-
123). The day of the Next Steps presentation, the Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher stated: ‘The Government will develop a continuing 
programme for establishing agencies, applying progressively the 
lessons of the experience gained’ (127, HC Deb. 6s.c. 1149).  
Considering this institutional development, some authors pointed out 
that the transformation of British central government was particularly 
similar to the Swedish one. As one scholar of the Swedish system has 
written, ‘The most striking difference between Britain and Sweden is 
the absence of a concept of ministerial responsibility,’ and he 
continued: ‘In Sweden, a Cabinet Minister is not held responsible for 
administration, for he is not the head of a hierarchy whose duty is the 
administration of government policy. Before the advent of “popular” 
government, administration was a matter for the King, who appointed 
his own Ministers and administered in accordance with the law. It is 
the latter concept of responsibility to the law which has been the central 
pillar of Swedish theory concerning the responsibility of both Ministers 
and State employees. The development of Parliamentary Government 
in Sweden did not lead to a subordination of administration to 
Parliament. The 1809 Constitution recognised the separation of powers, 
and, although this effectively ended with the completion of 
Parliamentary democracy in 1918, the institutional framework and the 
culture derived from an earlier period persisted.’ This different 
arrangement gives more independence to Swedish administration, with 
the consequences that just a small number of civil servants work in 
Ministries and the bulk of it is concentrated in the Central State Boards. 
The Swedish government as a result has a strong centre, contrary to the 
United Kingdom one. The budget of these Boards is established by the 
government, which can press them to adopt ‘good administrative 
practices’, and it investigates to ensure that this is done. Between the 
Heads of the Boards and the Government there is an informal 
cooperation and political negotiation. This situation led to the 
conclusion that probably there was inspiration from, but not a direct 
influence of, the Swedish system in the Next Steps reform. Moreover, 
the agency model was already present in the administrative landscape 
of the UK, and this fact is reported by the Efficiency Unit in Annex A of 
the Next Steps Report.  
The report considered the Boards of Customs and Excise and of Inland 
Revenue that there were non-ministerial bodies with a defined 
statutory autonomy. In addition, the Prison Service Agency, the 
Defence Procurement Executive and the National Health Service 
Management Board were agencies within departments, and then there 
were some non-departmental bodies such as the Manpower Service 
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Commission. As far as concerned accountability, officials with 
operational responsibility would be liable to appear before Select 
Committees of the House of Commons (Annex A, para.8), and the 
powers of the Parliamentary Commission for Administration would be 
brought to bear on the agencies.  
The Efficiency Unit argued: ‘Quite apart from the issue of improving 
Civil Service management, there is a good case for trying to reduce the 
degree of ministerial overload that can arise from the questions about 
operations, as distinct from policy. For example, Social Security 
Ministers receive about 15,000 letters a year from MPs, many of which 
are about individual cases. In the future, MPs could be asked to write 
about operational matters directly to the Chairman of the Board or the 
local office manager. Arrangements of this sort could be promulgated 
by a letter from the relevant Minister or the Leader of the House to all 
MPs. In the past the Chancellor of the Exchequer has written to all MPs 
asking them to refer questions about constituent’s tax to local tax 
offices, and the Secretary of State for Social Services has written 
similarly about referring social security cases to DHSS local office 
managers. If an MP writes to an operational manager about matters 
which are essentially political, it is already normal practice for the 
manager to refer the letter to the Minister’ (ibid., para.10).  
During the first series of inquiries by the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee, Sir Peter Kemp stated: ‘I am Central Department Project 
Manager and I had a very small team – initially only three people – to 
help me’ (HC 494-II, 1987-8, evidence, q.9). In addition to this Project 
Team and the influence of osmotic discussions with the world of 
academia, think tanks and other professions, the Project Manager was 
supported by two other groups, as Goldsworthy pointed out: ‘Closest 
at hand was the Project Executive, a small working group from the 
central departments – the Treasury, the Efficiency Unit, and the OMCS 
– which met weekly to think through some of the across-the-board 
issues as they came up, and to make sure that there was agreement 
about the way that progress was being made. The Project Manager also 
met informally each month with the Project Liaison Group, composed 
of senior representatives from the main departments. Here, ideas could 
be exchanged before they were worked up into firm principles. This 
helped to involve departments in the process of developing Next Steps 
policy and to get endorsement of the Project Manager’s ideas. The aim 
was to foster support for and a sense of purpose about Next Steps at 
senior level’ (Goldsworthy, 1991: 21–2).  
Goldsworthy remarked, ‘Although the Government was firmly 
committed to implementing Next Steps, the policy itself was not 
publicly set down anywhere in any detail,’ and he continued: ‘Indeed, 
Sir Robin Ibbs’s Report had described an idea, and sketched out, but no 
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more, how it might be put into effect, so the policy had to be developed 
in the light of progress’ (ibid.:34). Peter Kemp, when asked in a session 
of Treasury and Civil Service Committee in May 1988 what percentage 
of the Civil Service he expected would be in agencies in ten years, he 
answered: ‘I would be personally sorry if we did not get to at least 
three-quarters.’ As the agencies comprised ‘11 or 12 per cent so far’ of 
the Service, Kemp said that meeting his target meant that ‘the very 
large battalions like the DHSS, which has something like 90,000 people, 
come into the reckoning’ (HC 494-II, 1987-8, evidence q.23). Kemp 
seemed to have clear ideas about where there was little scope for 
agencies: ‘The Foreign Office, like other departments, will be surveying 
their activities on that front,’ Kemp stated, adding, ‘It may very well be 
there are parts of the Foreign Service which would be inappropriate. I 
have just been to Stockholm talking to people who have a similar 
system to this and their residual Civil Service consists of about 2,000 
people, of which nearly half are the Foreign Office. The Swedish 
experience – and it goes back 300 years – seems to be that the approach 
has not proved successful in this area. I would not like to say that was 
the only area where it was unsuitable’ (ibid., q.9).  
In some cases, Kemp’s plan in creating agencies in some areas of 
government was not shared by ministers. Nigel Lawson, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer at the time, later wrote that he had ‘volunteered three 
of my outlying departments, the Stationery Office (HMSO), the Royal 
Mint, and the Central Office of Information, as executive agencies’, but 
that ‘I did not, however, support Kemp’s desire to convert the Inland 
Revenue and the Customs and Excise into agencies. These politically 
sensitive departments, with a small but important policy role, had long 
enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from political control so far as their 
executive functions were concerned, and converting them into agencies 
would have created no discernible advantage. Moreover, the only way 
in which it could have been achieved would have been to transfer their 
policy role to the Treasury, leaving them as purely tax-collecting 
agencies. This was something to which the Chairmen of the two 
Revenue departments were implacably opposed, arguing with some 
plausibility that policy advice was improved if it was informed by 
practical experience on the ground’ (Lawson, 1992:392–3). Despite these 
arguments, the Boards of Inland Revenue and of Customs and Excise 
were designed by the Next Steps programme and, in June 1989, A.W. 
Russell, an official from the Board of Customs and Excise, made it clear 
to the Treasury and Civil Service Committee that the aim would be 
achieved (HC 217, 1988-9, evidence, q.116).  
In May 1989 Peter Kemp clarified that, even though the initial Next 
Steps target of creating sixteen agencies by April 1989 had not been 
met, the target of at least 75 per cent of civil servants lasted. ‘In fact 
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about eight are now likely to be set up by July 1989,’ the Comptroller 
and Auditor General had stated in a report published 6 June 1989 (HC 
420, 1988-9, para.58). Peter Kemp replied in an evidence: ‘The 
unpublished report, although obviously available to the National Audit 
Office, I made to the Prime Minister in July 1988 did suggest that we 
might have expected 16 to be set up. In fact only five were set up. We 
now have seven. We did one last month, the Resettlement Agency of 
the Department of Social Security, and only yesterday the Civil Service 
College was set up as an agency. I am hoping very much there will be 
one more: the QEII Centre will be set up before we get to the end of 
July. You are quite right that makes eight out of 16’ (HC 420, 1988-9, 
evidence, q.4016). ‘We have not been able to go quite as fast as Peter 
Kemp had hoped,’ said G. H. Phillips, the senior official at the Treasury 
with whom Kemp had most regular contact, in evidence to the 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee, arguing, ‘First of all, it is 
important when you are starting off a new enterprise – and here we 
agree completely with Peter Kemp – that you set yourself an ambitious 
target in order to get things moving, in the knowledge that you may 
not be able quite to meet it. Secondly, in the process of dealing with the 
first few agencies we have obviously come across a number of across-
the-board issues which have needed to be settled in relation to these 
particular agencies but which might then have application across 
government. Therefore it has been right to take time over doing them.’ 
Then, ‘in departments there has been a recognition that perhaps their 
timetables on some occasions were over ambitious’ (HC 348, 1988-9, 
evidence, q.263). The Treasury and Civil Service Committee argued for 
‘an improvement in the pace at which executive agencies are created’ 
(HC 348, 1988-9, para.12).  
‘The Project Manager’s judgement is that by next summer at least 20 
agencies will have been established, with more to come,’ the 
Conservative government reported in October 1989 in response to the 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee (Cmnd 841, 1989, p.3). ‘There 
will be 30 agencies established by the end of the next week,’ Richard 
Luce, a Minister of State involved, informed a Tory MP on 2 April 1990, 
adding ‘We expect more to be set up by the summer’ (170 HC Deb. 6s. 
Written Answer c.386). In July 1990 the Treasury and the Civil Service 
Committee reported that ‘the situation this year is very different: 33 
agencies have been established compared to eight a year ago’ and ‘not 
only have more agencies been created: larger numbers are now 
involved. The largest agency created in the first year of the programme 
was the HMSO with 3,250 staff. In the past few months the 
Employment Service (35,000) and the Land Registry (11,000) have been 
launched. The total number of staff now in agencies is about 80,000’ 
(HC 481, 1989-1990, para. 8–9). The first Next Steps review was 
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published in October 1990 and reported that ‘there are now 34 agencies 
… by next summer we expect that there will be around 50 agencies up 
and running, covering 200,000 people’ (Cmnd 1261, 1990:7). The reform 
was on its way and it was becoming permanently institutionalised, 
creating a new framework for the Civil Service. 
 
7. Conclusions: from reducing waste and manpower to a new public 
management and administrative framework in the British Civil 
Service 
 
To conclude on this period, when on 28 November Margaret Thatcher 
left Downing Street in favour of John Major, the administrative reform 
of the Civil Service was running and a turning point towards 
modernisation in the history of this institution had been definitely 
reached. The yearly spending review, manpower reduction, executive 
agencies creation and functions hived-off, new arrangements in the 
civil service pay, recruitment and framework, budgeting devolution, a 
new development of managerial skills and techniques and separation 
of policy-making and policy implementation became regular and 
permanent. Probably, there was not an initial ‘grand strategy’ by 
Thatcher governments for the Civil Service reform, but the objective 
was to build a government that ‘works better and costs less’ (Hood, 
2015).  
To achieve this result, there was a first ‘emergency’ phase that lasted 
until 1983 and focused mainly on waste, costs and manpower 
reduction, considered as priorities to reduce public expenditure and to 
respect cash limits. A second ‘managerial’ phase (1984–1990) 
characterised by the shaping of a new administrative structure 
functional to privatisations, contracting-out, executive agencies, 
performance measurements and merit pay, developing of managerial 
tasks and reform implementation. In the following government, led by 
John Major, the breach in the traditional structure of the Civil Service 
opened by Mrs Thatcher widened, managerial reforms continued to be 
implemented and the traditional organisation of the Civil Service 
continued to be overhauled. 
 
 
  
	   129	  
Chapter Two. Policy implementation, consumer service 
and marketisation: civil service reform in the Major 
Government (1990–1997) 
 
1. Continuity and Implementation: the executive agencies 
 
On 28 November 1990 John Major succeeded Margaret Thatcher both as 
Prime Minister and Conservative Party leader, and he established a 
new Conservative government as a result of a new political balance 
inside the party. As far as concerns the bureaucratic organisation that 
we are investigating, the main feature was a strong continuity with 
Thatcher’s reforms. Furthermore, the influence of new managerialism 
in central government practices, and within it in particular New Public 
Management’s doctrine (Hood, 1991, 1995; Pollitt, 1990), was becoming 
more spread and influential.  
The executive agencies were implemented and the Next Steps 
programme completed, privatisations and contracting out were 
widened to local public services, the civil service’s manpower reduced, 
market testing was introduced in Whitehall, greater attention was 
concentrated on public services and delivery with the Citizen Charter 
initiative, and a new system of recruiting was established with the idea 
of achieving more flexibility and opened the Civil Service to outsiders. 
Despite some differences in style, leadership and political environment, 
Major’s government could be considered the continuation and the 
natural developer of Thatcher’s programme and ideas on the public 
sector. 
 
Implementing Next Steps Agencies 
 
By the early 1990s, the political context had become highly unstable and 
risky: the poll tax riots exploded, Thatcher left government after a 
revolt in her party and she was replaced by John Major, the Gulf War 
began and a general election occurred in 1992, giving Conservatives 
another victory. Alongside this, many reforms were put into the 
agenda, including the Citizen’s Charter and Competing for Quality in 
1991, and they were announced by the new Prime Minister, speaking to 
the Conservative Central Council on 23 March 1991.  
Peter Kemp, Next Steps project manager, was particularly conscious 
that these initiatives were a direct contest for the implementation of 
Next Steps reform. There was a strong effort to manage the effect 
produced by the programmes of the new government. Kemp and 
Butler met the shadow Cabinet in the run-up to the general election and 
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convinced them that ‘Next Steps was a transferable technology that 
could deliver a better model for whoever formed the government’ 
(Panchamia and Thomas, 2014:7).  
In May 1991, John Smith, the shadow Chancellor, gave a speech 
committing the Labour Party’s cooperation to the reforms. Butler 
worked to ensure that a possible change in the party government in the 
1992 elections did not undermine the progress, by creating new 
administrative interests for John Major such as increasing transparency 
and accountability through the Citizen’s Charter into the narrative of 
the Next Steps (Haddon, 2012:20). By May 1991, 50 agencies had been 
established, including 50 per cent of civil servants; 60–70 per cent of 
chief executives had been appointed following an open competition, 
and about 35 per cent came from outside the Civil Service (Butler, 1999: 
400). On 24 June 1991, Sir Peter Kemp gave evidence to the Treasury 
and Civil Service Committee: ‘We have got 50 agencies set up so far; in 
fact, we have got 51 and I commend you to the Social Security Agency 
in Northern Ireland which I was in Belfast this morning helping to 
launch … I hope … that at this time next year we can show you 20 
more. That is our present estimate of what we are going to get to then. 
And there will be over half the Civil Service by then with (as we always 
say) more to come.’ (HC 496, 1990-1, evidence, q.413).  
In November 1991 the second Next Steps Review was published and it 
highlighted that the most important change of the year had been the 
creation of the Social Benefits Agency in April 1991, which employed 
around 70,000 staff (Cmnd 1760, 1991:57). The review stated that 
‘Customs and Excise is moving towards full operation on Next Steps 
lines, and since 1 April 1991 most of its work has been organised in 30 
executive units. These include all 21 of the department’s regional 
collections as well as the Investigation Division and a number of 
operational and service units formerly organised as headquarters 
divisions. About 95 per cent of the department’s 27,500 staff work in 
Executive Units’ (ibid.:17). There were 56 Next Steps agencies besides 
these Units, and the government stated in November 1991 answering to 
the Treasury and Civil Service Committee that ‘the Inland Revenue has 
published an action plan for moving towards full operation on these 
lines’ (Cmnd 1761, 1991:1). 30 September 1991 witnessed the launch of 
the Valuation Officer of the Board of Inland Revenue, which involved 
about 5,300 staff (Cmnd 1760, 1991:65). Thirty-four executive offices 
were established by the Inland Revenue by 1 April 1992 and, added to 
the Valuation Office Agency, they accounted for around 96 per cent of 
the entire department’s staff of over 70,000 officials (Cmnd 2111, 
1992:44).  
The Next Steps model began to spread more awareness of financial and 
budgetary issues, as well as an acceptance of external recruitment, 
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normalising a process that just a few years before was seen as highly 
radical. However, some unsolved problems remained around 
accountability, especially about the relation between CEO and 
Ministers, as well as performance measurement (Panchamia and 
Thomas, 2014:8). These concerns created the occasion for the Fraser 
review, which criticised the fact that there was no one in departments 
responsible for controlling agencies, and it recommended a senior 
department sponsor for each agency to act as consultant on agency 
performance (Fraser, 1991). In September 1992, Kemp left the Civil 
Service after a clash with William Waldegrave, then Minister for Public 
Services, and Richard Mottram replaced him as project manager. This 
change in leadership provided an opportunity to implement and 
enforce the reform programme. Mottram was a policy director at the 
Ministry of Defence and he had shown little interest in the 
implementation of the Next Steps report until his appointment as 
project manager in 1992 (CSR Interview 20, IFG, 2014). The procedure 
was the same adopted with Peter Kemp and he was appointed 
Permanent Secretary.  
In December 1992 Mottram’s team reported the third Next Steps 
review, which recorded: ‘There are now 76 executive agencies, of which 
20 have been launched in the last year together with 30 Customs and 
Excise Executive Units and 34 Inland Revenue Executive Offices 
working on Next Steps lines. Between them, they employ just over 
290,000 civil servants, or slightly more than half the total’ (Cmnd 2111, 
1992:6). The fourth Next Steps Review, published in December 1993, 
stated: ‘Since the publication of the last Review … 16 new agencies 
have been launched. These include HM Prison Service, the third largest 
agency, whose Director General (Chief Executive) is responsible for 
managing a mix of directly managed and contracted-out facilities, and 
the Child Support Agency and the Northern Ireland Child Support 
Agency, the first official bodies to be established, from the outset, as 
agencies’ (Cmnd 2430, 1993:6). Furthermore, the Review reported that 
‘there are currently 92 agencies. Together with the 31 Executive Units of 
HM Customs and Excise and the 33 Executive Offices of the Inland 
Revenue, working fully on Next Steps lines, they employ 60 per cent of 
the Civil Service’ (ibid.:6).  
In July 1993 a Management and Consultancy Services Unit had been 
launched (ibid.:33), and the Review explained: ‘Our aim has been to 
identify by the end of 1993 the principal areas of Home Civil Service 
activity which are potential candidates for agency status, and to ensure 
that most of those that are to become agencies should be up and 
running by mid-1995. […] Agencies and announced candidates for 
agency status in the Home Civil Service … represent 78 per cent of the 
total’ (ibid.:10). Mottram established a strong relationship with the 
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Cabinet Secretary and he frequently accessed the Prime Minister. His 
style and leadership were different to Kemp’s. While his predecessor 
was considered highly charismatic and determined, Mottram was 
regarded as being far more conciliatory and smooth (Theakston, 1995). 
He preferred to motivate officials by making the reform fit with their 
attitudes rather than forcing them to obey as Kemp did. At this stage, 
Treasury resistance was ‘no longer an issue’ (CSR Interview 20, 2014), 
even if Nigel Lawson was sceptical about the appointments of the Chief 
Executives in the agencies, stating that ‘most of the Chief Executives are 
still drawn from the Civil Service’ and denouncing the lack of openness 
and outsiders. The fourth Next Steps Review, of December 1993, stated: 
‘Chief Executives are normally appointed through open competition to 
get the best person – whether a civil servant or an outside appointee – 
for the job. Of the 98 Chief Executives and Chief Executive-designate 
appointments made so far, 65 have been recruited via open 
competition. Of those, 35 have come from outside the Civil Service, 
from a wide variety of backgrounds including the private sector, local 
government, the National Health Service and the academic world’ 
(Cmnd 2430, 1993:8).  
The Treasury and Civil Service Committee had argued early on that ‘if 
one of the objects of the Next Steps Programme is to develop 
managerial talent within the Civil Service, we would expect a 
considerable proportion of future senior appointments to come from 
within the Civil Service, but to be appointed as a result of open 
competition’ (HC 348, 1988-9, para.29). The Government was slow in 
implementing open competition and the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee repeated its view on open competition (HC 481, 1989-90, 
para. 28), hence in May 1990 the Government made clear its position in 
a Parliamentary Answer by the Economic Secretary of the Treasury: 
‘The first priority in selecting Chief Executives and other key staff for 
agencies must be to get the right person for the job … Open 
competition will be considered in every case as a potential means of 
attracting talented people from inside and outside the Service.’ The 
Minister argued that ‘pay is usually based on normal Civil Service 
arrangements but more is offered if this is necessary to secure the right 
person’ (173, HC Deb 6s, Written Answers, c.192.)  
The Treasury and Civil Service Committee pointed out in 1990 that ‘the 
Chief Executive’s job at the Social Security Benefits Agency carries a 
salary about half the going rate in a private financial institution with a 
network of high-street outlets’ (HC 481, 1989-90, para.29). Chief 
Executives were appointed on the basis of fixed-term contracts, which 
were not the same in each case, and Peter Kemp underlined that if they 
were responsible for major mistakes the consequence should have been 
their dismissals, because the government had ‘to fire the people in 
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charge’ (ibid., q.162).  
About appointments for particular jobs in agencies, Kemp argued that: 
‘These will be people with grades, because we are that sort of animal. 
There must be benchmarks for pay and that sort of thing, but they are 
still not in the hierarchical situation as they might previously have 
been. These are very special jobs and responsibilities delegated by the 
Minister personally … they will be individually graded posts, but they 
will be rather more loosely graded’ (ibidem, q.175). As far as concerned 
the Chief Executive’s responsibility, the Treasury argued in 1989 that 
‘the Chief Executive’s authority is delegated to them by Ministers who 
are and will remain accountable to Parliament and its Select 
Committees’ (Cmnd 914, 1989, para.5.3), and it clarified that ‘A key 
feature of Next Steps is the personal accountability of Chief Executives 
to their Ministers for the discharge of their responsibilities as set out in 
an agency’s framework document and for the achievement of 
performance targets’ (ibid.).  
The Treasury also stated that: ‘The Government therefore believes that 
the general rule must continue to be that civil servants who give 
evidence to Select Committees do so on behalf of their Ministers. In 
practice, where a Committee’s interest is focused on the day-to-day 
operation of an agency, Ministers will normally regard the Chief 
Executives as best placed to answer on their behalf. The Chief Executive 
will be able to inform the Committee how his agency has performed its 
responsibilities. Ministers themselves will remain fully accountable for 
all Government policies. Agency Chief Executives will in addition be 
appointed Accounting Officers or Agency Accounting Officers … 
Where the agency has its own vote, the Treasury will appoint the Chief 
Executive as Accounting Officer under existing procedures … the 
Government also accepted that where an agency does not have its own 
vote and is financed by one or more sub-heads the departmental 
Accounting Officer will designate the Chief Executive as Agency 
Accounting Officer’ (ibid., para. 5.4-5.5).  
As Goldsworthy reported, framework documents were reviewed in 
three-year intervals, and more frequently if policies or other changes 
required it (Goldsworthy, 1991:27). The Treasury’s paper in 1989 
argued that: ‘The framework document for each agency is a new and 
key element in the accountability process. Objectives for units of Civil 
Service work have existed since the Financial Management Initiative, 
but they have usually been for internal management purposes. 
Framework documents, which are normally made available to 
Parliament and published more widely, set out explicitly for each 
agency its aims and objective, and the boundaries between policy and 
service delivery functions. They also describe the monitoring, 
accountability and reporting patterns between the agency and the 
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parent department, the financial and the personnel management 
flexibilities that the agency will have, and the Accounting Officer status 
of the Chief Executive. They are essential to Next Steps, in that they 
publicly set out the respective role of Ministers (and their supporting 
officials) in policy and strategic management and those of agencies in 
execution and delivery. They define clearly the tools that each will have 
and the measures for assessing agency performance; and they make 
transparent the resulting accountabilities within Government and to 
Parliament’ (Cmnd 914, 1989, para. 5.8). In May 1991 the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Procedure prescribed that ‘in future 
replies from agency Chief Executives in response to Parliamentary 
Questions referred to them by Ministers should appear in the Official 
Report’ (HC 178, 1990-91, para. 125). This recommendation was 
supported by the Treasury and Civil Service Committee (HC 496, 1990-
1, para.82), but the Government opted for the writing of a separate 
report that would contain Chief Executives’ answers to questions on 
operational matters (HC 199 Deb. 6s. Written Answers c.522).  
The Administration Committee of the House of Commons established 
that ‘letters sent to Members by agency Chief Executives in response to 
Parliamentary Questions should be printed among the written answers 
in the daily Official Report, beneath a standard form of reply given by 
the Minister with responsibility’ (HC 211 Deb. 6s. Written Answers 
c.286-8). In September 1990, the Thatcher Government feared that Next 
Steps could fail in its development; for this reason, Sir Angus Fraser, 
the successor of Sir Robin Ibbs as Adviser on Efficiency for the Prime 
Minister, and the Efficiency Unit were asked to lead a study on the 
executive agencies ‘to investigate, in the context of development of the 
Next Steps Programme, the relationship between individual 
departments and their agencies, taking account of the responsibilities of 
the central departments to consider how departments ought to adapt 
their structure, size and methods of working and to make 
recommendations’ (Efficiency Unit, 1991:29). This work was completed 
in May 1991 and titled Making the Most of Next Steps, and it was also 
known as the Fraser Report.  
The paper selected three areas in which the development of executive 
agencies could be improved. The first concerned the mission of any 
agency, and it argued: ‘Departments and agencies must develop and 
maintain a clear and shared vision of what an agency is there to do and 
of what its priorities and objectives should be. This is particularly 
important at the three-year review. The Project Manager should 
continue to monitor progress on these issues in his reports to the Prime 
Minister’ (ibid.:3). The Report also recommended: ‘We would expect 
departments and agencies to give a high priority to improving target 
setting. The aim should be for each agency to have a handful of robust 
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and meaningful top-level output targets which measure financial 
performance, efficiency and quality of customer service, over and 
above whatever subsidiary performance indicators are required for the 
agency’s internal management purposes’ (ibid.:3). And it added: ‘There 
should be a firm timetable agreed between the agency, the department 
and the Treasury for ensuring that all agencies have, by the time of the 
three-year review of their framework document, financial regimes 
suited to their business needs, including the associated accounting and 
financial management systems. The Project Manager should continue to 
monitor progress on these issues in his reports to the Prime Minister’ 
(ibid.:4).  
As noted, the passage from the Thatcher to the Major government 
didn’t change the approach to public management. The Fraser Report 
focused on management by objectives, accounting and performance 
evaluation, tracing continuity in implementation with the previous 
government. The second area of development outlined in the report 
involved ‘empowering the Chief Executive’, and it argued that ‘the 
objective should be to move to a position where agency framework 
documents establish that, with the overall disciplines of the cash limits 
and targets set, managers are free to make their own decisions on the 
management of staff and resources except for any specifically reserved 
areas. The exclusion of any area from the Chief Executive’s authority 
should be positively justified. In order to achieve further progress in 
delegation, a first objective should be to revise framework documents 
on these lines at the first three-year review of each agency. This does 
not rule out an earlier review if the Chief Executive or sponsor 
department considers it timely. The Order in Council should be 
amended at the earliest opportunity to permit such delegation’ (ibid.:5).  
The Report stated that ‘open competition should continue to be the 
conventional route for filling Chief Executive posts. Departments 
should develop for all Chief Executives, including those from inside the 
Service, schemes for remuneration which offer significant rewards for 
achieving results and clear and effective penalties for failure’ (ibid.:5–6). 
And it continued: ‘All departments should examine the full range of 
internal services they provide (including consultancy, inspection and 
review services) and, in the context of their next annual plan, set out a 
timetable for moving to the provision and procurement of as many of 
them as practicable on a full costs basis. This would leave Chief 
Executives – and where appropriate budget holders within the 
department – free to decide where they can obtain best value for 
money. Where they continue to use HQ resources or expertise, whether 
or not on a charging basis, costs and quality of services should be 
clearly specified. It would be primarily for the Treasury to monitor 
progress in this area in its discussions with departments on their plans’ 
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(ibid.:6).  
Here is reaffirmed the original idea of the Financial Management 
Initiative of 1982 in order to complete the process of budgetary 
delegation-setting constraints for departments and to let the Chief 
Executive free to manage the resources available. The third point of the 
Fraser Report was about the role, the organisation and the size of 
departments: ‘As the Next Steps initiative develops, departments 
should formulate a clear statement of their evolving role and the part 
their agencies play in the delivery of their policy objectives. The 
statement of the agency’s strategic purpose can then be expressed in the 
context of the department’s aims and objectives and become part of a 
shared vision’ (ibid.:7). The Report argued, ‘Departments should 
consider how best they can support Ministers in their roles in relation 
to agencies and identify a focal point at senior level for their dealings 
with each agency. The arrangements adopted should be clearly set out 
in the framework document and their effectiveness evaluated as part of 
the three-year review of the framework document … The Accounting 
Officer Memorandum … should be amended to clarify the respective 
Accounting Officer responsibilities of Chief Executives and Permanent 
Secretaries’ (ibid.:7–8).  
It continued arguing that departments should agree with Treasury a 
timetable for establishing target staffing levels, preceded, as necessary, 
by a detailed review of their headquarters’ functions, which needed to 
include the relevant posts in the Senior Open Structure. These reviews 
should be informed by wider advice from within the Service, including 
the Next Steps Project Manager, and by experience from the private 
sector and other parts of the public sector (ibid.:9). The idea to open up 
the Civil Service continued to dominate the process of implementation 
of the Next Steps initiative, marking a change in the history of the 
British bureaucracy.  
As far as concerned the role and organisation of central departments, 
the Fraser Report stated: ‘As the initial work demanded by the 
establishment of agencies declines, the central departments should 
review their changing roles in the light of the Next Steps and set new 
staffing levels for this functions. It will be even more important than in 
the past that criteria for selecting people to staff these functions should 
include experience of working in other parts of government, including 
agencies directly concerned with the provision of services’ (ibid.:9). The 
Treasury and the Office of Public Service and Science were worried for 
the implementation of the Fraser Report, and they asked a French 
official for a study to evaluate progress in the implementation of the 
Next Steps Initiative. The name of the official was Sylvie Trosa, and the 
Trosa Report was published in February 1994, six years after the Next 
Steps report. The Trosa study recognised the need to make order: 
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‘There was a need to make certain changes to the current arrangements’ 
in the executive agencies’ design in order to ‘avoid day-to-day 
interference in management issues; define a clear role for the centres of 
departments; and plan the evolution of the human resources of the 
departments’ (Trosa Report:1). It pointed out: ‘Those recommendations 
are as relevant now as they were when the Report was issued. That 
raises the question of why very little progress has been made on these 
issues since the Report was published. Several hypotheses might be 
made, but what seems clear is that one of the major reasons that 
relatively little has happened is that departments have not felt that it 
was in their interests to implement the changes. Given that part of the 
Fraser recommendations was for a 25 per cent reduction in 
departmental staff dealing with central functions, perhaps this is not 
too surprising’ (ibid.:72). The Trosa Report found a dysfunction in the 
relation between the policy-making at senior level within department 
and the dealing with each agency that the Fraser Report had pointed 
out ‘mainly because the proper balance between representing the view 
of both the department and the agency has not been achieved … nor 
have most Fraser Figures been able to devote enough time to following 
the activity of the agency. Therefore, the Fraser Figure should be a very 
senior figure who will be respected by the department and agency. It 
would also be helpful if he had a small team helping him; this team 
should avoid any overlapping and also be independent from the policy 
divisions of the department to avoid any conflict of interests, thereby 
being more free to promote the Next Steps process’ (ibid.).  
Then the Trosa Report focused on the management of the agencies: 
‘There exists a considerable cultural gap on both sides with Chief 
Executives often believing that departments’ management is a 
bureaucratic obstacle, and departments viewing agencies as a little 
fortress following their own aims regardless. Both viewpoints can be 
true. Too often senior managers in a department have no experience in 
man management. The fact is that many agencies buy fewer services 
from the centre and are more concerned with creating closer 
relationships with their clients. In that case, if a department does not 
make a special effort (such as an effective Advisory Board) to keep a 
certain unity, the divergence between agencies and parent departments 
can only grow’ (ibid.:6).  
The report argued: ‘Agencies are a compromise; they are semi-
autonomous bodies within a department. As long as they are part of a 
department, it will be difficult to make a success of Next Steps (which 
means that everybody shares the values of output-oriented activities, a 
more customer-related attitude, greater responsibility and 
accountability) without extending the values of Next Steps to the whole 
department by: more interchange of staff through mobility (still 
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minimal), common training, networking etc. and the extension of Next 
Steps principles to the remaining parts of a department (probably fewer 
financial targets but more quality and improvement targets). Otherwise 
the fact of having two categories of staff (Ibbs Report) and two 
completely different ways of working can only create resistance and 
inertia (to go back to Trevelyan, the intellectual and the executive 
functions will remain separate)’ (ibid.:7).  
To conclude, the Trosa Report focused on central departments and the 
future shape of the Civil Service. It argued: ‘What will remain a 
common currency within the Civil Service? Financial, management and 
personnel rules will become more and more different; the only element 
of unity which will be left, besides ethical standards, will be the 
uniform tag of being a civil servant’ (ibid.:7). This statement seems to be 
unfair with Civil Service traditions and values, but well represents the 
managerial emphasis of that period. 
Despite these reports on the implementation of the executive agencies, 
the Major government focus had shifted from the executive agency 
towards the Citizen’s Charter and the Competing for Quality White 
Paper by 1991. These occurred after the new general direction of the 
Next Steps reforms, but represented a challenge in terms of priorities 
since Major had never shown much interest in the agenda. Things 
became more complicated when in 1992 a Conservative counter-attack 
began immediately after the general elections. Backbenchers and 
radical voices of the party began to argue that public servants were 
escaping into agencies, which formed a barrier for privatisation, 
contracting out or for the dropping out of functions (Kandiah and 
Lowe, 2007).  
It was crucial that the Citizen’s Charter and Competing for Quality 
were tied in with Next Steps to ensure continued prime ministerial 
interest. Mottram made a great effort to achieve better coordination of 
these policies among civil servants employed in different departments 
and agency staff (CSR Interview 20, 2014). Eventually, all the reforms 
were integrated into the same narrative, giving the impression that the 
Prime Minister was absolutely focused on the reform, a behaviour that 
encouraged all the permanent secretaries, including the most reluctant, 
to implement the Next Steps (ibidem). By the mid-1990s, Next Steps 
had become a permanent reform and part of a very supported set of 
policies, which made it easy to underestimate how it had been 
contested a few years before. The Next Steps Unit developed the 
agencification process as a standard procedure; it was well experienced 
in implementing it and in the years it required less day-by-day 
attention. Agencies were created at a faster pace and in higher-profile 
areas, such as customs and revenue, defence, child support and prisons; 
by 1994, 99 agencies had been created, comprising 65 per cent of the 
	   139	  
Civil Service. Although the coverage never reached the aim established 
in 1988 of 75 per cent of civil servants employed in agencies, that after 
six years was again to fulfil (Richards, 1994:44).  
With time the process changed its pace, becoming slower and more 
ritualised (Panchamia and Thomas, 2014). On the other hand, the 
process of agencification began to stabilise and the agencies were 
considered as an institution of the Civil Service; in other words, they 
were considered the normal way things were done. The exact number 
of agencies meant that departments and ministers were less engaged in 
the design, approval and monitoring of agencies, and some Fraser 
suggestions, such as the use of external consultants to supervise the 
process, were never really put in practice. As some officials argued, 
with this method, numbers became the priority and they prevailed on 
quality (CSR Interview 17–20, 2014). By the mid-1990s, the government 
understood that the framework agreements for individual agencies 
were not an incentive to improve performance. So in July 1995, Michael 
Heseltine was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and focused on the 
reform of public services. He fostered the development of a major 
public sector benchmarking project that would be able to compare 
performance of different agencies. However, these experiments were 
stopped by resistance from the Treasury and individual agencies and 
they were never really implemented (James et al., 2011). In broader 
terms, this loss of focus on agency performance led to some high-profile 
IRA prisoner escapes, which led Michael Howard, then Home 
Secretary, to fire the agency chief executive, Derek Lewis (Riddell, M., 
‘Did prison work in Michael Howard’s day? Only if riots and jailbreaks 
equal success’, The Telegraph, 30 June 2010). The case underlined the 
confusion in the roles and accountability of ministers and chief 
executives, as well as problems arising from a lack of support for 
agencies, poorly designed policies and underestimation of the 
resources required to set up an agency. 
Prior to the 1997 election, Labour had publicly committed to the Next 
Steps programme, despite problems that derived from the erosion of 
ministerial responsibility. Once in power, David Clark, then Minister 
for the Cabinet Office, declared that ‘delegation is here to stay’ and that 
Labour would not repeal the reform (Theakston, 1995:45–59). Soon 
after, the 1997 Next Steps report stated that more than 75 per cent of the 
Civil Service was now working for the agencies. As a result, it 
announced the end of the main creation phase and closure of the 
central unit (Next Steps Report, 1998). In the end, the reform resisted 
and the continuity was guaranteed by maintenance that introduced 
simplification and reduction in the number of agencies. Departments 
now had sole responsibility for their agencies, with little external 
support from a central unit. To conclude, the Next Steps initiative was a 
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successful attempt to refresh and reinvent an existing civil service 
reform intervention such as Rayner’s scrutinies and lasting reforms. It 
began ambitiously with the target of hiving off between 75 and 95 per 
cent of the Civil Service to executive agencies and immediately had a 
huge impact on the framework of the central government. But the 
discipline and the cautiousness gradually decreased over time as 
agency creation became standardised and normalised. As political, and 
therefore official, the attention on government focused on other 
initiatives such as the Citizen’s Charter and Competing for Quality.  
After 1992, there were no more incentives to improve the agency model 
or ensure it was effectively embedded. Instead, in 1997, the programme 
was officially closed. As pointed out by Panchamia and Thomas 
(2014:9): ‘Since then the chaotic, tactical cycle of proliferation then 
reduction in the number of agencies and other arm’s-length bodies is 
testament to the lack of challenge and discipline. Without an energised 
leader and an influential central team to measure progress against the 
original intentions, further progress and benefits were squandered.’ A 
permanent and structural reform was completed and achieved. It 
transformed a unitary bureaucracy into a federalised and budgetary 
decentralised one. A critical milestone in the history of the Civil Service 
had been reached. 
 
2. The Citizen’s Charter Initiative: towards customer service in 
central government 
 
In his autobiography published in 1999 John Major gives his account of 
the birth of the charter: 
‘We had to end the excessive focus on financial inputs rather than 
service output. I knew that if I could achieve this it would be a huge 
gain – for taxpayers and service users alike. As part of the information 
revolution, we decided that standards for every service should be 
published, both as a benchmark for improvement and to show the 
public what they could expect. So too, and in clear, comprehensive 
detail, should results. I wanted to see reports on performance placed in 
public libraries and newspapers. These would show, on a range of key 
measurements, how local services were doing. Relative success would 
be a source of pride. I intended also to provide incentives for good 
performance, through more performance-related pay. Relative 
weakness would be a point of pressure on failing management to 
upgrade standards. Ideally, there should be financial sanctions for 
service failure. What is more, I wanted improved complaints 
procedures and to ensure that members of the public got redress, and 
explanation, an apology or even compensation when things went 
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wrong. I set out these ideas in some detail in a speech to the 
Conservative Central Council on 23 March 1991. It was there I used for 
the first time the phrase “Citizen’s Charter” and undertook that with it 
we should look systematically at every part of public service to see how 
higher standards could be achieved. I did not much like the name 
“Citizen’s Charter”; with its unconscious echo of revolutionary France, 
it had a faintly alien ring to it. At one point I thought of calling it “the 
People’s Charter”, but such populism was thought to be risible and 
likely to be taken as a gimmick … So Citizen’s Charter, more stuffy and 
formal, became its name’ (Major, 1999:251). The White Paper that 
presented the Citizen’s Charter opened with this statement: ‘All public 
services are paid for by individual citizens, either directly or through 
their taxes. They are entitled to expect high-quality services, responsive 
to their needs, provided efficiently at a reasonable cost. Where the state 
is engaged in regulating, taxing or administering justice, these 
functions too must be carried out fairly, effectively and courteously’ 
(Cmnd 1599, 1991). With these words was presented Major’s big idea 
on public services known as ‘The Citizen’s Charter’, whose aim was to 
improve value for money for taxpayers, now called ‘consumers’ or 
‘customers’, and also for public-sector activities. A ‘lexical revolution’ 
underlined how managerial culture was pervading the higher echelons 
of the British State. 
The bulk of it was in a different concept of public sector organisation: 
‘Choice can also be extended within the public sector. When the public 
sector remains responsible for a function, it can introduce competition 
and pressure for efficiency by contracting with the private sector for its 
provision.’ It continued: ‘Finally, choice can be restored by introducing 
alternative forms of provision, creating a wider range of options 
wherever that is cost-effective.’ It added: ‘Through the Citizen’s Charter 
the Government is now determined to drive reforms further into the 
core of the public services, extending the benefits of choice, competition 
and commitment to service more widely. The Citizen’s Charter is the 
most comprehensive programme ever to raise quality, increase choice, 
secure better value, and extend accountability’ (ibid.). Following the 
Charter’s launch, the Government restated its commitment to it on a 
number of occasions. The Queen’s Speech following the Conservative 
Party’s election victory in 1992 announced: ‘My Government will give 
priority to improving public services through the Citizen’s Charter, 
which will be at the centre of decision making.’ In November 1992, this 
sentiment was repeated in the Queen’s Speech for the current 
Parliamentary Session: ‘My Government will continue to implement 
policies and programmes responsive to the needs of the individual 
citizen, in line with the principles of the Citizen’s Charter’ (Queen’s 
Speech, 1992) 
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Indeed, Mr Major’s willingness to be personally identified with the 
Charter, and his determination that it had a high profile, was a 
consistent theme in the Charter’s development. The Citizen’s Charter 
Unit, which was responsible for the implementation, development and 
co-ordination of the Charter initiative, was part of the Cabinet Office. 
One of its tasks was to agree on the exact wording of any given charter 
with the public service concerned. It should be pointed out that 
although the privatised utilities, as well as the Post Office, issued 
standards of service agreements, these were not counted as part of the 
Charter initiative itself.  
The 1991 White Paper was a wide-ranging document, discussing, 
among other things, existing practices in the public sector, the powers 
of regulators over the privatised utilities, the use of market testing and 
contracting out to improve the quality of public services, and future 
legislation to privatise some parts of the public sector. Arguably the 
most distinctive aspect of these proposals concerned the creation of 
charters. Each public service would be required to issue a charter, with 
two linked aims: first, to enable consumers to determine what were 
acceptable standards of service for that particular institution; and, 
second, to tell them how to go about complaining, and obtaining 
redress, if the service they were given fell below this benchmark. In 
short, charters would empower those who relied on public services to 
ensure they obtained the standard of service they were entitled to 
receive (Seely and Jenkins, HC Research Paper 95/66, 1995). 
In a written answer in July 1992, William Waldegrave, the newly 
appointed Cabinet Minister with responsibility for the Charter 
programme, argued this principle clearly: ‘The Citizen’s Charter aims 
to provide better-quality service, greater customer choice, published 
standards of service and accessible means of redress to all users of 
public services. Published, measurable standards ensure the public 
know what quality of service they can expect to receive, compare this 
with other service providers, and measure performance in achieving 
the standards required’ (HC Deb 13.7.92 cc.428-9W). 
In addition to Mr Waldegrave’s appointment, two other administrative 
initiatives in late 1991 gave an indication as to the Charter’s 
importance: the creation of the Citizen’s Charter Unit within the 
Cabinet Office to co-ordinate action after the White Paper; and the 
appointment of eight individuals drawn from outside Government to 
form an Advisory Panel which the Prime Minister and the Citizen’s 
Charter Minister could consult on Charter issues. 
After being set up, the Citizen’s Charter Panel of Advisers gathered 
once a month, and members gave their services on two or three days a 
month, though members had additional meetings with the Prime 
Minister, with other Ministers and with officials. The Panel had an 
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advisory role only and it did not produce or publish its own reports. 
Panel members came from the private sector with direct experience of 
service to the public. For example, the Chairman, Sir James Blyth, had 
held posts in both Lucas and Plessey, as well as being Head of Defence 
Sales in the Ministry of Defence; prior to his appointment, he had 
served as both Chief Executive and Deputy Chairman of The Boots 
Company plc. The Panel lasted until November 1996 (Seely and 
Jenkins, 1995).  
As far as concerns the origins of the Citizen’s Charter, we have to 
consider different initiatives that preceded it. 
Indeed, the concern with users of public services and the quality of 
services expressed by government departments and executive agencies 
was not an exclusive innovation of the Major government. An 
occasional paper, for example, was published in 1988 by the Cabinet 
Office and it identified the principles of a ‘service to the public’ 
strategy, underlying the importance of providing ‘quick, efficient and 
courteous service’ (Cabinet Office, 1988, para. 1.3).  
There existed other attempts for the Charter before the Prime Minister’s 
speech in March 1991. For example, in the mid-1980s, the Labour Party 
wrote two policy documents on the potential for using charters, At 
Your Service (April 1986) and Quality Street (April 1989). In 1990 
Labour issued Looking to the Future, which included the proposal to 
introduce a consumers’ charter and replace the Audit Commission with 
a ‘Quality Commission’ to cover ‘value for people as well as value for 
money.’ Another example was a paper issued in spring 1991 by the 
Local Government Information Unit, Going for Quality. This discussed 
the use of service contracts, compensation schemes, complaints 
procedures and consumer surveys by a number of local authorities – 
Leicester, Reading, Rochdale, Islington – to improve the standard of 
their public services. Moreover, the city of York launched its own 
charter in April 1989, setting out performance targets for the coming 
year, and reporting on the authority’s success in meeting the previous 
year’s goals. 
However, the Citizen’s Charter differed in one crucial aspect from these 
initiatives – its sheer scope. A written answer given in November 1992 
highlighted the range of organisations that the Charter was intended to 
affect: 
‘To ask the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster which organisations, 
in each principal sector, have been targeted to receive a copy of the 
citizen’s charter; and what progress has been made to date in ensuring 
that all public bodies affected by the charter’s recommendations have a 
copy of Cm 1599’ (Ms Mowlam, HC Deb 5.11.92, c.325w). 
Mr. Waldegrave: ‘In July 1991 the head of the home civil service, Sir 
Robin Butler, wrote to permanent secretaries of civil service 
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Departments about the Citizen’s Charter and its implementation. 
Copies of the White Paper were made available to them. In addition, 
agency chief executives, the chairman of British Rail and London 
Regional Transport, the Association of District Councils, the 
Association of Metropolitan Authorities, the Association of County 
Councils, the London Boroughs Association, the Association of London 
Authorities and the Convention of Scottish Authorities were also sent 
copies. Many other bodies were informed of the White Paper’s 
availability, including the general managers of the regional heath 
authorities, district health authorities, family health authorities, special 
health authorities, chief executives of National Health Service trust 
hospitals, the chief officers of police, the chief probation officers and the 
secretaries of clerks of magistrates’ courts committees. The White Paper 
was advertised widely. To date, 20,246 copies of the White Paper have 
been sold; 455,617 copies of the popular version – “A Guide to the 
Citizen’s Charter” – have been distributed, free of charge’ (ibid.). 
This had important implications for discussing the success of the 
Charter as a whole. ‘The approach varies from service to service in 
different parts of the United Kingdom. The Charter is not a blueprint 
which imposes a uniform pattern on every service. It is a toolkit of 
initiatives and ideas to raise standards in the way most appropriate to 
each service’ (Raising the Standard: Britain’s Citizen’s Charter and Public 
Service Reforms, November 1992:5). The idea of the Charter as a ‘toolkit’ 
had to be emphasised, for although a number of legislative changes 
have been made under the aegis of the Charter, the Charter itself was 
not a legal entity as such. There were no legal requirements as regards 
the structure of any charter, or the mechanisms it sponsored for 
consumer redress. In his foreword to the 1991 White Paper, the Prime 
Minister noted, ‘The White Paper sets out the mechanics for improving 
choice, quality, value and accountability.’ As it was made clear in a 
written answer of 1994, ‘Under the Citizen’s Charter, each public 
service organisation is responsible for setting its own charter standards 
and ensuring they are monitored’ (HC Deb, 16.6.94, c.628w). Indeed, 
the character of the Charter appeared to have undergone a shift: from 
requiring individual public services to do some operations such as 
draw up a charter, publish targets for performance, issue statistics on 
the achievement of those targets, etc., to encouraging and promoting 
best practices across public services. 
In this respect, the Charter became less centralised and more diffuse in 
its operation, and it received much less attention in the national press 
as a result. The work of the Citizen’s Charter Complaints Task Force, 
and the annual Charter Mark awards, were both a demonstration of 
this change in emphasis.  
In 1994, the improvement in the quality of outputs was considered the 
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real confirmation of the success of the Next Steps initiative, launched 
by Thatcher’s government in February 1988 (TCSC 1994, Vol.1, para. 
145). The attention towards the quality and the efficiency of service was 
still very high during the first year of the Next Steps programme, when 
the Treasury and Civil Service Committee stated that the success of the 
initiative should have ‘to be judged in large measure by the extent to 
which it improves services to customers’ (TCSC 1989, para. 54). This 
emphasis on customer satisfaction was consistently confirmed by the 
launch of the Citizen’s Charter in 1991 and it wouldn’t have lasted 
British governments’ approach to civil service and public service 
reform in the following fifteen years.  
With it focused on raising the standards in the public sector, it 
established a clear political commitment to the customer orientation in 
the civil service. In the words of the Cabinet minister responsible for its 
early implementation, the Citizen’s Charter was a policy of 
relationships with ‘customers’ (TCSC 1994, Vol. II, Q. 2507). The 
Charter has been seen in continuity with the Next Steps reform. The 
first director of the Cabinet Office’s Citizen Charter Unit pointed out 
that the Charter was ‘the next stage after Next Steps. Next Steps gets 
management sorted out and we are now saying with greater clarity 
what we want managers to deliver’ (quoted by Hennessy, 1991). The 
Citizen’s Charter raised the public service standards as a central theme 
of the 1990s as far as concerned the public sector reforms. However, it 
must be considered that the Charter involved a number of different 
themes. Using Deakin’s classification (1994:51–52), there were four 
main policy agendas associated with the Charter: the ‘constraining 
public bureaucracy’ agenda, which included the market testing and 
contracting out of services; the ‘state and citizen’ agenda, with its focus 
on flow of information, effective complaints procedure and greater 
responsiveness to consumer needs; the ‘new management’ agenda, 
with its emphasis on the delegation of responsibility; and the ‘cost 
cutting’ agenda, with its concern for economy. As we will see, these 
strands were developed in different ways by Major’s government, and 
they all pivoted around the Citizen’s Charter ideas.  
 
 
 
 
Inside the Charter 
 
The first part of the Citizen’s Charter was presented by the Major 
Government in July 1991. The Command Paper that established the 
initiative was about the key principles for the public services to raise 
the standards and quality. The general premise of the Government was 
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to promote ‘more privatisation’ and ‘wider competition’, using ‘further 
contracting-out’, monitoring civil servants’ work with ‘more 
performance-related pay’ and ‘published performance targets’. The 
guarantees to the citizens–consumers were based on the principles of 
‘comprehensive publication of information’, ‘more effective complaints 
procedure’, ‘together and more independent inspectorates’ and ‘better 
redress for the citizens when the services go badly wrong’. The 
Citizen’s Charter programme spelled out six key ‘principles of public 
services’ which every citizen was entitled to expect (Cmnd 2101, 1992). 
They were: a) Standards – the setting and publication of explicit 
standards for services and the publication of actual performance 
against these standards; b) Information and openness – information 
and openness in the provision of services; c) Choice and consultation – 
the provision of choice wherever practicable, together with regular and 
systematic consultation with the users of services; d) Courtesy and 
helpfulness – courteous and helpful service from public servants; e) 
Putting thing right – redress and well-publicised and easy-to-use 
complaints procedures; f) Value for money – the efficient and 
economical delivery of services within the resources the nation can 
afford.  
As several commentators of the period pointed out, the Citizen’s 
Charter was, despite the title, substantially about promoting efficiency 
and quality of public service and their responsiveness to their 
customers and not about enhancing the rights of citizenship (Stewart 
and Walsh, 1992:507). In the words of one observer, the Charter was 
about ‘citizens as consumers by means of rights to receive information 
on services and performance, to assert choices and preferences, to 
complain and to receive redress’ (Prior, 1995:89–90).  
The Charter emphasised service to so-called ‘customers’. In the words 
of one minister who was actively involved in the early stage of the 
programme, the real aim of the Citizen’s Charter was to ‘encourage 
those who work in public services to think about what they do in 
relation to how it affects the customer, the user of services’. The 
government was ‘trying to get away from the old doctrine that the man 
or woman in Whitehall knows best. We actually think the customer 
knows best what he or she wants’ (Select Committee on the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, 1992, Qs. 3 and 36). 
According to the deputy director of the Citizen’s Charter Unit, the 
Charter was trying to build the concept of the ‘customer’ as a real 
element for measuring public services (Goldsworthy 1993:141). She 
stated: ‘The Citizen’s Charter is […] about the outward face of the 
organisation: the relationship between public services and their users. 
The Charter puts itself in the shoes of the recipient of services and asks 
“What can I as individual expect from this organisation?”, “Does this 
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represent my full and fair entitlement?”, “Have I received what I was 
told to expect?” and “What is the organisation going to do for me if it 
fails to deliver the standards that I as an individual have been told that 
I can expect?”’ (ibid.:140).  
Hence, the Charter’s emphasis on consumerism was a clear recognition 
of the importance of the customer in the delivery of public services. 
This was a view of consumerism which has been described as ‘an 
orientation towards the consumers of goods/services rooted in a sense 
of public service with its concomitant moral obligations towards the 
public’. This was an approach focused on making ‘things better for the 
consumer’ by taking the point of view of consumers and attempting to 
improve services in the light of those views (Connolly, 1992:30). One of 
the pillars of the Charter’s consumer orientation was its concern with 
the availability of more information through the publication of service 
standards and performances. The provision of such information was an 
important manifestation of the Major government’s broader attempts to 
innovate traditional methods of political accountability, thereby 
increasing the influence of consumers of services, the customers, over 
the quality of public services (Oliver, 1991:25). In the words of its 
creator, Prime Minister John Major, the Charter was about ‘giving more 
power to the citizen’ (Cmnd 1599, 1991:2). According to one minister, 
the founding principles of the Citizen’s Charter were supposed to 
‘bring about greater clarity about people’s entitlements to services and 
create pressure for improvements in the quality of service’ (Select 
Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioners for Administration, 
1992, Q.1). As a government report about the first four years of the 
Citizen’s Charter argued, the publication of performance information 
made public services ‘more accountable to their users: the public can 
see their strengths and weaknesses and seek changes where 
improvements are needed’ (Cabinet Office, 1995b:34). 
 
 
From Charter to Charters 
 
The implementation of the Citizen’s Charter proposed by the White 
Paper provided for the creation of many charters, one for every issue 
considered by the government. The Paper argued: ‘Services work best 
where those responsible for providing them can respond directly to the 
needs of their client. The White Paper sets the framework and gives 
some examples of what the new policy will mean in some key areas. It 
will be followed up by a programme of action across all public services 
and by detailed charters from patients, parents, passengers, taxpayers 
and other groups’ (Cm 1599, 1991:7). Hence, as Kevin Theakston 
(1995:130) wrote, ‘The Charter programme was, to some extent, just a 
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repacking of a number of existing but separate initiatives, but there 
were some new ideas too.’ The aim of the Charter covered all the public 
services as well as services delivered by the civil service.  
By 1993 there were over thirty charters in the different branches of the 
public sector. The developing of the Charters involved civil servants, as 
the White Paper stated: ‘We are determined to ensure that the goals set 
out in the White Paper are achieved. In some areas reforms are already 
in place which will form the springboard for implementing the Charter 
proposal. In other parts of the public sector, employees are dedicated 
and eager to provide a good service, but are held back in the system in 
which they work’ (Cmnd 1599, 1991:7). The new approach implied an 
erosion of the principle of ‘faceless bureaucrats’, because the Charters 
prescribed wearing name badges. The Taxpayer Charter established 
what taxpayers could expect of the services provided by the Inland 
Revenue and by Custom and Excise, and targets were set for the time 
taken to reply to a customer’s letter. The Benefits Agency and the 
Employment Service also produced charters. These charters gave an 
interesting framework for the Citizen’s Charter’s ‘big ideas’. Here are 
some examples from the health care and transport sectors: ‘If you need 
to call an emergency ambulance, it should arrive within 14 minutes if 
you live in an urban area, or 18 minutes if you live in a rural area, or 21 
minutes if you live in a sparsely populated area’ and ‘On the London 
Underground, if you wait more than 20 minutes for a train, you should 
receive a refund voucher.’ About roads: ‘Contractors of road repairs 
will incur a financial penalty if they cone off more of the motorway 
than is strictly needed to do the repairs’ (Cmnd 1599, 1991).  
The first Parent’s Charter too was issued in 1991. It signalled the start of 
an information revolution to extend parental choice and to raise 
standards. It promised parents five key documents: ‘a report on their 
child’s progress at least once a year; regular reports on their child’s 
school from independent inspectors; performance tables for local 
schools; a prospectus or brochure about individual schools; and an 
annual report from the school’s governors’ (ibid., 1991). As we will see 
below, these were not legal entitlements for the citizens, but they 
provided principles for the Civil Service and other administrative 
bodies to deliver better services. All these Charters were coordinated by 
the Prime Minister’s Office as outlined by the 1991 White Paper: ‘The 
Prime Minister will appoint a panel of advisers for the Citizen’s Charter 
initiative. A Unit will be set up in the Cabinet Office to coordinate the 
programme of action arising from the White Paper’ (ibid.:7). This Unit 
had the mission to formulate standards for the charters and to assign a 
Charter Mark as an award of good results and performances to the best 
providers: ‘One of the first tasks will be to convert the Charter 
principles into general applicable guidance on the way in which 
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standards should be specified in the public services, taking account of 
progress already made in the development of codes and practices for 
quality performance in the field of services.’ It continued, ‘All those 
organisations which feel they have achieved excellence in pursuit of the 
Citizen’s Charter objectives will be able to apply for the Charter 
Standard and the right to use the Charter Mark’ (ibid.:7).  
To conclude on this point, it has to be pointed out that some 
organisations were not covered, such as universities, and even a 
number of private sector organisations were seeking to employ the 
charter technique.  
The Government said it was reluctant to force charters on the privatised 
utilities, but the charter principles were to be pressed on the utilities via 
the regulatory offices. A number of local authorities had already been 
using charter documents to set out standards of service. In each case the 
charter documents were to set out the standards of service that the user 
could expect, but the precise status of these documents was difficult to 
ascertain. Formally there was not legal effectiveness, Charter bet on a 
mere ‘nudge effects’ on local institutions, but these documents could be 
characterised as customer service contracts or customer guarantees and, 
as such, they clarified the standard of service which the customer was 
entitled, in principle, to receive (Barron and Scott, 1992). 
 
 
The Citizen’s Charter and its relationship with government 
departments and Next Steps Agencies 
 
Prior (1995:87) pointed out that the Citizen’s Charter was not really a 
charter but ‘an agenda for the future development of charters in a wide 
range of services’. A programme of action across the public services 
was the next step for this initiative.  
A few days after 22 July 1991, the date of the official launch, the 
Citizen’s Charter Unit was established in the Cabinet Office. The Unit 
was responsible for examining draft charters, it had thirty staff and it 
was directed by Diana Goldsworthy (1991–93), a civil servant of the 
Ministry of Defence, and Genie Turton (1993–1997), a deputy secretary 
from the Department of Environment. The Unit worked in parallel with 
an advisory panel chaired by the chief executive of Boots plc, which 
reported to the Prime Minister. After the launch of the Citizen’s 
Charter, a number of individual charters were written by several 
departments and Next Step Agencies.  
As we have seen, the two taxation departments, the Inland Revenue 
and the Customs and Excise, both published the Taxpayer’s Charter, 
establishing the standards of service to be expected. The Redundancy 
Payments Office, part of the Department for Education and 
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Employment, issued the Redundancy Service Payments Charter. Other 
government departments issued Charter Standard Statements setting 
out the services provided for customers. Two such departments were 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution in the Department of 
Environment, where a Charter Statement outlined pollution control 
policies and established performance standards, and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, which published the document 
Commitment to Service in which standards for payment of grants and a 
complaints procedure were established.  
The Next Steps Agencies were identified as the main vehicles for 
carrying forward the Citizen’s Charter’s principle in central 
government (Cmnd 2101, 1992a:66). By late 1995, many executive 
agencies had published their own charters or similar documents. The 
largest agency of the whole Next Steps initiative, the Benefits Agency, 
published a Benefits Agency Customer Charter, setting out the services 
that customers should receive and how they should be treated. Other 
charters were the Contributor’s Charter and the Employer’s Charter, 
published by the Child Support Agency. The second largest executive 
agency, the Employment Service, wrote a Jobseeker’s Charter, outlining 
what help is available for customers and the level of service they can 
expect. In 1995 the Court Service published a Charter for Court Users 
and the Companies House issued a paper entitled What You Can Expect 
from Companies House. In the period between 1991 and 1997, more than 
thirty Next Steps agencies published Charter Service Statements. 
The concept of customer service was an important element in the 
launching of new Next Steps Agencies. Agency framework documents 
and business plans were thought to set a customer approach. Agencies 
which dealt directly with citizens were basically expected to write a 
Charter or a Charter Service Statement that outlined the services the 
people could expect, including arrangements for customer consultation 
and complaints procedures. Thus, the Prison Service published a 
Charter Statement on Standards when it was launched in 1993, with a 
Prisons Ombudsman responsible for reviewing unresolved complaints 
being appointed a year later. 
 In 1992, the Prime Minister’s Office developed the Charter Marks 
award, described by the Citizen’s Charter Unit as ‘the Oscar for public 
services’. The winners of these annual awards, who met the goals 
established and reached high levels of customer satisfaction, were 
entitled to use the Charter Mark logo for three years.  
The Charter Unit also ran different activities promoted to exchange 
information and ideas across the public services, including charter 
quality networks and seminars. Another step towards the 
implementation was in 1993 when the Citizen’s Charter Complaints 
Task Force was created under the leadership of Lady Wilcox. The Task 
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Force included members from the public and the private sectors, and 
they examined how complaints systems in the public services were 
working. The Task Force published its report in July 1995, and it wrote 
a Good Practice Guide for use by public service managers and staff (Seely 
and Jenkins, 1995). Interactions between programmes and continuity 
with the past became evident in the case of the Next Steps programme 
and the Citizen’s Charter. The federalisation of the Civil Service was a 
premises to fully develop the Citizen’s Charter idea and to 
progressively move the focus of reform from central government 
organisation to public services delivery. 
 
 
 
The results of the Charter 
 
The most detailed information on the operation of the Citizen’s Charter 
lies in the two Citizen’s Charter Reports, prepared by the Government 
and published in November 1992 (Cmnd 2101) and March 1994 (Cmnd 
2540). There was no fixed timetable for the publication of these Reports, 
and, as yet, a Third Report was never produced. Both Reports contain a 
great deal of information on how individual public services have 
implemented the principles of the Charter in practice, though, as it has 
already been pointed out, neither the 1991 White Paper, nor any other 
publication, had set down a single set of tools for judging all public 
sectors’ performance in this respect. It was argued that the production 
of this information is, in itself, proof of the Charter’s success; the idea of 
the public services publishing their own standards was an innovation. 
Of course, the opposite vision had been argued: that by requiring 
services to publish measurable standards, performance would be 
turned towards certain types of activities, practically those that are 
easiest to measure or improve. Aside from this, it had proved more 
difficult to use this type of information in assessing the quality of 
public services themselves.  
Independent analysis of the Charter, said in the national press, tended 
to be either very anecdotal or general. In a perceptive article written in 
February 1993 by Andrew Marr in the Independent, he stated ‘so much 
writing on this subject is abstract to the point of meaninglessness.’ In 
essence, he argued, the Charter acted as a measure to encourage and 
highlight good management at the lower levels of government: ‘Scores 
of similar stories could come from other councils, from privatised water 
companies, hospitals and schools. They are small, local stories. But 
multiply them by several thousand and continue “entrepreneurial 
government” for another decade, and you would have a big national 
story’ (‘A revolutionary stalks Whitehall’, the Independent, 23-02-93). 
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A success for the Major Government, it was the impact that the Charter 
had had, since its inception, on public expenditure. This aim was 
discussed in the First Report, though efficiency gains were linked, not 
with the initiative of charters themselves, but a much wider set of 
policies intertwined with the Charter initiative in broader terms: 
namely, privatisation, market testing, improving management, and 
performance-related pay (First Report). By means of the first two 
policies, some activities would be hived off by the public sector, since 
they could be done more efficiently by private companies. For those 
areas that remained in the public sector, the First Report stated that 
efficiency would be maximised by devolving management 
responsibility and ensuring that each individual’s rewards were related 
directly to their individual performance. 
We can notice that in written answers the effectiveness of the Charter 
had generally been analysed in terms of policy commitments made in 
the White Paper, rather than through a calculation of how it had 
reduced the average costs of public services (HC Deb. 18.3.93 c.342-3w). 
The methodological problems in considering the success of the 
initiative in this manner may explain why, in general, less interest has 
been shown in PQs about the Charter’s development by 1994, 
compared to the first two years of its life. 
In March 1994 the Financial Times published its own audit comparing 
the fifteen charters then issued covering public services in England. The 
newspaper argued that the Charter had ‘failed to achieve central 
objectives in many of the public services it is intended to improve,’ and 
they highlighted three specific criticisms: that the standards of service 
specified were often too vague to be meaningful; that financial 
compensation was only offered in a small number of cases; and that too 
limited a role was given to independent audit (Financial Times, 
‘Citizen’s Charter – halfway there’, 17 March 1994).  
A firm contestation of the comments contained in the Financial Times 
audit was made by the then Minister for Public Service and Science, 
William Waldegrave. Mr Waldegrave explained that the Charter had 
always been regarded as a ten-year programme; criticisms that the 
Charter had yet to achieve a promised revolution in public services 
missed the point. On the concern of standards, he counter-argued that 
despite ‘the main charters explained to users what the public is entitled 
to expect’, others ‘act as “models” which will guide those writing local 
charters of service for colleges and council departments and many, 
many others. The local charters will be expected in every case to 
contain testable performance measures.’ 
Mr Waldegrave also pointed out that the article ‘made the common 
mistake of equating the Charter with the charter documents 
themselves. It is far wider than that. The documents are only part of the 
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story, one means to the common end of wider choice, higher standards 
and new ideas. This wider programme is about competition and choice. 
It covers privatisation and contracting out – putting private sector skills 
and ideas at the service of the public – just as much as devising 
mechanisms to improve performance where the service remains in the 
public sector.’ Here lay the enlargement of scopes of the Citizen’s 
Charter; in fact, as one commentator said, ‘since the Charter was 
launched it has become an ever-expanding portmanteau – concerned 
not just about improving the quality of public services but also 
incorporating the Government’s privatisation programme and schemes 
for contracting out public work to private hands’ (‘Citizen’s Charter. 
Some progress could try harder’, the Independent, 20 March 1994). 
One other point to consider would be that privatisation and contracting 
out were both economical solutions, and did not involve the general 
public, the whole body of consumers of these services.  
One of the strongest commitments in the 1991 White Paper was that 
charters provided a formula to raise standards in areas where creating 
a competitive market with different suppliers might prove impossible 
or infeasible. Charters provided to the customers the opportunity to 
have a more effective influence in determining standards, and a more 
informed picture of which standards were achievable. Indeed, in the 
Commons debate on the Charter in January this year, Robert Jackson 
argued that the Charter was important in the context of reshaping 
public attitudes to what public services the public themselves could 
afford to have: ‘One of the biggest problems facing Governments in the 
late 20th-century democracies is how to operate successful, good- 
quality public services when we have more or less reached the limits of 
taxpayers’ willingness to pay for such services ... the Charter [is] an 
attempt to meet rising expectations of quality in the public services 
when people’s willingness to pay ... is strictly limited’ (HC Deb. 13.1.95, 
c.378, c.382). 
In December 1994, the report on maladministration and redress by the 
Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration made criticism about standards and compensation in 
the public services affected by charters. In its summary, the Committee 
reported the views of the National Consumer Council (NCC) on the 
standards set out in the individual Charters: ‘The NCC has claimed that 
there is some confusion among the Charters in their use of language’ 
and ‘… the language of charters is sometimes vague and ambiguous. It 
can be difficult to tell which statements involve enforceable standards 
as distinct from unenforceable “targets”, “aims” and so on. The term 
“standard” is sometimes unhelpfully used when all that is being 
promised is that the organisation will aim to achieve a certain level of 
service – and there is no guaranteed redress in the event of failure to do 
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so’ and ‘The Committee focused on the lack of attention given to 
redress for consumers and it recommended that a “Redress Team” be 
established within the Charter Unit to monitor and advise on the 
granting of redress within departments and agencies … Such a team 
would be able to advise on improvements in Charter standards and 
conduct selective and specific audits of departmental practice’ (HC 112, 
1994). 
The Government’s reply to these recommendations was published in 
March 1995. There was agreement on the need for ‘close co-operation 
between the Treasury and the Citizen’s Charter Unit in advising 
departments and agencies on questions of redress and compensation.’ 
The Government promised to consider the recommendation to form a 
Redress Team ‘in light of the forthcoming Report from the Citizen’s 
Charter Complaints Task Force, which is undertaking a wide-ranging 
review of public service complaints systems’ (HC 316, 1995).  
About the more general recommendation that existing charters should 
have to improve the forms of redress, and that a survey be conducted 
of public services to help in this matter, the Government’s statement 
was: ‘The Government agrees that Charters should make clear that 
users of the service in question are entitled to redress, appropriate to 
the circumstances and from the appropriate authority, when Charter 
standards are not met. It will seek to ensure that this is made clear 
when new Charters are produced, or existing ones revised. Some form 
of redress should in principle be available in response to a failure to 
meet any Charter standard, but the nature of that redress (including 
whether it be non-financial or financial) may depend on other factors, 
e.g. the extent to which there has been a failure to meet a standard; 
whether the complainant has suffered financial loss as a result; whether 
the handling of the original complaint has been maladministrative etc. 
It would not therefore be useful or cost-effective to revise every Charter 
in order to list standards in the manner proposed. On the proposed 
survey of public services, the Government will consider this 
recommendation further in the light of the final report of the 
Complaints Task Force, which is itself carrying out a wide-ranging 
review of the systems for complaints and redress in public services’ 
(ibid., 1995). 
A poll carried out for the Trades Union Congress by National Opinion 
Polls in autumn 1994 found that two thirds of the 1,000 people asked 
saw the Charter as a public relations exercise. One in three had seen 
either a copy of the Charter, or one of the individual charters, but only 
2 per cent of respondents had used a charter. Of course, this type of 
response may simply reflect the fact that the Charter was a long-term 
programme. Ruth Evans, director of the National Consumer Council, 
was quoted in the Independent on Sunday stressing the point of long 
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term: ‘One of the problems with the way the Charter was launched was 
that a degree of cynicism set in because the expectations raised were 
well beyond what could be delivered. The Charter was never going to 
be a recipe for revolution. It is a recipe for slow change to make 
improvements’ (‘Citizen’s Charter an irrelevance’, Financial Times, 16 
October 1994). Consumer rhetoric and delivery results to individuals 
did not follow the same pace. While the first became immediately a 
government catch-phrase, the second was much slower and it faced, as 
seen below, implementation problems and even some failures as the 
Charter line. 
 
 
Charter Mark and Charter Line: a history of one success and one 
failure 
 
The Charter Mark Scheme was first discussed in The Citizen’s Charter 
(Cmnd 1599). The scheme established that public organisations which 
satisfied selected criteria in their provision of public services were 
awarded with the Mark. This Mark certified excellence in the public 
sector. The scheme was formally launched in January 1992, and 36 
Charter Marks were awarded in September that year. The functioning 
of the Charter Mark was explained in the First Report on the Citizen’s 
Charter, published in November 1992: 
‘Winners had to satisfy the judges – the Prime Minister’s Citizen’s 
Charter Advisory Panel – that they met the Citizen’s Charter principles 
for delivering quality in public services. The winners also had to 
provide evidence both of customer satisfaction and of measurable 
improvements in quality of service. And they had to have plans to 
introduce or have in hand at least one innovative enhancement to their 
services which could be or is being introduced without increasing the 
cost either to the taxpayer or to those who use the service. Charter 
Mark winners can now use the Charter Mark on their products and 
equipment, on stationery, vehicles and promotional material to show 
that their achievements have been recognised’ (Cmnd 2101).  
The control of the process was organised and supervised by 
independent consultants and, in 1994, this role was taken by the Touche 
Ross company. A team of Charter Mark assessors, chosen from within 
the public services providers, evaluated the applications for awards 
submitted by the organisations concerned. Furthermore, the Advisory 
Panel considered comments received from, among others, Government 
Departments, independent regulators, and the Audit Commission. A 
shortlist of the best applications was compiled and visited by either 
members of the Advisory Panel, one of the Charter Mark assessors, or 
senior staff from the Cabinet Office. The Advisory Panel then drew up 
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a final list of winners, with the commitment of the Citizen’s Charter 
Minister, and the list was approved by the Prime Minister (Seely and 
Jenkins, 1995). 
In 1993 the Government doubled the number of awards deriving from 
the model of the scheme from 50 to 100. The Charter Marks were given 
to 93 organisations in October 1993. In October 1994, 98 awards were 
conferred, and 123 organisations received commendations; overall, 523 
organisations had applied that year for consideration for a Charter 
Mark (‘98 services get their reward’, Cabinet Office Press Notice, 
21/10/1993). In January 1995, during a debate on the Charter, David 
Hunt, Minister for the Citizen’s Charter and Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster, announced that the scheme would be enlarged so that 
members of the public could make a direct contribution in the selection 
of winners: ‘I believe that we must make the Charter Mark award much 
more the property of the public and that we must involve many more 
members of the public in the system. With the introduction of public 
nominations for honours, the Prime Minister has set up a system which 
has been a remarkable success. I want to extend that principle. I am 
pleased to announce that in 1995, for the first time, we will ask the 
public – the users of public services – to nominate organisations for a 
Charter Mark award’ (HC Deb. 13.01.95, c.364). 
In the Second Report on the Charter, published in March 1994, it was 
argued that ‘the award of a Charter Mark is not a final stamp of 
approval. Charter Mark winners are expected to go on raising their 
standards of service year by year and Charter Marks can be taken away 
if standards fall. Charter Marks are held for three years, and then 
winners must reapply with evidence of how their service has 
improved’ (Cmnd 2540). David Davis, the then Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for the Office of Science & Technology, in a written 
answer given in June 1994 explained the process of withdrawing a 
Charter Mark from an organisation that didn’t maintain or improve 
their standards: ‘No organisations have had their Charter Marks taken 
away, although the Citizen’s Charter Unit reserves the right to take 
away a Charter Mark from an organisation whose performance 
subsequently falls significantly below standard’ (HC Deb. 14.6.94 
c.433W).  
This issue was raised, for example, in connection with British Gas, 
awarded a Charter Mark in October 1993. The company had introduced 
a new set of standards in April 1992: 30 at the requirement of Ofgas, 
and a further 24 on its own initiative. In addition, a register of 
individuals with special needs, such as the elderly, was developed, so 
that these customers would receive priority treatment. In January 1995, 
the Gas Consumer Council appealed to David Hunt, concerned that 
there had been a substantial rise in the number of customer complaints 
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in four areas: account queries, service and repairs, staff manner, and 
lack of reply to correspondence or non-answering of telephones. 
Mr Hunt agreed a programme of action, involving both the Council 
and British Gas, specifying criteria the company must prove it had met 
by the end of 1995 if it was to retain its Charter Mark. John Horam, 
Parliamentary Secretary for Public Service and Science, argued that this 
case showed the value of the Charter Mark initiative: ‘The point about 
Charter Marks is that they are designed to be the Oscars of public 
service, and a mark of quality for someone who is doing well. It does 
not matter whether we are talking about British Gas or a local library –
if it does not live up to its promises, it should have its Charter Mark 
removed. British Gas has another nine months to come up to the mark. 
If it does not do so, we will take its Mark away’ (HC Deb. 1.5.95, cc.15–
16). Indeed, on 9 November 1995, British Gas pulled out of the Charter 
Mark (‘British Gas pulls out of charter mark award’, the Independent, 9 
November 1995). Even with big organisations, the Charter Mark was 
implacable in evaluating standards, enforcing governmental credibility 
and introducing standards and performance measurement.  
The Charterline was an experiment launched on 19 May 1993; it was a 
telephone helpline to supply information about the status of public 
services to residents in Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and 
Leicestershire. The Government had announced its intention to pilot 
such a scheme in its First Report on the Charter: 
‘The Government intends to pilot a telephone helpline, the 
“Charterline”, to help people who find it daunting or frustrating to get 
information from large bureaucracies. Charterline will be an advice and 
information service. It will give: information about the Citizen’s 
Charter and about the other Charters and statements of charter 
standards that have been published; contact numbers to help people to 
find out more about public services; contact numbers for making 
complaints about services. There are already many successful telephone 
helplines in service and Charterline will link in with these. It will also 
direct people to other sources of help such as the various Ombudsmen. 
We aim to launch the Charterline pilot in 1993. If successful, Charterline 
will eventually cover all public services nationwide’ (Cm 2101:49). 
The next month, the results of a survey commissioned by the Citizen’s 
Charter Unit were published on the public’s view about this scheme. It 
concluded that ‘Charterline would be widely welcomed. Nine in ten 
respondents said it was a good idea and should be set up’ (The 
Charterline Service, Research International, December 1992:8). In 
February 1993, the pilot area chosen for the scheme covered 
Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire; this area was selected 
on the basis of its being broadly representative of the entire country, in 
terms of its population and its area of public services (‘Pilot Area 
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chosen for Charterline’, Cabinet Office press notice, 17 February 1993). 
It was stated that the experiment would run for six months, and, if 
successful, would be extended to cover the whole country during 1994. 
The project was to be managed by the consultants of Price Waterhouse, 
who had estimated a demand of around 30,000 calls a month. At 
maximum capacity, the scheme was designed to take 1,000 calls a day 
(‘Manning hot lines’, Financial Times, 19 May 1993). However, the 
original intention was to gradually provide answers to phone calls, and 
the initial launch of Charterline was relatively unpublicised. For 
example, it was not until the first week of June 1993 that 
advertisements for the scheme were placed in the local press (‘Helpline 
unravels official mysteries’, The Times, 7 June 1993).  
At that time, the average number of calls received was around 200 per 
day, but this figure dropped dramatically over the six-month trial, 
fuelling speculation that the whole scheme would be scrapped. With 
the average number of daily calls down to about 25 per day, the 
average cost per call was estimated to be £68 (‘Citizen’s Charter 
helpline costs £68 for every call’, The Times, 17 March 1994). The latest 
estimates for the cost of the whole scheme were given in a written 
answer by Mr. David Davis: ‘Over 5,530 calls have been made to 
Charterline since its inception, an average of 25 calls a day. IBM has 
nine trained staff available to answer Charterline calls, who also 
perform a wide range of other tasks and answer other calls. Up to four 
of these are awaiting Charterline and other calls at any one time. The 
operational cost per call to date is £68. If call volumes were higher, 
significant economies of scale could be achieved. The operational costs 
of a pilot study are always relatively high. One of the purposes of the 
Charterline pilot study is to assess the demand for the service and the 
volume of calls and costs that would be associated with a national 
service. The pilot study will ensure that, if Charterline is rolled out, it is 
done on a high-quality and extremely cost-effective basis. Total set-up 
costs amount to £1,251,000. These include initial research, project 
planning and management, system design, contractual advice and data 
collection, which are all one-off costs. Running costs to date amount to 
£1,037,679. These include paid advertising research during the pilot 
study, set-up and use of ACORN data – which categorise groups of 
households into one of 38 types, on the basis of such factors as the ages 
of the people living there, the size of their home, the type of work they 
do, their ethnic background and so on – operational costs, and 
operation of the Charterline language service, which is available in 
Gujarati, Hindi, Punjabi and Urdu’ (HC Deb, 10.03.1994, cc. 402-3W). 
In May, the minister William Waldegrave announced the failure of the 
scheme and that it would not be extended on a national basis. The 
Cabinet Office improved the distribution of existing helpline numbers 
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to the general public (‘Better access to public services information’, 
Cabinet Office press notice, 6 May 1994).  
The failure of Charterline, and the public’s presumed preference for 
taking complaints or inquiries directly to the particular public service 
involved, seemed to underline this trend in the Charter’s character, 
away from national initiatives affecting public services generally, and 
towards local or regional developments within individual services. 
 
3. Privatisation of public investments: the Private Financial Initiative. 
A new managerial issue for civil servants 
 
In November 1992 the then Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman 
Lamont made an announcement in the Autumn Statement about ‘ways 
to increase the scope for private financing of capital projects’ (HC Deb, 
12 November 1992, col 998 Back). This was the beginning of what was 
to become known as the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), under which 
groups of private investors manage the design, build, finance and 
operation (DBFO) of public infrastructure, an initiative that has affected 
even the Civil Service and its organisation and the changing 
relationship between the private and public sectors. 
Prior to 1989, governments were not keen to allow private capital in the 
financing of public sector projects. Their position was set out in the so-
called Ryrie Rules. The Rules presupposed that some projects, such as 
road building, should be undertaken by the public sector and that, 
where private sector finance was involved, public expenditure cover 
would usually be required. The Ryrie Rules were formulated by a 
National Economic Development Council (NEDC) working party in 
1981 under the chairmanship of Sir William Ryrie, then Second 
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury. The Rules sought to establish 
criteria under which private finance could be introduced into the 
nationalised industries. The Ryrie Rules said that: 
(i) decisions to provide funds for investment should be taken under 
conditions of fair competition with private sector borrowers; any links 
with the rest of the public sector, Government guarantees or 
commitments, or monopoly power should not result in the schemes 
offering investors a degree of security significantly greater than that 
available on private sector projects; 
(ii) such projects should yield benefits in terms of improved efficiency 
and profit from the additional investment commensurate with the cost 
of raising risk capital from financial markets (House of Commons 
Library Deposited Paper, 3639). 
The Rules were revised in February 1988 to take account of the 
privatisation of the previously nationalised industries and the 
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introduction of schemes such as contracting out, opting out, mixed 
funding and partnership schemes. The two fundamental principles of 
the guidelines were: private finance could only be introduced where it 
offered cost effectiveness; and privately financed projects for public 
sector programmes had to be taken into account by the Government in 
its public expenditure planning. 
In a speech to the Institute of Directors in May 1989, John Major, then 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, formally retired the Ryrie Rules on the 
grounds that they had outlived their usefulness. The retirement was 
intended to further encourage ‘the private sector to bring forward 
schemes for privately financed roads, which offer value for money for 
the user and the taxpayer’. In the same speech Mr Major gave an 
‘explicit assurance’ that he ‘would not seek reductions in the [public] 
road programme on a scheme-by-scheme basis to offset privately 
financed projects’ (HM Treasury, Private Finance for Roads, News 
Release 41/89, 5 May 1989).  
The Ryrie Rules were superseded by the Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI), announced by Norman Lamont in his 1992 Autumn Statement: 
‘I said in my Mansion House speech that I was examining ways to 
increase the scope for private financing of capital projects. Obviously, 
the interests of the taxpayer have to be protected, but I also want to 
ensure that sensible investment decisions are taken whenever the 
opportunity arises. I am now able to announce three significant 
developments. 
In the past, the Government have been prepared to give the go-ahead 
to private projects only after comparing them with a similar project in 
the public sector. This has applied, whether or not there was any 
prospect of the project ever being carried out in the public sector. I have 
decided to scrap this rule. In future, any privately financed project 
which can be operated profitably will be allowed to proceed. [...] 
Secondly, the Government have too often in the past treated proposed 
projects as either wholly private or wholly public. In future, the 
Government will actively encourage joint ventures with the private 
sector, where these involve a sensible transfer of risk to the private 
sector. […] Thirdly, we will allow greater use of leasing where it offers 
good value for money. As long as it can be shown that the risk stays 
with the private sector, public organisations will be able to enter into 
operating lease agreements, with only the lease payments counting as 
expenditure and without their capital budgets being cut’ (HC Deb 12 
November 1992, vol. 213 c998). 
The aim of introducing the PFI was to achieve closer partnerships 
between the public and private sectors at both central government and 
local authority levels. The guiding principles of the PFI are similar to 
those underlying the Ryrie Rules: ventures established under the PFI 
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need to achieve a genuine transfer of risk to the private sector and 
secure value for money in the use of public resources. The new policy 
had a limited impact in the early months and, when he became 
Chancellor, Kenneth Clarke decided to enforce it (Allen, 2001). In 
autumn 1993, he announced the creation of a Private Finance Panel 
(PFP), whose role was: to encourage the greater participation in the 
initiative by both public and private sectors; to stimulate new ideas; to 
identify new areas of public sector activity where the private sector 
could get involved; and to seek solutions to any problems that might 
impede progress. 
In a speech to the CBI conference on 8 November 1994, Mr Clarke 
reiterated the two guiding principles of the PFI: the private sector must 
genuinely assume risk without the guarantee by the taxpayer against 
loss; and value for money must be demonstrated for any expenditure 
by the public sector. The Chancellor told the CBI conference that 
‘private sector finance would be the main source of growth’ in public 
investment projects and that the Treasury would not approve capital 
projects unless private finance options had been explored. Mr Clarke 
also stressed that for projects conducted under the PFI no target rates of 
return or profit caps existed or would be introduced. He made it clear 
that he wanted to maximise the scope for and use of private finance, 
reserving public capital provision for those areas where private finance 
was considered inappropriate or could not be expected to provide 
value for money (HM Treasury, Private Finance: Overview of progress, 
News release 118/94, 8 November 1994). 
In the 1995 Budget, the Chancellor announced another re-launch of the 
PFI and a £9.4 billion list of ‘priority’ projects. Michael Jack, then 
Financial Secretary, sought to allay widespread scepticism as to the 
ability of the government to proceed with PFI contracts and the 
readiness of the private sector to participate. He published a new PFI 
handbook, Private Opportunity Public Benefit, progressing the Private 
Finance Initiative and drawing together the lessons that had been learnt 
from some key PFI projects. He also pledged to eliminate ‘unnecessary 
bureaucracy’ and to promote a more favourable climate for the 
initiative across Whitehall (HM Treasury, Financial Statement and 
Budget Report, HC 30 1995/96, November 1995). 
The details of the PFI were published by Lamont successor Kenneth 
Clarke in Breaking New Ground: The Private Finance Initiative (HM 
Treasury, 1993). Departments were accustomed to awarding contracts 
for roads and weapons as well as equipment to hospitals. They 
specified what was to be done, and paid the contractors when the 
project was delivered.  
The Treasury also allowed private investment in physical 
infrastructure, provided it fit within the Treasury’s planned public 
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expenditure and the private company took the risk without public 
sector involvement. Examples from transport, the biggest public user of 
private investment, include the Channel Tunnel and the Channel 
Tunnel Rail Link, the M6 Toll Road north of Birmingham, and toll 
bridges across the Severn and the Thames and to Skye, all signed and 
sealed though not necessarily delivered before the advent of PFI 
(Glaister et al., 1998:209–17). Private constructors proved unwilling to 
undertake other projects that the government proposed in 1990, and the 
economic downturn encouraged the Treasury to change its rules. With 
PFI, the government could bring in public investment sooner, and 
without the cost of borrowing immediately appearing on the public 
balance sheet, by letting the public sector design, finance, build and 
usually operate the new equipment. The public authority or consumer 
would pay for its use over twenty or thirty years. At the end of the 
period the equipment would remain with the private contractor or 
enter/return to the public sector, depending on the contract. The PFI 
applied to public investment the market ideas that the Thatcher 
Government applied to public services. Traditional procurement had a 
reputation for delays and costs overruns, for reasons of over-optimistic 
initial assessment, technical problems emerging and labour difficulties. 
The profit motive should have encouraged private companies to 
manage staff and technical problems efficiently and to design in higher 
quality to reduce long-term maintenance costs and attract users.  
The early PFI projects were likely to cost on average about 10 per cent 
less than similar public projects (Allen, 2001:30). The first prison PFIs, 
which were to be operated by private sector staff, were strongly 
opposed by the Prison Officers’ Association (Public Service Committee, 
1998, para. VIII). The National Audit Office (NAO) estimated that 
Bridgend and Fazakerley prisons would cost about 10 per cent less than 
prisons operated by the private sector but built with public finance 
(NAO, 2001). The Director General of the Prison Service Agency said 
the private prisons performed as well as the better public sector 
prisons, but wages and other contractual conditions were poorer, 
enabling private operation to be ‘11 to 17 per cent’ cheaper than in 
public-sector prisons (HL 55, Public Service Committee, 1998:275). 
The FMI became another permanent initiative that was never repealed 
as a whole by future governments and it became part of a ‘modernised’ 
public sector deeply involved in a competition–cooperation 
relationship with the private one. The aim was in line with the Civil 
Service managerialisation process begun with Thatcher’s premiership 
to increase efficiency and reduce costs, to achieve better value for 
money, to hive off some functions of the State. 
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4. The rise of marketisation: Market testing, contracting out and 
Competing for Quality 
 
As we have seen, the replacement of Mrs Thatcher with Mr John Major 
in November 1990 did not arrest the Conservative Government’s pace 
in reforming the Civil Service. The implementation of the Next Steps 
programme continued fast, and the Citizen’s Charter proved that the 
aim of the Government for radical change in the civil service was one of 
the priorities for the new premiership. In particular, attention was 
focused on delivery of public services and promotion of free market 
competition. As the Cabinet Office explained, ‘We believe that the 
process of buying public services from private contractors is still only 
in its infancy’ and ‘We propose to move the process decisively forward. 
There are great potential benefits to be had, both in improved quality 
and lower costs.’ It was a governmental aim to ‘subject much more 
work each year to market testing than has ever been the case before’ 
(Cm.1599, 1991:33).  
There was a clear attention to Civil Service numbers, pay levels and 
conditions, as stated in the White Paper of November 1991, Competing 
for Quality: ‘Market testing so far has been largely concentrated on 
traditional support services. The Government wishes to build on this 
by opening up to competition new areas, closer to the hearth of 
government: Departments, executive agencies and contribution to the 
delivery of, for example, clerical and executive operations, specialist 
and professional skills, and a wide range of facilities and management 
approaches’ (Cm. 1730, 1991:12).  
The Government was determined to give a ‘new impetus’ to market 
testing and to the contracting-out of functions and to establish further 
targets for departments and executive agencies for measuring 
performance and progress. The targets were set up with the 
contribution of special advisers from the private sector, and a 
continuing programme was established under the control of central 
monitoring (ibid.:8–9). The procedures for market-testing existing 
services had to move faster. After a ‘decade of efficiency reform’, the 
Government believed the existing practice of allowing time for the in-
house operation to gain maximum efficiency before competitive 
tendering could begin should be discontinued (ibid.:11). The 
Government stated that ‘departments which achieve savings through 
market testing and contracting out’ would be able to apply these 
savings for ‘the benefit of their programmes’; it also considered that ‘for 
competition to be possible, managers need to know the full cost of 
providing services in-house. Often overhead costs fall on central 
budgets and appear free to the user.’ It continued: ‘Where a manager’s 
budget is fully charged for all the goods and services used, the 
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incentive to increase efficiency is maximised for costs and savings 
directly affect the budget. Increasingly, services provided by one 
department to another are being charged for. The Government is also 
encouraging charging for services supplied within departments’ 
(ibid.:9–10).  
A relevant of functions to the private sector it could be relevant for the 
purposes of the Transfer of Undertakings Regulations 1981 (Protection 
of Employment). As the White Paper argued, ‘Under present law there 
is a room for uncertainty whether civil servants’ redundancy rights are 
transferred in such cases.’ It anticipated: ‘Legislation will be introduced 
to ensure that a civil servant can have no entitlement to redundancy 
compensation where his employment is transferred under 1981 
Regulations’ (ibid.:12). This promised change was part of the Trade 
Union Reform and Employment Rights Act of 1993. In Competing for 
Quality (Opinion, December 1991) the National Union of Civil and 
Public Servants asked itself sceptically, ‘Competing for own jobs?’, and 
the Council of Civil Service Unions considered the underlying policy as 
‘determined to push the notion of competitive tendering to the limit in 
the Civil Service … the list of areas to be examined excludes virtually 
nothing – except perhaps the security services’ (CCSU Bulletin, January 
1992:1). Jobs for Sale was the polemic title of a critical essay published by 
the CCSU about Competing for Quality in 1992, and it argued: ‘The 
speed of this tendering drive is alarming … with little regard for the 
procedures for hiring consultants at huge costs to the taxpayer, and 
with no apparent safeguards against conflicts of interest. Private sector 
consultants invariably have clients with a keen interest in Civil Service 
work. Despite the rhetoric of the Citizen’s Charter, the Government 
emphasis is on cutting costs, rather than improving services. The hype 
of “value of money” is a smokescreen for cuts. The Government 
concentrates on efficiency at the expense of effectiveness. They have 
shown no interest in any clear quality-based criteria for market testing, 
preferring to concentrate on encouraging private sector involvement in 
setting both the Government’s agenda and its timetable’ (CCSU, 
1992:3).  
In 1993 The Government’s Guide to Market Testing was published 
(Efficiency Unit, 1993), and the CCSU immediately responded, arguing 
that ‘the issue of full and proper consultation with the trade unions 
should be prioritised in the guidance’ (CCSU, 1993:1). However, quality 
of service was not the principal aim of the Conservative Government 
either. In 1991 Francis Maude, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 
told the House of Commons that ‘competition does not mean 
invariably choosing the cheapest service’ and ‘market testing has 
typically cut the cost of providing services in central government by no 
less than 25 per cent’ (199 HC Deb. 6s. c.25). The second annual report 
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on the Citizen’s Charter reported ‘a step change in central 
government’s market testing activity’. By the end of 1993, 389 
individual make tests had been made, and ‘in most individual cases 
where comparisons are possible savings of over 25 per cent have been 
made’, and it added ‘the overall average saving was over 22 per cent’. 
In-house teams had gained 68 per cent of the work when they had been 
allowed to compete, which was not the total because ‘113 activities 
were contracted out as a result of a strategic decision to employ an 
outside employer’ (Cmnd 2540, 1994:93).  
The market testing was then supported by provisions in the 
Deregulation and Contracting Out Act of 1994, under which the 
Carltona principle (1943, 2 All E.R. 560-4), which established the 
opportunity for the civil servants to exercise a Minister’s government 
functions on his behalf, was extended to private contractors. Obviously 
‘those (functions) transferred out from the Civil Service had to be given 
comparable terms and conditions of service’ (Fry, 1998). Furthermore, 
the Conservative Government had continued to reform the civil 
service’s pay arrangements. For Major government long-term pay 
agreements should be reached considering principles of private 
business practices, and the Citizen’s Charter too underlined that in 
future ‘a larger proportion of pay would be linked to performance’, 
adding that ‘we will encourage the drive towards greater delegation 
and flexibility in the Civil Service’ (Cmnd 1599, 1991:35).  
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, wanted to 
renegotiate the long-term pay agreements, and on 24 July 1991 he 
proposed to introduce ‘three new elements into Civil Service pay 
structures. The first is to put in place a range of forms of performance-
related pay in order to achieve a closer link between performance and 
reward, both for individuals and for groups of staff. This will be an 
important means of securing the objective of improving the quality of 
public services, which is at the heart of the Citizen’s Charter 
Programme. Over time, performance will come to determine a larger 
portion of the pay bill without performance pay becoming a disguised 
way of providing unacceptably high increases in the pay bill. The 
second is to further enable responsibility for pay bargaining to be 
delegated to Civil Service departments or agencies to allow them wider 
discretion in relation to their pay and grading regimes. Alternative pay 
and grading structures will be approved where they are expected to 
produce value for money benefits greater than through centrally 
controlled negotiation. The third is to give an option to those 
departments and agencies for which such extensive discretion is not 
appropriate to negotiate for themselves flexibilities of their own within 
the total of the overall central pay settlement agreed by the Treasury’ 
(195 HC Deb. 6s. Written Answers c. 604-5).  
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The idea of the Chancellor was to secure the confidence of the staff that 
their pay would be determined fairly. The Government withdrew from 
a previous pay agreement in January 1992 and this withdrawal was 
extended to the agreement of 1925 that provided for arbitration in Civil 
Service pay and related matters. A new Civil Service Arbitration 
Agreement was signed in October 1992 which ‘does not provide for 
unilateral access to arbitration as did the old one’ (CCSU Bulletin, 
October/November 1992:148–9). In the first report on the Citizen’s 
Charter initiative it was recorded that ‘new performance pay schemes 
have been put in place for half a million civil servants. These provide 
for an individual’s pay to reflect his or her performance against 
objectives set each year’ (Cmnd 2101, 1992:67). The changes were 
concentrated mainly in the lower grades of the civil service; indeed, the 
pay proposal for grades 5, 6 and 7 was ‘dramatic evidence of the 
Government’s ambitions for performance-related pay. The scale max 
and all centrally determined spine points disappear to be replaced by a 
pay range. Between the min and the max of the range departments will 
be allowed to pay staff on intermediate points, negotiated with their 
trade union side. Range quotas and restraints are abolished.’ In 
September 1992 the New Pay Arrangements for Grades 5, 6 and 7 were 
published and stated ‘all increases will be performance related’ 
(Treasury, 1992a). Similar statements were made for other grades, 
manager and specialist, clerical and secretarial grades. It survived the 
adjustment to the interquartile range of pay and conditions of relevant 
jobs outside the public sector, and this arrangement tended to be seen 
by the unions as a very important element of the pay determination 
system. In November 1992 the then Chancellor of the Exchequer stated 
that ‘in the coming year pay settlements in the public sector should be 
restricted to a maximum 1.5 per cent … without exception, regardless 
of whether pay is negotiated, recommended by review bodies or 
subject to formula calculations’ (HC 213 Deb. 6s. c.996).  
After the protests of the unions the pay determination provisions were 
suspended until the end of pay restraint period, in accordance with 
provisions embodied in the agreements allowing the Government to 
choose this option where necessary to safeguard the budget or for 
public policy reasons. Hence, the pay agreements resisted and they 
remained in place.  
These measures were overcome by the approval of the Civil Service 
(Management Functions) Act of 1992, which crystallised important 
changes that had been made in the last decade between central 
government, departments and agencies. William Waldegrave, then 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, argued: ‘In the present 
organisation the Treasury is given the responsibility for determining 
pay, grading, expenses, allowances, holidays, hours of work, and other 
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related personal matters. The Minister for the Civil Service regulates 
the conduct of civil servants and those other conditions of service 
which are not allotted to the Treasury … As things stand … the 
Treasury and the Prime Minister cannot lawfully delegate those 
functions to the departments and agencies; they cannot be delegated to 
another Minister – the relevant Secretary of State, for example – let 
alone to agencies which are responsible for the day-to-day management 
of the staff that they employ. Whether it is sensible or not – I do not 
think that it can be – decisions affecting the working conditions of all 
560,000 or so civil servants must conform to rules laid down by the two 
central departments, and those rules, like the laws of the Medes and 
Persians, must then obeyed’ (HC 213 Deb. 6s. c.458).  
Waldegrave underlined that these arrangements were now ‘wholly 
inappropriate’, constituting as they did ‘an immensely complicated 
system of hurdles set up when the Treasury was, in effect, the 
personnel department of a small Civil Service’. The Cabinet pushed ‘to 
introduce … more variegated styles of employment in our great Public 
Service’, Waldegrave added, and the 1992 Civil Service Management 
Functions Act was approved to delegate civil service for personnel 
management functions previously exercised from the ministers to 
departments and agencies officials and these functions were to be 
‘progressively devolved’ (ibid., c.464). Contrary to how it was 
presented at the House of Commons, this Act was not just a technical 
Bill with a restricted scope. As the Fultonite John Garrett declared, the 
legislation had great potential: ‘The big change embodied in the Bill is 
the end of the national Civil Service. That is the point of the Bill: agency 
employees – at present, civil servants – will be subject to terms and 
conditions, employment regulations, recruitment and training policies 
and rights peculiar to the agency concerned. Instead of having a 
national Civil Service, we shall have a conglomerate of agencies, all 
with different terms and conditions’ (HC 213 Deb. 6s. c.451).  
Furthermore, the Mueller Report was implemented in the early nineties 
by Major Government. A 1990 Treasury report stated that ‘the standard 
pattern of working’ was being increasingly displaced by a much wider 
range and diversity of working arrangements’, and it added: ‘Part-time 
working, for example, has grown tremendously over the last few years’ 
(Treasury, 1990, p.1). It was later reported by the Civil Service Statistics 
that ‘between 1984 and 1992 the number of non-industrial part-timers 
has increased from 16,029 to 43,590. Nearly 16 per cent of all women 
non-industrial staff now work part-time. Whilst the proportion of men 
working part-time is still low – 0.9 per cent – the number working part-
time has risen from 954 in 1984 to 2,377 in 1992’ (Civil Service Statistics 
1992:14). In April 1992, of the 368,045 staff in all departments excluding 
agencies, 7 per cent were part-timers and 2 per cent were causals, and 
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in the agencies were respectively 11 per cent and 5 per cent (Treasury 
and OPSS, 1993, Annex X). This document underlined that most civil 
servants worked with permanent 41/2 hours contract and it 
highlighted that ‘full-time permanent employment was easier to 
manage’ (ibid., section 8).  
In July 1992 Sir Robin Butler, Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home 
Civil Service, and Sir Peter Levene, the Prime Minister’s Adviser on 
Efficiency and Effectiveness, established a commission to make a point 
on the civil service reform that lasted by 1988 and to study future 
personnel arrangements in central government. John Oughton, the 
Head of the Efficiency Unit, was appointed to supervise the report that 
was published in November 1993, and it was called the Oughton 
Report. This study considered ‘current arrangements in departments 
for identifying and developing those with potential, for appointing to 
top posts, and the tenure under which staff are currently employed’ 
(Efficiency Unit, 1993:1).  
The report reaffirmed traditional principles of the British Civil Service: 
‘the key principles of recruitment through fair and open competition, 
promotion though merit, the emphasis on integrity, objectivity and 
impartiality and non-politicisation as the foundation for a permanent 
Civil Service continue to remain valid and should be preserved’ (ibid., 
p.7). A Permanent Secretary who worked on the Report observed the 
lack of coordination created by years of reform, but he commented 
positively ‘we often need to create order out of chaos – indeed that is 
often what effective public administration is’ (ibid.:15). This Report 
showed how the perception of civil servants was changed, from a 
cultural point of view, after nearly fifteen years of Conservative 
reforms in search of more efficiency and effectiveness. One Grade 2 
official interviewed told the study team: ‘The drive should be to find 
people who can show added value, not ask clever questions’ (ibid.:22). 
The report launched an offensive against the top grades, considering 
that ‘Grade 1s and 2s need to be persuaded to leave their rooms. They 
see themselves as top policy advisers to Ministers, not managers’ 
(ibid.:24).  
The study concluded on this point that ‘there should be more explicit 
criteria for the selection, appraisal, development and promotion of staff 
at Grades 3 and above, and the Cabinet Office should ensure that these 
are built effectively into the relevant over the next year’ (ibid.:29). 
Indeed, one of ‘the biggest weaknesses of the Civil Service was in the 
fact that people tend to stay in a particular job for only a relatively short 
period of time before being moved to another post’ (ibid.:49), an 
opinion supported also by a Permanent Secretary, who argued that ‘the 
current caricature of a successful career is to get yourself whizzed 
around as many posts as possible, rubbing shoulders with very senior 
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people. In reality, people need at least a couple of specialisms’ 
(ibid.:50). An agency CEO added that ‘high flyers should be identified 
on the basis of their achievements (as they come through the 
organisation), not a specially watered flowerbed’ (ibid.:31).  
The Report established a future review that the Treasury and the First 
Civil Service Commissioner should jointly arrange for a further review 
of recruitment arrangements for the fast-stream entry, to report with a 
recommendations in 1994 and that each department should have 
established a process for identifying within the next two years a specific 
scheme to provide opportunities for staff with high potential on fast 
stream and management development programme to gain extended 
first-hand experience of front-line service delivery (ibid.:66). It 
continued: ‘Departments should introduce career anchors under which 
staff by Grade 5 level at the least would nominate one or two functions 
or areas of work to which they would expect to return in the course of 
their career’ (ibid.:67).  
As far as concerned the contractual arrangements and flexibility, an 
agency Chief Executive argued that ‘a three-year contract makes me 
feel less secure and more wary; discourages me from putting all my 
cards on the table … and encourages staff to believe that they can sit 
tight and resist change until my contract is over’ (ibid.:76). A Grade 2 
official stated that ‘you don’t need short-term contracts to get rid of the 
unsatisfactory performer, you just need the will’ (ibid.:77).  
However, the Oughton Report made specific recommendations and 
one of the most impressive was: ‘The Treasury should work up 
proposals for alternative contract terms of employment for the Senior 
Open Structure, so that the costs and benefits can be assessed, which 
would safeguard against politicisation, but which would strike an 
appropriate balance between risks and rewards … We recommend a 
contract of indefinite term but with a clear, specific period of notice’ 
(ibid.:81). The report pushed for more openness and it looked to the 
model of private organisations ‘in which 80 per cent of their vacancies 
were filled from within and the remaining 20 per cent through open 
advertisement, from which they might expect to fill some vacancies 
from outside their organisation and some from insiders who matched 
the best outsiders. This does not compare too starkly with recent Civil 
Service experience. Over the last three years, 14 per cent of the 
vacancies in the Senior Open Structure have been openly advertised 
and that has led to 10 per cent of the vacancies being filled by people 
who were not career civil servants’ (ibid.:55).  
These were the recommendations promoted by the Oughton team that 
showed how the interest of the Government was to open up the Civil 
Service and to contract out most of the public services, ensuring 
competition. At the same time, to preserve good morale and to make 
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acceptable these changes, the Government reaffirmed traditions and 
‘classic’ principles of the Civil Service in more than one executive 
paper. Indeed, it needed another two papers to further change the Civil 
Service organisation. 
 
5. The Civil Service: continuity and change. The resilience of 
traditions 
 
A crucial step to consolidate the reforms, started in 1979 by Margaret 
Thatcher’s government and continued by Major’s government, was the 
White Paper published in July 1994 and titled The Civil Service. 
Continuity and Change (Cmnd 2627, 1994). The White Paper was 
commissioned by minister William Waldegrave and it was assessed by 
Sir Peter Kemp, the manager who developed the Next Steps initiative 
and retired in 1992.  
Sir Peter Kemp’s radical beliefs on public management and 
entrepreneurial approach to government could not be doubted. Indeed, 
one of the central ideas of the paper was closely related with agencies, 
and it was to establish by April 1996 a Senior Civil Service from Grade 
5 level and above, including all agency Chief Executives, and for its 
members new pay and contractual arrangements. The White Paper 
stated that: ‘The new Senior Civil Service that would emerge from this 
process would be broader than the existing Senior Open Structure, 
which is confined to the current Grades 1–3. The Government believes 
there is merit in such a development. It would strengthen the cohesion 
not only of the senior management of departments, but also of the 
wider Senior Civil Service. Entry to the Senior Civil Service from within 
a department or agency would be marked for the individual concerned 
by leaving negotiated group pay arrangements and moving to 
individually determined pay, and by acceptance of a written contract of 
service. It would be a signal to the individual and to his or her senior 
managers of the need to think more broadly, both in respect of the job 
to be done and, potentially, in career management terms, looking 
across the Civil Service and at opportunities for experience outside. The 
Report noted a step change in responsibility between the current Grade 
7 and 5 – requiring the ability to manage through others and a greater 
role in representing the organisation externally that accords with the 
Government’s perception – and reinforces the case for extending the 
scope of the Senior Civil Service to encompass that level of 
responsibility’ (para.4.18).  
The paper pointed out progress made by 1979: in the highest three 
grades numbers were cut by 20 per cent in fifteen years, and 
departments had, eliminated unnecessary layers of management (para 
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4.19). To complete this process of modernisation, the Government 
asked departments to arrange a Senior Civil Service structure that 
‘matches the need of the organisation and is not driven by a formal 
Service-wide grading system; and informing the process of moving 
senior staff on to new pay and contractual arrangements’ (para. 4.20). 
These senior management reviews were created to continue the trend 
that had seen more than 50 per cent of the individuals who had left the 
Senior Open Structure in the previous seven years doing so before the 
normal retirement age, 30 per cent of them having departed as the 
result of voluntary or compulsory early retirement brought about by 
management. The White Paper suggested introducing a ‘privatisation’ 
of contract for the new Senior Civil Service. Indeed, new written 
contracts would specify the terms and conditions of employment for 
members of that Service, with specified periods of notice.  
The Government did not favour fixed terms or rolling contracts, but it 
argued that ‘there could not be a single comprehensive contract 
applicable to everyone’, and this option was introduced to give more 
freedom to agencies and departments that ‘would have discretion to 
use either of these alternative forms of contract as they judge best in the 
circumstances’ (para. 4.31–35). Here the Government proposed an 
adjustment of the Senior Civil Service contractual conditions to any 
similar contracts in the private sector, and more flexibility was 
introduced along with personalisation of pay and conditions. The idea 
of Major’s reform was to create ‘a smaller but better paid Senior Civil 
Service’, eliminating the large discount between private and public 
sector favouring applications from private sector to open competition 
for Civil Service posts. A single pay range was established for all 
Permanent Secretaries up to and including the Head of the Home Civil 
Service, with the level and extent of the range being determined on the 
basis of the advice of the new Review Body on Senior Salaries. A 
remuneration committee was to establish the position of individual 
Permanent Secretaries within this range.  
Below this level, the Government proposed to replace ‘the present 
central grading structure’ with ‘a number of overlapping pay ranges 
broadly linked to levels of responsibility’. Individual Permanent 
Secretaries would control the pay progression of their staff, taking 
account of performance, level of responsibility and marketability of 
their skills and experience. The operation of this system by Permanent 
Secretaries was to be monitored and adjusted as necessary central to try 
to ensure adequate coherence between departments (para. 4.36–39). 
About the appointment procedure the White Paper stated: ‘Subject to 
satisfying the Civil Service Commissioners where outside recruitment 
was involved, it will be for departments to make appointments to and 
within the new Senior Civil Service, including appointments made 
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following an internal competition, which do not fall within the category 
of posts where central approved is required’ (para. 4.27), which meant 
the higher three grades. And it continued: ‘For posts where central 
approval is required the Head of Home Civil Service will make 
recommendations to the Prime Minister, after a meeting of the Senior 
Appointments Selection Committee (SASC) or following an open 
recruitment exercise conducted under the auspices of the Senior Civil 
Service Commissioners’ (para. 4.27).  
The White Paper reported that ‘there is no successful country in the 
world which does not try to recruit early and develop some of its ablest 
men and women with the task of supporting elected Ministers in doing 
their jobs.’ Hence, the spirit was that ‘the Government believes that the 
Civil Service must continue to recruit its share of the most talented 
graduates’ (para. 4.23). This was effectively to support the results of a 
Review of Fast Stream Recruitment, which the Oughton Report had 
proposed, and which was published in parallel with the White Paper 
by the Office of Public Service and Science. The reasons behind the 
Recruitment Studies Team’s recommendation in favour of retaining a 
generalist Fast Stream were much the same as those advanced by the 
Atkinson Report in 1983, which promoted the idea of attracting the best 
talents with a competitive entry.  
The Team argued: ‘It is needed for hard business reasons: without it, 
departments cannot be confident that policy support for Ministers 
would be adequately staffed and managed. Whatever the fluctuations 
in demand from year to year, it makes no sense for the Civil Service to 
withdraw from the top end of the graduate market. And as the 
participating departments are happy to share the same basic 
specification, and are convinced that a common approach to marketing 
and assessment gets better results than they could achieve on their 
own, there is no case for abandoning a common scheme’ (Office of 
Public Service and Science, 1994a, para. 4.15–16). Considering these 
guidelines, many people could have objected to the Office’s elitist 
approach. In order to avoid this accusation from the public, the Team 
felt the need to suggest that the term ‘fast stream’ should be abandoned 
for its ‘elitist connotation’ (para.6.12). Apart from the name, the aim of 
the project was elitist, and, given the hard competition for talent at the 
level concerned, nothing was to be gained accidentally.  
The target of a smaller civil service was achieved; indeed the paper 
reported: ‘The size of the Civil Service will fall below 500,000 over the 
next four years.’ The means of doing this would be to continue the 
control of running costs (para. 3.33), and a special provision was 
established for the short-term funding of any resulting early 
retirements (para. 3.34). The White Paper explained the government’s 
policy of monitoring departmental functions in order to drop, privatise, 
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market-test, contract them out or organised an agency for which the 
set-up was extended from three to five years (para. 3.22).  
This slowdown was part of a precise strategy of the Government, 
which wanted to give departments and agencies ‘greater freedom and 
flexibility to develop programmes for improving efficiency which best 
meet their own needs’ (para. 3.20). These programmes had a role to 
play in the efficiency plans that departments and agencies were to be 
required to draw up each spring to show how they were to stay within 
their running costs limits over the next three years (para. 3.21). 
Proposals for disaggregating the Civil Service pay and grading were 
made clear both by the White Paper and more precisely by the Office of 
Public Service and Science. From April 1996, existing national pay 
arrangements was replaced by a single agreement for each department 
and the Government reserved the autonomy to agencies for having 
responsibility for its own pay and grading (para.3.26). The aim was that 
departments could develop a ‘flatter management structure’ (para. 
3.29).  
The Government enforced the management information system within 
departments and it published separately proposals that departments 
should introduce resource accounting systems based on commercial 
principles. This last objective was to ‘bring about a long overdue 
revolution in government’ because for the first time ‘the government’s 
accounts will identify the true cost of its various activities’ (Evans, 
1994:31-2). On 16 July 1994 Sir Peter Kemp wrote in The Economist about 
the 1994 White Paper: ‘In the Whitehall battle over Civil Service reform 
the evolutionaries have routed the revolutionaries,’ and he continued, 
‘What the White Paper finally recognised is that there are two (or 
perhaps many more) Civil Services. Essentially, on the one hand, there 
are top people we all think we know about, now about 3,500, to be 
entitled the Senior Civil Service, plus their supporters; on the other 
hand about 500,000 invisible people, who do the work. The White 
Paper at last addresses the existence of an enormously diversified set of 
services, delivering what needs to be done in the best way it can be 
done, whether publicly or privately. It finally buries the idea of the old 
monolithic Civil Service, which has hampered thinking for so long, 
leaving those described as civil servants simply bound together by 
familiar concepts of independence, impartiality etc., and by 
accountability through Ministers to Parliament and the iron hand of the 
public expenditure system’ (Kemp, 1994a:49). Kemp showed his 
scepticism, arguing that ‘practically nothing has changed’ with the new 
Senior Civil Service and ‘the Luddites seem to have won part of the 
battle’ (ibid.:50). Resilience to change in central government could be 
considered as a symptom originated by an ancient and deeply rooted 
system of government in which the civil servants used to advise 
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ministers rather than manage delivery of public services. Despite this 
opposition within the Civil Service, it seems evident that, at least by 
1988, a long path of change had been undertaken and the reformers 
didn’t win all along the line but they had the best of ‘the long war’ for 
modernisation. 
 
Preserving traditional values: The role of the Civil Service 
 
After the White Paper The Civil Service: Continuity and Change, a new 
phase was opened by the Major government. On 1 November 1994 the 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee published its fifth report, The 
Role of the Civil Service, focused mainly on constitutional aspects of the 
Service and the problems of accountability that derived from a long 
path of reforms during the last fifteen years.  
The last three years of Major’s office were used by Government and 
Parliament to manage legal and institutional ambiguities that 
characterised the modernised Civil Service. The report largely endorsed 
the Government’s reforms, in particular the development of the Next 
Steps Initiative and the Citizen’s Charter. However, the Committee was 
hesitant and doubtful on one specific issue: accountability.  
The report expressed the confusion over the dividing line between 
government ministers and agency chief executives and particularly as it 
influenced the relationship between control of policy and operational 
control. The constitutional convention of ministerial responsibility, by 
which a minister is responsible for the actions of all officials under his 
or her control, remained theoretically in force. Yet the question 
remained as to how far ministers could be held responsible for the 
actions of government agencies that have been given a considerable 
degree of autonomy and that are often expected to respond to the 
demands of market forces.  
The new convention grew that ministers are responsible for policy 
matters while chief executives are responsible for operational matters. 
The problems raised when all questions posed by the Parliament 
concerned operational matters made by agencies, for which minister 
had no responsibilities. One of the recommendations made by the 
Committee to resolve this dilemma was that officials in charge of 
government agencies should be made accountable to a parliamentary 
select committee rather than to a departmental minister. The 
Committee was concerned about the erosion of the traditional values of 
the Civil Service such as impartiality and integrity owing to 
innovations introduced by the Next Steps programme and strategies to 
increase efficiency of civil servants.  
The report recommended that a new Code of Conduct for the Civil 
Service should have been introduced by the government to spell out in 
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concrete terms just what was to be expected of the Service. This 
crystallisation of traditional values would have helped, in the 
argumentation of the Committee, to preserve the unity and integrity of 
the Service in the on-going managerial revolution. It was also proposed 
that there should be a new appeals procedure whereby breaches of the 
new code could be reported to the Civil Service Commissioners.  
The government drafted a new code in the Command Paper of 1995, 
The Civil Service: Taking forward Continuity and Change, but both 
Parliament and Government were unwilling to accept any moves 
which were intended to make agency chief executives directly 
accountable to Parliament. The Government was determined to 
maintain the convention of ministerial responsibility as the sole 
garrison of accountability. 
 
Taking forward Continuity and Change 
 
The recommendations of The Role of the Civil Service were received by 
the Government with the Command Paper The Civil Service: Taking 
Forward Continuity and Change in January 1995 (Cmnd 2748, 1995). This 
document was particularly important to set the basis for updating 
constitutional status of the Civil Service. Indeed, in the first chapter the 
Command Paper stated its mission: ‘The Command Paper indicates the 
Government’s acceptance of the proposal, recommended by the Select 
Committee, for a new Civil Service Code, to apply all civil servants, 
summarising the constitutional framework within which they work 
and the values they are expected to hold and incorporating a new, 
independent line of appeal to the Civil Service Commissioners in cases 
of alleged breaches of the Code or issues of conscience which cannot be 
resolved through internal procedures’ (para. 1.5).  
A draft of the Code was attached to the Paper. However, the 
Government wanted to ensure a better accountability for the Civil 
Service and the document announced ‘the Government’s intention to 
enhance the role of the Civil Service Commissioners as guardians of the 
principle of selection on merit, and its decision that the next First Civil 
Service Commissioner will have a new role in monitoring internal 
appointments and consequently should not hold the post as a serving 
civil servant’ (para. 1.5).  
The paper confirmed the Government’s intention to proceed with the 
other approaches set out in Continuity and Change to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the Civil Service, including delegation of 
pay and grading below senior levels to departments, and the 
introduction of Efficiency Plans in place of the centrally driven 
Competing for Quality Programme. The paper reaffirmed the idea of 
carrying out senior management reviews in all departments, to 
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introduce new pay arrangements for the Senior Civil Service, including 
Permanent Secretary, and to introduce contracts for all senior civil 
servants. The Paper was a compromise between the necessity to 
continue the process of modernisation and the defence of traditional 
values of the Service.  
To accomplish this mission, a new Civil Service Code was fundamental. 
As the document argued: ‘The aim of this new Civil Service Code will 
be, as the Select Committee recommended, to set out with greater 
clarity and brevity than existing documents the constitutional 
framework within which all civil servants work and the values which 
they are expected to uphold.’ It continued, ‘It must also reflect the 
existing constitutional position rather than seek to change it, and 
provide a clear and more accessible expression of duties and 
responsibilities which are already a condition of employment in the 
Civil Service’ (para. 2.8). The previous appeal procedure to the Head of 
the Home Civil Service as set out by the Armstrong Memorandum of 
1985 had remained ‘almost wholly unused and untested’, the Paper 
established ‘an independent line of appeal to the Civil Service 
Commissioners proposed by the Select Committee would effectively 
replace the present right of appeal to the Head of the Home Civil 
Service’ (para. 2.10). The appeal procedure should be applied when the 
internal resolution procedure had failed and the civil servant ‘had not 
had a reasonable response’ and the commissioners now had ‘powers of 
investigation’ but not ‘powers of enforcement’ because ‘the confidential 
relationship between Ministers and officials is not undermined’ (para. 
2.11).  
The role of Commissioners was enforced as far as concerned open 
competition. The paper stated that ‘the Civil Service Commissioners 
will in the future be responsible for the interpretation of the principles 
of fair and open competition on merit for all Civil Service recruitment – 
not, as now, only for senior appointments.’ The Government 
established a simple but binding Code issued by the Commission that 
set out principles and exceptions for recruitment addressed to 
departments and agencies. Moreover, the Commissioners became 
responsible also for approving all appointments from outside the Civil 
Service to the new Senior Civil Service. Major’s government decided 
that ‘a new Code could also be promulgated as soon as it had been 
agreed, without waiting for a legislative opportunity’ and this was 
possible because ‘the management of the Civil Service is one of the 
aspects of the Prerogative which is exercised by Ministers on behalf of 
the Crown’ (para. 2.15).  
Here was expressed a very traditional constitutional position that 
denoted a certain amount of ‘conservatism’ in approaching legislation 
about the Civil Service. Indeed, the Paper argued ‘the Government is, 
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however, cautious about the prospect of opening up the possibility of 
change in the constitutional position of the Civil Service, and thereby 
risking its politicisation. It would not introduce or support legislation 
which ran such risks or specified in detail the employment rights of the 
civil servants, conferring on them privileges or disadvantages relative 
to other employees, or inhibiting effective and efficient management. 
Before introducing a Civil Service Bill the Government would, 
therefore, need to be satisfied that there was a broad measure of 
agreement on legislation which sustained rather than altered the 
existing constitutional position of the Civil Service, retained the 
flexibility of the existing arrangements for regulating the terms and 
conditions of civil servants, and did not change the position of civil 
servants under general employment law’ (para. 2.17).  
The third chapter of the Paper focused on performance. It confirmed 
the Government’s attention to ‘clear standards of service for users and 
to a clearer definition of output targets’ and to ‘tight control of the costs 
of running the Civil Service’ (para. 3.1). The control of running costs 
included a cut of 10 per cent in real terms and the elaboration of 
Efficiency Plans that included privatisation, strategic contracting-out, 
market-testing and application of Next Steps principles, together with 
techniques such as bench-marking and business process re-engineering. 
As far as concerned recruiting and training of civil servants, the White 
Paper confirmed the strategy of Continuity and Change with 
‘maintaining of a predominantly career Civil Service, providing the 
opportunity for a full career for those whose performance continues 
throughout to meet requirements’ (para. 3.5) and the Government ‘also 
proposes to revise the fast-stream entry scheme along the lines 
proposed in the Review of arrangements for the Fast Stream entry into 
the Civil Service, which was published in July 1994 at the same time as 
Continuity and Change’ (para. 3.6). The Cabinet used a very linear 
approach on the issue of recruitment and training, coherent with 
historical development of the institution. By 1992 5,000 posts in the 
Civil Service had been eliminated through privatisation, and value for 
money continued to be significantly improved as the result of 
reviewing activities and exposing them to competition under the 
Competing for Quality programme. The White Paper reported that 
‘between April 1992 and September 1994, over £2 billion of activities 
were reviewed under this programme, producing annual cost savings 
of £400 million (average cost savings of 20 per cent), with a reduction of 
27,000 in Civil Service manned posts’ (para. 3.9). Then, the Major 
Government announced the intention to carry out a policy evaluation 
of the first three years of Competing for Quality and to continue to 
promote contracting-out. Regarding Next Steps agencies, the White 
Paper argued: ‘A key task for the next two years will, therefore, be to 
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continue the programme of agency creation for this function where 
agency status is found to be the best approach’ (para. 3.13).  
The Government set out its strategy to improve managerial tasks for 
executive agencies in Taking Forward Continuity and Change. It pursued 
arrangements for the strategic monitoring of agencies by departments, 
strengthening the departmental control on performance, and it 
promoted maximum clarity about objectives and targets, delegation of 
management responsibility and a clear focus on outputs and outcomes. 
Departments and agencies were being given greater freedom and 
flexibility to develop programmes for improving efficiency which best 
met their own needs. Responsibility for pay and grading of staff below 
senior levels was delegated to all departments by 1 April 1996. As far as 
concerned the management information systems, the White Paper 
established: ‘the Efficiency Unit scrutiny of management information 
systems, aimed at determining departmental and agency needs in the 
light of best practice in the public and private sectors, will be completed 
at the end of February 1995. The report will be submitted to the Prime 
Minister’s Efficiency Adviser, who will then advise Ministers on the 
recommendations’ and ‘OPSS/Treasury will be working with 
departments to share examples of best practice in management 
techniques – for example, benchmarking, and business process of re-
engineering – with applications in Government departments, agencies 
and public bodies’ (para. 3.16).  
The White Paper summarised the results of the Government’s plan for 
the Civil Service. The size of the institution had fallen by over 40,000 
posts since January 1993, from 565,000 then to 524,000 in January 1995. 
The plan was to reduce civil service manpower to significantly under 
500,000 by 1997, a mission that would be accomplished by Major’s 
Cabinet through privatisation and contracting-out, early retirement 
policy, working methods and pay and grading arrangements. The 
fourth chapter of the paper was focused on the New Senior Civil 
Service. It reaffirmed policy options chosen in Continuity and Change 
establishing ‘leaner, flatter management structures with less emphasis 
on working through hierarchies and more scope for talented 
individuals to make their mark; explicit, written employment contracts 
for senior civil servants; and better, more flexible pay arrangements 
which recognise increased levels of personal responsibility, reward 
successful performance and assist in retaining high-performing staff 
with the greatest potential’ (para. 4.6).  
The government established six objectives: ‘to end the traditional 
grading systems at these levels and to have a pay system which does 
not impose an organisational pattern but encourages senior structures 
tailored to departmental requirements, with the minimum necessary 
management layers; to provide better rewards within a smaller Civil 
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Service for those who contribute most to policy formation and 
management objectives in departments and their agencies; to give 
flexibility to Heads of Department to reflect levels of responsibility and 
of individual performance; to ensure that the pay system supports 
cohesion across the Senior Civil Service and helps to encourage free 
movement between departments; to establish a system that is fair and 
transparent in operation; and to maintain the role of the SSRB, to whose 
advice the Government attaches continuing importance’ (para 4.13). As 
it can be noticed, the Senior Civil Service reform of the Major 
Government represented another step towards managerialisation of the 
public sector. It was not a revolution, but an incremental reform that 
started in the early 80s and continued until the end of the 90s. It 
ensured more flexibility, performance measurement and openness in 
the profession in return for the end of the ‘job for life’ regime, a 
reduction of Civil Service intervention in policy-making in favour of a 
greater attention of civil servants on public services delivery and the 
introduction of a new appointment style directly inspired by private 
sector practices. 
 
6. Conclusions. The friction between management and tradition at 
the end of the twentieth century 
 
Two trends for the Civil Service during Major’s era can be identified. 
The first was the progress of market-oriented and managerialisation 
reforms that moved from administrative organisation, with the 
completion of the Next Steps programme, towards contracting-out, 
performance measurement, more attention for delivery and public 
services. The second was the rise of regulation in the Civil Service. In 
this area, the problem was mainly related to accountability and 
responsibility of civil servants and, in particular, of Chief Executive 
Officers of Next Steps executive agencies. As far as concerned the first 
aspect, the civil service was smaller after the seven years of Major’s 
government: staff numbers decreased from 553,863 in 1990 to 475,340 in 
1997. In the last year of Conservative Government (1996–97), 77 per 
cent of civil servants were working in an executive agency, and the 
continuous process of agencification set up 110 agencies from 1988 to 
1997 (Civil Service Statistics, 1997).  
As far as concerned codification, the government drafted in 1992 the 
document Questions of Procedure for Ministers, and in 1995 it 
proposed a new Civil Service Code. The pressure of managerialisation, 
market testing and media exposure, as well as the openness of the 
Service, necessitated stronger legislation to bind and to ensure 
preservation of traditional values of the British central government 
	   180	  
bureaucracy. The Government showed an eagerness to reaffirm 
traditional principles of this institution in its documents, especially in 
those where the pressure for changes in the Civil Service career and 
structure was heavier. The tension between tradition and 
managerialisation in the Service was not reduced in Major’s period, but 
in some ways increased. The Cabinet justified reforms with the need for 
better services, more efficiency and less waste, and it strove to enforce 
historical principles of the Civil Service to reassure civil servants while 
reaffirming their legal position (Lord Richard Wilson interview).  
On 15 March 1995 the Government fixed by statute the traditional 
principles of the Civil Service, the new arrangements of the Civil 
Service Commission, and it established basic rules for special advisers’ 
appointments with the Order in Council 1995. It set the basis for further 
developments both in public services and in the constitutional 
framework.  
Continuity in ‘constitutional resilience’ that meant the effort to preserve 
traditional values and change with ‘managerial revolution’ introducing 
new tools and organisation for civil servants continued to be, as in the 
Thatcher era, in rhetoric and practice the ‘swinging pendulum’ of 
government. 
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Chapter Three. 1997–2007: Coordination, Consolidation 
and Delivery in Blair’s government 
 
 
1. The New Labour, the Third Way and the consolidation of public 
management 
 
The New Labour Party won the 1997 general election and their leader 
Tony Blair became Prime Minister on 2 May. Labour’s 1997 Manifesto 
made no explicit references to the public sector and the civil service, but 
broad ideas about the government of the UK ‘Over-centralisation of 
government and lack of accountability was a problem in governments 
of both left and right. Labour is committed to the democratic renewal of 
our country through decentralisation and the elimination of excessive 
government secrecy.’ and about the coordination between State and 
market expressed by ‘The Third way’ vision elaborated by Anthony 
Giddens (1996), one of the inspirers of New Labour’s political proposal. 
The manifesto argued: ‘The old left would have sought state control of 
industry. The Conservative right is content to leave all to the market. 
We reject both approaches. Government and industry must work 
together to achieve key objectives aimed at enhancing the dynamism of 
the market, not undermining it.’ This statement effectively influenced 
the new government’s approach to administrative reforms and public 
services organisation. The commitment expressed by New Labour to 
the New Public Management ideas was confirmed during the first 
years in Government, and a series of clues proved it.  
First, Tony Blair’s government didn’t repeal any substantial 
administrative reforms made by the previous Conservative 
governments: the Next Steps agencies reform was completed, the open 
structure was not re-arranged, competitive tenders were maintained, 
performance-related pay and performance evaluation were enforced. 
As we will observe, the managerialisation process was taken even 
further with some adaptations to the changed political environment. 
Second, some more innovation were introduced as a symbol of trust in 
new managerialism. For example, in one of the towers of Whitehall 
traditionalism, the Foreign Office, Robin Cook started up a process of 
organisational rebranding by publishing a ‘mission statement’. Other 
ministers followed his example, introducing motivational techniques in 
order to encourage civil servants to take ‘ownership’ of departmental 
and agency objectives (Painter, 1999:99–100). The Prime Minister 
introduced the practice of a business-style annual report to inform 
citizens about the progress achieved with the public sector reform. 
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Beyond these communication skills, other developments indicated a 
firm commitment to new public-management-oriented reform. The 
government quickly dropped its proposal on market testing in favour 
of a more selective use of the policy within the framework of Best Value 
in local government, and Better Quality Services, its civil service 
equivalent. These initiatives’ objective was to replace the law of 
compulsory competitive tendering and market testing with a more 
pragmatic approach. The aim was to find the best provider of a public 
service through consideration of competitive tendering, although, 
contrary to the previous system, there would be no obligation to do 
this, provided solid internal reviews of service provision were sufficient 
to have satisfied the external audit and the Cabinet Office, the Treasury 
and Cabinet Committee in the case of the civil service.  
The procedures of the most controversial form of contractualisation of 
the last years, the Private Finance Initiative, were reformed, but basic 
principles resisted despite growing criticism within the New Labour 
Party. Privatisation process was not reversed. For example, the 
government’s plans for the London Underground and the air traffic 
control system were based on public–private partnership but definitely 
introduced significant elements of privatisation. Another important 
aspect of the public sector reform agenda was the continuation of the 
emphasis on consumerism.  
The Labour Government’s position was initially expressed by David 
Clark in 1997, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Public 
Services Minister, when he announced that the Citizen’s Charter would 
continue, soon after relaunching and refocusing it. The new 
programme was renamed Service First and its aim was to improve 
‘quality’ and ‘performance’ of the public services. The programme 
included the People’s Panel, a 5,000-strong nationally representative 
group charged to tell the government ‘what people really think’ about 
public services and the efforts taken to improve them. This New 
Labour experiment was adopted in mid-1998 and was ended by the 
Cabinet Office in 2002. The Cabinet Office argued that government did 
not still need a central initiative because in 2002 agencies and 
departments had developed their own customer polling system 
(Burnham and Pyper, 2008:143). Furthermore, the government clearly 
showed its willingness to use managerial techniques such as 
benchmarking, the practice of comparing processes and procedures 
between administrations and transferring the best practices from one to 
others, performance indicators and public service agreements, 
introduced to set out what taxpayers could expect in return for public 
expenditure on specific services.  
All these improvements were illustrated in several governmental 
papers and, as we will see in the next paragraphs, summarised in the 
	   183	  
Modernising Government White Paper published in March 1999. This 
paper put together many of the managerial issues and processes which 
had been deploying piecemeal during the life of the Blair 
administration and even before. This document was, in some respects 
such as clarity, shortness and simplicity, a typical Blair product centred 
on communicative approach. However, the White Paper’s contents 
underlined the government’s philosophy and emphasised the 
significance and the centrality of the new public management in the 
New Labour project. The pace of reform was very tight, but only two 
years after its launch the Modernising Government initiative 
incorporated the practical concepts of the new ‘focus on delivery’ and 
‘reforming public services agenda’ (Massey and Pyper, 2005). However, 
while it was a political necessity for New Labour in government to 
adopt phraseology and techniques of the new public management, it 
was not necessarily the case that this approach to governance, even 
supported by the philosophy of the Third Way, would facilitate a real 
transformation of the public services invoked by its proponents. During 
the Blair era ‘administrative crisis’ in providing public services didn’t 
disappear, such as the ones of the Child Support Agency and the 
Passport Agency with the collapse of their services in 1999 and the 
policy failings of the Foreign Office, such as the ‘arms to Sierra Leone’ 
affairs. For these reasons, some observers (Painter, 1999; Horton and 
Farnham, 1999) have recognised that the political claims for the virtues 
of the new public management and modernisation were often inflated.  
The political leaders tended to emphasise the benefits of the New 
Public Management without focusing on policy implementation, 
impact and outcomes evaluation (Barber, 2007, 2015). In government, 
the New Labour Party attempted to differentiate its approach from that 
of the previous Conservative governments, and effectively gave its 
managerialism a softer, friendlier and more accommodating image. 
Furthermore, the focusing on constitutional and political reform rather 
than economy reform was the strategy to enhance citizenship. As 
Painter (1999:100) noted, the concepts of communitarianism and 
stakeholderism were initially stressed as means by which the harshness 
and rigidity of market solutions and naked competitiveness might be 
alleviated, but the currency of these concepts was fairly limited, and 
they were superseded, in time, by the Third Way, a much broader set of 
ideas. The debates about the Third Way approach involved a large 
number of issues (Giddens 1998, 2000, 2002), and the Third Way 
presented itself as a path between rampant free-market capitalism and 
state socialism. However, it offered a linkage with the early 
manifestation of new managerialism and the New Labour 
modernisation programme (Newman, 2001).  
Third Way initiatives included partnerships in delivering public 
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services, inclusion in policy formulation, and coordination or join-up 
between government agencies and markets as the route to modernise 
governance and reform the Civil Service. However, as some authors 
noted (Horton and Farnham, 1999, p.225–8), the concept of the Third 
Way and its rhetoric decreased a few months after the victory in the 
1997 general election. Indeed, Prime Minister Tony Blair and his 
ministers opted to develop the broader concept of modernisation as the 
key of the managerial reforms. In the end, the differences between the 
New Labour and Conservative governments’ approaches to public 
management and the civil service in some respects at least did not 
appear to be fundamental or striking. ‘More significant, perhaps, are 
the areas of similarity’ (Horton and Farnham, 1999, p.255). 
 
 
2. A new governmental style: The reorganisation of the central 
government 
 
The first priority for the Blair government was to introduce a new 
arrangement of the central government in order to start the programme 
of public sector reforms illustrated during the electoral campaign of 
1997. The first working paper was The Government Expenditure Plans 
1998–1999, and it was published in April 1998 (Cmnd 3920). The first 
chapter of the paper, called ‘Departmental Report’, is particularly 
significant to understand the public policy approach used by the New 
Labour government that was based on a ‘Unitisation’ of the central 
government that meant a creation of different units composed by civil 
servants for policy-making on the principal social issues of the public 
debate. The paper opened with the appointment of the new Cabinet 
Secretary and Home of the Civil Service, Sir Richard Wilson, on 3 
January 1998, which ended the ten years of his predecessor Lord Robin 
Butler (Lord Wilson interview).  
After that, it showed the principal changes introduced by the new 
government, such as the creation of the Social Exclusion Unit, based in 
the Cabinet Office, to tackle the problems associated with 
unemployment, low incomes, poor housing, family breakdown and 
crime. In June 1997 the Better Government Team was set up; its aim 
was to produce a white paper that formulated the vision of the new 
government on public services along with a programme of work to be 
taken forward together with government departments and partners. In 
May 1997 was created a Freedom of Information unit to set out 
proposals for a Freedom of Information Bill as proposed by the Prime 
Minister in his first Queen’s speech. In the meantime, a Strategic 
Communications Unit was created at 10 Downing Street to coordinate 
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the Government’s strategic messages across departments. Then, the 
Deregulation Unit was renamed the Better Regulation Unit; its aim was 
to cut the red tape for business and to ensure a right balance between 
costs and risks of regulation. In 1997–98 this Unit led a review of the 60 
per cent of administrative forms in government, reducing it of the 18 
per cent in 1998 (ibid.:27).  
The Citizen’s Chart Unit and the Charter Marks Unit were maintained 
in order to relaunch the initiative for improvement of public services. 
The Efficiency and Effectiveness Group was set up to improve 
performance of departments and agencies ‘by securing better value for 
money for the resources they use and by improving management of 
their business, to assist in carrying out the Government’s programme to 
provide high-quality and efficient public services, at the lowest cost to 
the taxpayer’ (ibid.:7). group was formed by civil servants of the 
Efficiency Unit and the Next Steps Unit. A new agency called 
Government Car and Despatch Agency was created on 1 April 1997 
under the supervision of the Office for Public Service to secure 
transport, distribution and mail-related services to central government 
departments, the public sector and other approved customers. In the 
end a Cabinet Office Secretariat was created ‘to support efficient, timely 
and well-informed collective determination of Government policy and 
to drive forward the achievement of the Government’s agenda’ 
(ibid.:16). The reorganisation was completed for 1 April 1998.  
A major role in the policy management was played by the Office of 
Public Service in the Cabinet Office (OPS). The purpose of the OPS was: 
modernising and simplifying Government so that it works more 
effectively for the benefit of the people; implementing a key 
Government programme to improve the accessibility and quality of 
public services to citizen and business; and providing the central 
strategic supervision for the Civil Service (ibid.:20). Six executive 
agencies were associated with the OPS and these were: Central 
Computer and Telecommunications Agency; the Civil Service College; 
Government Car and Despatch Agency; Property Advisers to the Civil 
Estate; the Buying Agency; and Security Facilities Executive. In 
addition the Central of Information was transferred to the Duchy of 
Lancaster under the responsibility of his ministry. The Report showed 
the results of the first year of the Blair government, such as the Charter 
Unit major consultation to find out what people wanted of the Charter 
Programme, in preparation for the relaunch of the Charter as part of the 
Better Government programme; furthermore, the Charter Unit ran the 
1997 Charter Mark Awards Scheme, with a record 947 applications and 
365 awards. More than 28,000 nominations were received from 
members of the public. The contract for the Government Secure 
Internet was awarded in June 1997 and the service was operational 
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from January 1998. The Efficiency Unit played a full part in the 
Comprehensive Spending Review, participating in the steering groups 
of all departmental reviews and in the cross-cutting reviews of many 
areas of government pursuing the Prime Minister’s requirement that 
the spending review should include rigorous scrutiny of the scope for 
increasing efficiency. Twelve new agencies were created in the first 
year of government, meeting the target of more than 75 per cent of civil 
servants employed by agencies. The plan of government was to 
implement a second phase to benchmark agencies against the Business 
Excellence Model, involving more than a half of all executive agencies, 
15 of the largest NDPBs, the Metropolitan Police and 6 units from core 
departments and including in all some 360,000 staff. The Information 
Officer Management Unit (IOMU) developed its services and systems 
to enable it to take on a much wider strategic role, and the Senior Civil 
Service Group implemented and monitored a common pay, appraisal 
and evaluation system across Departments and established an 
Interchange Unit to monitor performance of departments and provide 
advice (ibid.:21).  
The last organisational change in the government system was 
introduced in the 2004 Budget speech by the Chancellor Gordon 
Brown, who announced that the Government would merge HM 
Customs & Excise with the Inland Revenue to form a single 
department: Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HC Deb 17 March 
2004 c 331). This followed the recommendation of a review chaired by 
Gus O’Donnell, permanent secretary to the Treasury, which had been 
set up in July 2003 to review the three organisations dealing with tax 
policy and administration: Customs & Excise, the Inland Revenue and 
HM Treasury (HM Treasury press notice 78/03, 2 July 2003; HC Deb 2 
July 2003 cc 270-1W). The Commissioners for Revenue and Customs 
Bill was passed in 2005, before the general election. A new single 
department named HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) was therefore 
formed. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill stated that the merger would 
enable the new department to meet its demanding Public Service 
Agreements and realise efficiency savings, with integration 
contributing 3,000 posts towards total savings in HMRC of 16,000 posts 
by 2007/08 (Revenue and Custom Bill, 2005). 
The objectives of the new government became clear after the first report 
and paper: focusing more on social issues by the creation of specialised 
units in government to pursue policy targets, taking forward a long-
term spending review, improving public services and giving continuity 
to the initiatives such as the Citizen’s Charter and Next Steps agencies 
started by the previous Conservative governments to implement 
managerial techniques and skills in the Civil Service and to provide the 
introduction of new regulations such as the Freedom of Information 
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Act and the Civil Service Code and Bill.  
 
 
3. Sweeping away the Quango State? Continuity with mixed results 
 
The analysis of central government’s changes under the Blair 
government would be incomplete without a focus on quangos (quasi-
non-governmental organisations). As we have seen, Thatcher’s 
government attempted to reduce and rationalise these bodies but the 
result was not completely satisfying in term of numbers (they 
decreased but many quangos were born as well in the Thatcher Era) 
and the use of them, particularly in local government, was never 
repealed by the Conservative governments of the 80s and 90s. 
In 1995, the then leader of the opposition Tony Blair pledged to ‘sweep 
away the quango state’ should Labour be elected to power at the 
following election. This appeared to suggest an intended strategy of 
central reform with practical measures to increase the accountability of 
quasi-state institutions. After a few months in Downing Street, the 
Labour Government then published a document, which was considered 
less radical than its pre-election comments. The consultation paper 
Opening Up Quangos, published in June 1997, suggested some reforms: 
a) increasing the upwards accountability of quangos to Ministers 
through the doctrine of ministerial responsibility to Parliament, as well 
as to higher-level bodies, such as government departments, regulators 
and larger quangos; b) reinforcing this upwards accountability through 
fair and accessible complaints mechanisms, plus tightened relations 
with Ministers, higher-level bodies and, in more cases, the Ombudsman 
service; c) and increasing quangos’ ‘responsiveness’ to the needs of 
local communities through increased ‘openness’, enforced largely 
through voluntary codes based on the government’s code on access to 
official information. 
Following answers to this consultation paper, in June 1998, the 
Government published Quangos: Opening the Doors, which set out its 
proposals for a non-statutory guidance framework for non-
departmental bodies. The paper advised that: NDPBs should hold 
annual open public meetings, where practicable and appropriate, and 
where practicable, NDPBs should release summary reports of meetings; 
NDPBs should invite evidence from members of the public to discuss 
matters of public concern; NDPBs should aim to consult their users on 
a wide range of issues by means of questionnaires, public meetings or 
other forms of consultation; executive NDPBs and Advisory NDPBs 
that have direct dealings with members of the public should be brought 
within the jurisdiction of the Parliamentary Ombudsman; 
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parliamentary select committees should be invited to take a more active 
role in scrutinising the work of NDPBs; the close cooperation between 
local authorities and NDPBs with local offices should be encouraged; 
Board members’ codes and registers of interest, which were already 
mandatory for executive NDPBs, should be extended to all advisory 
NDPBs; and all advisory and executive NDPBs should produce and 
make publicly available annual reports. 
Furthermore, the Public Administration Select Committees published a 
report on quangos in 1998–99 which recommended further action in 
increasing the transparency of local public spending bodies, while 
acknowledging that progress had been made: ‘Many NDPBs now 
publish a wide range of information about themselves either on paper 
or on the Internet. The evidence we requested from each department 
which sponsors NDPBs shows how far most quangos have 
implemented the recommendations in Quangos: Opening the Doors. It is 
now common for NDPBs to issue Annual Reports, minutes or summary 
reports of meetings’ (Quangos Public Administration Select Committee, 
HC 209-I 1998–99). 
Through a series of reforms documented in reports from the Public 
Accounts Committee, the National Audit Office’s responsibility for 
auditing was extended to all executive NDPBs. The Government 
Resources and Accounts Act 2000 enabled the government to make 
Orders to provide the Comptroller and Auditor General with statutory 
rights of access and to enable his appointment as auditor on behalf of 
Parliament to those non-departmental public bodies currently audited 
by auditors appointed by Ministers or the bodies themselves. 
In July 1998, the government published Quangos: Opening Up 
Appointments, which included a commitment to the equal 
representation of women in public appointments and a proportionate 
representation of ethnic minority groups. Of particular significance was 
the extension of the Commissioner for Public Appointments’ remit to 
include ministerial appointments to the boards of public corporations, 
nationalised industries, utility regulators and advisory NDPBs from 1 
October 1998. 
Hence, there were four key documents produced by the Blair 
Government: Opening Up Quangos (11 November 1997), Responses to the 
Consultation Paper: Opening Up Quangos (May 1998), Quangos: Opening 
the Doors (29 June 1998) and Quangos: Opening Up Appointments (5 July 
1998). 
Following the 1997 election the Labour Government brought more 
bodies under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner for Public 
Appointments, but it resisted broader changes to local public spending 
bodies. There had been occasional suggestions of elections for local 
bodies, such as police boards, but no general policy to introduce 
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electoral principles. Statutory rights to inspect agendas and minutes of 
local government meetings, and to attend such meetings, were not 
extended to quangos until the implementation of the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 in January 2005. This now offers the public 
opportunity to gain more information on quangos, particularly with 
regard to publication schemes, but a series of exemptions means that 
public bodies may resist disclosure in certain instances (Skelcher, Weir 
and Wilson, 2001:13; Parliament and Constitution Centre Research 
Paper 04/84, Freedom of Information Implementation, 24 November 
2004). 
Parliamentary debates on the subject of quangos indicated that political 
interest and the previously felt urgency for widespread reform then 
declined. Tony Wright, former Chairman of the PASC, noted at the 
start of a Westminster Hall debate: 
‘One would have thought that with all the attention focused on 
quangos in recent years, there would have been queues at the door for 
our debate this afternoon with people wanting to weigh in with their 
views on something that has been a running theme in our political life 
for a long time. It is distressing and revealing that this is not the case’ 
(HC Deb 16 March 2000 Vol. 346 c115WH). 
Then, in 2003 the PASC published the report Government by 
Appointment: Opening Up the Patronage State (HC 165, 2003). The 
conclusions drawn by the Committee were: there was a basic lack of 
information about the quango state, including which bodies exist, their 
roles and powers, and their formal organisational status. Lists currently 
in circulation (such as the Cabinet Office publication Public Bodies) did 
not include all bodies and commonly included errors and omissions; 
there was poor public understanding of the process by which 
department Ministers and officials decide whether a given body should 
become a NDPB, executive agency, non-ministerial department or 
another ‘unrecognised’ form of quango, and the implications of this 
categorisation in terms of the accountability frameworks that pertain to 
each type; public mistrust in the quango state remains and whilst the 
proportion of women, people from ethnic minorities and people with 
disabilities in public bodies has improved, further increases are 
necessary to ensure the boards of quangos are representative of the 
public they serve (MacLeavy and Gay, 2005). 
In response to these findings, the PASC pointed out some 
recommendations: ‘The Government should create a comprehensive 
“Directory of Government” that would set out the topography of the 
state and be available online for use by members of the public. This 
would improve the transparency of the quango state and raise the 
public’s perception of its legitimacy; the Government should ensure 
clarity of quangos’ status and the process by which this is determined. 
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This ought to improve intelligibility of the overall system and thus raise 
its strategic capacity within any given policy field; the Government 
should extend the remit of the Commissioner for Public Appointments. 
This should help increase the public’s faith in the appointment process; 
and the Government should continue with programmes that aim to 
increase proportions of women, members of ethnic minorities and 
people with disabilities within the quango state. This will help diminish 
the view that quangos are the domain of a privileged elite and that 
members are only appointed as a result of political patronage’ (PASC, 
Government by Appointment: Opening Up the Quango State, Fourth 
Report, 2002–03, 26 June 2003, HC 165-1). 
In its formal response to the 2003 PASC report, the Government 
accepted the recommendation for a ‘Directory of Government’ and the 
need for increased transparency and it promised a review of quangos, 
to be conducted by the Cabinet Office, and proposed initiatives to allow 
local government some supervision over local public spending bodies. 
The Government planned to maintain its investment in programmes 
that helped to further increase the representation of minority groups on 
the boards of quangos (MacLeavy and Gay, 2005, RP 05/30).  
At the end of the Blair premiership, the issue remained under 
discussion, especially as concerned accountability and 
representativeness of these non-governmental bodies. Regarding 
numbers of Quangos Public Bodies showed a decline in total NDPBs 
numbers, from 1,128 in 1997 to 849 in 2003. However, NDPBs which are 
the responsibility of devolved administrations are not included from 
2002. Excluding NDPBs sponsored by the Scottish Office, Welsh Office 
and Northern Ireland Office, in 1997 there was an overall total of 880. In 
the case of the Conservative governments as well as the Blair 
administration, the divergence between government aims and final 
results in reducing these spurious bodies was consistent. 
 
4. The Comprehensive Spending Review: routinising public 
spending control in the Civil Service 
 
In July 1998 the government launched the CSR (Comprehensive 
Spending Review) initiative (Cmnd 4011, 1998). In the introduction the 
Prime Minister wrote, ‘This Government will spend only what it can 
afford, and will spend wisely to achieve specific outcomes’ (Cmnd 
4011:5), coherently to the managerial idea of achieving results and to 
control deficit spending in continuity with the previous Conservatives 
policies. Then he explained the mission of the spending review: ‘This 
White Paper sets out the overall plans for each department for the next 
three years and the Government’s new, strategic approach to public 
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spending. In each area, it reflects detailed public service agreements 
between departments and the Treasury about how these overall totals 
will be spent, with clear objectives and output and efficiency targets 
that departments have agreed to meet.’ The Public Service Agreements 
were one of the most important innovations introduced by Blair’s 
Cabinet during his first term in office and, as we will see, the PSA 
would had been the pillar of the public service reform.  
The new strategy of government was illustrated by the Prime Minister’s 
introduction: ‘That is why we insist on a new principle for funding 
public services: “money for modernisation”. “Money for 
modernisation” is a contract. It says we will invest more money but 
that money comes with strings attached. In return for investment there 
must be reform’ (ibid.:5). In the General Overview of the White Paper, 
the spending plans showed how the Government would combine 
prudent spending plans with stability (three years – long-term plan), 
separating capital investments and budget in order to avoid the 
squeeze out of investment in the short term, and flexibility, which 
meant the central government could act as enabler, promoter, owner 
and controller depending on the opportunities and needs. The paper 
continued setting out the departmental plans: ‘The new Departmental 
objectives, plans and spending limits set out in this White Paper will 
help to deliver the Government’s key objectives of increasing the 
sustainable level of growth and employment, promoting fairness and 
opportunity and delivering efficient and modern public services.’ It 
maintained, ‘The Government’s strategy for securing these objectives is 
based on the principle of “money for modernisation” – investing in 
reform: the Government is determined to improve public services by 
securing a commitment from all departments to modernise and reform 
in return for the money allocated to them. Departments will apply 
modern performance management techniques in delivering clear and 
quantifiable targets by the end of the Parliament. Reforms across 
departments will result in: 
- resources being reallocated from bureaucracy to front-line services; 
- services being targeted more effectively where they are most needed; 
greater emphasis on prevention rather than simply dealing with the 
symptoms of deep-rooted social problems; and wasteful expenditure 
and subsidies being cut, and the commitment to competition enhanced’ 
(ibid.:10). 
This part enhanced the willingness of the Government in moving the 
focus in the Civil Service from the policy advice, called ‘the 
bureaucracy’ in the paper, to front-line service that meant delivery of 
public services. Another symptom of the New Public Management 
influence in the path of reform was the strong commitment to establish 
targets and to monitor outcomes from the public services.  
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For this purpose, new departmental limits were settled in the CSR 
finding ‘key priorities’ in the allocation of the spending without 
overcoming the budget constraints. In the last part of the overview, all 
these characteristics were reaffirmed: ‘The Government will ensure that 
the policy reforms and targets are delivered by: 
- monitoring closely each department’s public service agreement; 
- regular reporting of progress on the main departmental targets and 
manifesto commitments, including in the Government’s Annual 
Report; 
- monitoring progress on the growth and employment strategy in the 
Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report; reporting annually on poverty 
trends and the delivery of the main anti-poverty measures; 
- keeping Departmental Investment Strategies under review to ensure 
the Government’s investment strategy as a whole is being delivered; 
requiring outstanding reviews to deliver against tight timetables and 
maintaining the pressure on departments to secure further service 
improvements’ (ibid.:16). 
The CSR was the first step towards a further modernisation of the 
United Kingdom central government: monitoring progress, reporting 
results, control of investment and strategy, attention to delivery were 
the new issues established by Blair’s Cabinet and the PM’s advisers that 
informed a new approach particularly for civil servants. 
 
5. Public Services for the Future: the Public Service Agreements 
 
In December 1998 the Chief Secretary to the Treasury presented the 
Command Paper 4181 entitled Public Services for the Future: 
Modernisation, Reform, Accountability to explain the concrete effects of 
the Public Service Agreements in the governmental departments. The 
commitment to achieve and monitor results continued: ‘The amount 
spent or numbers employed are measures of the inputs to a service but 
they do not show what is being achieved. […] What really matters is 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the service the public receives. That is 
what makes a difference to the quality of people’s lives.’ It affirmed: 
‘The targets published in this White Paper are therefore of a new kind. 
As far as possible, they are expressed either in terms of the end results 
that taxpayers’ money is intended to deliver, […] or service standards’ 
(Cmnd 4181, 1998:1). Even the rhetoric of efficiency was very spread, 
nearly as it was during the Thatcher era, as the Treasury Paper argued, 
‘so that every pound of taxpayer’s money is spent efficiently and 
effectively on delivering the Government’s objective’ (ibid.:1). The 
government knew that performance in the public sector was ‘harder to 
measure objectively than the outputs of the private sector’ but ‘the 
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Government has set targets related to end results or service standards 
wherever it can, recognising that some may have to be refined in the 
light of experience, as the factors involved become clearer and better 
information becomes available’ (ibid.:1). 
As far as concerned accountability, ‘the publication of PSAs represents 
a fundamental change in the accountability of government to 
Parliament and the public’ because ‘PSAs show the public what they 
can expect to get for their money’ (ibid.:2). The aim was to enforce 
responsibility of competent Ministers for each public service towards 
monitoring; indeed, ‘The publication of PSAs is of course only the 
beginning. The Government will be monitoring performance against 
individual PSAs’ and ‘if progress is slipping, a Cabinet Committee 
chaired by the Chancellor of the Exchequer will look with the relevant 
Minister or Ministers at ways of getting performance back on track’ 
(ibid.:2), and this control by the Treasury was meant, as well, to 
strengthen its role in controlling governmental activities. The 
Government committed itself to giving regular information to 
Parliament and to writing a public annual report on general progress 
and any single department committed itself to report annually on its 
individual functions.  
This approach by the Government was unavoidable because the PSAs 
covered all departments and agencies right across Government and set 
out the aims and targets the Government had established for the rest of 
the Parliament and beyond. 
PSAs were a single document in which each department wrote some 
important information about the public service offered. The elements 
established by the White Paper were: an introduction setting out 
Minister’s commitments on behalf of all the administrative bodies of 
the ministry; the aims and objectives of the department or cross-cutting 
area focusing in particular on growth and employment, promotion of 
fairness and opportunity, deliver and efficiency; the resources which 
have been allocated to it by the Treasury with the Comprehensive 
Spending Review; key performance targets for the delivery of its 
service, together with, in some cases, a list of key policy initiatives to be 
delivered (SMART – Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and 
Timed); a statement about how the department had increased the 
productivity of its operations (Cm 4181).  
The paper showed how the Cabinet was committed to enforcing 
managerialism through spending reviews and performance 
management, and how governmental papers were becoming more 
usable and simple to communicate outside the Civil Service. 
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6. Modernising government: a new focus on public services delivery 
for the Civil Service 
 
In April 1999 the Command Paper 4310 was presented by the Blair 
Cabinet to Parliament. The approach to government was clearly 
expressed in the introduction made by the Minister of the Cabinet 
Office, Jack Cunningham, who wrote, ‘It is a clear statement by the 
Government of what government is for. Not government for those who 
work in government, but government for people – people as 
government, people as citizens’ (Cm 4310, 1999:5). The influence of 
managerial doctrines in the organisation of public administration was 
clear; the idea of efficiency, central in the previous Conservative 
governments, was not arrested by the Labour government, but it was 
combined with a plan to improve coordination at governmental level, 
focusing in particular on public services delivery. Cunningham 
continued: ‘We need joined-up government. We need integrated 
government. And we need to make sure that government services are 
brought forward using the best and most modern techniques, to match 
the best of the private sector – including one-stop shops, single 
contracts which link in to a range of government departments and 
especially electronic information-age services’ (ibid.:5). Once again the 
importance of techniques from the private sector was highlighted, as 
well as the use of technology in providing public services. 
To ensure that the government had become more inclusive and 
integrated, the paper found three aims in the process of modernisation: 
ensuring that policy making was more joined up and strategic, making 
sure that public service users, not providers, were the focus by 
matching services more closely to people’s lives, delivering public 
services that were high quality and efficient.  
The paper focused on five key elements. First of all policy making was 
centralised in the new Centre for Management and Policy Studies, then 
joint training for Ministers and public servants was introduced together 
with a peer review system for Departments. Second, the joined-up was 
enforced with local partnerships and one-stop shops as well as with the 
involvement of the needs of all different groups in society. Third, to 
improve the quality of public services the government established a 
review of all central and local government department services and 
activities to identify the best supplier in each case, new targets were 
introduced for all public bodies in order to improve effectiveness in 
public services, monitoring of performance was applied to all suppliers 
of public services. Fourth, a new IT strategy was settled and new 
targets for electronic service were established. Last of all, 
modernisation of the civil service, revision of performance management 
arrangements and tackling of under-representation of women and 
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ethnic minorities were undertaken.  
The new form of the State imagined by the Blair government was clear 
in the first chapter, titled ‘Vision’: ‘Distinctions between services 
delivered by the public and the private sector are breaking down in 
many areas, opening the way to new ideas, partnerships and 
opportunities for devising and delivering what the public wants’ 
(ibid.:9). Inspired by new managerialism, the Cabinet expressed a new 
pragmatic philosophy of government that combined a free-market-
inspired approach with social inclusion. The borders between markets 
and government became willingly blurred and flexible. ‘Modernisation’ 
became the new linchpin of the initiative, as the paper argued: 
‘Modernisation, though, must be for a purpose: to create better 
government to make life better for people’ (ibid.:9). Which problems 
did the paper tackle? As far as concerns our main issue, the civil 
service, it argued six main bias to fix: 1) Organisation – because 
institutions tend to look after their own interests, public services can be 
organised too much around the structure of the providers rather than 
users; 2) Inertia – because the risk considered by Modernising 
Government was that parts of the public sector could therefore be left 
to fail for too long; 3) Inputs not outcomes – the Whitehall system 
meant that Ministers, Departments and units have often been forced to 
devote much of their effort to maximising their funding rather than 
considering what difference they can make in the form of actual results 
or outcomes; 4) Risk aversion – for the paper ‘the cultures of 
Parliament, Ministers and the civil service create a situation in which 
the rewards for success are limited and penalties for failure can be 
severe. The system is too often risk-averse’; 5) The last problem was 
management itself, as the Government argued: ‘Over the past 20 years, 
various management changes within the public service have improved 
value for money and quality in the way services are delivered by 
organisations. But too little attention has gone into making sure that 
policies, programmes and services across the board are devised and 
implemented in ways that best meet people’s needs, where necessary 
by working across institutional boundaries’ (ibid.:11).  
The continuity with Conservative policies for central government 
became evident in the following pages about policy making, as the 
Paper argued, ‘Like some other countries the United Kingdom has, 
over the past 20 years, implemented a series of reforms in the work of 
government. The main focus has been on improving value for money in 
service delivery’ and ‘this emphasis on management reforms has 
brought improved productivity, better value for money and in many 
cases better-quality services – all of which we are determined to build 
on’ (ibid.:15). The addition of the New Labour government was based 
on two main concepts: coordination and inclusion. As far as concerned 
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the first, the paper argued ‘in general to little effort has gone into 
making sure that policies are devised and delivered in a consistent and 
effective way across institutional boundaries. […] An increasing 
separation between policy and delivery has acted as a barrier to 
involving in policy making those people who are responsible for 
delivering results in the front line’ (ibid.:15). In the list made by 
Modernising Government of new policies, the Government wrote about 
inclusion – ‘We will devise policies that are fair and take full account of 
the needs and experience of all those – individual or groups, families 
and business – likely to be affected by them’ – because this meant 
developing new relationships between Whitehall, the devolved 
administrations, local government and the voluntary and private 
sectors and consulting outside experts, those who implemented policy 
and those affected by it, early in the policy-making process so the 
government could develop policies that were deliverable from the start 
(ibid.:16)  
To achieve more inclusion, the strategy of government was to launch a 
new phase of cross-cutting policies that meant cross-departmental as 
well. The command paper set up the Social Exclusion Unit to tackle 
inequalities, the Women’s Unit to represent the needs of women, the 
Performance and Innovation Unit to focus on coordination and delivery 
of public services, the UK anti-drugs co-ordinator to tackle the drugs 
problems, the Small Business to improve support for small business, 
and the crime reduction programme to coordinate the efforts of central 
and local government in fighting crime. The Customs and 
Excise/Inland Revenue agreed cross-representation on each other’s 
Boards and appointed a joint programme director to improve co-
ordination of their tax policies. 
Hundreds of civil servants in central government were involved in this 
new system of functions. The aim of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet 
was ‘developing, in the newly formed Civil Service Management 
Committee of Permanent Secretaries, a more corporate approach to 
achieving cross-cutting goals and providing the leadership needed to 
drive cultural change in the civil service. One of its tasks will be to 
ensure that the principles of better policy making are translated into 
staff selection, appraisal, promotion, posting and pay systems … and 
joint training to Ministers and officials which will allow them to discuss 
the way policy is, and should be, made to address particular areas of 
policy’ (ibid.:18). Furthermore, a peer review system was introduced to 
ensure Departments implemented the principles of Modernising 
Government (ibid.:20). 
Another crucial aspect of Blair’s modernisation programme was 
‘listening to people’. The Modernising Government launched the 
People’s Panel initiative, ‘a 5,000-strong nationally representative group 
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– a world first – to tell us what people really think about their public 
services and our attempts to make them better.’ The initiative was 
carried on by individual parts of government, including local 
organisations such as citizens’ juries, community forums and focus 
groups. This action taken by government was the continuation and the 
update of the Citizen’s Charter launched and promoted by Major’s 
government in 1991. Consumeristic rhetoric continued in the paper: 
‘Government Departments and agencies must be sensitive to their 
customers. This is true even of organisations whose work does not 
bring them into daily contact with the public’ (ibid.:25). The new public 
policy style employed by the Blair government was narrower and more 
precise, and focused on groups and interests like families, women, 
older people and ethnic minorities. For this purpose the central 
government was equipped with a series of units and plans in order to 
elaborate policies designed to improve inclusion of these socio-
economic groups. Even for small businesses, there was a direct policy 
established by the Command Paper of 1999 that certified, ‘The new 
service will have over £100 million of new money over the next three 
years for this purpose’ (ibid.:28). Its role was to: act as a strong voice for 
small business at the heart of government; improve the quality and 
coherence of delivery of government support programmes for small 
business and ensure that they addressed their needs; and help small 
firms deal with regulation, working with others such as the Inland 
Revenue and Custom & Excise to cut the burdens of compliance.  
The policies were also divided into three typologies: national, citizen-
focused programmes managed by central government, such as 
employment policy; group-focused programmes, such as Service 
Families Task Force, based at national or local level; and area-based 
programmes focused on a particular geographic area, mostly managed 
by local governments. 
Another innovation introduced by the Government with the 1999 
Modernising Government were one-stop shops. What were they? The 
paper explained that ‘they can take the form of places people visit to 
get advice and information about different services, such as the Public 
Record Office’s Family Records Centre and the Lewisham and Camden 
one-stop shops for benefits.’ They could be real (a desk) or virtual (such 
as via telephone or Internet). One-stop shops were introduced to 
‘reduce the number of separate visits people have to make to get 
services. They also lead to a more efficient use of resources by service 
providers’ (ibid.:30). 
As far as concerned the public services, the Cabinet adopted a very 
managerial approach, based on pragmatism more than ideology.  
First of all a problem of correlation between public expenditure and 
services was highlighted: ‘Governments have not always looked closely 
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enough at the link between spending and what the public is really 
getting in the way of results. Sometimes they have to cut resources in 
one area without being fully aware of what the consequences across the 
system will be. At other times, resources have been increased with no 
real certainty that this is leading to improvements in services as 
experienced by users’ (ibid.:35). Despite this pragmatism, neoliberal 
and conservative echoes were still present; indeed, the paper argued 
that it was not to be assumed that ‘everything the government does has 
to be delivered by the public sector’. In the vision of Blair’s 
government, competition was a tool to deliver improvements but not a 
holy creed as it was for Major’s Cabinet. In the end, ‘this means looking 
hard – but not dogmatically – at what services government can best 
provide itself, what should be contracted to the private sector, and 
what should be done in partnership’ (ibid.:35). These aims were 
achieved through a set of policies: comprehensive spending review, 
public service agreements, public expenditure planning and control, 
introducing targets and measures for all public bodies and services.  
A new Cabinet Committee called PSX was set up to monitor progress 
on a regular basis, a Public Service Productivity Panel was established, 
bringing together public and private experiences to help Departments 
to achieve the improvements necessary, and an annual report was 
institutionalised for presenting progress to Parliament and to the 
public. A new system of inspections was elaborated to ensure 
effectiveness and evaluate value for money for both national and local 
public services, and this policy was pursued with the help of the Public 
Audit Forum, which represented all the national audit agencies. 
Auditors were used to obtain value for money and to support 
innovation and risk-taking in public services. Deregulation was carried 
on with the proposal ‘to extend the Deregulation and Contracting Out 
Act 1994 to make it easier to remove burdens from public sector 
organisations’ (ibid.:38). The Public Sector Benchmarking Programme 
was launched ‘to spread use of the Business Excellence Model across 
the public sector. The Model is widely used by leading private sector 
companies, but for the public sector this project is the world leader in 
scale and ambition. It is helping to spread best practice across 
boundaries, not just within the public sector, but between public and 
private users of the Model and internationally. Uptake of the Model has 
already reached 65 per cent of central government agencies and 30 per 
cent of local authorities’ (ibid.:39).  
At the heart of the strategy to modernise government there was the 
identification of the best supplier; in any case, it didn’t matter if this 
was private, public or partnership. As the paper established, ‘Winning 
suppliers will need to offer improved quality, as well as better 
productivity and lower costs. […] We will mount a co-ordinated 
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programme across the public sector based on common principles, 
embracing the Better Quality Services initiative for central departments 
and agencies, and Best Value in local government’ (ibid.:41). New 
standards were set by the paper in order to deliver real improvements 
such as the Charter Mark for customer service, Investors in People for 
skills and motivations of staff, ISO 9000 for services and processes, and 
the Business Excellence Model to achieve better organisation. 
The idea of modernisation was developed by the government even by 
the use of information technology. The concept of ‘Information age 
government’ was coherent to the Third Way ideas sustained by Blair in 
order to face the issues raised by globalisation and 24/7 media 
development at the end of the twentieth century. Managing 
information through new technologies at the heart of government 
became central. As the paper argued, technology ‘can give us access to 
services 24 hours a day, seven days a week. It will make our lives 
easier’ (ibid.:45). The programme was to expand the use of IT from 
central government to services like schools and healthcare, to foster the 
development of e-commerce, and to decentralise IT spread in a way 
that departments and agencies could provide for their own needs of 
modernisation.  
Once again a managerial rhetoric was adopted with the catch-phrase ‘a 
corporate IT strategy for government’. The paper set five objectives: set 
key for managing, authenticating and identifying data, use commercial 
open standards wherever possible, establish frameworks for specific 
technologies where stronger coordination is needed, ensure that 
government acts as a champion of electronic commerce, use the 
Government Secure Internet to boost cross-departmental working and 
to make the public sector work more coherently, and strengthen the 
protection of privacy and human rights while providing a clear basis 
for sharing data between departments. A set of new frameworks across 
government was established to cover data standards, digital signatures, 
call centres, smartcard access to some governmental functions, digital 
TV and websites, government gateways to a wide range of services and 
information provided by the government through Internet, online 
services for business (ibid.:51). Considering numbers, the paper argued 
‘by 2002, 25 per cent of dealings with Government should be capable of 
being done by the public electronically’ and progress had been 
measured every six months and published online. For the future, the 
proposal was ‘to arrive to 50 per cent of dealings […] by 2005 and 100 
per cent by 2008’ (ibid.:52).  
The strategy was articulated in a series of points. A route map and a set 
of strategic enablers were provided by the government IT strategy 
together with tools envisaged in the paper, a cluster of related 
government functions that could be informatised was aligned to the 
	   200	  
needs of citizens and business, stronger central co-ordination to ensure 
that best practices and consistent standards was pursued, progress 
against targets had to be regularly monitored and reported, close 
consultation and benchmarking would continue with international, 
private sector and experts, and market research and user feedback 
would improve the design and organisation of services and other 
processes (ibid.:53). 
The last part of the paper was focused on public servants. On this topic 
the government set out an approach based on three assumptions. First, 
there was the necessity of restoring the pride of public servants after a 
long period of administrative reforms led by Conservative 
governments: ‘Public service has for too long been neglected, 
undervalued and denigrated. It has suffered from a perception that the 
private sector was always best and the public sector was always 
inefficient. The Government rejects these prejudices.’ Second, 
continuity with the past would not be withdrawn, yet neither would 
progresses achieved by Conservatives be denied, the government 
argued in the paper: ‘The reforms of the last two decades in the civil 
service, for example, have done much to develop a more managerial 
culture. The quality of management has improved: there is a better 
focus on developing people to deliver improved performance and there 
is greater professionalism.’ Third, a new spin in public services and 
bureaucracies for the twenty-first century had to be built because ‘we 
must not jeopardise the public service values of impartiality, objectivity 
and integrity. But we need greater creativity, radical thinking and 
collaborative working. We must all, both the politicians elected by 
people and the officials appointed to serve, move away from the risk-
averse culture inherent in government. We need to reward results and 
to encourage the necessary skills’ (ibid.:55). Flexibility and opening-up 
became two central concepts, as the paper argued: ‘We want the civil 
service to reinforce its effort to be more open and to recruit more 
experience, skills and ideas from outside. This must happen at all 
levels. We must be more flexible in bringing people in for short periods 
to provide specific skills for a particular policy area or project’ (ibid.:56)  
This was an aim that, as we will see further, was to be achieved with a 
massive increase of appointments of special advisers, introducing de 
facto a very limited and singular spoils system as the paper outlined. 
Several challenges were established for the civil service, such as 
implementing constitutional reform in a way that preserves a unified 
civil service and ensures close working between the UK government 
and the devolved administrations, getting staff in all departments to 
integrate the EU dimension into policy thinking, focusing work on 
public services so as to improve their quality, make them more 
innovative and responsive to users and ensure that they are delivered 
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in an efficient and joined-up way, creating a more innovative and less 
risk-averse culture in the civil service, and improving collaborative 
working across organisational boundaries.  
To meet these points, a learning organisation for training and 
development was necessary, and Modernising Government introduced 
a series of reforms. A Centre for Management and Policy Studies was 
created. It incorporated the Civil Service College with the mission of: be 
responsible for corporate civil service training and development, 
ensure that current and future leaders of the civil service are exposed to 
the latest ideas and thinking on management and leadership, keep 
abreast of the latest developments in public governance and 
management, act as a repository for best practice, and work closely 
with research and evaluation units in departments to develop and 
strengthen policy evaluation capacity and co-ordinate evaluations of 
cross-cutting policies (ibid.:57).  
In the meantime, the Department for Education and Employment set 
up the new National College for School Leadership, and the Armed 
Forces had a new joint Services Command and Staff College. 
Furthermore, the paper established: ‘The civil service is committed to a 
target that all its organisations become accredited Investors in People 
by 2000. To date, 40 per cent of civil servants work in such 
organisations. […] We must ensure that the civil service meets and 
exceeds the new National Learning Targets for qualifications’ (ibid.:57). 
As far as concerned pay the Government commitment was to revise 
pay scales and introduce new grades based on skills for all public 
servants, making best use of non-pay incentives such as better training 
and development opportunities, good career prospects, improved 
working environments, flexible working, family-friendly working 
practices, national awards and honours. Then, the Government focused 
on rewarding results and performance; the best results of individuals 
and teams had to be best rewarded. The paper argued, in very broad 
terms, that in the civil service the performance management was not 
always clear and that pay performance had to be used in a more 
creative way to sustain high-quality performance. 
An equality policy was launched to reduce the difference between men 
and women, ethnic minorities and disabled people in the civil service. 
A five-year plan was started in order to achieve targets established by 
the government, such as 35 per cent of women in the senior civil service 
and 25 per cent at top posts by 2005. Other targets were established for 
ethnic minorities and disabled people. The same principle was applied 
for public appointments. Furthermore, the paper argued, ‘The 
Government will improve access to public appointments. We are 
committed to ensuring that public appointments are open to a wide 
field of candidates so we can draw on the widest possible range of 
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expertise and backgrounds’ (ibid.:60). Every year a departmental action 
programme would devise plans about improved accessibility to and 
equal representation in public posts. 
In the conclusions the White Paper highlighted a vast programme of a 
‘change in the way government makes policy, in the way services are 
delivered, in the way government use technology and in the way public 
services are valued. It will involve everyone working in the public 
services, and everyone who uses public services.’ To check results ‘the 
Government will set milestones to chart our course and success criteria 
so that the users of public services can judge whether the 
modernisation programme is working. We will report annually on 
progress.’ As with a company, an annual report by the Government 
was introduced to give updates on reform progress.  
The pillar for Blair’s government civil service reform action was built 
with a greater continuity with the past, shuffling managerialism, 
tradition and a new attention towards delivery, inclusion and social 
issues. 
 
 
7. The implementation of performance evaluation: good practice in 
performance reporting 
 
On 7 March 2000 the House of Commons issued a report called Good 
Practice in Performance Reporting in Executive Agencies and Non-
Departmental Public Bodies (HC 272, 2000) to ensure improvements in 
performance evaluation of public bodies. The report was realised under 
the direction of the National Audit Office and the Comptroller and 
Auditor General in consultation with the Cabinet Office, the Treasury 
and executive agencies. Its purpose was ‘to assist agencies to improve 
further their performance reporting by setting out guidance based on 
their own good practice in collecting and reporting performance 
information’ (HC 272, 2000:5) This was the first report on this issue and 
it was a consequence of Modernising Government and the Public 
Service Agreements practice. Once again managerialist influence was 
consistent: ‘Performance measurement and reporting are intrinsic to the 
whole process of public management, including planning, monitoring, 
evaluation and public accountability’ (ibid.:6). The measurement was 
based on data collection, specialist advice, clear measure definitions, 
designing who was accountable for performance data, developing and 
implementing methods for collecting data, and establishing clear 
guidelines for the validation of performance data. The results should 
have been presented to the public considering the needs of clarity, 
explanation and evaluation of data. The paper listed a checklist to 
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collect, evaluate and present data focused on costs, value for money, 
establishing routines, controlling the use of information, considering 
methodology and quality. 
The executive agencies were required to report performance against 
key targets set by Ministers in their annual reports and accounts, to 
provide a complete picture of performance by including information on 
achievements against internal managerial targets and other 
performance measures. The strategy was established as a first step to 
align performance measures with aims and objectives; the second was 
reporting the outcomes of agency activities as fixed by Modernising 
Government agencies had to ‘move from counting what goes in, to 
assessing what is being delivered … The targets for government 
departments, as far as possible, are expressed either in terms of the end 
results or service standards, and we are working to develop measures 
for all levels of government which support this approach.’ Third was to 
consider the interests and needs of stakeholders, continuing the 
consumerist approach started by John Mayor’s Conservative 
government; the last was to provide a comprehensive view of 
performance, as the Cabinet Office guidance of 1998 wrote that ‘for 
reasons of public accountability, it is important that annual reports 
should give a complete picture, so it is likely that they will also need to 
include information on performance against internal management 
targets and other performance measures, especially when these fill gaps 
in the coverage of Ministerial targets’ (Cabinet Office, October 1998). 
As far as concerned performance data, ‘All performance information 
must be correctly calculated, reliable and fairly presented. The primary 
responsibility for this lies with Chief Executives. They must have 
confidence in a properly managed system of internal control’ (Cabinet 
Office: 1998). The report highlighted how the quality of data should 
had been basing it on four characteristics: valid, comprehensive, 
accurate, consistent. Furthermore, the agencies had to rely on advice 
from specialists who were consulted about selection of samples, use of 
forecasting models, methodologies to validate performance data, and 
construction of measures with formulas (HC 272, 2000:31). 
Accountability was a pillar for good-quality performance data, as the 
report argued: ‘Chief Executives have the prime responsibility for 
ensuring data are correctly calculated and reliable’ (ibid.:33). The report 
also pointed out how the key role of CEO was important for ensuring 
performance in delivery and, before, in collecting performance data 
through information systems, surveys and external sources (ibid.:37).  
Data capture and data processing were two sides of the same coin 
under the control and responsibility of an agency’s management. An 
external validation of data was established by the National Audit 
Office, as the external auditors of Executive Agencies; however, the 
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agency could decide to establish ‘specialist teams of those responsible 
for data collection, processing and analysis to check performance data, 
and, using the agency’s own internal auditors, to review data collection 
systems’ (ibid.:41). In the end, executive agencies had to produce an 
annual report based on good practice listed in the report: presenting 
information clearly, over time, explaining performance measures, 
describing quality of data. 
In July 2000, the spending review focused on a better delivery of public 
services through the use of public service agreements, which became a 
central issue in governmental action. The spending review ‘continues 
that process by setting out, for every major government department, its 
aims, objectives, and the targets against which success will be 
measured, including targets on improving value for money and 
efficiency’ (Cm 4808, 2000:1). Coordination was another aim to achieve, 
and the paper set out actions taken by the government in this area: ‘To 
improve coordination further, fifteen cross-departmental reviews were 
undertaken as part of the 2000 Spending Review, focusing on key 
issues from crime reduction and intervention in deprived areas to 
science research and the knowledge economy’ (ibid.:2) and ‘there are 
around 160 of these performance targets in total, some jointly held by 
more than one department, focused on the key strategic goals for 
departments and the Government as a whole’ (ibid.:3).  
The foundations for another managerial breakdown in the public 
sector, establishing a new form of performance measurement and 
political control of bureaucracy’s outcomes, had been set up. 
 
8. The institutionalisation of Special Advisers and new issues in 
central government 
 
Tony Blair had increased both the size and the influence of the Policy 
Unit. On 3 May 1997 the Prime Minister had amended the civil service 
order in council in order to enable special advisers directly appointed 
by the Prime Minister (Jonathan Powell and Alastair Campbell) to give 
orders and lead civil servants, in essence putting them at the head of 
policy-making process. According to Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony 
Seldon, the Unit combined roles of ‘a think-tank (working up policy 
and seeking ideas outside from policy specialists) and a French-style 
cabinet reinforcing the political direction of the Prime Minister […] a 
Unite member sat on each of the twenty or so departmental review 
teams set up under the Comprehensive Spending Review and attended 
Blair’s meeting with ministers to agree the terms of the department’s 
final allocation’ (Kavanagh and Seldon, 1999:253). This was an example 
of the new leadership style that reflected a new organisation of power 
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in the core executive, which relied on the increasing use of special 
advisers to define policy and management. For this reason, the Select 
Committee of Public Administration published an inquiry on 28 
February 2001 titled ‘Special Advisers: boon or bane?’ (HC 293, 2001), 
which focused on roles, numbers, costs and regulation of special 
advisers. The inquiry was not critical of the growing use of special 
advisers in central government, but its concerns were about rules and 
accountability. As the report wrote, ‘Advisers are a kind of civil 
servant, but an anomalous kind. They do not have to be appointed on 
merit; their performance is not assessed by other civil servants; they are 
appointed personally by a Minister, with the approval of the Prime 
Minister; and they do not have to observe the normal civil service 
principles relating to political impartiality’ (HC 293, 2001:8).  
This framework created a series of problems concerning boundaries of 
the special advisers’ actions and, in particular, special advisers’ relation 
with the civil service. In 2001, special advisers were regulated by the 
Ministerial Code, the Civil Service Order in Council, the Model 
Contract for Special Advisers, published in May 1997 by the Labour 
Government, and the Civil Service Code, but the Public Administration 
Committee underlined the need of a comprehensive legislation with the 
Civil Service Act that will never be approved by Blair’s Cabinet. The 
report of the Committee recommended some actions, such as: 
limitation of special advisers as set up by parliamentary vote; 
recruitment of special advisers under standard procedure of the civil 
service wherever possible; a requirement that staff working in the area 
of communication had to be considered special advisers; more 
accountability on special advisers’ budgets; public advertisement of 
and open competition for special advisers’ posts, with the Minister 
given power of choice; a rule that special powers and authority given to 
the Prime Minister’s special advisers were not to be extended to others; 
promulgation of a Code of Conduct for Special Advisers; and adoption 
of a Special Advisers Code after a parliamentary debate. Most of these 
recommendations were not followed by the Blair Government in the 
following years, except for the draft of a Code of Conduct and 
limitation of powers of the Prime Minister’s special advisers. 
 
 
The new shape of the Civil Service 
 
On 28 March 2001 the Public Administration Select Committee 
published Making Government Work: the Emerging Issues, a report on 
the changes made and future developments in central government. As 
it was close to the end of Blair’s first term, this was the occasion to 
make a point about the status of the civil service. As the report 
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suggested, ‘The Civil Service cannot be frozen in a mould appropriate 
to one particular era, but must instead constantly change and reform if 
it is to meet the changing demands of government’ (HC 94, 2001:11). 
The report outlined the transformation in progress, with ‘the central 
Civil Service moving from being line administrators to being experts in 
fields such as change management, extended strategic contracting, the 
development of multichannel procurement and delivery systems and 
so on’ (ibid.:12), a very similar reformist approach to the one argued for 
by Sir Richard Wilson in the report ‘Civil Service Reform’, published in 
December 1999, which committed the Civil Service to action on the 
basis of six key themes: stronger leadership; better business planning 
from top to bottom; sharper performance management; a dramatic 
improvement in diversity; a service more open to people, ideas and 
talent; and a better deal for staff. However, the former Cabinet Minister 
David Clark had a different view about the possibility of self-reform by 
the Civil Service. He said that he had ‘studied the reforms Sir Richard 
Wilson put forward. But I think he almost gave the game away when 
he said his reforms were reforms for the Civil Service, by the Civil 
Service, led by the Civil Service’ (HC 2000-2001, 94-IV Q916). The 
tension between tradition and reform was expressed by the Cabinet 
Secretary in a speech in May 1999 when he argued that the Civil Service 
‘has to face the challenge of continuing change and modernisation. The 
important thing is to ensure that the process is constructive and does 
not damage our core values’ (Wilson, 1999). 
Another issue considered by the report was the opening up of the Civil 
Service. As the Committee argued, ‘An important feature of the Civil 
Service reform programme is the expectation that in the future senior 
civil servants will be expected to have wider experience in a variety of 
possible settings. […] There will also be greater movement between 
departments and witnesses pointed to increasing service-wide 
advertisement of posts. We believe that these developments, if actively 
pursued, offer great potential for enhancing skills’ (HC 94, 2001:15). Sir 
Richard Wilson was in favour of promoting open competition among 
middle and senior managers with a long-term plan and he claimed: 
‘We have committed ourselves to increasing the number of open 
competitions by 10 per cent a year over five years. I think we will 
probably be shown to have done in one year what we aimed to do in 
five. We have committed ourselves to identify 100 key posts, which are 
to be filled by bringing in people on secondment, a more open service. 
We have identified 180 posts now and have written to 1,000 
organisations to try to get the best people we can to fill them’ (HC 2000-
2001, 94-XIV Q 1051). However, secondments were not a direct entry 
into the service and the report noted, ‘This represents positive progress, 
but the increased use of secondments is not a substitute for real 
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mobility and permanent change in the pattern of a career path’ 
(ibid.:15). 
To conclude, the report summed up changes of the Blair government’s 
first term, focusing on modernisation of government. As the conclusion 
admitted, ‘some fundamental issues we have not addressed’, such as 
pay, performance-related rewards, state and market relation, and 
changes to the pattern of public provision.  
Once again a balance and a focus on improving management, 
preserving traditions and promoting equality was pursued let the 
continuity with the eighties and nineties prevailed on features of 
traditional welfare state. 
 
The new centre 
 
After the Labour Party won the general election of 7 June 2001, a new 
phase started for Blair’s government. Some new arrangements were 
introduced in the autumn of 2001 to support the Prime Minister’s 
leadership and to achieve aims set by the Cabinet. A new strategy 
based on four key principles for the Cabinet Office was outlined (HC 
262-I, 2001): a national framework on standards and accountability; 
within this framework, devolution of power to front-line professionals, 
enabling local leaders to innovate and develop new services; better and 
more flexible rewards and conditions of service for front-line staff; 
more choice for the consumers of public services and the ability, if 
provision falls below acceptable standards, to have an alternative 
provider.  
Following the recommendation of Modernising Government, the 
Cabinet Office was strengthened by the creation of the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister, which worked closely with the Prime 
Minister’s own office in playing a central role in ensuring that the 
government’s strategic objectives were met. The Deputy Prime Minister 
had responsibility for supporting the Prime Minister in the delivery of 
key Government priorities and programmes, and he took on specific 
tasks at the request of the Prime Minister. He was responsible for some 
issues directly through units as: social exclusion, regional coordination, 
regional governance, international matters and climate change, 
devolution and the British Irish council (HC 262-I, 2001:2). The minister 
for the Cabinet Office and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, in the 
person of Lord Macdonald, assumed the day-to-day responsibility for 
the work of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit, for which he reported 
to the Prime Minister. Lord Macdonald focused particularly on policy 
implementation in the fields of education, health, crime and transport. 
These changes had resulted in a strengthening and deepening of the 
relationship between the Cabinet Office and Number 10. The strategic 
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leadership of the Cabinet Office was empowered, creating a stronger 
steering from the centre, which benefited the Prime Minister. This 
framework left Tony Blair to play a key role in delivering the 
Government’s objectives and improving the delivery of public services. 
In summer 2001 another innovation was established in Whitehall – the 
Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit – which helped government to achieve 
key objectives. The new unit reported to the Prime Minister and was 
under the day-to-day supervision of the Minister of the Cabinet Office. 
It was headed by the Prime Minister’s Chief Advisor on Delivery, 
Professor Michael Barber, who was based in Number 10 Downing 
Street. The role of the Unit was to ensure that the Government achieved 
its delivery priorities during this Parliament across the key areas of 
public service: health, education, crime, asylum and transport.  
The Unit’s work was carried out by a team of staff with practical 
experience of delivery, drawn from the public and private sectors. The 
Delivery Unit reported regularly to the Prime Minister on progress 
towards achievement of these priorities and established the agenda for 
regular meetings with the Ministers concerned; it helped in holding the 
public service departments to account through the established PSX 
monitoring process to make sure that they met their agreed PSA 
targets; ensured problems of delivery were solved as rapidly as 
possible undertaking specific processes; sustained Government’s focus 
on the key objectives over time.  
Furthermore, the Office of Public Services Reform, also in the Cabinet 
Office, was created to advise the Prime Minister about the reforms of 
the Civil Service and public services. It considered competence and 
capacity in the public service, checked the respect of national standards 
and local innovation, and ensured intervention from the centre only 
when justified. It provided for alternatives for service users where 
provision was below minimum standard set in the Public Service 
Agreement, and it promoted better conditions of service and more 
flexible rewards for frontline staff (ibid.:4).  
Using these two tools, Blair’s government tried to enforce the role of the 
central government and the policy-making process, promoting a shift 
from the traditional policy-advisory role of civil servants to a policy-
implementation role for the most of them. 
 
 
The Delivery Unit: creation and aims 
 
As we have already seen, after June 2001 the government restructured 
parts of the core executive and it created the Prime Minister’s Delivery 
Unit. The mission of the Unit was to ‘ensure the delivery of the Prime 
Minister’s top public service priority outcomes’ (PMDU, 2005). The 
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timing of the creation of the PMDU was an answer to some failures in 
policy implementation of Blair’s first term. A PMDU official observed: 
‘I think there was a general frustration from Number 10 and 11 about 
how tricky it was just to get stuff transferred through the machine,’ and 
Geoff Mulgan (Head of Policy Directorate 2001–2005) argued, ‘I always 
thought it was very dangerous for policy makers just to sit at the top of 
the hierarchy and push things down, expecting that if you pull a lever 
something predictable will happen at the other end’ (Richards and 
Smith, 2006:334) 
The view from the centre was that two key problems had emerged in 
the course of Labour’s first term concerning effective policy delivery. 
The first problem was that there had been too much emphasis on 
imposing national standards in a top-down, hierarchical structure. 
Frameworks of national standards had been established across different 
public services – health, education, policing, etc. – but even clearly 
defined standards imposed from the centre did not necessarily translate 
further down the policy chain to the street level. The second problem 
was that departments were still not responding to the briefs of the 
centre. This partly reflected the nature of the British system of 
government and the power and resources available to departments 
compared to the relatively weak structural resources available to 
Number 10. 
There was an attempt to change the focus, moving from process, which 
has always been one of the traditional civil service characteristics, to 
outcomes, where the civil service has been weak. As former Cabinet 
Secretary Andrew Turnbull pointed out: 
‘Ultimately we need to be judged by outcomes as they are at the front 
line. Are standards in schools getting better? Are standards in the 
Health Service getting better, the service it offers and the outcomes it 
achieves in terms of how long people live and avoid disease? Is crime 
coming down? Is the criminal justice system working better? Those are 
the things we would be judged by. If you look at the whole collection of 
PSAs you will have to make a judgement and the electorate will make a 
judgement on those’ (Public Administration Select Committee 
2003/2004: para. 67). 
Originally located in the Cabinet Office, the PMDU was moved to the 
Treasury in 2002, although it still continued to report directly to the 
prime minister. This move was predominantly the choice of its director, 
Michael Barber, who believed that success would be dependent on 
establishing a close working relationship with the Treasury, and in 
particular the Public Services Directorate. Michael Barber was an 
academic who became an adviser in the Department of Education 
before being appointed as the Head of PMDU. He was appointed for 
his analytical approach and he was very keen to appoint people outside 
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of Whitehall to work with him. 
His successor as head of the unit was Peter Thomas, who had been 
promoted to this role from deputy director and had previously been a 
director of performance development at the Audit Commission. 
Thomas was also the prime minister’s chief adviser on delivery, and 
had a team of around 40 individuals under him, not solely drawn from 
the ranks of the civil service. Individuals had been seconded from both 
the public and private sectors.  
The unit also drew on what it referred to as ‘the expertise of a wider 
group of Associates with experience of successful delivery in the 
public, private and voluntary sectors’ (PMDU 2005). After 2005, the 
unit was part of the wider building capacity section within the Cabinet 
Office which included other units responsible for delivery, such as the 
E-Government Unit, the Office of Public Sector Reform and the Better 
Regulation Unit (Richards and Smith, 2006). This allocation again 
exalted the explicit importance of central capacity building to the Blair 
government. However, the PMDU was the lead body which had direct 
and frequent access to the prime minister. 
Measurement became a key concept for the mission of the Unit. As the 
Cabinet Secretary Andrew Turnbull argued: ‘We are not saying we 
have gone through an era in which we set targets very tightly from the 
centre and now all of that is being let go. We are trying to move on, not 
go back, to a world in which certain things we set very tightly, certain 
national standards and minimum standards, while encouraging greater 
freedom to tailor how that service is delivered and how that target is 
achieved and also to vary in local areas so that you match more closely 
what people want’ (Richards and Smith, 2006). 
The Delivery Unit had created a direct relationship between the centre 
and policy delivery actors such as agencies, which were becoming 
definitely by government departments. There was an important shift in 
resources going on, with executive power shifting from departments to 
the Prime Minister’s Office. The Delivery Unit established a direct line 
of responsibility between those on the ground and Number 10 in a way 
that had not existed. Consequently, the centre was increasingly 
enforcing in respect to the role of the locality (Richards and Smith, 2006; 
Richards, 2008). However, the right to increased autonomy was not 
being given to front-line professionals completely. Instead, it was given 
on a ‘carrot and stick’ basis: ‘Better services should get more freedom 
and flexibility – earned autonomy for schools, hospitals, local 
government and other public services. Failing services should be given 
the incentives to improve, and receive intervention in proportion to the 
risk of damaging under-performance’ (Office of Public Service Reform, 
2002: 17). 
The Labour government was committed to reinforcing front-line staff 
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who had conquered this right for their role of control in meeting 
centrally imposed national standards in the form of Public Service 
Agreements (PSAs). It is here that the PMDU played an essential role.  
To achieve its objectives, the Delivery Unit had to develop new tools of 
control and measurement. One Delivery Unit official argued: ‘If you 
look at that old model, that traditional model, it simply didn’t work 
very well. And it didn’t work very well because there’s a sort of 
inherent “small c conservatism” in Whitehall that is trying to produce – 
justifiably so – defensive lines for ministers.’ 
The PMDU sought to create the tools for assessing whether policy was 
being delivered and whether the process of delivery could be 
improved. So, as the same official said: ‘What Michael Barber said – 
and the Prime Minister asked him to do this – to kind of “show me the 
numbers”. So, that was a key shift. If we don’t have numbers it’s really 
very hard for us to kind of drive stuff out. So the development of the 
PSA targets, and the underpinning of those with what are a kind of 
numerical value to those aspirations. We all know that that can be 
constraining, but what it did do was move the kind of discussion on 
from words to numbers’ (Richards and Smith, 2006:337) 
A key element in this process was the targets developed under the 
guidance of PSAs, developed in co-operation with the Treasury. This 
pointed out another important relationship of the PMDU: while it was 
accountable to the prime minister, the Treasury also had an important 
influence on its work. Thus, although the Prime Minister’s Delivery 
Unit was, as the name suggests, responsible to the prime minister, the 
role of the Treasury was also important because the Treasury 
established the targets that departments had to meet. However, to 
underline the point about personalism, the PSAs could be considered as 
targets set by the prime minister. 
Another key role of the Delivery Unit was to check that progress was 
made in achieving departmental policy goals as specified in the PSAs. 
By Modernising Government paper in 1999 departments set specific 
targets for the delivery of policy. PSAs were established after the 1998 
Comprehensive Spending Review and contained the aims, objectives 
and performance targets for each main government department. They 
included value-for-money targets and a statement of which office was 
responsible for delivering these targets. PSAs were decided on by the 
individual department following discussions with the Treasury and the 
Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit.  
As Richards and Smith (2006:338) noted, ‘The historical tensions 
between the Treasury and Number Ten were institutionalised through 
the Delivery Unit and, to an extent, it was a ‘prime ministerial’ unit still 
based on Treasury capabilities for collecting and processing financial 
data.’ 
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Where organisations failed to achieve the prescribed targets set up by 
government, they were penalised in different ways ranging from a 
simple cut in government funding to the outright closure of an 
organisation, such as had occurred for example with a number of 
‘failed’ secondary schools. The practice of target setting had become the 
key tool of control exerted by government, as a report by the 
comptroller and auditor general, focusing specifically on Next Steps 
Agencies, argued: ‘Performance measurement and reporting are 
intrinsic to the whole process of public management, including 
planning, monitoring, evaluation and public accountability’ (Report by 
the Comptroller and Auditor General 2000: 2). The bulk of the unit was 
to ensure that policy priorities identified by the prime minister were 
attended to, such as health, education, crime and transport. 
Michael Barber, the prime minister’s chief adviser on delivery and the 
first head of the Delivery Unit (2001–2005) believed that for PMDU to 
be successful it needed to concentrate on key targets and indicators, 
rather than trying to address a whole range of targets across every 
policy field (Seldon, 2004). Focusing on a relatively small proportion of 
PSAs allowed the PMDU to maintain a clear, strategic focus over key 
policy areas. As Geoff Mulgan pointed out, an aim of the PMDU ‘was 
to help the system focus better on a few really compelling targets and to 
use those targets really to fix problems rather than just to become 
compliance exercises or to divert attention from other important 
priorities’ (Richards and Smith, 2006:339). In organisational terms, the 
use of PSAs and the PMDU had led to a major change in the 
relationship between the centre (the Prime Minister’s Office, the 
Cabinet Office and the Treasury) and departments. Then, only 
departments had had responsibility for the delivery of services. Now, 
the PMDU institutionalised Number Ten’s and the Treasury’s role in 
monitoring what traditionally had been a relatively autonomous area of 
departmental activity. The PMDU, in discussion with the interested 
departments, planned the process of delivery and how result was to be 
measured. From a constitutional side ministers remained responsible to 
Parliament for the delivery of services, but the PSAs created a new line 
of responsibility directly to the centre. This created a strong connection 
between the PMDU and those responsible for delivering policy. Once 
the targets were established there was a planning process which 
followed up the implementation of the targets. This included ‘the prime 
ministerial “stock-take”, the Delivery Report and the Delivery Planning 
Process’. The delivery planning process involved examining the data 
flows and operationalised the targets by relating them to deliverables. 
Then, through the delivery report, the PMDU analysed the processes of 
delivery in order to assess whether targets were realisable.  
A Joint Action Programme was developed to coordinate concerned 
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departments and to find the most appropriate indicators. One such 
official observed: ‘And they can be projects that sort of – should I say, 
not made up – but are designed specifically for a particular problem or 
we’ve got some standard tools. The PMDU may also use what is called 
the priority review, which is a very rapid analysis down the delivery 
system, looking at what’s going on, what’s going wrong with it, you 
know, what’s kind of blocking delivery’ (Richards and Smith, 2006). 
These tools constituted new ways for the centre to intervene in the 
policy process: public sector reform fragmented the delivery process 
and new instruments had been re-established at the centre to re-impose 
central control. The prime minister no longer oversaw the direction of 
government but became involved in the process of policy delivery. 
 
The rising importance of policy-making process organisation 
 
On 1 November 2001 the Comptroller and Auditor General published 
the report Modern Policy Making: Ensuring Policies Deliver Value for 
Money (HC 289 2001–2002), which was a manual for civil servants and 
politicians to build effective policy-making and to achieve better value 
for money between taxation and public services. The paper was a 
technical guide to introduce the fundamentals of policy-making within 
Whitehall and it was the last one of a series of papers produced by the 
beginning of the Blair era. It was a very practical paper based on case 
studies, solutions and empirical principles to improve the chain of 
command in decision-making and to deliver better services.  
The series of papers based on this issue started in 1999 with the 
Modernising Government White Paper, which stated that the 
Government would improve the way in which policies were designed 
and managed around user needs and make use of the best available 
evidence. It also emphasised the need to assess, manage and 
communicate risks, part of the policy-making process. In June 1999 the 
Centre for Management and Policy Studies was established, 
incorporating the Civil Service College, to work with partners from the 
civil service, the wider public sector, private sector and academia to 
ensure that the civil service was cultivating the right skills, culture and 
approach to perform the task, to ensure that policy makers across 
government had access to the best research, evidence and international 
experience and to help government to learn better from existing 
policies.  
In summer 1999 the Cabinet Office published the paper Policy Makers’ 
Rapid Checklist, which was a source of advice and guidance on impact 
assessment and appraisal systems in policy-making, providing 
questions on whether and what needs to be done to take account of 
areas such as: regulatory impact assessment, sustainable development, 
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environmental appraisal, policy appraisal for equal treatment, health 
impact assessment and health and safety and scientific advice. In 
September 1999 the Strategic Policy Making Team in the Cabinet Office 
published the paper Professional Policy Making for the Twenty-First 
Century. The report aimed to examine what professional modernised 
policy-making should look like; provide a snapshot of current good 
practice; suggest possible levers for change to help bring about the 
vision of the Modernising Government paper; and promote a vision for 
policy-making.  
In January 2000 the Innovation Unit issued Adding it Up – Improving 
Analysis and Modelling in Central Government, which examined ways to 
ensure that analysis and modelling are given due weight in policy 
advice to ministers and senior managers, and that analysis, like policy 
itself, is properly joined up. The report concluded that there needs to be 
fundamental change in culture to place good analysis at the heart of 
policy making, thereby developing leadership from ministers and 
senior officials, openness from analysts and policy makers, better 
planning to match policy needs and analytical provision, best practice 
across departments and professions, and innovative solutions to recruit 
and retain the best people.  
To tackle the problems of coordination, the Innovation Unit published 
Wiring it Up in the same month in order to deal better with cross-
cutting issues, and to remove some of the barriers to joining up to 
improve public service delivery. In July 2000 the Office of Science and 
Technology published Guidelines 2000: Scientific Advice and Policy-
Making, which set out key principles that should apply to the 
development and presentation of scientific advice for policy-making. 
The key messages were that departments should think ahead and 
identify early the issues on which they need scientific advice, get a 
wide range of advice from the best sources, particularly when there is 
scientific uncertainty, and publish the scientific advice and all relevant 
papers. In August 2000 Good Policy Making: A guide to Regulatory Impact 
Assessment set out the importance of integrating regulatory impact 
assessments as a tool into the policy process for assessing the impact in 
terms of costs, benefits and risks of any proposed regulation which 
could affect business, charities and voluntary bodies. In March 2001 
Better Policy Delivery and Design drew on case studies of policy 
delivery to identify the factors for success in successful policy delivery, 
to encourage more rigorous thinking about delivery issues and to focus 
attention on what can be done to achieve better results. 
Another interesting report, written by the Public Administration Select 
Committee and titled On target? Government by Measurement, was 
published on 10 July 2003 (HC 62-I 2001–2002). The report outlined two 
cultures of public service reform: the first approach ‘emphasises 
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capacity-building in organisations, with attention to leadership and 
management issues’, and the second approach ‘is typified by targets, its 
time frame is shorter and its techniques are more mechanistic’. The 
paper argued ‘both have their place, but it is important that the former 
is not crowded out by the latter’ (HC 62-I, 2002:7).  
The paper highlighted the importance of targets because they ‘provide 
a clear statement of what the Government is trying to achieve. They set 
out the Government’s aims and priorities for improving public services 
and the specific results Government is aiming to deliver. Targets can 
also be used to set out standards to achieve greater equity’ (ibid.:10). 
Delivery by the early 2000s had become central in the public service 
reform: ‘Targets provide a focus on delivering results. By starting from 
the outcome Government is trying to achieve, the targets encourage 
departments to think creatively about how their activities and policies 
contribute to delivering those results. They also encourage departments 
to look across boundaries to build partnerships with those they need to 
work with to be successful’ (ibid.:11).  
In the second chapter problems of the measurement culture were 
exemplified and the Committee found five main failings: failure to 
produce equity that meant lack of clarity about what government was 
trying to achieve; failure to communicate a clear message to staff; 
failure to focus on delivering results; failures in reporting and 
monitoring; confused accountability and the problems with league 
tables. In the last chapter the Committee concluded with some 
recommendations, such as decentralisation of performance 
measurement in the main public services, increasing local government 
involvement in target setting, to enforce the use of targets among 
providers, the moving from absolute targets to measure progress in 
performance, better information for civil servants about service 
delivery and front-line experience, strengthening of reporting by 
executive agencies, local government and providers to the Cabinet. 
As it can be noticed, the commitment of government to improve policy-
making, implementation and delivery was strong and it included many 
governmental bodies employed periodically on research about 
management techniques. This period marked the passage from the only 
interest to reduce public expenditure and promote efficiency in public 
services of the 80s and the 90s to the development of a more 
comprehensive administrative science and management practices 
focused on quality, value for money, results’ control and organisational 
process in decision and policy making.  
The rise of policy-making studies and of ‘deliverology’ (Barber, 2007) as 
a science which studies elements and techniques for improving public 
services delivery started at the beginning of the new century during the 
Blair second term, and it affected mainly the central government, the 
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civil service and its organisation. 
 
 
The rise of leadership in the Civil Service 
 
On 25 April 2003 the Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service 
Sir Andrew Turnbull sent a letter to all the members of the Senior Civil 
Service titled ‘Improving leadership in the Senior Civil Service’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2003) asking to his colleagues to work on leadership in 
the Civil Service. He created a Civil Service Management Board Sub-
Group to: establish a clear picture of what successful leadership looks 
like; examine investment in the development of leaders; change the 
approach to performance management to support high-performance 
culture; challenge assumptions about a lifelong career in the Service; 
and examine how we refresh talent at senior levels by both bringing in 
and bringing on talent. In the following letter of 4 July 2003 he wrote: 
‘You will see that the goal is to create inspirational, visible leaders 
taking personal responsibility for delivering results effectively and 
swiftly, working in teams that are more than the sum of their parts, and 
across traditional boundaries, focused on strategic outcomes, matching 
resources to business priorities, honest, courageous and realistic with 
staff and Ministers, constantly learning.’  
Sir Turnbull wanted to achieve more active organisational and personal 
performance management that meant measurement and outcomes, 
more active career management that meant flexibility, and more 
investment in development that meant education and training. In the 
last letter of 22 September 2003 the Cabinet Secretary outlined the 
vision and the programme of the Civil Service Management Board, 
stressing these points: offer more and better-quality training and 
development opportunities to staff at or approaching SCS level; 
introduce a new high-potential development scheme to equip the best 
for top posts; improve the approach to performance management, by 
simplifying the process, using better evidence, and adopting a more 
systematic approach to improving the lowest performers; improve the 
reward and incentives package; introduce time-limited postings; 
develop more flexible employment patterns in the SCS by encouraging 
new career options; and develop more active exit strategies. 
The letters showed the big shift that had occurred in the Civil Service in 
the previous twenty years. Until the 80s a programme and a vision on 
leadership were inconceivable. The civil servants were considered in 
the traditional role of ‘servants of the Crown’, anonymous players at 
the heart of central government. In the twenty-first century their 
speeches had become based on leadership, reform commitment, and a 
self-reformist approach on the Civil Service issues. The changes that 
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had occurred in the media, society and politics showed their impact on 
the institution, which was adapting itself to play a new role in 
government.  
This vision was then elaborated by the Performance and Innovation 
Unit in the review Strengthening leadership in the public sector (Cabinet 
Office, 2000). The research opened with a very reformist approach, 
arguing, ‘Britain’s public services face unprecedented challenges at the 
start of the 21st century. They include: demands to modernise public 
services and orient them more closely to the needs and wishes of 
customers; higher expectations on the part of the general public, who 
expect public services to keep up with private ones; increased 
opportunities, and requirements, for partnerships both across the 
public sector and with private and voluntary organisations; pressures 
to harness new technology and deliver government services 
electronically.’  
The Performance and Innovation Unit suggested that ‘the public 
services are not attracting or keeping the best leaders, and do not have 
sufficiently robust strategies for recruiting them to the posts that matter 
most; jobs and careers in the public services are undervalued, and top 
leadership jobs are, arguably, underpaid. Too few organisations seek 
actively to recruit the best leaders; there are many leadership 
development initiatives, and new leadership colleges are being set up, 
but there is little evidence so far as to their effectiveness. And too little 
attention is paid to the growing importance of leadership across 
organisational boundaries, or to learning between different sectors; 
public service leaders are often unable to lead effectively because others 
fail to give them the freedom, the support systems or the challenges 
that will permit them to do so’ (PIU, 2003:1).  
The solutions argued by the research were of a different kind such as 
understanding what worked as a priority because it was fundamental 
to improved leadership was a clearer shared understanding of what 
leadership behaviours work in delivering today’s public services. In the 
era of charismatic super-leaders to solve crisis situations could be 
necessary in some circumstances, but was not sufficient to deliver a 
systemic reinvigoration of public sector leadership. Leadership is a 
complex task, underlined the Unit, and often depends on 
organisational and structural change. Most of the work in improving 
leadership had to be driven forward by departments and agencies 
themselves. The report marked the need to urgently establish how to 
improve the evidence base for recruitment planning in the public 
services. Best practice in leadership development had to be shared 
across public sector organisations.  
The report continued considering that ‘government must offer a better 
deal for public service leaders to make the public sector more attractive. 
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This should build on attractive careers, conditions of work and valuing 
expertise, but with a new emphasis on public sector values, on pay and 
valuing outstanding leadership. A group of high-level leadership 
champions drawn from leaders in the field should be established to 
raise the profile of public service leadership and help “sell” a better 
deal for public service workers and leaders. The public service should 
articulate its core values more explicitly. Pay should be adjusted where 
it is shown to be a barrier to mobility. A new award scheme to 
recognise outstanding public leadership should be explored further.’ 
The leadership development had to be enforced through taught 
programmes, cross-departmental monitoring of performances, 
secondments to strengthen the relation between the centre and the 
field, and promoting joined-up service delivery. A ‘sponsor group’ was 
proposed to spread best leadership development practice across 
sectors.  
The PIU concluded with the recommendation that ‘public service 
leaders require appropriate challenge from those to whom they are 
accountable (politicians, non-executives and inspectorates). But they 
also need to be given the space in which to lead from politicians and 
central government. Policy-makers should more systematically take 
account of the effects of policies, guidance and legislation in either 
encouraging or constraining leadership. Departments should ensure 
that relations between politicians and chief executives are clarified and 
promote initiatives in joint training of political and administrative 
leaders. Inspection bodies should collectively look at leadership 
performance. Non-executives should be trained in best recruitment 
practice and in the effective holding of leaders to account for 
performance. The PIU should undertake scoping work on a project to 
examine in more detail the options for encouraging greater 
entrepreneurship and risk within the public sector’ (ibid.:6)  
A leadership-centred approach spread from politics and Cabinet to the 
Civil Service in order to satisfy the pressures and the expectations of 
the public. A new role for the senior civil servants was designed, 
considering individual responsibility, skills and competence as 
guidelines to set a new public management. 
After these transformations an assessment by Government was 
considered proper, and in November 2004 the Minister for Cabinet 
Office presented to Parliament a draft of a Civil Service Bill in order to 
give a legislative shell to the developments of that institution. The 
Cabinet chose the consultation draft formula the Government wishes to 
consult on whether legislation is a necessary and desirable step to take 
in support of the values that have characterised the Civil Service since 
Northcote and Trevelyan wrote their report (Cm 6373, 2004). 
Previously, in 1994 the Treasury and the Civil Service Select Committee 
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called for a limited piece of legislation and in January 1995 in the White 
Paper Taking Forward Continuity and Change the Major Government 
declared itself open-minded about a Civil Service Act drafted on the 
basis of three conditions to meet: widely supported by Parliament, it 
must sustain the existing constitutional position of the Civil Service, not 
limit flexibility to regulate civil service terms and conditions, and not 
alter their position guaranteed by the employment law. In the event no 
legislation was forthcoming. 
For Blair’s government, leadership was one of the main causes to 
legislate as far as concerned the Civil Service. Considering the opinion 
of Sir Andrew Turnbull, former Cabinet Secretary, there were four 
basic elements that shaped the modernised civil service: leadership and 
skills; departmental restructuring; an effective centre of government; 
and efficiency (Cm. 6373, 2004:4). At the same time the Government 
wanted to preserve the founding principles of the Civil Service, such as 
incorruptibility and integrity, impartiality, honesty and integrity. The 
value of self-government for this bureaucratic body was not 
questioned: ‘This non-statutory approach has stood the test of time and 
change, as the permanent Civil Service has adapted to numerous 
political, organisational and managerial transformations over the past 
one hundred and fifty years’ (ibid.:5).  
However, continued the draft, ‘The government believes the current 
arrangements remain workable and afford flexibility in the way in 
which the Civil Service can be organised and managed in accordance 
with the employment market and changes in public expectations and 
consequent changes in the requirements of government. Political 
commentators have often noted that even the best-intentioned changes 
can bring with them unintended consequences, and, before adopting a 
statutory approach, the Government would want to be sure that these 
advantages would be preserved’ (ibid.:6). The bill proposal sought a 
balance between tradition and change, because if it was real that ‘it 
should not change the constitutional and the practical role of civil 
servants’ on the other side ‘it should not make the Civil Service 
immune to change, but should provide a framework within which it 
can continue its 150-year evolution into the era of globalisation’ 
(ibid.:8). The bill aimed to regulate the Civil Service Commission, 
which is responsible for appointments and recruiting, shape the roles 
and responsibilities of special advisers, protect core values of the Civil 
Service such as loyalty and impartiality, and enforce managerial issues, 
in particular budgetary delegation as set out by the Civil Service 
Management Act of 1992. Despite this moderate and gradualist 
approach embedded in the British administration tradition, expressed 
by the balance between managerialism, leadership and traditions, this 
consultative Bill never became an Act of Parliament. 
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9. Three reviews for efficiency in the public sector in the twenty-first 
century: Gershon, Lyons and Hampton reviews 
 
In August 2003 Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer appointed Sir Peter Gershon for an Independent Review of 
Public Sector Efficiency that was completed in July 2004 with the 
publication of the report. The role of the Treasury, which officially 
commissioned the research, was enforced in the intergovernmental 
interplay with Downing Street and it gave a major power in managing 
economic resources to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, a sign that 
Blair’s second term was becoming much more a diarchy than a 
‘presidential’ government of the Prime Minister (Rhodes, 2013). The 
objectives of the review were: reduced numbers of inputs (people and 
assets), whilst maintaining the same level of service provision, lower 
prices for the resources needed to provide public services or additional 
outputs for the same level of inputs, or improved ratios of output per 
unit cost of input; or changing the balance between different output 
aimed at delivering a similar overall objective in a way which achieves 
a greater overall output for the same inputs (Gershon, 2004:6). 
Considering the previous spending review, some changes were 
introduced by Gershon, such as a move to multi-year (three-year) plans 
for public spending at the departmental level and full end-year 
flexibility, allowing departments to carry over unspent resources and 
any efficiency savings into later years within the settlement period.  
Furthermore, the Public Service Agreement, including value for money 
PSA targets focused on the efficiency with which public services are 
delivered, there was the introduction of resource accounting and 
budgeting, plus Departmental Investment Strategies, which have 
placed an emphasis on asset management and estate rationalisation in 
departments, and the replacement of previous running cost controls by 
administration cost limits for government departments (ibid.:7). The 
review focused on back office activities, introducing simplification and 
standardisation of policies and processes, adoption of best practices 
within each function and sharing of transactional support services to 
achieve economies of scale through clustering with other central 
government bodies. As far as concerned procurement, some best 
practices were highlighted by Sir Gershon, who found procurement 
savings in particular through better supply-side management seeking 
to communicate and manage likely aggregate public sector demand in 
a strategic way with the supply sector, thereby enabling the supply side 
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better to anticipate and plan for shifts in public sector demand and 
further professionalisation of the procurement function within the 
public sector through either use of shared procurement models, or the 
enhancement of procurement skills (ibid.:14). As far as concerned 
transactional services, the review recommended the enforcement of the 
IT investments in managing practices and data and a rationalisation of 
functions to stop duplications. 
Delivery chain and policy-making structure had to be reformed for 
Gershon’s review. In particular, the institution of a policy, funding and 
regulation (PFR) monitoring for the public sector was highly 
recommended in order to achieve a better value-for-money control, 
performance measurement and quality control. The same scheme had 
to be applied in relation to the private sector. 
The estimated savings were between £15 billion and £20 billion within 
the 2007/2008 budget, and it set a reduction of 84,000 posts by April 
2008 in the Civil Service, of which 13,500 had to be relocated to front-
line activities, giving continuity to the governmental policy of 
enhancing delivery of public services. Of these annual savings, some 
£6.45 billion was proceeded by local government and health spending. 
Over 60 per cent of these efficiency gains were directly cash releasing.  
An Efficiency Team led by John Oughton, Chief Executive of the OGC 
(Office of Government Commerce), was set up to supervise the project 
of spending review, working closely with the Treasury and reporting 
directly to the Prime Minister and the Chancellor. The Team cooperated 
with the Prime Minister Delivery Unit, directed by Michael Barber, in 
order to exploit the experience of this unit about PSA framework. 
Moreover, the departments had to produce Efficiency Technical Notes, 
setting out the measures and methodologies that they would use to 
assess efficiency savings. These Notes were scrutinised by the Audit 
Commission and the National Audit Office in order to check the 
reliability and credibility of these measures. In the end cooperation of 
civil servants and ministers was fundamental to achieving the 
objectives of Gershon’s plan, and we could come back the initial 
explanation of this review in the words of the author ‘the programme 
of work you have agreed to establish will, with sustained political and 
management leadership, provide the foundations to help realise these 
gains and sustain efficiency as an integral part of your delivery and 
reform agenda’ (ibid.:1). 
With this package of measures the Blair Government took a 
considerable step in its recognition over the public sector that went 
further by 15 March 2004 with the publication of the Lyons Review. 
The Chancellor announced a new review of Civil Service dispersals 
during his 2003 Budget statement: ‘Successful relocation out of London 
by private sector companies suggests that public sector jobs transferred 
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to regions and nations could exceed 20,000, to the benefit of the whole 
country. Today, therefore, we are asking Departments to submit 
updated workforce development plans and asking Sir Michael Lyons of 
Birmingham University to advise with a view to decisions on relocation 
by the next spending review’ (HC Deb 9 April 2003 c280). 
Some examples of dispersals are listed below. The first two are 
straightforward dispersals, while the second two involve the location of 
new agencies outside London and the South East: 1,760 staff of the 
Manpower Services Commission to Sheffield; 850 staff of the Patent 
Office to Newport; 650 staff of the Contributions Agency in Newcastle; 
and 2,500 staff of the Child Support Agency in Dudley, Falkirk, 
Birkenhead, Belfast and Plymouth. 
The Guardian reported the day after the Budget statement that: ‘An 
exodus of civil servants from London is being planned on a scale not 
seen since Harold Wilson decreed large-scale dispersal from Whitehall 
in the 1960s. The government wants to cut the number in the capital by 
a quarter of its 90,000’ (David Walker and Peter Hetherington ‘London 
exodus for civil servants’, the Guardian, 10 April 2003). As part of his 
pre-Budget statement in December 2003, the Chancellor said: ‘I can also 
confirm that, as a result of the Lyons Review, we will relocate out of 
London and the South East 20,000 civil service jobs—to the benefit of 
the regions and nations of the UK.’ Press reports the following day 
indicated that the report itself had been delayed: ‘The Treasury 
admitted the delay was to allow “close engagement” with Government 
departments that needed a “better understanding of the opportunities” 
of moving out of the capital’ (HC Deb 10 December 2003 c1066).  
At least three departments are believed to have received a clear letter 
from Sir Michael Lyons, who was conducting the review. They were 
told the number of staff they planned to relocate was ‘disappointing’ 
and ordered to think again. Some were told to double the number to hit 
their targets. On 18 December 2003 a Comparative Assessment of 
Locations Review was published, undertaken by the relocation experts 
King Sturge. It analysed 102 towns and cities in terms of 
unemployment, average earnings, catchment population and office 
stock. The Lyons Review gave ten recommendations and the most 
were: departments had identified more than 27,000 jobs that could be 
taken out of London and the South East, including up to 20,000 jobs for 
dispersal as a first tranche. Plans for these dispersals should be taken 
forward urgently as part of the Government’s forthcoming spending 
review; central direction of relocations. The Lyons Review expressed 
disappointment that most departments had not submitted more radical 
plans for reorganisation and relocation and called for greater central 
direction; likelihood of regional pay rates for civil servants being 
introduced. The review considered this as essential in order to make 
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significant savings; the choice between promoting employment 
prospects in particular regions and areas, contrasted with clustering 
jobs in areas which have suitable labour markets. In the end in 2004 
Chancellor Gordon Brown announced a further development by the 
Lyons Review in the future. In the Spending Review statement he 
announced a new target for asset sales: ‘As a result of this relocation 
and rationalisation, I can now make a further reform. I will also today 
set a new objective for the disposal of Government assets for the period 
from now to 2010. I have asked Sir Michael Lyons to work with each 
Department to rationalise its use of property and land and, where 
necessary, to arrange asset sales and disposals. I can tell the House that 
the objective that I am setting is an overall total of £30 billion of asset 
sales’ (HC Deb 12 July 2004 c1132). 
The last review of these years was even it requested by the Treasury 
which asked in the Budget 2004 to businessman Phillip Roy Hampton 
to conduct a review of the British government regulatory framework 
considering how to reduce unnecessary administration for businesses.  
The Hampton Report was published in March 2005 and it was titled 
Reducing Administrative Burdens: Effective Inspection and 
Enforcement (HM Treasury, 2005). The review found that the current 
regulatory system imposed too many forms, duplicate information 
requests and multiple inspections on businesses. Hampton 
recommended that introducing risk assessment could reduce 
inspections by up to a third, meaning around one million fewer 
inspections, and cut the number of forms sent by regulators by almost 
25 per cent.  
The report also stated that risk assessment would help regulators target 
non-compliant businesses more effectively, and reduce the burden on 
those businesses that do comply. Other recommendations made by the 
report were: reducing inspections where risks are low, but increasing 
them where necessary, making much more use of advice, applying the 
principle of risk assessment, and substantially reducing the need for 
form-filling and other regulatory information requirements; applying 
tougher and more consistent penalties where necessary; reducing the 
number of regulators that businesses deal with from thirty-one to 
seven, entrenching reform by requiring all new policies and regulations 
to consider enforcement, using existing structures wherever possible; 
creating a business-led body at the centre of government to drive 
implementation of the recommendations and challenge departments on 
their regulatory performance (HM Treasury, 2005). 
As a result of this final recommendation, the Government created the 
Better Regulation Executive (BRE) to oversee the reduction of 
regulatory burdens on business, and hold government departments 
and regulators to account. 
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These three reports enhanced how the British Civil Service continued to 
be a poster child institution for the New Public Management 
techniques and innovations even in the twenty-first century. Even with 
different tools and promoting a ‘social story-telling’ in the Civil Service 
and through the public, the three Es (Economy, Efficiency, 
Effectiveness) celebrated by Thatcher government in the eighties 
continued to be the driver for British administrative reforms even in the 
twenty-first century. 
 
 
10. Departmental capability reviews: enforcing delivery in the core 
executive 
  
As we have seen delivery of public services had become a serious issue 
for the Blair government, in particular during the second term. 
However, the Prime Minister Delivery Unit was very effective in 
setting and promoting key priorities of the Prime Minister, but it 
remained a body to serve only Downing Street while departments were 
not equipped to improve their delivery. For this reason, the Cabinet 
Secretary Gus O’Donnell proposed in June 2005 to ‘do for departmental 
capability what (Blair) had done for delivery’, creating a Capability 
Review programme in a letter to the Prime Minister titled 
‘Transforming Departments’ Capability to Deliver’ (27 July 2005). Even 
if the Delivery Unit checked the progress of Public Service Agreement 
targets, it had begun to embed a focus on delivery in selected 
departments and civil servants soon understood that a long-term public 
service reform could be achieved successfully only if the capability of 
all departments was enforced. As Michael Barber stated in 2005: ‘We 
discovered that the departments were not really up to driving the kind 
of agenda that we were setting them. So we could help them deliver 
these outcomes, but for sustainable reform, we needed to strengthen 
the departments as institutions’ (Kemplay, 2006).  
This idea was promoted through a series of high-profile reports such as 
Delivery and Reform (2003) and Delivery and Values (2004). In 
continuity with these recommendations, the Cabinet Secretary argued 
that the Capability Reviews would focus on a department’s capability 
to meet its future challenges. He would apply to permanent secretaries 
the same scheme applied by PMDU to ministers in delivering key 
prime ministerial priorities, making them personally accountable for 
strengthening this capability. O’Donnell highlighted that the review 
‘must generate compelling and comparable evidence about capability 
to deliver, which allows me to hold permanent secretaries to account 
for the capability of their department and monitor and challenge 
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progress’ (CSR, IFG, interview 4, 2015).  
One month after O’Donnell proposed the reviews, a Capability 
Reviews Team was set up in the PMDU, led by Peter Thomas, who had 
been director of performance development at the Audit Commission. In 
the team there were four directors and ten deputy directors, and as the 
Cabinet Secretary said, ‘If we are going to fail, it won’t be because we 
lacked good people’ (ibid.). The composition of the team followed that 
of the PMDU: there was a mix of career civil servants and individuals 
with experience from the wider public and private sectors. 
The team followed a similar path made by similar initiatives: priority 
reviews for PSAs, developing the best-value inspection methodology 
for local government, and the later Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment for local government star ratings. They also developed and 
tested elements of what became the review methodology during a 
commissioned review of performance management for the principal’s 
public institutions.  
There was a combined approach to performance management that 
mixed what were seen as the most effective elements of each approach. 
With this method, techniques for delivery, leadership and strategy 
were compounded with other functions such as IT development 
(Panchamia and Thomas, 2015). The model linked the capability issue 
directly to the quality of leadership in each department, developing a 
framework that went beyond O’Donnell’s initial view, and it was 
considered completely new in the British Civil Service. The Cabinet 
Secretary was clear about the personal and challenging nature of 
reviews: ‘Leadership makes the difference … This is not our comfort 
zone. We are going to have to say “so and so is not good enough” … 
We have a tradition of not being honest … we are willing to discuss 
anything rather than the person … for me this is personal. Please 
concentrate on that’ (PMDU, 2005).  
In August 2005, the proposal for capability reviews was signed off by 
the Prime Minister. In September 2005, Jonathan Slater, then the co-
leader of the development phase and the PMDU director covering 
health targets, presented the proposal to a group of permanent 
secretaries at the Sunningdale meeting, where they signed up (CSR 
Interview 2, 2014). Engagement was drawn into the reform process 
from the outset. This helped to ensure that the reform was explained in 
a recognisable language, coherent with their experience on successful 
delivery: ‘We wanted the design to engage a large number of senior 
civil servants as well as outside experts, so that they owned, 
understood and influenced the focus and the method of the 
programme’ (ibid.). In the following two months, the project team 
conducted around 100 interviews and ran many workshop sessions 
with senior officials involved in delivery, to develop and test both the 
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capability model and ideas about method and approach. The 
programme that was eventually started was therefore ‘stress-tested 
against a whole series of anxieties’, which was seen as a measure to 
reduce polemics and criticisms (CSR, interview 4, 2014). This was a 
method to strengthen the formal engagement processes, as they 
ensured that everyone was on the same page and in agreement on the 
key principles (ibid.).  
This long phase of consultation and engagement ended with a two-day 
event at Woking for 90 senior civil servants and a number of specialists 
and experts brainstorming on reform and capability. Disagreement 
focused on specific issues of implementation more than on the reform 
itself. Particularly, the results were an issue of much contention as were 
the concerns around Freedom of Information and the extent to which 
the detail underpinning the reports would be made public. Part of the 
group from the Woking event directly fed back the main results to 
O’Donnell (PMDU, 2005).  
Two factors were central for starting up this reform: O’Donnell’s will 
and leadership style and the team’s engagement effort. They ensured 
the building of an agreement on reform based on legitimacy and shared 
aims, without neglecting details about techniques and practices.  
Political support to do the reviews was one of the most critical aspects. 
There was a certain concern by Ministers that reviews were used 
against their political action rather than hold officials to account for 
capability in their department (CSR, Interview 2, 2014). Prime-
ministerial commitment was crucial to foster the reform and there was 
just one cabinet discussion where Blair lined up ministerial support 
behind the initiative. Then, Ian Watmore, who became head of PMDU 
in January 2006, had face-to-face meetings with key ministers who 
remained sceptical, to assure them that the reviews would have focused 
only on the Civil Service (CSR, Interview 21, 2014). In the following 
weeks a decision was made to ‘take politics out of it’ so that the reviews 
could not eventually be used as a tool by secretaries of state against 
their departments. This was crucial for the success of reform: enough 
political support was gained to start the programme up and running, 
but a significant decision was made to de-politicise it to establish its 
credibility and independence (CSR, Interview 4, 2014). 
The first series of Capability Reviews started in March 2006. They 
focused on three broad areas of management capability: leadership, 
strategy and delivery. A review team was established and it was 
composed of five senior people from inside and outside Whitehall, 
including two directors general from other departments and three 
external members from the private, public and voluntary sectors 
(Panchamia and Thomas, 2014). A former head hunter, Esther 
Wallington, recruited high-profile outsiders, such as Richard Baker of 
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Virgin Active, Rob Whiteman, chief executive of the London Borough 
of Barking and Dagenham, and Amelia Fawcett, chairman of Pension 
First. Each team was helped by two members of the Capability Review 
Team, who drove the development and implementation facilitating the 
review team’s analysis and conclusions. 
The reviews made use of the evidence provided by the department as 
well as a combination of interviews and workshops held over a two- or 
three-week period. There was daily feedback to the department and 
regular conversations with the permanent secretary about the progress 
of the initiative. Then, the review team produced a report scoring the 
department against each element of the capability model. An 
independent moderation panel was set up to ensure coherence between 
the scores given to each department and to allow for comparison 
between them (Panchamia and Thomas, 2014). 
The reviews aimed to provide a shared diagnosis of the situation and a 
sense of perspective on the challenge. To be precise, it was not a 
technical review but a ‘look in and make a judgement’ about the 
capability of a department compared with its peers. This process 
generated anger and resistance among some permanent secretaries 
concerning the scores they received and some challenged O’Donnell 
hard not to publish the findings of the first tranche of reviews.  
The Prime Minister’s support was essential in the end for the final 
publication, but active efforts were made to connect with departmental 
concerns and convince civil servants to implement the reviews. This 
process underlined how the managing of relations and consent 
building among the different socio-political-administrative bodies 
involved in the reform have to be developed progressively and 
constantly, not just in the first phase. The values and methods of 
working underpinning the operating model were crucial to achieve 
results. The Cabinet Secretary personally managed some of the difficult 
conversations and held management teams to account by chairing the 
moderation panel and the stocktakes. The implementation process was 
managed by O’Donnell, who saw the reform as an occasion to enforce 
its dialogue between centre and departments: ‘I will use the reviews to 
expose the improvements needed, get the right people into the right 
senior posts to deliver the improvements, ensure they get the support 
they need, reward success and take though action in response to 
failure’ (CSR, Interview 2, 2014). 
The Cabinet Secretary enforced this plan in his annual performance 
reviews with permanent secretaries. Such intensive commitment by 
O’Donnell was criticised and seen as an intention to make permanent 
secretaries feel accountable. At the more difficult points, Watmore was 
a precious resource. He used his previous connections and 
relationships to develop ‘challenging but supportive’ relationships with 
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permanent secretaries and director generals. The PMDU influence was 
a support for this style of working; indeed, it had developed a 
reputation for being firm but constructive, the teams working 
collaboratively with departments to solve problems, rather than just 
telling them what to do. The reviews were considered robust because 
for the first time they involved all departments and allowed for 
comparisons between them. This model revealed weaknesses and 
strengths within their departments to permanent secretaries and it 
created, as well, pressure and competition for improvement. ‘Without 
scores they wouldn’t have listened,’ said O’Donnell (CSR, Interview 2, 
2014). 
The composition of the review team enhanced the credibility of the 
project. The involvement of directors general introduced an element of 
peer review, which created an incentive for senior officials to carefully 
monitor the process. The presence of external reviewers, especially at 
the moderation stage, helped O’Donnell to resist pressure from 
permanent secretaries who wanted to tone down the reports: ‘The 
review team members’ interaction with the permanent secretary and 
the board is crucial in ensuring the review’s conclusions are both valid 
and – especially – accepted by the top management team. In most cases, 
review team members had repeated and frank meetings with the 
permanent secretary, especially about difficult issues such as weak 
board members. These meetings reinforced permanent secretaries’ 
engagement in the review and their determination to follow through … 
Interaction with departmental boards … was an intense, emotional 
occasion for both parties. The feedback presented was open and hard 
hitting’ (Sunningdale Institute, November 2007:12). The choice to apply 
the same framework to every department helped to maintain balance 
and to sustain difficult moments by promoters. As one civil servant 
declared, ‘If you were unable to robustly answer questions around 
methodology it would have been easily pulled apart’ (CSR, Interview 4, 
2014). 
However, despite these difficulties there was a high level of acceptance 
of the remarks made by the review team. Many ministers and 
permanent secretaries who were reluctant and sceptical at the 
beginning then used the scores to carry on their internal reforms, and 
some others, such as Alistair Darling and David Miliband, appreciated 
the value of the reviews. To achieve such commitment the participation 
of directors general in the initiative as external reviewers was essential 
to make supporters and advocates grow. Thanks to these efforts, the 
programme of reviews became a functional and permanent reform in 
central government. 
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11. The Freedom of Information Act and the Civil Service 
 
In the period from the 1980s, the civil service started its process of open 
government to slowly adapt the institution to pressure for major 
openness by citizens. Considered the culture of secrecy as a typical 
element of the civil service this new openness has been a major 
challenge for officials and politicians. Indeed, the dominant culture of 
secrecy in the British government imposed severe constraints on civil 
servants and contributed to a crisis of conscience in situations where 
officials believed they should be able to serve the public interest by 
disclosing sensitive information. These difficulties were best 
exemplified by the cases of Sarah Tisdall and Clive Ponting.  
The dynamics of these cases included prosecution of the officials 
concerned, with mixed results (Tisdall convicted, Ponting acquitted), a 
severe restatement of the limited nature of the institutional 
accountability in the form of the Armstrong Memorandum, an issue 
that was faced a year later the publication of the Memorandum in 1986 
with the Westland Affair and with the reinforcement of the secrecy 
legislation in the form of the 1989 Official Secrets Act. While this 
reduced the restrictions on certain types of government information, it 
failed to meet the desire of reformers for a ‘whistleblower’s charter’. 
The trend began to change with the Major Government, which 
published its White Paper on Open Government in 1993 (Cmnd 2290), 
and the subsequent 1994 Code of Practice on Access to Government 
Information put increased amounts of information automatically into 
the public domain. When the Labour Party won the election in 1997, it 
had a clear programmatic commitment to legislate for open 
government and freedom of information, but the policy became very 
delicate for disagreement between ministers on the bill and for the 
lobbying of civil servants on the draft bill and the White Paper. The 
Freedom of Information Act was approved by Parliament in 2000, but 
with a long delay by central government in providing for full 
implementation. From November 2002 government departments were 
required to produce publication schemes, setting out the information 
they would publish proactively, and how this information could be 
accessed (Burnham and Pyper, 2008). It was a long and difficult process 
for the civil service, and the public right of access was completely 
enforced only in January 2005 and some exemptions were maintained 
by the law in these cases: information related to national security, 
ongoing investigations, material whose release is prohibited by another 
law, or where the information can ‘reasonably’ be obtained elsewhere. 
In the case of a refusal for information, a citizen could appeal to the 
Information Commissioners (based in London and in Edinburgh). The 
Freedom of Information Act represented a new form of scrutiny of the 
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civil service introduced by Parliament, even if the last decision on 
information disclosure remained in the hands of ministers. The flow of 
certain types of information from within government departments to 
the public domain has become fairly routine, and for new civil servants 
there has been the acknowledgement that in the future FoI requests 
could be made by citizens about the documents they have drafted and 
created.  
With Freedom of Information there was a significant change in the 
dominant culture of the civil service that could be read in parallel with 
managerial changes of the last thirty years. Although there was 
continuing criticism of the Act, progress was demonstrated with the 
publication in later 2005 of a letter from Labour Chancellor Denis 
Healey, sent in 1976 to the International Monetary Fund, asking for a 
loan of £2.3 billion to help the United Kingdom to face economic crisis. 
It showed that he offered back budgetary reductions of £2.5 billion that 
started with the reduction in resources and manpower of the civil 
service. Published thirty years later, it no longer had much relevance 
for contemporary policy-making (FT, 10–11 December 2005). 
Then, recommendations by the Public Administration Committee 
(2002) persuaded the Blair government to establish the Phillips Review 
to reform its system for communicating government information. The 
Phillips Review (2004) found that a culture of secrecy and insufficient 
disclosure of information was at the heart of the breakdown in trust 
between government and politicians, the media and the citizens. This 
situation prompted the government to enforce the implementation of 
the Act in order to create a ‘powerful tool to help rebuild public trust’, 
by announcing that ministers would not use their veto and by 
assuming disclosure as a default position. In 2006, departments and the 
largest executive agencies and regulatory agencies (all staffed by civil 
servants) were together receiving about 1,200 requests a month at that 
time. For around 60 per cent of requests the information was provided 
in full; and for 20 per cent it was refused entirely (Burnham and Pyper, 
2008:188–189). 
The most common reasons to deny access to information are that the 
request involves personal information or information provided in 
confidence or may prejudice a criminal investigation. Furthermore, 
formula as ‘formulation of government policy’ and ‘prejudice to the 
effective conduct of public affairs’ are more controversial reasons to 
deny access to information and they have been applied in 13 per cent of 
cases. Moreover, Richard Thomas, the Information Commissioner for 
England, tried to resolve disputes over non-disclosure amicably and he 
issued 187 formal decision notices in 2005–06, some ordering 
disclosure, some agreeing that the information need not be disclosed. 
The former group included a notice to the DES that it must provide 
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minutes of some meetings (Information Commissioner’s Office, 2006: 
14). A journalist interested in investigating a school funding crisis had 
asked for minutes of the meetings of the DES senior management 
group which discussed school budgets. The DES invoked ‘formulation 
of government policy’ to exempt itself from providing information, and 
then the claimant appealed to the Information Tribunal against the 
Commissioner’s decision on disclosure. It ruled that the reason for the 
refusal did not outweigh the public interest in disclosure.  
The former Cabinet Secretary Andrew Turnbull, called as witness of 
government, argued that disclosure ‘would strike at the heart of civil 
service confidentiality.’ The Tribunal argued another opinion: it said 
understanding how government tackled important policy problems 
was more important, and that, though the names of the officials were 
not interesting, there was no public interest in their suppression either 
(Robert Verkaik, Case Report, the Independent, 9 March 2007). 
The Freedom of Information Act and its implementation completed a 
long walk of twenty years towards a more transparent State and more 
open civil service. It moved the UK closer to the norms and practices of 
other Western democracies. However, these formal procedures did not 
prevent scandals and affairs in later years that became the unintended 
consequences of transparency and freedom of information. Indeed, in 
his autobiography (2010), Tony Blair expresses regret about the FoI’s 
effects: ‘The truth is that the FOI Act isn’t used, for the most part, by 
“the people”. It’s used by journalists. For political leaders, it’s like 
saying to someone who is hitting you over the head with a stick, “Hey, 
try this instead”, and handing them a mallet. The information is neither 
sought because the journalist is curious to know, nor given to bestow 
knowledge on “people”. It’s used as a weapon.’ He concludes, ‘It didn’t 
impact much in 2005. It was only later, far too late in the day, when the 
full folly of the legislation had become apparent, that I realised we had 
crossed a series of what should have been red lines, and strayed far 
beyond what it was sensible to disclose’ (Blair, 2010:517). 
 
12. Conclusions: delivery, politicisation, coordination in Blair’s era 
 
To conclude, there is much evidence of continuities between the Blair 
and the Conservative governments regarding in particular spending 
reviews, efficiency strategies, development of public management 
techniques following ideas of New Public Management and restrictive 
manpower policy. There were also some differences: the Blair 
government supported the Prime Minister’s office more strongly, 
creating a number of units focused on objectives established by 
Downing Street, coordination among units and departments became a 
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driver to achieve objectives, the use of special advisers was increased, 
the Civil Service was more focused on delivery than on policy making, 
some social issues seemed to be more considered the work of central 
government.  
With the Freedom of Information Act and quangos reforms, more 
transparency and openness were introduced in the statecraft, even if 
with fluctuating political results. There was also a deeper politicisation 
effect of bureaucracy, which does not mean a spoils system was 
introduced or civil servants were politicised, but that the political 
control on public bureaucracy outcomes was strengthened through 
tools like the Delivery Unit, performance measurement and 
management. As far as concerned the institutional position of the civil 
service, continuity was not damaged, the project of a Civil Service Bill 
failed in the parliamentary debate and the ‘constitutional conservatism’ 
continued to be preserved even in Blair’s era. So this period was 
aligned to the previous two decades, arresting any substantial change 
in constitutional principles and institutional conformation of the Civil 
Service.  
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Chapter Four. Management and tradition in the British 
Civil Service: assessing institutional development. Issues 
and conclusions 
 
 
This journey through the contemporary history of the Civil Service and 
administrative reforms has reached its conclusion.  
The process of civil service reform has been long and complex. It is of 
course simply a means to an end, which involves deliberate changes to 
the structures and processes of public sector organisations with the 
purpose of getting them to run better (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). 
Analysis of public management reforms by the influential public 
administration scholars Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert has 
identified the following effects: making savings in public expenditure; 
improving service quality; making government operations more 
efficient; increasing the likelihood that the chosen policies will be 
effective (ibid., 2011:8). 
The two scholars also identified some intermediate ends: strengthening 
the control of politicians over bureaucracy; freeing public officials from 
bureaucratic restraints that inhibit their opportunities to manage; and 
enhancing the Government’s accountability to the legislature and 
citizenry for its policies and programmes (ibid., 2011:8). 
Symbolic and legitimacy benefits of reform for leaders (politicians, 
officials, consultants) include: showing actions and creating storytelling 
while announcing reforms, criticising bureaucracy and praising new 
management techniques; restructuring ministries and agencies; and 
making a reputation or career from modernising and streamlining 
activities. 
Over the three decades of reform, these ends and benefits have been 
recognisable. Most prime ministers, cabinet secretaries, senior civil 
servants, occasional commissions and select committee inquiries have 
argued for civil service reform at some point or another. The logic has 
been remarkably consistent over the years, and appetite for reforms 
remained unchanged.  
However, some other issues more related to historical roots, traditions 
and institutional development of the Civil Service need to be 
considered to finish the picture and to present a more complete 
overview of this institution. First of all, it is analysed the evolution of 
the legal framework that it was considered in the previous chapters but 
without systematising it, second, the chapter focuses on the evolution 
of ministerial responsibility, highlighting a new relationship between 
ministers and civil servants determined by managerial reforms, then it 
is considered the rising of special advisers as temporary civil servants 
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institutionalised at the centre of government, fourth, the evolution of 
performance management is examined as a reform that evolved 
through three decades and to conclude a picture of the civil service as a 
managerial bureaucracy is drawn as the result of the interplay between 
managerialism and tradition in the three decades considered. 
 
1. The new legal framework of the Civil Service: preserving the 
tradition 
 
In 1985, following the Clive Ponting affair, in which a civil servant was 
accused of breaking S.2. of the Official Secrets Act 1911 by leaking 
information on the Belgrano affair, Sir Robert Armstrong, then head of 
the Home Civil Service, issued a note titled ‘The Duties and 
Responsibilities of Civil Servants in relation to Ministers’, best known 
as the Armstrong Memorandum (Dep NS 1391 25/5/85 and HC Deb 
26/2/85 c.128-30). It stated, ‘Civil Servants are servants of the Crown – 
for all practical purposes the Crown in this context means and is 
represented by the Government of the day’ (para. 2). Civil Servants 
who felt that a fundamental issue of conscience was involved were told 
to consult a superior officer or the Permanent Secretary who could 
consult the head of the Home Civil Service (para. 11). The 
memorandum made use of an unpublished paper written in the 1950s 
by Sir Edward Bridges and a memorandum prepared by Sir Warren 
Fisher, head of the Home Civil Service from 1919–1939, for a 
Parliamentary Committee (‘Civil Servants’ duty is to Ministers’, The 
Times, 27 February 1985). The trade union for senior civil servants, the 
FDA, argued for a Code of Ethics for Civil Servants and produced a 
draft discussed at its 1986 Conference. Following Ponting, the Treasury 
and Civil Service Committee conducted an inquiry into the duties and 
responsibilities of civil servants.  
Interest was further increased by the Westland affair of 1986, where 
there was controversy over publicity given to the actions of individual 
civil servants. The TCSC report commented, ‘Those whose prime 
loyalty is to the government of the day look to the Crown as a more 
enduring expression of their position within the constitution’ (HC 92 
Session 1985/86). The appeal to the head of the Home Civil Service was 
introduced into a revised version of the memorandum issued in 1987 
following the drafting of a recommendation on this point by the 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee Report (para. 4.16 HC 92 
1985/86). The FDA had argued for an independent body for appeals. 
The revised memorandum was issued following comments from the 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee, the Defence Select Committee, 
and the Civil Service unions (HC Deb 2/12/87 c.572-575W). Following 
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a further recommendation by the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee (HC 260 1989/90), the Armstrong memorandum was 
embedded into the Civil Service Management Code. The Treasury and 
Civil Service Committee report in November 1994 (HC 27 Session 
1993/94) summarised contemporary thinking on the status of the 
Armstrong Memorandum and argued for its replacement: It 
recommended the establishment of a civil service code of ethics (para. 
103–107) and an independent appeals procedure based on a 
strengthened Civil Service Commissioner body (para. 108–112). 
Moreover, it called for a Civil Service Act to provide statutory backing 
to maintain the essential values of the Civil Service (para. 116). The 
Government response, published in The Civil Service: Taking Forward 
Continuity and Change (Cmnd 2748 January 1995), accepted the 
proposal for a new Civil Service Code and provided a revised version 
of the Committee’s draft as an Annex. 
Then the Nolan Committee (Committee on Standards in Public Life) 
was set up by the then Prime Minister John Major in October 1994 to act 
as an ‘ethical workshop’ for the public service in the UK. Its first report, 
published in May 1995, also considered the text of the proposed code 
and the planned independent appeal mechanism. Nolan was concerned 
with ensuring that the Code covered circumstances that might loosely 
be described as ‘whistle-blowing’, setting up a system where a civil 
servant became aware of a wrongdoing or maladministration by others. 
Moreover, it recommended that departments nominate an official to 
investigate staff concerns raised confidentially and that the Civil 
Service code be introduced without waiting for legislation (Chapter 3 
paras 53-54 Cmnd 2850). 
The Government response accepted the whistle blowing 
recommendations (Cmnd 2931, July 1995) while renominating the 
terms to reflect a duty to report evidence of criminal or unlawful 
activity (Response to Recommendation 23). Civil servants would not be 
required to use the confidential channel proposed but officials would 
be nominated, and guidance incorporated into the Civil Service 
Management Code (Response to Recommendation 24). It refused to 
implement recommendations from Nolan for the Civil Service 
Commissioner to give detailed information about appeals made before 
them, leaving the nature and extent of reporting up to the 
Commissioners to decide. 
The new code came into force legally from l January 1996 (Cabinet 
Office News Release 28/12/95; the text of the 1996 Code may be found 
in Library Research Paper 97/5). The Armstrong Memorandum was 
overruled by the Code, which had been incorporated into the Civil 
Service Management Code that was re-drafted in April 1996 (Paragraph 
11 of the Armstrong Memorandum, which deals with an instruction 
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which would give rise to a clear breach of the law, has been preserved 
in para. 7.7.6 of the Management Code). However, in evidence to the 
Public Service Committee, the Cabinet Office advised ‘the 
Memorandum remains a valuable statement of constitutional 
principles, and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster indicated his 
intention to issue a revision in due course’ (Extract from a letter to the 
Clerk of the Committee 17/7/96 HC 313 II p.198). Such a revision was 
never issued. 
Thereafter, the text of the Code wasn’t the subject of debate. It was 
revised on 13 May 1999 following devolution to Scotland and Wales to 
make clear that civil servants in devolved areas owed their loyalty to 
the devolved government for which they worked. The Committee on 
Standards in Public Life called again for a Civil Service Act, which 
would affect the status of the Code. Further details are contained in 
Library Standard Note no. 2863 The Civil Service Bill 2003–4. In the 
2004–5 session, the Government issued a draft Civil Service Bill for 
consultation. However, no plans have been announced to bring 
forward legislation. 
Sir Gus O’Donnell was appointed Cabinet Secretary in August 2005 
and he launched a consultation on a new draft of the Code in January 
2006, together with the First Civil Service Commissioner. The 
consultation closed on 21 April 2006. The accompanying press notice 
from Sir Gus explained: 
‘The new text is very different to the existing one. It’s deliberately 
written in more everyday language, which, we hope, will make it more 
relevant to you and your work. It has also deliberately been kept short. 
The new Code is meant to be an accessible, high-level summary of core 
values and behaviours which are common to all civil servants rather 
than a full list of everything that we do. More detailed guidance, like 
your own departmental staff handbooks and values and mission 
statements, will flow from it’ (Cabinet Office, 26 January 2006). 
An innovation in the new Code was that it allowed appeals directly to 
the Civil Service Commissioners for some cases outlined in the new 
paragraph 18. In addition, civil servants would have also been able to 
report actions by others, as recommended by the Civil Service 
Commissioners. However, there was no new power for the 
Commissioners to initiate inquiries without a complaint. 
The new text covered much of the same ground as the old version in 
more accessible language, but omitted any reference to the fact that 
civil servants are servants of the Crown, which formed part of para 2 of 
the 1996 Code. It didn’t reproduce the commentary of para 3 which 
noted that the Code should be seen in the context of the duties and 
responsibilities of ministers as set out in the Ministerial Code. Finally, 
in the last paragraph, the draft code reminded civil servants that the 
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Code is ‘part of the contractual relationship between you and your 
employer’. This contractual relationship had not previously been set 
up.  
To conclude, it can be argued that the historical period considered was 
an ‘age of codification’ and it was a reaction to a managerialisation and 
contractualisation process undertaken by the British Civil Service, it 
was the attempt to crystallise a changing relationship with ministers, to 
establish a clearer legal framework during a season of administrative 
reforms and, at the same time, the need to reaffirm the traditional 
principles of the Civil Service. Once again, the coexistence between 
managerialism and tradition showed its double face even in the (self) 
regulation of the central government’s bureaucracy. 
 
2. The rise of special advisers and their process of institutionalisation  
 
The British Civil Service has never had a complete monopoly on giving 
policy advice. Throughout the history of central government, the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet have used other sources to design policies and 
to make decisions. Party research departments, academic experts and 
think tanks have played an influential role in governmental policy-
making (Campbell and Wilson, 1995).  
For example, the Thatcher Governments had developed a close 
working relationship with a number of independent research bodies 
such as Centre for Policy Studies, the Adam Smith Institute and the 
Institute of Economic Affairs that elaborated the bulk of ideas for ‘the 
new Right’ of Mrs Thatcher. Blair’s New Labour was influenced 
particularly by a number of think tanks that offered research mainly 
focused on public policies such as Demos and the Institute for Public 
Policy Research. By the eighties, civil servants understood that their 
policy papers were considered within a broader comparative context, 
and that the work of external bodies would be taken seriously by 
ministers.  
Particularly by 1964, with Harold Wilson’s government, civil servants 
had begun to cooperate with political advisers co-opted directly by the 
Prime Minister and ministers, who revived the practice of appointing 
advisers which had started during the Second World War in order to 
face technical difficulties presented by the war (Blick, 2004).  
However, the British administrative system has never developed the 
practice of appointing ministerial cabinets, a small team of policy 
advisers made up of civil servants and outsiders recruited mainly from 
the party or with a direct relationship with the minister, which are 
common across continental Europe. In the United Kingdom, special 
advisers are temporary civil servants whose destiny is related to the 
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Minister or Prime Minister who appointed them. They are paid by the 
Government and they finish their term once the Minister or the 
Government has ended their time in office (Yong and Hazell, 2014).  
Individual special advisers have been appointed by increasing numbers 
of ministers since the first experience in the mid-sixties. After a decade, 
the total number of special advisers had risen to thirty-eight. In this 
period, a debate took place on the relationship between these political 
appointees and the civil service (Young, 1976; Blackstone, 1979), 
stimulated by some tensions that had arisen between Tony Benn’s 
special advisers and officials in the Department for Trade and Industry. 
Thatcher’s centralised and polarised Cabinet maintained fairly tight 
control over the numbers and types of special advisers appointed by 
her ministers, but her successor, John Major, expanded the political 
appointments and, in 1997, when he finished his term, there were 
thirty-five special advisers in Whitehall. The view in the Civil Service at 
this time was that special policy advisers offered ministers tailored, 
expert advice and support which were not achievable within the 
conventional civil service institutional framework. They insulated the 
civil service from political matters by providing ministers with 
politically oriented advice and providing additional channels of 
communication to ministers which the civil service could use in a 
positive way to help persuade ministers of a course to follow (Pyper 
and Burnham, 2008).  
Robin Butler, as Cabinet Secretary and Head of Home Civil Service in 
the period 1988–1998, developed a pragmatic vision on special advisers, 
probably influenced by working amicably with Harold Wilson’s policy 
advisers when he was private secretary to Wilson in the 1974–6 
government (Donoughue, 1987: 19, 106). In 1998 Butler told the Public 
Service Committee of the House of Lords: ‘The Prime Minister, who is 
always, as it were, in need of good advice, will draw it from the best 
people and that is a thoroughly good thing whether they are political or 
civil servants’ (1998: Q2133) and ‘You have, in opposition, Opposition 
spokesmen working with a very small group of advisers with whom 
they are intimately bound. They come into Government and that 
intimacy is not broken, it is maintained […] so part of the transition will 
be the building up of the confidence that already exists between the 
Minister and the special advisers, between the Ministers and the Civil 
Servants. You cannot do that overnight. It takes a little time to do so. 
That is perfectly understandable and natural’ (1998: Q2140).  
When in May 1997 New Labour won the general elections and came to 
office, there was an immediate increase in the appointments of special 
advisers. By the end of 1999, there were seventy-four special advisers 
(Richards, 2000), and in 2001 there were eighty-one (Jones and Weir, 
2002). In 2007, after ten years in government, Blair and his Cabinet had 
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appointed 297 special advisers (UCL Constitution Unit, 2014), a 
massive growth compared to the 181 appointed in the Conservative era 
by Thatcher and Major. The reaction to this wave of appointments by 
the Cabinet Secretary (1998–2002) Richard Wilson was pragmatic and 
moderate: ‘I do not think the senior civil service of 3,700 people is in 
danger of being swamped by 70 special advisers’ (Richards, 2000:91-
117).  
His successor, Andrew Turnbull, argued that numbers were not a real 
problem, as he stated on 4 March 2004 in front of the Public 
Administration Committee of the Commons (2004). He used statistics 
to contextualise: ‘Is the civil service being politicised? I do not think 
you can judge this by simply looking at the number of special advisers 
… There has been roughly a doubling of the numbers of special 
advisers from 36/7 to 70-something. Most of that increase has been in 
Numbers 10 and 11, Treasury and particularly Number 10. Out in the 
world of departments, the two-per rule, two special advisers per 
secretary of state, pretty much rules … by and large … the number of 
special advisers is not significantly different from what it was, say, 15 
years ago.’ 
In this dynamic the social changes and Blair’s leadership style played a 
major role. Indeed, special advisers were broadly of two kinds: the 
policy advisers who mainly worked in the departments advising 
ministers and secretaries of state on policy agenda and policy design 
and helping to coordinate them with the different policy units, and the 
media experts and the spin doctors who worked in the communication 
roles. The ‘media obsession’ became evident with New Labour 
governments, especially in Number 10, where news management and 
spin-doctoring became one of the main activities of the prime 
ministerial staff (Yong and Hazell, 2014).  
Appointing special advisers was a way to achieve better media 
management and react to the pressure of 24/7 information and new 
media as the Internet. Some advisers such as Alastair Campbell and 
Jonathan Powell in number 10 became very influential, and the Prime 
Minister reserved for them a special regulation through an order in 
council that allowed them to give orders to civil servants (Civil Service 
(Amendment) Order in Council 1997 on 3 May 1997). 
During these years of increasing appointments of special advisers, there 
had been some disciplinary problems particularly as far as concerned 
the relation between them and civil servants. There had been a series of 
public allegations of misconduct concerning special advisers and the 
two best-known cases are those of Jo Moore and Damian McBride. 
Briefly, Damian McBride was an official turned special adviser who 
was accused of planning to smear opposition politicians by diffusing 
rumours about their private lives (Yong and Hazell, 2014), but it is the 
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case of Jo Moore that illustrates the importance of personal 
relationships and of the subtle bond between civil servants and special 
advisers and the ambiguities of the special adviser’s role. 
Jo Moore was one of two special advisers to Stephen Byers, the 
Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions in 
2001. Before, she had been special adviser in the Department for Trade 
and Industry. As a special adviser she primarily focused on media 
relations. There were bad relations between her and the department’s 
press officers, who were all civil servants; she was accused of trying to 
push the press officers to compromise their political impartiality. On 11 
September 2001, Moore sent an email suggesting that it was ‘a very 
good day’ to ‘get out anything we want to bury’. Department officials 
leaked her mail, and by October it had become news. As a temporary 
civil servant, Moore was subject to disciplinary action by Sir Richard 
Mottram, her Permanent Secretary, who was responsible for the 
conduct of all civil servants in the department. Moore was issued with 
an official disciplinary warning and a personal reprimand from 
minister Byers. In October 2001 it was further reported by the media 
that Moore had asked her department press officers to brief the media 
against Bob Kiley, then Transport Commissioner for London. This 
action breached the then Code of Conduct for Special Advisers, which 
established that special advisers could not ask officials to violate civil 
service impartiality. The press officers refused to complete her request. 
At this point, Mottram, who wanted to preserve his good relationship 
with Secretary of State Byers, decided to manage Moore himself rather 
than directly confront him.  
On 14 February 2002, there were press reports that Moore had 
suggested that inconvenient news on rail statistics could be announced 
on the day of Princess Margaret’s funeral. Martin Sixsmith, who was 
appointed in November 2001 as new Director of Communications of 
the department, sent around an inter-departmental email blocking this 
initiative. This later email was then leaked and led to the resignation of 
Moore on 15 February. In May 2002, Byers resigned as Secretary of 
State, having been curbed by various political troubles. The case was 
investigated with an inquiry by the Public Administration Select 
Committee (PASC) in 2002 (‘These unfortunate events’: lessons of 
recent events at the Former DTLR”, PASC, 2002). The PASC report 
highlighted a very serious breach of civil service principles in the 
Moore case, and recommended that the Government should review the 
system by which disputes were handled between ministers, special 
advisers and career civil servants. A later recommendation of 2003 by 
the Committee on Standards in Public Life led to the Ministerial Code 
being amended to state that ministers were personally accountable for 
the management and discipline of their special advisers (‘Defining the 
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boundaries within the executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and 
Permanent Civil Service’, 2003, CSPL). However, special advisers 
remain subject to disciplinary action by their department’s permanent 
secretary.  
These problems had emerged mainly during the Blair era because of 
the massive use of special advisers in central government to manage 
news and media. The Cabinet recognised, in particular during Blair’s 
second term, the need to regulate the role of special advisers. In 2001, 
the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers, which regulated the work of 
those temporary and partisan civil servants, was issued under the 
supervision of Sir Richard Wilson. Indeed, from the early days of the 
Blair Government there was tension between some elements of the civil 
service and the special advisers, particularly the spin doctors focused 
on media and news management. Just a few weeks after the general 
elections of 1997, seven civil servants, including the Treasury’s senior 
information officer, had left their posts; by the summer of 1998, a total 
of twenty-five Heads or Deputy Heads of Information had been 
substituted, and by August 1999 only two Directors of 
Communications who had been in position when Labour came to office 
were still in post (Public Administration Select Committee, 1998; 
Oborne, 1999).  
During these years there was an intensive intra-governmental debate 
about the impact of special advisers on the civil service. The Prime 
Minister was asked by the Civil Service First Commissioner, who had 
supervised the system of appointments, to limit their number in 
Whitehall. An internal review in 1997 led by Robin Mountfield 
concluded that special advisers did not do any damage and that the 
civil service should be prepared to learn lessons from the efficiency of 
the new Labour approach to media relations (Oborne, 1999). For this 
reason, permanent civil servants and appointed civil servants were put 
to work together in the new Strategic Communication Unit based in 
Downing Street. 
In 1998 the Select Committee on Public Administration of the House of 
Commons launched an investigation into the role and the 
responsibilities of the PM’s official spokesman, Alastair Campbell, who 
benefited from a special regulation under the Order in Council 
Amendment of 1997. During this investigation, the strong influence of 
number 10 Special Advisers on the executive became evident; for 
example it emerged that Campbell had ordered social security 
ministers to seek advance clearance of their process communication 
with him (Oborne, 1999:156–7). In 2001, the Committee faced the issue 
again with an inquiry focused on the politicisation of the civil service. 
The evidence submitted to the Committee during the inquiry showed 
different ideological positions about the impact of the special advisers 
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on the civil service, from this worried for the politicisation of the civil 
service to those who defended special advisers as a tool to insulate 
officials from political matters. The Committee concluded: ‘All the 
available evidence suggests that special advisers can make a positive 
contribution to good government. In particular, they broaden the range 
of policy advice upon which ministers can draw. None of this need be 
threatening to the traditional role of the civil service.’ It further argued, 
‘However, we believe that it is time to put the position of special 
advisers on a firmer footing. This means recognising them as a distinct 
category: funding them in an appropriate way; appointing them on 
merit; and putting a proper framework of accountability around their 
activities’ (PASC, 2001, para. 81). Even the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life (2000) participated in the debate, arguing that special 
advisers had not politicised the civil service, but that their activities 
should be regulated and governed. The Code of Conduct for Special 
Advisers was drafted shortly afterwards. 
The Code offered a better perspective on the role of the special advisers 
in the United Kingdom government. It stated that the employment of 
Special Advisers adds a political dimension to the advice and support 
available to Ministers while reinforcing the political impartiality of the 
permanent civil service by distinguishing the source of political advice 
and support. Then, the Code established that special advisers were 
‘exempt from the requirement that civil servants should be appointed 
on merit and behave with political impartiality and objectivity. They 
are otherwise required to conduct themselves in accordance with the 
Civil Service Code.’ It limited the functions of special advisers, 
specifying that ‘Special Advisers must not: ask civil servants to do 
anything inconsistent with the Civil Service Code; behave towards civil 
servants in a way inconsistent with the standards set by the employing 
department; have responsibility for budgets or external contracts; 
suppress or supplant the advice prepared for ministers by permanent 
civil servants (although they may comment on such advice); be 
involved in issues affecting a permanent civil servant’s career such as 
recruitment, promotion, reward or discipline (with the exception of up 
to three posts in the Prime Minister’s office)’ (Cabinet Office, 2001). 
To conclude, the rise and the process of institutionalisation of special 
advisers was a consequence of the development of 24/7 media and the 
new leadership style interpreted by Tony Blair. They had been an 
addition to the eroded advisory function of the civil service, a process 
that began in the eighties with the managerialisation of the British 
public administration. They expressed the will of the Blair government 
to set objectives and achieve them in controlling the civil service’s work 
and using it as a tool more than as the ‘Prince’s adviser’. However, the 
traditional framework of the civil service was preserved with the 
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intervention of regulations such as the Code of Conduct for Special 
Advisers and the Civil Service Code. The founding principles of the 
institution remained untouched by managerial transformation and the 
massive use of special advisers. Certainly, the process began with the 
Thatcher Government of further separation of public management from 
policy advisory that means a further separation between administration 
and politics continued more vigorously during Blair’s period. If, during 
the Conservative era, as we have seen yet, there was a process of 
depoliticisation of traditional bureaucracy, reducing its burden, 
numbers, functions, influence and capacity to bargain through unions 
with government with the new Labour a process of ‘soft politicisation’ 
was undertaken by central government focusing on the achievement of 
political aims through performance management, public services 
delivery techniques and large use of special advisers. 
 
3. Ministerial responsibility: implications produced by three decades 
of administrative reforms 
 
This work would be incomplete without an overview of the impact of 
administrative reforms in the 80s and 90s on the constitutional 
convention of ministerial responsibility. A fundamental principle of the 
British political system and constitution is that the government is 
accountable through its ministers to Parliament. The constitutional 
requirement and the political need for accountability are most obvious 
when mistakes have been made and the government is under pressure, 
but there is also the expectation of routine accountability of ministers 
for the actions of their departments. Such accountability is central to the 
concept of responsible government, and it is considered essential in a 
system with a dominant executive and a lack of a written constitution 
that establishes legal checks and balances ensured by a constitutional 
court (Marshall, 1989). Traditionally, accountability is seen as operating 
through conventions of both collective and individual responsibility. 
Collective responsibility provides Parliament with the means of 
holding the government as an accountable body, and individual 
ministerial responsibility enables the House of Commons to dwell on a 
single minister and his responsibilities without the need to censure the 
whole government (Woodhouse, 1994). 
The Next Steps agencies reform (1988) had the potential for making 
accountability stronger in the areas in which they operated. The rigidity 
of the Policy and Resources Documents, which established 
responsibilities and procedures, suggested a realistic definition of 
responsibilities for decision-making. The concerns of the Next 
Programme were with internal or managerial accountability and there 
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had been little commitment to explore a method of making this 
compatible with the public accountability that was required by 
constitutional conventions. Internally, there was a structure of 
accountability which equated power with responsibility, but externally 
the dominant constitutional theory prevented officials being held 
personally accountable. At managerial level the executive agencies 
required Chief Executives to be personally accountable for their 
responsibility as detailed within the Policy and Resource Document, 
while at the constitutional level ministers retained the entire 
responsibility for the agencies within their departments, and the 
personal accountability of civil servants was denied.  
Furthermore, although the names of Chief Executives were public 
knowledge and they gave evidence about their responsibilities to select 
committees, in theory they acted only on behalf of their minister, with 
all the attendant protections and limitations that implied. Despite the 
apparent continuity in the application of the constitutional convention, 
these internal changes affected the practical application of external or 
public accountability. This had already been demonstrated by the 
redirection by ministers of questions from Parliament to Chief 
Executives. The answers of the CEO were daily published, as we have 
seen before, in the Official Report of the Hansard.  
Thus, ministers were less exposed and they provided less information 
to Parliament than before the Next Steps programme. Indeed, even the 
Accounting Officials became accountable in front of the Public 
Administration Committee as far as concerned the financial facts of the 
agency they worked for. The success of the Next Programme was based 
on a further delegation of powers to civil servants in delivering public 
services with a managerial approach and these powers were technically 
exercised only on behalf of the minister, and this fact determined a less 
pronounced difference between internal and external accountability. 
Chief Executives were often outsiders recruited from the private sector 
and they used to account personally to select committees in the same 
way as they did with the minister, thereby suggesting a greater 
openness or transparency of government and improved public 
accountability. However, the ministers could limit benefits in 
accountability originated by Next Steps reforms imposing limitations of 
ministerial responsibility through the application of the Osmotherly 
Rules (Marshall, 1989). 
One of the most significant developments during the 1980s and 1990s in 
relation to accountability was the erosion of the anonymity of officials 
regarding civil service accountability. The scrutiny by select committees 
has determined a diminution as civil servants appear in public and 
addressed by name. The creation of Next Steps agencies extended the 
process with Chief Executives having personal responsibility for the 
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operation of the agency as detailed within the framework document. 
Indeed, the Next Steps development suggested a fundamental change 
in accountability; a passage from the ministerial accountability towards 
a division of accountability between minister and civil servants 
(Woodhouse, 1994). Despite the government’s defended tradition and 
the immutability of the constitutional convention of individual 
ministerial responsibility, the responsibility of civil servants was clearly 
enforced and a stronger accountability was developed towards officials. 
Considering that ministers and civil servants worked together in the 
department, in some cases there was a lack of clear division of 
responsibility. There have been a number of examples where officials 
have been implicated in departmental mistakes. In the prison escape 
cases, both Prior and Baker denied their responsibility and blamed civil 
servants. Officials were also involved in the leaking of the Solicitor 
General’s letter in the Westland Affair, but culpability was never 
defined.  
Another example of responsibility devolution to civil servants included 
the policy misjudgement in the crises of the coal industry, announced 
in October 1992. Michael Heseltine, President of the Board of Trade, 
was welcomed with political and public hostility. Heseltine took full 
responsibility for the policy, both in the House and in front of the Trade 
and Industry Select Committee, and did not blame any officials of its 
department (27 October 1992). However, the senior civil servant in 
charge of energy policy was moved sideways and the department 
began to look for his replacement (the Guardian, 28 October 1992). The 
department told the media that the move was to recruit a ‘fresh pair of 
eyes to look at policy’, a statement that inevitably implicated the 
deputy secretary in the policy error. The Times welcomed this apparent 
assumption of responsibility within the department (30 October) and it 
argued that ‘making senior civil servants responsible when their policy 
led to disaster is not a matter of seeking scapegoats or trying to distract 
attention from ministers.’ 
This new shape of ministerial responsibility raised some questions 
about constitutional arrangements. The identification of civil servants 
with specific policy decisions created a problem if the civil servants had 
to be or did not have to be responsible and accountable for policy 
formulation. Indeed, the function of officials is to advise ministers on 
policy options. It is the minister who makes the decision, and any 
reduction in his responsibility for policy choice reduces his role to that 
of a policy presenter. This is the extension of the principle expressed by 
Kenneth Baker after the Brixton escape, when he implied that he was 
merely doing as he had been advised and that responsibility lay with 
those who had advised him (Woodhouse, 1994:291). 
In the Heseltine case, the scale and consequences for future energy 
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supply and for miners were significant enough to raise matters of 
economic strategy and political sensibility for the chairman of the 
board, but not for a line manager. This line was not only good 
management practice but essential constitutional practice in Britain’s 
parliamentary tradition. 
With Next Steps agencies and managerialism, ministers tended to push 
responsibility downwards to officials as an answer to more freedom to 
manage left to civil servants with the decentralisation, both in budget 
and functions, institutionalised with the creation of the executive 
agencies. However, the dilemma over who was and who should have 
been responsible remained uncertain. After two decades and a long 
historical reconstruction, we can argue that the constitutional 
convention of ministerial responsibility was not suppressed or 
substantially changed but that it was ‘pluralised’. As Diana Woodhouse 
stated, ‘the research in […] and the trends in Britain suggest the 
possibility of significant long-term change in the culture, attitude, 
expertise of the public service which may make it incompatible with the 
traditional form of public accountability, which centres upon the 
minister. Whether the change is for better or for worse is debatable, but 
either way it is essential that a realistic and effective system of 
accountability is in place to cope with it. This reinforces the 
requirement, already evident through the Next Steps reforms, that 
modifications be made to the convention of individual ministerial 
responsibility and the recognition that other means of accountability 
are also appropriate’ (ibid.:294). Next to the traditional principle of 
ministerial responsibility that the minister is personally accountable to 
Parliament for all the policies and activities of his department, there 
was an expansion of senior civil servants’ and administrative Chief 
Executives’ responsibility owing to their more prominent role, 
committees’ power of scrutiny and pervasiveness of media. As civil 
servants became more visible and responsible for policy 
implementation and delivery, more cases that implicated their 
responsibility increased. We might argue that individual ministerial 
responsibility had been eroded by administrative reforms, but it seems 
fair as well to state that ministerial responsibility was expanded to 
senior and top-management civil servants. 
 
4. Performance management: a permanent evolution towards a 
government by measurement 
 
In the twenty-first century performance measurement is at the heart of 
public sector management and it shapes administrative organisation. 
Many aspects of public management such as contracts, regulations and 
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organisational framework depend upon a comprehensive performance 
measurement system being in place for all public sector organisations 
that was developed during the historical period examined. Along this 
spinal cord New Public Management’s doctrine values were 
transmitted, such as ‘hands-on professional management’ in the public 
sector, explicit standards and measure of performance, greater 
emphasis on output control, shift to disaggregation of unit in the public 
sector, greater competition, private-sector style of management 
practice, discipline and parsimony in the use of resources (Hood, 1991).  
Prior to the establishment of a comprehensive performance 
measurement regime, the public sector frequently operated just using 
the traditional account methodology. There was a deep ignorance 
within government regarding costs and outputs prior to the 1980s. It 
was not until the late 1970s that any effort was made to assert the kind 
of financial and accounting regimes common to the private sector 
(Massey, 1988). In 1982 Sir Derek Rayner was shocked to discover, 
working on public sector scrutinies, that not only were the costs of 
individual services unknown, but until the 1980s no one had thought it 
important enough to investigate how much it cost to run departments 
of state (Massey, 1993; Carter, Klein and Day, 1992). The true costs of 
government were not known and there was no existing methodology to 
calculate them accurately. The incremental approach to budgeting had 
progressed slowly since the days of Gladstone (Massey and Pyper, 
2005).  
During these years of administrative reforms, new tools, techniques 
and organisations were developed, tested and applied. A new regime 
of performance management was implemented as an answer to the 
pressure of 24/7 media, public expectations and global economic 
competition.  
As we assessed, the story started under the leadership of Sir Derek 
Rayner during the first term of the Thatcher government when in May 
1982 the Financial Management Initiative was published. It was the first 
document that introduced performance indicators. The Initiative 
introduced the monitoring of objectives and performance indicators 
covering efficiency and productivity for all government departments.  
In 1988 the Next Steps Initiative established that executive agencies 
were required to report their performance against targets set by their 
departments covering the volume and the quality of services, financial 
performance and efficiency, and in 1991 the Citizen’s Charter, 
introduced by John Major, set indicators for quantifiable standards of 
service that had to be monitored and reported by the public bodies that 
delivered public services. In 1998 the White Paper Modern Public 
Services – Investing in Reform (Cmnd 4011, 1998) was published, and this 
reported the results of the Comprehensive Spending Review and 
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contained a restatement of departmental objectives in line with 
governmental priorities. In the same year, another White Paper on 
Public Services (Cmnd 4181) established a Public Service Agreement for 
each department and cross-cutting areas, showing their aims and 
objectives and the progress they were expected to make. Furthermore, 
the Charter Programme was renamed Service First and given a new 
emphasis to promote quality, effectiveness and responsiveness and the 
need for service providers to adapt in order to deliver services across 
sectors and different tiers of government. In 1999 the Modernising 
Government White Paper (Cmnd 4310) was published and it enforced 
the role of Public Service Agreements. It emphasised the shift to 
outcomes measures and it reinforced the linkages between 
organisational and individual objectives.  
In 2000 Wiring it Up, drafted by the Cabinet Office, recommended an 
extended use of performance to defeat the weaknesses in the handling 
of issues that crossed departmental boundaries. In the same year the 
spending review document enforced the use of PSAs, making PIs 
inherent to them, and the Statistics Commission was established as an 
independent body, and part of its new job was to measure progress 
against PSAs targets. The Lyons Review of 2003 introduced some 
criteria of rationalisation in order to help achieve better value for 
money and measuring outcomes also on the basis of inputs and 
expenditure. In 2005 the Departmental Capability Reviews were started 
under the leadership of the Cabinet Secretary Sir Gus O’Donnell, and 
the aim was to apply to departments the same indicators, developed in 
the PSAs, established for agencies and administrative bodies that 
provided public service. A comparative approach was used to look into 
any department and to align each department to best performance and 
practices. The method met with good success, mostly because of the 
decision to give scores to every department, to compare them and to 
improve organisation on the basis of these results. 
The impact of the FMI’s announcement of ‘a general and co-ordinated 
drive to improve financial management in government departments’ 
has been likened by some commentators to the storming of the Bastille 
(Carter, Klein and Day, 1992: 5). The FMI’s authors announced that 
they would seek to achieve its results for each departments through ‘a 
clear view of their objectives and assess, and wherever possible 
measure, outputs or performance in relation to these objectives’ (Carter, 
Klein and Day, 1992:5). With this statement, a new season in 
government was launched, a new regime that has annually gathered 
momentum, generating an abundant series of initiatives, projects and 
methods. Carter, Klein and Day noted that: ‘Following the Financial 
Management Initiative, performance indicators did indeed multiply. In 
1985 the annual Public Expenditure White Paper contained 500 output 
	   249	  
and performance measures. In the two succeeding years, the figure rose 
first to 1,200 and then to 1,800. And by the time that the 1998 White 
Paper was published, the PI explosion had been such that no one was 
counting any more’ (ibid.:20). The first experiments of Performance 
Indicators had been deemed a success by the Treasury and by 1987 
their own expansion and progress was ensured (Durham, 1987). 
However, performance measurement was not a static science, but a 
dynamic one and new types and models were carried out during the 
period we have examined in this work. 
Performance measurement implementation was a complex process for 
government officials. There were problems of quantifying qualitative 
data such as that pertaining to quality issues and public satisfaction. 
There were other problems in attempting to compare dissimilar 
services, and outputs, to compare inputs with outputs, efficiency with 
effectiveness etc. (Carter, Klein and Day, 1992). For example, early 
performance indicators were developed purely as management and 
they were just Treasury tools to improve efficiency in the public sector. 
Later performance indicators, especially those developed under the 
Labour governments that had been elected after 1997, have switched 
emphasis emphatically towards populist indicators, such as league 
tables of schools, universities and hospitals, that are aimed at the public 
in their role as citizens/customers (Massey and Pyper, 2005). They were 
used to measure and report on the delivery of public services and to 
control through quality indicators that results established by policy 
implementation had been achieved. 
As we have pointed out there was a seamless transfer from the 
Conservative government to Labour as far as New Public Management 
was concerned. As soon as they came to office, Labour understood that 
performance measurement was the most effective tool to control the 
machinery of government and its outcomes. In part, this also reflected 
the conversion of the highest echelons of the civil service to an 
acceptance of the NPM principles to exercise control over the 
agencification process; it especially reflected the efficacy and 
adaptability of performance measurement as a managerial tool of 
control (Durham, 1987).  
In this process, the National Audit Office (NAO) took a leading 
position as far as concerned the elaboration of performance indicators 
and public service agreements within each department and agency. It 
argued: ‘Performance measurement is an integral part of modern 
government. It stands behind the creation of targets, contracts and 
agreements that control service delivery. Good performance 
information can help departments to develop policy, to manage their 
resources effectively, to improve Departmental and programme 
effectiveness and to report their performance to Parliament and the 
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general public, so promoting accountability for public resources’ (NAO, 
2001:1). Public Service Agreements were the mechanism for achieving 
this. Introduced by Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the 
Comprehensive Spending Review of 1998, PSAs were a ‘clearly stated 
commitment to the public (and specific stakeholders) on what they can 
expect, and each agreement sets out explicitly which Minister is 
accountable for delivery of targets underpinning that commitment’ 
(Massey, 2002:37). Moreover, ‘Public Service Agreement targets should 
flow from the Government’s overreaching themes and Departmental 
objectives. A good target not only demonstrates the achievement of a 
Departmental objective, but also encourages appropriate behaviour by 
staff in the organisation delivering the relevant services’ (NAO, 2001:2). 
The government wanted to establish intelligent targets that helped not 
only to achieve goals but to positively influence outcomes. These 
targets ‘should be SMART – Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant 
and Timed’ (NAO, 2001:1). 
The NAO’s document Measuring the Performance of Government 
Departments went into some detail as to how departments went about 
this business, after noting that, despite years of increasing numbers, an 
attempt to reduce the burden of audit had at last resulted in a reduction 
in the number of PSAs (NAO, 2001:1). The use of SMART and 
intelligent targets is one way this has been attempted. Performance 
indicators were divided into three groups (NAO, 2001:3): the 
specification by government of overarching objectives that apply across 
all departments, such as that for the promotion of sustainable 
development; key government priorities such as reducing drug misuse, 
unemployment, poverty and crime led to the creation of cross-cutting 
PSAs which provided shared objectives and targets for these policy 
areas; where different targets overlap, there is the opportunity for a 
shared target. 
The aim of the targets was to optimise the link between administrative 
activity and outcomes order to improve organisation and methods in 
providing public services. The performance indicators and 
benchmarking activities imposed upon the public sector have 
sometimes resulted not in improved performance, necessarily, but in an 
improved ability of civil servants to play the game. For this reason 
performance indicators increased rapidly; some estimates (the 
Independent, 16 December 2002) pointed out that they had grown to 
over 400 by 2003. The numbers were still more if we consider that there 
were many hundreds of PSAs and SDAs, which raised the number of 
individual PIs to well over a thousand. At the end of the Blair era each 
major area of government found itself constrained to operate within the 
performance regime. 
One minister admitted that in some cases setting targets ‘was a 
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substitute for having a proper policy’, while the head of the prime 
minister’s Strategy Unit pointed out, ‘It is very important that we 
understand that they are tools to support judgement: they are not 
substitute for judgement’ (the Independent, 5 December 2002). The 
NAO’s view was that ‘the format of targets can be varied so that they 
closely dress the policy objective’ (2001:4). However, mistakes in the 
indicators formulation could happen; indeed, ‘targets may 
unintentionally create incentives for servers or unwanted activity, or 
they may create so tight a focus on targeted areas that no attention is 
paid to important but untargeted areas’ (NAO, 2001, p.4). 
To conclude, documents such as Measuring the Performance of 
Government Departments were useful papers not only because they 
provided a guide to ‘how performance measurement works’, but also 
because they provided a clear indication of the perspectives 
underpinning the rising performance measurement regime.  
This framework was a natural development of the New Public 
Management-oriented reforms and it was a manifestation of the new 
approach promoted by political leaders and ministers on civil servants 
and special advisers in policy-making, which enforced the oversight on 
the public sector organisation and results of this organisation in 
providing public services through a managerialist regime. This process 
represented two faces of the same coin: a tool of command and control, 
it was designed to inspect and report upon the performance of the 
bureaucracy and, at the same time, to check the quality of the public 
sector at the same time.  
Finally, performance measurement of government and public services 
represents the historical product of the ‘managerialist siege’ on the 
public sector developed from the late 60s to the dawn of the new 
century. It is the more tangible effect of the penetration managerial 
techniques, imported from the private sector, in governmental 
institutions. As we have written, it has been an incremental process 
begun with de-unionisation, manpower and waste reduction, 
continued with new pay arrangements, budgeting devolution, new 
information process for ministers and senior civil servants, new 
administrative structure through executive agencies and consolidated 
with customisation, contracting-out, privatisation that increased the 
distance between politics (and policy-making) and bureaucracy (and 
policy-implementation) and, finally, culminating in public service 
delivery techniques, results monitoring and performance measurement.  
 
 
	   252	  
5. Everything changes but constitutional conventions: administrative 
reforms and constitutional conservatism 
 
As this research reveals there was a continuous change in the British 
civil service by the end of the seventies as far as concerned 
organisation, pay schemes, performance measurement, functions 
distribution, recruiting and manpower policies. The evolution, in terms 
of administrative reforms, became accelerated in the nearly thirty years 
examined. However, traditional constitutional principles that regulated 
the institutional life of the civil service remained unchanged. 
The central argument is that while there have been a number of periods 
in the last 200 years in which the British civil service has undergone a 
process of reform (particularly the 1850s, the 1940s, and from the 1980s 
onwards), the nature of change has been evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary. To explain this argument, the chapter concentrates on 
the reverence that both major political parties, Conservative and 
Labour, have always maintained towards the British constitution (see 
Greenleaf, 1987; Heady, 1979; Hojnacki, 1996; Marsh et al., 2001). Even 
on the rare occasions when either of these parties has been elected on a 
radical platform, particularly in the case of the Thatcher government of 
1979, their period in office has been characterised by an unwillingness 
to provide a new constitutional settlement that would fundamentally 
transform the foundations on which both the civil service and the state 
were legitimised. 
As we have seen, real changes were introduced in the British 
administrative state by Mrs Thatcher. The political will to initiate and 
persevere with management reforms derived from Mrs Thatcher’s style 
of ‘conviction politics.’ Conviction politics refers to a basic set of 
attitudes which underpinned Margaret Thatcher’s approach to policy 
making and governing. Conviction politics stood in contrast to 
consensus politics, which Mrs Thatcher fought, and which were 
characterised by indecision, drift and muddling through, leading to 
waste of taxpayers’ money, inefficiency, administrative confusion and 
duplication. Conviction politics defined better management as the 
means to put government’s house in order, control public expenditure, 
and reduce civil service numbers, by targeting resources more 
narrowly (Metcalfe, 1993). 
Within Thatcher’s strong belief that government should do much less 
than it was doing, there was an equally firm conviction that what it did 
could be done more cheaply and more efficiently by introducing 
proven methods of modern business management from the private 
sector (Metcalfe, 1993). However, these techniques were a considerable 
advance on established civil service practices and gave to reform a 
definite direction. These convictions were promoted by performative 
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ideological and intellectual forces by means of increasingly coherent 
critiques of big government as an inefficient, interfering and 
inappropriate means of dealing with all manner of tasks ranging from 
the ‘micro level’ of service delivery through the ‘meso level’ of 
industrial regulation to the ‘macro level’ of managing the economy 
(Metcalfe, 1993). Prescriptions were developed by public choice and 
public management theorists and consultants helped to underpin and 
reinforce reforms which aimed to roll back the frontiers of the state, 
deregulate, privatise, increase reliance on market processes in the 
private sector and, of immediate relevance here, introduce business 
management concepts and methods into government.  
The most important changes of the Conservative era were: 
decentralisation of operational management responsibilities to 
individual units; creation of a business management ethos, cost 
consciousness, management by objectives, financial accountability 
within organisations; competition between providers in health and 
education; the public as customers rather than clients in a purchaser–
provider contracting system; centralised financial control over local 
management discretion; centrally established policy parameters. 
Despite all these real transformations, any reform of the British civil 
service has always been contained within the existing constitutional 
framework, and this has limited the scope for overhauling the 
institutional arrangements that condition the bureaucracy. The political 
cost to the Thatcher government of reforming the constitution was too 
high, so the reform of the civil service in the 1980s was both constrained 
and evolutionary. A similar argument can be used for the Blair Labour 
government, elected in 1997 on a progressive modernising agenda that 
aimed to join up public services, implement managerialist reforms of 
the previous period and develop a more open and delivery-oriented 
civil service. It is therefore argued here that, although in the last thirty 
years the British civil service has undergone structural, cultural and 
personnel reforms similar to those experienced by other liberal-
democratic states, the reform process itself has always been constrained 
by continued maintenance of the constitutional conventions that define 
Britain’s institutional arrangements (Halligan, 2003). The Westminster 
model of government continues to condition the way both ministers 
and civil servants operate within the British political system (Marsh et 
al., 2001).  
Indeed, the impact of administrative reform on the civil service, both 
under the Conservatives from 1979 and under Labour from 1997, has 
led a number of authors to conclude that Britain is moving towards a 
federal civil service (see Pilkington, 1999; Gray, 2000; Pyper and Robins, 
2000). This analysis came from the observation that the vast bulk of the 
civil service was deployed outside Whitehall, in either agencies or the 
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newly devolved assemblies, evidence that the old monolithic, 
hierarchical, centralised model of an integrated civil service had 
disintegrated and had been replaced by a structure that was much 
more federal in nature.  
Indeed, in many ways these arguments were repetition of the mid-
1990s thesis proclaiming the death of the Whitehall paradigm (see 
Campbell and Wilson, 1995; Foster and Plowden, 1996). As Gray 
(2000:298) concluded, the reforms have ‘led towards the creation of … a 
managerial state where new sets of relationships between state and 
citizen, public and private, providers and recipients and management 
and politics are being created … In this respect, control … has been 
relocated to new arenas of power. These new arenas are commonly at 
one remove from the direct patterns of accountability and control that 
were to be found in previous state reforms, and maybe overseen by 
non-elected organisations and actors or by combinations of state, quasi-
state and private organisations in new forms of governance.’ 
Whereas in the mid-1990s the ‘end of the Whitehall paradigm’ thesis 
may have been overstated, by the end of the Labour government’s era 
the structure of a ‘federalised’ civil service was emerging more clearly. 
Structurally, much had changed. But other elements of the Westminster 
model have persisted. For example, Theakston (2000:58) observed that 
senior civil servants continue to play a vital role at the fulcrum between 
politics and administration by virtue of their expertise in making the 
system work. Ministers seem to look for and to value the traditional 
mandarin skills of managing the political interface, political nous and a 
thorough knowledge of the governmental and parliamentary process. 
The point here was that while some elements of the Westminster model 
had clearly been eroded others were still safe and firmly in place. 
Furthermore, confirmation of the collapse of the Westminster model 
would require explicit recognition of such a state of affairs by both the 
incumbent government and the senior civil service (Halligan, 2003). 
This did not happen; Britain has tended to avoid facing up to 
constitutional problems for as long as possible (see Campbell and 
Wilson, 1995:314). 
The Westminster model could be replaced by an alternative entailing 
fundamental constitutional reform, but risks and political costs were 
considered too high. Instead, in the period 1979–2007 reforms 
continued in the same manner, with elements of reform being tacked 
on to the existing constitutional model. Indeed, Campbell and Wilson 
(1995:314) were probably right when they observed, ‘It would be too 
optimistic … to suggest that the Whitehall model will be replaced by a 
carefully designed new model of political–bureaucratic relations. 
Whatever the difficulties, strains and contradictions evident in the 
model, it may continue. Indeed, the proponents of the Whitehall model 
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can argue that its capacity to survive the Thatcher years is evidence of 
its adaptability.’ 
The same can be said of the Labour government’s period in office. As 
some authors suggested, the British case of civil service reform is 
perhaps best understood in the context of path dependency, in which 
there have been infrequent moments when the bureaucracy’s 
equilibrium has been punctuated. As Peters (1999.65) noted, ‘There will 
be change and evolution, but the range of possibilities for that 
development will have been constrained by the formative period of the 
institution.’ 
For sure, the most important regulations of the Civil Service in the 
period considered reaffirmed the traditional principles of the British 
civil service such as non-partisanship, impartiality, access by 
competition and promotion with merit, neutrality, bureaucratic 
professionalism immune to politicisation, self-government. From the 
Armstrong Memorandum (1985) to the Civil Service Code (1995), the 
Code of Conduct for Special Advisers (2001) and the last never 
approved by Parliament Civil Service Bill proposal (2004), traditional 
values were never underestimated and they were present in all the 
major governmental papers of the period examined as this research 
shows. The tension between managerial reforms and tradition was a 
constant characteristic of this historical phase of British government. 
Some principles, such as the power of advising in policy-making, may 
have been eroded or reduced by administrative reforms, but the bulk of 
the civil service values and the Whitehall model, meaning professional 
bureaucracy, hierarchical, non-political, meritocratic, were respected 
and untouched by the managerial storm in practices and organisation. 
Frameworks, methods and organisations changed; political and 
constitutional architecture resisted. As Martin Painter and B. G. Peters 
(2010) argue, any contemporary administrative systems now appear to 
have a number of layers within them, so that some more contemporary 
elements exist along with the traditional elements (see Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). These layers may coexist, with 
some aspects of governing displaying the more modern traits and 
others the more traditional. 
The historical trend here considered it was in line with the past, thus 
even when reform of Whitehall occurred, for example, in the 1850s, the 
1940s and the 1980s onwards, the impact of change was solid, but 
incremental.  
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6. Conclusions: the development of managerial bureaucracy  
 
As we have pointed out in this research the history of the British Civil 
Service from 1979 to 2007 was based on the interplay between 
managerialism, delivery and choice in the public services, central 
government organisation and traditions. The process of reform was 
continuous but without revolutionary fractures and it is to argue that it 
was an evolutionary institutional transformation, because the boost of 
new managerialism, market openness and competition were 
compensated by the resistance of traditional principles of the civil 
service as hierarchical, self-governed, neutral, professional 
bureaucracy. 
Managerialism was a set of inherited beliefs about how private sector 
management techniques would increase the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness, the 3Es, of the public sector. Initially the beliefs focused 
on costs and manpower cut; explicit standards and measures of 
performance; managing by results; and value for money. Subsequently, 
it also embraced marketisation, promotion of competition and openness 
to new markets. It introduced ideas about restructuring the incentive 
structures of public service provision through contracting-out, quasi-
markets and consumer choice. Margaret Thatcher introduced both 
managerial and neo-liberal ideas and both were adopted by New 
Labour, with a twist. 
Managerialism has had a long history which cannot be retold here (see 
Pollitt, 1993; and Ferlie, Lynn and Pollitt, 2005, chapter 1) that became 
central by the end of the seventies and it still persisted in Blair’s 
reforms. The core concern for decades has been better performance 
management, whether called accountable management or 
management-by-objectives, which the Fulton Report sought to 
introduce in 1968. Only the labelling has changed: ‘Effective 
performance assessment within government helps to identify how well 
public organisations are meeting their objectives, as well as 
highlighting where improvements could be made, so that government 
is better able to work towards its desired outcome’ (PASC 2009, 3; see 
also PASC 2003; Better Government Institute (BGI) 2010, 33). 
Over the last decade of this historical research (1997–2007), several 
innovations have come and gone, including total quality management, 
skills of the civil service, joined-up government, capability reviews, and 
the myth of leadership. 
The principles of delivery and choice were embedded in neoliberalism 
and the free-marketer approach to government developed by Margaret 
Thatcher, as the Next Steps programme witnessed, but they exploded 
in the nineties providing major theoretical elaboration, institutional 
transformations and administrative results in Blair’s period at Downing 
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Street. 
The general principles informing the delivery agenda were outlined by 
Michael Barber, the Prime Minister’s former Chief Adviser on Delivery, 
in his comments about education: ‘Between 2001 and 2005 what Blair 
increasingly hankered after was a way of improving the education 
system that didn’t need to be constantly driven by government. He 
wanted to develop self-sustaining, self-improving systems, and that led 
him to look into how to change not just the standards and the quality of 
teaching, but the structures and incentives. Essentially it’s about 
creating different forms of a quasi-market in public services, exploiting 
the power of choice, competition, transparency and incentives’ 
(interview with Michael Barber, 13 January 2006; see also Barber, 2007, 
chapter 3; and PASC, 2005). 
In February 2004, the Prime Minister outlined what delivery meant for 
him: ‘The principal challenge is to shift focus from policy advice to 
delivery. Delivery means outcomes. It means project management. It 
means adapting to new situations and altering rules and practice 
accordingly’ (Tony Blair’s speech on modernisation of the Civil Service, 
24 February 2004). 
Consumer choice and effective delivery became the two pillars of the 
Civil Service reforms in the new century. These two factors, 
managerialism and delivery, were not orphans of the resistance of 
traditional frameworks and beliefs of the civil service. Reforms were 
combined with embedded practices and beliefs that came from nearly 
two centuries of constitutional bureaucracy.  
Indeed, even today, ministers and civil servants act as if the nineteenth-
century liberal constitution sets the rules of the political game. The 
British constitution reminds ‘geological strata’, a metaphor which 
captures the longevity of the beliefs and practices (Rhodes, 2012). 
Obviously much has changed, but much has remained. Managerialism 
and network governance produced by privatisation, hiving off and 
marketisation had not replaced earlier beliefs and practices; rather, they 
coexisted with the inherited Westminster tradition. Ministers and civil 
servants were fluent in all these practices, yet they continue to act as if 
earlier constitutional beliefs and practices are reliable guides for 
present-day behaviour (Halligan, 2003). The United Kingdom 
government continuously dealt with its incommensurable traditions 
and heritage. Administrative history remained an important guide to 
interpret recent administrative reforms. The history of the Civil 
Service’s ‘managerialisation’, in its various forms, and the new 
institutional arrangement that arose in the period considered have not 
replaced the Westminster central operating code. Rather they have been 
grafted on, and the Westminster, managerialism and civil service 
traditions developed side by side. 
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This coexistence between management and tradition, change and 
continuity was the characteristic of the British civil service by the end of 
the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
If we look into the history of the British civil service, we note its 
development from an administrative body inefficient and 
unaccountable that aided ministers in the nineteenth century towards a 
meritocratic, hierarchical, anonymous officialdom institution in the 
twentieth century whose main pride was to advise ministers and to 
develop the welfare state. Then, a federalised system of units, agencies 
and public services that works following managerial principles and 
interacting with markets and other institutions characterised the British 
civil service at the end of the previous century and the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. 
It’s a history of changes and reforms, and even of continuities and 
traditions, as the period on which we focused in this research showed 
us.  
The constitutional bureaucracy evolved in a managerial bureaucracy 
without losing the institutional stratifications of the history that 
remained embedded and influenced administrative reforms developed 
by the Thatcher, Major and Blair governments.  
During these three decades of reforms, the concepts of ‘management’ 
and ‘bureaucracy’ had been fused together, without losing their own 
significance and balancing innovation and tradition, and this dynamic 
originated a new phase of the United Kingdom’s history of 
government. 
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